Select Committee on Education and Skills Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-39)

23 JUNE 2004

MR DAVID YOUNG AND SIR HOWARD NEWBY

  Q20 Chairman: I thought Pearsons were involved at one time. Did they bail out at some stage?

  Sir Howard Newby: Pearsons were one of a number of private sector companies who in 2000 expressed interest in being private sector partners. In the end, at that time, they decided not to pursue that interest. I am afraid I do not know why exactly—you would have to ask them, obviously—but they decided not to pursue it. Instead I think they created FT Knowledge. Their involvement in higher education learning e-learning is now very minimal, although I think they still have a presence in e-learning in schools, which I understand has been quite successful.

  Q21 Chairman: We were given a figure of £44,000 per course that this has cost. Is that an accurate figure?

  Sir Howard Newby: I think the figure of £44,000 relates to Baroness Perry's question in the House of Lords about how much per student rather than per course.

  Q22 Chairman: A mischievous e-mail to the Committee suggested that if you looked at it as a full-time equivalent, it was £1 million per course.

  Sir Howard Newby: The situation, Chairman—and this is an estimate; I have to be careful here, I cannot pin it down to the exact amount—is that we expect, by the time we achieve the wind-down of the e-University, to have expended £30 million on the e-University: £30-£31 million. There are 16 higher education institutions which have developed courses as a result of this initiative. There were, as you know—it is in the public domain—900 students who were registered for courses which were offered on the e-University platform. You do not need to be too much of a whizz at mathematics to work out that £30 million divided by 900 students is approximately £33,000 per student. It is of course the case in all conventional forms of learning that when any university offers a new course the initial costs will be very high. It costs a lot of money to put on a conventional course and you hope the numbers build up over time to make it worth everyone's while. If the numbers had built up, it would have been worth everyone's while, but the recruitment was extremely disappointing.[4]

  Mr Young: And it would only be a successful business if it operated at scale. That was always recognised. Indeed, that was very much in our minds when we looked at what they had achieved in the autumn of last year.

  Chairman: Val, you wanted to come in just now.

  Q23 Valerie Davey: Yes, I wondered very specifically about the change, as I understood it now, from the PwC report to the later delivery. The one aspect in which I am interested is the fact, as you rightly say in the information you have given us subsequently, of some very good work on e-learning going on, which you were supporting, at different universities. Indeed, there was a British market for it, and, as I understood it, the PwC report was building on a British market, whereas the business plan as it emerged was purely for a global market and did not seem to have that natural progression. Am I right, or is that a misunderstanding?

  Sir Howard Newby: I think there was a shift in emphasis, yes. I do not think it was one or the other but once the e-University Opco board had been set up, they certainly felt that there was a major opportunity here, if you like, for UK export earnings. A great deal of emphasis was placed on international recruitment but not at the expense of students and home courseware. Even those UK universities which were developing courseware saw an international market for what they were producing in addition to the home market, but I think it is fair to say that the Opco board took the view that the major growth market was overseas, especially in Asia.

  Q24 Valerie Davey: But HEFCE, with its educational background, perhaps ought to have been more alert to the fact that you develop these things from known good practice, and we had known good practice, and in the account you have just given, the historic outline, as it were, the universities do not seem to have been brought in with their expertise until March 2001, which is some way down the line of developing the business plan. My underlying concern, looking in—and I am not an entrepreneur—is that you have a process of delivery before you have the product.

  Sir Howard Newby: First let me be clear, the university sector was brought in right from the very beginning. There was extensive consultation over the structure of the e-University as it went forward, and, as I said earlier, only four institutions decided not to take up the offer to become shareholders in Holdco.

  Q25 Chairman: What did it cost them?

  Sir Howard Newby: £1—because Holdco is a company limited by guarantee. What I was referring to specifically was working with those universities—some of which, you are quite right, had already developed in embryonic form and some of which had developed quite extensively, certain amounts of courseware which could be improved and marketed through the e-University. Some universities were approached by the board to develop courseware from scratch. That is where a lot of investment went, because the e-University believed it had spotted a market in which it was looking for a UK institution or institutions to help them develop. So the sector was brought in right from the beginning. If I may say so, we are approaching one area, which I hope we will come on to, which I personally did find extremely difficult, and that is where my responsibilities as an accounting officer end and those as a shadow director begin. This is what was unique about this venture. To go back to your earlier comment, Chairman, if I may, when we deal with a conventional university, my role is very clear: I am the accounting officer for the sector, the vice-chancellor or principal is the accounting officer for the institution. That whole relationship is set out in a financial memorandum between ourselves and the governing body of the institution, and my rights and responsibilities are very clear. In this case, because it was set up as a commercial venture, company law comes into play, where I have to be very, very careful—and I was always cognisant of this—of not acting or being seen to act as a shadow director, and yet I had accounting officer responsibilities which might, if it had been a more conventional institution, have led me to act in a way which might have been judged as acting as a shadow director.

