Further memorandum from the Ministry of
Defence
Further information requested following the
evidence sessions on 2[20]February
2005 and 9[21]
February 2005.
The broader lessons that the MOD has identified
in the way the Armed Forces approach Security Sector Reform in
Peace Support Operations. What kinds of planning, training and
doctrinal changes are considered necessary?
In general terms, successful progress on security
sector reform (SSR) requires early and coordinated civilian/military
planning and appropriate financial apportionment for SSR early
in the campaign planning stages.
We are currently carrying out a formal "lessons
learnt" process to identify the most pertinent lessons coming
out of the UK Armed Forces' experiences of security sector reform
in Iraq. There will undoubtedly be recommendations which affect
Armed Forces' planning, training and doctrine, but it would not
be appropriate to comment on what these might be until the analysis
is complete.
The additional support from other UK departments,
eg FCO and DFID, which the MoD believes is necessary to undertake
Security Sector Reform as part of Peace Support Operations.
There is, in general, a need for good strategic coordination
between Departments, a good understanding of OGD priorities, and
effective mechanisms to coordinate actions in-theatre. The cross-Whitehall
commitment to improve the governmental approach to post-conflict
reconstruction is being addressed through the establishment of
the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU).
Our experience of security sector reform in MND(SE)
confirms that there is a need for a civilian component to SSR
as well as a military component. The policing Strategic Task Force,
in which MoD will take part, is intended to bring greater focus
to the UK's response in future, ensuring that the UK is able to
deploy appropriately trained and skilled personnel, particularly
civilian police, in a timely way.
What estimates were produced by the MoD or other
departments on the size and scope of an insurgency following before
the end of major combat operations? Could you share these with
the Committee?
The prospects for a major insurgency were not the
main focus of the MoD's attention at the time and there was very
limited relevant intelligence. There was a recognition that the
Shia or the Kurds might rise against Saddam's regime in the event
that the Coalition took military action to remove him, but it
was not considered that this would develop into a widespread insurgency
against the regime. There was a recognition also that after a
brief honeymoon period, significant elements of civil society
could become anti-occupation and that the reduced role of the
Sunni in the running of Iraq would need to be handled carefully.
Ex-regime security and military officials in particular were seen
as a possible force for instability and it was recognised that
military restructuring and the disbandment of regime security
organisations would produce unemployment and disaffected Sunni,
some of whom could turn against the Coalition. Specific threats
to Coalition Forces were expected from Al Quaeda-linked or sympathetic
terrorists and from criminal violence. However, an insurgency
on the scale that subsequently developed was not foreseen before
the end of major combat operations.
What guidance was given to British Commanders
on re-building the Iraqi Security Forces before March 2003?
Formal guidance to British Commanders on the conduct
of Operation TELIC was issued in the form of an Executive Directive
from CDS to the Joint Commander for Op TELIC, dated 18 March 2003.
This stated that one of the tasks of the commander was "if
directed, be prepared to contribute to the reform of Iraq's security
forces." At this stage, however, formal guidance was mainly
concerned with combat operations.
What level of involvement did the MoD have in
the US planning post-conflict and in the conduct of counter-insurgency
operations outside MND(SE)?
The UK has been significantly involved in US planning
post-conflict. We retained significant representation in the US-led
HQ even after the draw down of our force levels (in proportion
to US Force levels) following the end of major combat operations.
When two new HQs (4* MNF-I HQ and 3* Multinational Corps HQ) were
established in spring 2004, the UK was invited to fill the positions
of Deputy Commander MNF-I (3*) and Deputy Corps Commander (2*).
UK embedded officers in MNF-I also contributed significantly to
the development of the MNF-I campaign plan which was published
in August 2004.
Apart from UK involvement in US counter-insurgency
operations through UK staff officers embedded in MNF-I, there
has also been significant and continuous UK/US exchange of information
regarding counter-insurgency experience and doctrine. For example,
a 20-man training team assisted in pre-deployment training for
US III Corps before they deployed to Iraq in April 2004—a
significant part of this was training for Peace-Support Operations
and counter-insurgency.
What role did the 2nd Peace Support Operations
Doctrine (JWP 3-50) play in the conduct of operations in Iraq?
The Peace Support Operations Doctrine (JWP 3-50)
was published in June 2004, over a year after the start of the
Iraq Campaign. It built on prevailing doctrine which provided
the framework for UK military strategy in Iraq and hence the conduct
of operations.
What strategic lessons have been identified for
British counter-insurgency operations within US-led operations
or alongside the US military?
The complexities of counter-insurgency operations
require an ability to integrate effort across a range of political,
intelligence, economic and military strands. The operation in
Iraq is the first time that the UK is participating in counter-insurgency
as a junior coalition partner. Since we can expect most of our
operations in future to be undertaken as part of a coalition,
it is important for the UK to continue to enhance its understanding
of US military doctrine and ethos.
