This paper has been written following discussions
with members of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee
during their visit to Iraq in late 2004.
It relates to the personal experience of one senior
police officer, but seeks to put into perspective the difficulties
currently being experienced by HMG in finding strategically trained
senior police officers who might assist with HMG objectives in
Iraq.
This is articulated in detail in the linked document
entitled "The role of Strategic Police Advice in Military
Operations and Peace Support".
— Immediately following and during
the combat operations of March/April 2003 there was no plan for
the maintenance of law and order amongst the civil population
in Iraq.
— Both Organised Criminals and Terrorists
quickly filled this power vacuum and flourished (they continue
to do so).
— Minor criminals and looters have caused
(and continue to cause) serious damage to the national infrastructure
— Key areas of policing activity, vital
for dealing with Organised Crime and Terrorism have not been or
are at best in the embryo stages of being established. ie forensic
science capability, sophisticated intelligence gathering and covert
operations (undercover officers, "bugging", surveillance
etc) eg virtually no forensic work is undertaken on kidnaps, bombings
or shootings.
— Key areas of policing activity, vital
for establishing legitimacy and public support have not been or
are at the embryo stages of being established eg Criminal Justice
partnerships, a willingness to be transparent and accountable,
relationships with the media an ethos of service. For example,
there is no confidence in the judicial system, witnesses will
not appear, corruption and intimidation is widespread.
It should be stated from the outset that the
Multi National Forces have worked hard and at considerable risk
to establish some uniformed patrol/enforcement capability within
the Iraqi Police. However, the key points articulated above have
not been achieved, indeed they are not really part of strategic
military plan. This should be no surprise, they are specialist
areas of modern police expertise that have not been within the
training or experience of Armed Forces.
Thus it may be concluded that there is a role for
sophisticated strategic policing advice at senior levels in both
Iraq and future conflicts.
PROVISION OF
STRATEGIC LEVEL
POLICE ADVICE
Within the UK policing structure, the appropriate
level of police officer to interface (plan/advise/command) at
General Officer/Ambassadorial/Iraqi Ministerial level is arguably
ACPO, ie, Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) or above.
Police officers who achieve this rank will have had
long and varied policing experience. They must be graduates of
the Strategic Command Course (SCC) at Bramshill.
They are trained to address problems from both a
long term and strategic perspective, paying attention to such
issues as politics, economics, social factors and legal implications.
However, the provision of such senior officers for
both planning an Iraq type operation or deploying abroad is very
problematical:
All ACPO officers are selected by local police authorities,
each post is filled by means of SCC qualified candidates competing
for local posts. Competition for all ACC posts during the past
two years has been intense. e.g the recent ACC vacancy in Avon
and Somerset attracted 18 qualified candidates.
ACPO Posts in Iraq do not attract applicants.
Of the six ACPO posts (each six month periods) filled
since the invasion of Iraq. Three have been taken up by officers
in the last year of service. One (due to no interest) has been
filled by an unqualified Chief Superintendent, one has been filled
by a SCC qualified Chief Superintendent (the writer) and the other
has been filled by a long retired former police officer, ie, no
one else would go.
Why is such a post so unattractive to potentially
upwardly mobile senior officers?
Clearly danger may be an issue but, it is probably
not the main one.
Any candidate who achieves a pass on the Strategic
Command Course seeks a future post as an ACC in a county force.
A posting in Iraq actually prevents such a candidate applying
effectively for posts back in the UK. Moreover, sometimes the
politics surrounding actions such as Iraq could serve to tarnish
any application to a local police authority, that is, the candidate
by working in Iraq could be viewed by some as being seen to support
what may be an unpopular political decision—that is, the
invasion.
Finally, working in Iraq , in today's climate of
Police Reform, can make a candidate for County ACC posts less
"match fit", ie dealing with strategic issues and suicide
bombings may not gel with local concerns about vandalism and graffiti
or reassurance.
The present position whereby the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office is unable to recruit new ACPO officers for Iraq/Overseas
tends to support the above.
Thus HMG faces a dilemma:
— The need for strategic policing involvement
in Iraq and future military expeditions is now accepted.
— The present system for selecting ACCs
etc. (by police authorities) does not allow for prolonged attachment/engagement.
— Upwardly mobile SCC graduates view such
postings as damaging to their career aspirations.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The requirement to fill ACPO level posts overseas/planning
with the MoD could be filled in one of two ways.
— A small number, perhaps two or so permanent
ACPO posts be established at either the MoD or FCO , with the
option to return to mainstream policing in the future.This could
be achieved within the forthcoming Police Reform process.[22]
— Government creates a mechanism whereby
those who undertake a posting as an ACPO officer abroad are automatically
placed in a substantive position as an ACC on their return to
the UK. However, this is likely to have implications on the tripartite
system of governance of police forces. Police authorities may
oppose the loss of their right to select for their ACC posts.
RECOMMENDATION
It is submitted that the establishment of a small
number of permanent ACPO posts at either the MoD or FCO is likely
to attract and retain suitable officers for both pre deployment
planning and subsequent overseas operations.
Kevin Hurley
Chief Superintendent, City of London Police
