Memorandum from Shlomo Avineri, Herbert
Samuel Professor of Political Science
FALLACIES ABOUT
IRAQ
1. The Regime
In the build-up to the Iraq war, the oppressive
and brutal nature of Saddam Hussein's regime was given—and
justly so—much prominence as one of the justifications for
going to war. The use of poison gas against Iraq's own Kurdish
population as well as in the war against Iran, the brutal suppression
of both Kurdish and Shi'ite uprisings after the Gulf War in 1991
were among the more prominent examples given of the cruelty of
Saddam's regime.
This was true, yet it overlooked the deeper
historical roots of the Ba'athist dictatorship of Saddam. Saddam's
rule was only the most extreme manifestation of the Sunni-controlled
regimes which have characterized the nature of the Iraqi body
politic since its emergence, under British tutelage, after the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I.
Modern Iraq was has been stitched together by
British pro-consuls from three very disparate provinces of the
old Ottoman empire: Mosul (with a Kurdish majority), Baghdad (with
an Arab Sunni majority) and Basra (with an Arab Shi'ite majority).
Before the 1920s, these three provinces have never constituted
part of a modern nation-state. It was under the British-controlled
League of Nations mandate that this modern Iraq was put under
the rule of the Baghdad-based Arab Sunni minority (with an Arab
Sunni ruler of the Hashemite dynasty).
It was this Arab Sunni hegemony which ruled
Iraq since the 1920's, first under the monarchy and later under
the republic. It was against this Arab Sunni hegemony that various
rebellions broke out decade after decade: Shi'ite rebellions in
the south, Kurdish repeated rebellions in the north, even Christian-Assyrian
rebellions in the 1930s. They were all bloodily put down—but
because of this, Iraq became the most repressive of all Arab countries,
since the Arab Sunni minority could keep itself in power only
through brutal force, later combined with the Pan-Arab ideology
of Ba'athism, itself a unique concoction of fascist ideology and
Bolshevik practice. It is for this reason that Iraq also experienced
the only case in the Arab world where a pro-Nazi regime, based
on Arab Sunni hegemonism, came to power in the early 1940's (Rashid
Ali al-Khailani) and was forcibly removed by British forces at
the beginning of World War II.
That Saddam's regime was just another—albeit
extreme—expression of this Arab Sunni hegemonism was totally
overlooked before the war. General statements about the Iraqi
"people" suffering under Saddam overlooked the fact
that this was an ethnically/religious-based minority regime. That
the demise of Saddam would mean not only an end to Saddam, his
minions and the Ba'ath, but also to Arab Sunni hegemony, hardly
figured in the analysis of the nature of the war—and what
one could expect would happen in its wake.
2. The War
The war against Saddam's regime was planned
as a conventional war: in such a paradigm it was obvious that
the regime would crumble under the overwhelming power of the Coalition.
Yet the quick and utter collapse of the Iraqi forces—including
not only the regular army, but also the Republican Guard, the
Special Republican Guard, Saddam's Fedayeen and other elite formations,
surprised most analysts. Yet it was misinterpreted.
The Iraqi military did not collapse, nor did
it "disintegrate". Coalition strategists, thinking inside
the box, thought that Saddam would do the same, ie prepare for
a conventional defense—perhaps heroic, certainly futile.
Even talk about Baghdad becoming Saddam's Stalingrad was thinking
within the parameters of conventional warfare.
What appears not to have been imagined was that
Saddam would decide not to waste his efforts on a futile conventional
defense—but prepare for a War After the War—ie a guerilla
war, in which the resources, manpower and expertise of the Iraqi
military machine in its different formations would be switched
to a kind of warfare which would make Coalition control of the
country impossible. Such guerilla tactics would make not only
holding elections impossible, but would further alienate the population
from their "liberators" and make it impossible to shift
political power in any legitimate way from the erstwhile Arab
Sunni hegemony.
The Coalition planned for one kind of war—which
it has won handily. It was totally unprepared for the kind of
war which it found itself eventually confronted with.
3. The "Resistance"
It is obvious that the current violence in Iraq
is the war Saddam and his regime have been preparing. What the
Coalition—and the Interim Iraqi Government set up by it—are
now facing is not a spontaneous rebellion by the Iraqi "people"
against "occupation". It is the rear-guard war waged,
quite successfully, by the Arab Sunni minority to hold on to its
power by making a relatively smooth transition to another form
of government impossible. The sophistication of the attacks, their
coordination, the training of suicide bombers, the availability
of materiel and intelligence, all point to the professional branches
of Saddam's security apparatus which has just gone underground,
living—in Maoist fashion—like fish in water.
The targets of this Sunni Arab guerilla war
are not only Coalition forces and their Iraqi allies. The attacks
on Shi'ite holy shrines in Kerbala and Najjaf (which started in
March 2004 with an attack during the Shi'ite holy period of Ashura),
against Shi'ite parties and clerics, against Kurdish parties in
the north (both in the Kurdish autonomous region as well as in
the contested city of Mosul) are all aimed at telling the Iraqi
majority population (Shi'ites+Kurds) that the Arab Sunni minority
is not ready to give up its historical hegemony and that they
have the arms, the fighters, the logistical organization as well
as the brutality and determination, not to give up. It is sometimes
lost in the confused reports talking about "violence",
that with the exception of the small group around the Shi'ite
renegade cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, all the attacks are carried out
by Arab Sunni elements. Furthermore, insofar as there are non-Iraqi
Arabs involved, they are all Sunnis.
It should be remembered, that all Arab regimes
are Sunni dominated, and if Iraq becomes Shi'a-ruled, it would
be the first Arab country to be escape Sunni domination. For European
and American ears, these differences sometimes sound like distinctions
without a difference—as between Baptists and Methodists.
One should think about Catholics and Protestants in 17th century
Europe to realize that this is not about theology—it is
about identity and power.
By boycotting the 30 January elections, the
Sunni parties are undermining the legitimacy of whatever institutions
will emerge out of these elections. It is difficult to imagine
that out of elections held under the twin conditions of violence
and boycott any sort of legitimate government would emerge, especially
as the Allawi interim government does not appear to be able to
create the minimal conditions for law and order.
4. One Iraq?
Under these conditions, it is difficult to see
how any sort of coherent, let alone democratic Iraq, could emerge
in the foreseeable future. While the Arab Sunni minority has it
in its power to thwart any attempt to create "law and order"
not on its terms, neither the Arab Shi'ite majority, nor the Kurdish
minority, are likely to submit once again to Arab Sunni hegemony:
the Shi'ites have the numbers, the Kurds have the arms and territorial
infra-structure, to resist it.
All Coalition planning has been premised—for
obvious and understandable reasons—on keeping the territorial
integrity of Iraq. But historically, this territorial integrity—like
that of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—has been maintained
only through a combination of the iron fist and a totalitarian
ideology. Absent both, it does not exist anymore, and it would
be almost impossible to re-establish it.
So one should at least entertain the idea that
just like in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it may
be impossible to put Humpty-Dumpty together again. Iraq did not
emerge as a nation-state out of the internal forces of Iraqi society:
it was a creature of Western imperialism, to be later sustained
by the brute power of Sunni hegemonism. Perhaps—as in Yugoslavia—there
may not be any way to re-establish it, and the mantra about its
territorial integrity is another nostalgic fallacy based on an
(idealized) past. When countries disintegrate along ethnic/religious
lines, it is extremely difficult to keep them together by force—and
under foreign occupation, it is well-nigh a mission impossible.
Thinking outside the box would be necessary.
Shlomo Avineri
Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science
The Hebrew University
January 2005
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