The over-all costs of Security Sector Reform in
Iraq, a break-down of costs per line item (eg police, ING) and
the UK's contribution to these expenditures.
The US committed approximately $5 billion on security
sector reform in 2004, covering, for example, the equipment and
infrastructure costs involved in developing the Iraqi Security
Forces. A similar sum is expected to be allocated for 2005. This
does not, however, capture the most significant part of the SSR
programme—the work of MNF-I armed forces who are simultaneously
engaged in developing the capability of Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF), and providing framework security.
The UK has contributed to SSR expenditure mainly
through the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A break down of GCPP
expenditure is given below:
GCPP Iraq Strategy—Committed SSR Expenditure
2004-05
|
| MoD Vetting Agency | £0.1 million
|
|
| Police Monitoring/Mentoring | £6.1 million
|
| Prisons Mentoring | £1.7 million
|
| Training at Sandhurst/ACSC | £0.15 million
|
| Police equipment projects | £0.6 million
|
| Equipment for Iraqi Civil Defence Corps |
£0.1 million |
| Equipment for Iraqi Police and Border Guards
| £2.5 million |
| Total | £11.3 million
|
|
GCPP International Peacekeeping Strategy—Committed SSR
Expenditure 04/05
Police training and mentoring in Iraq and Jordan £8.3
million
Project Osiris, the provision for equipment and infrastructure
for ISF in MND(SE), has been funded by GCPP (£2.5 million)
and the Treasury Contingency fund (£40.6 million).
Coalition programmes related to the development of the Iraqi
Police Service's investigative techniques (training/mentoring
in forensic techniques, bomb scene investigations etc.) and when
the MoD believes the IPS may become capable in these more sophisticated
police areas?
The FCO are the lead UK Government Department on policy for UK
civilian engagement on police training, though there remains a
significant MNF component to police training across Iraq as a
whole. Responsibility for the training, equipping and mentoring
of the Iraqi Police Service within the MNF-I resides with the
Coalition Police Advisory and training team (CPATT) which is based
in Baghdad and currently headed by a US military officer. In terms
of UK civilian police commitment the UK has a Senior Police Adviser
(SPA-I) in Baghdad advising the Ministry of the Interior, and
a further Senior Police Adviser in the South (SPA-I(S)). Both
posts are supported by additional UK civilian police officers.
In the South the civilian police officers work very closely with
MND(SE).
There are currently courses running on the following subjects:
— Organized Crime Investigations.
— Violent Crime Investigations.
— Drug Enforcement Investigations.
— Explosive Hazards Awareness Training.
— Mid Level Management Training.
— Civil Disorder Management.
— Interviewing and Interrogation Techniques.
— Front Line Supervision.
— Critical Incident Management Training.
— Counter Terrorism Training.
— Executive Leadership Course
In MND(SE) UK Civil police officers supported by UK contractors
are now running "ab initio" forensics training courses.
These should give IPS in the south a basic forensic capability
in a relatively short period of time. The MoD is purchasing forensics
equipment for a laboratory for the IPS operating in the divisional
area
The Iraqi Major Crime Unit (MCU) deals with a variety of serious
crimes in Baghdad. The unit is expanding in size (there are now
three MCU detachments), and is being mentored by 14 US International
Police Advisers. Basic equipment, such as computers, vehicles,
weapons, office supplies has also started to arrive. Most of the
focus so far has been on the first detachment of the MCU which
is estimated to have 85% of the equipment it requires to be a
functioning investigative unit.
The MCU carries out investigations into major crime, including
murders, terrorist offences, organised crime and robbery, but
lacks skills in investigative techniques, interviewing skills
and forensics.
The MCU also deal with a large number of hostage cases, the majority
concerning Iraqi nationals, but they have limited capacity to
investigate these. They will react to information reported to
them (for example, if information is received they will carry
out raids on suspect houses), but are not proactive. As explained
above, they also have very little technical expertise, particularly
forensic capability, to help with hostage cases.
Progress is being made in criminal intelligence/Transitional Integration
Programmes (TIPs). The first training courses for criminal intelligence
started on 20 February in Jordan for 50 students. They will provide
analysts, researchers, data inputters, and field intelligence
officers for the criminal intelligence project. Equipment has
been received to set up offices in various parts of Iraq. The
Criminal Intelligence project is being managed by advisers from
both the UK and Czech Republic—a $16 million allocation
for this is underway.
It is difficult to produce an exact timeline for when the IPS
will become fully capable in all of the areas above. Progress
is being made although the ability of the IPS to perform policing
functions effectively will depend on a number of factors running
from training, IPS leadership and of course the security situation
and the levels of violence. Nevertheless, we expect significant
progress during 2005 as investment starts to bear fruit.
March 2005
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Ev 63-85 Back
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Ev 102-121 Back
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