  Q26 Chairman: Going back to my earlier question, Sir Howard, that was my very point: Why you? It does not fit really, does it?

  Sir Howard Newby: It did not fit in that respect, no, but, as I said earlier, there was a recognition by everyone concerned, including myself when I took over in this post, that the e-University would not be a success without substantial private sector involvement. It was not something we could do ourselves.

  Q27 Chairman: Sir Howard, you keep saying that, and we all agree with that, but why in this form? Why did you not spin it off to the Open University or a cluster of universities and give them the money to do it, so you had that traditional relationship?

  Sir Howard Newby: Both of those options were very seriously considered and the answer to the question why we did not do a deal with either the Open University or with a cluster of universities was there was such enthusiasm from the sector as a whole for this, to be involved in this, that the sector did not take kindly to the idea that one institution or a group of institutions should in some way be privileged in running this venture.

  Mr Young: My understanding is certainly that the structure, the Holdco/Opco structure, was specifically recommended in the Pricewaterhouse report which was published for consultation in October. It was not that HEFCE overturned their advice—because you made that point earlier. We will go back and look at it, and if I am wrong we will put a note in, but that is certainly my understanding.

  Q28 Chairman: If the Secretary of State said tomorrow, "We have this idea that you run this arm's length venture" on a similar method for some other purpose, what would you say?

  Sir Howard Newby: I think I would want to establish very clearly, as I said earlier, how we get around this problem of shadow directorships conflicting with my accounting officer role. That is a very serious lesson to learn from that.

  Chairman: Thank you for that introduction.

  Q29 Mr Gibb: You have both been very assiduous in disassociating yourself from this operation by highlighting when you were appointed. David Young, you were appointed in June 2001; Sir Howard, you were appointed in October 2001. But some key decisions were taken after that. The impression we have as a Committee so far, I think it is fair to say, is that the failure here was not in the plan; the failure was in the implementation of the plan which falls squarely within the periods that you were in office. For example, Sir Anthony Cleaver was appointed in December 2001 and John Beaumont was appointed in March 2002. Could one of you tell me what commercial experience John Beaumont has had?

  Sir Howard Newby: John Beaumont was recruited from Energis, where he had been responsible for their IT operations. Before that, from memory, he had been in the academic sector as head of the University of Bath Business School. We can send you a note on that.

  Q30 Mr Gibb: For how long was he at Energis?

  Sir Howard Newby: I cannot put an exact figure on it, but my memory would be something in the order of four to five years. But, again, his appointment was not made by us but by the board. I can send you that information, certainly. I am sorry, I just do not have that information at hand.[5]

  Q31 Mr Gibb: I know you are trying to avoid some company law problems with being a shadow director, but your recollection of events seems very vague and you seem always to disassociate yourself from any of these key decisions. I would have thought as the accounting officer you would have been far more involved in deciding who was to be the chief executive of this very large commercial venture.

  Sir Howard Newby: No, I was not involved in deciding. I was certainly consulted at the time by the chairman Sir Anthony Cleaver—just as I was consulted at the time about the appointment of Sir Anthony himself, which again was a matter for the then interim board.

  Q32 Mr Gibb: Should we have some other people before us, then, instead of you two? Should we have Sir Anthony Cleaver and John Beaumont before us? Is that what we should do next?

  Sir Howard Newby: I think that is a matter for you. If you want to investigate in some detail, which you may wish to do, the detailed operational management of UK e-University, that really was a matter for the board and its senior management. I understand what you are saying about sounding vague and disassociating myself, and I am certainly not disassociating myself with oversight responsibility of what happened—absolutely not—but when it comes to the day to day business decisions that were taken, they were taken by the board and its senior management and not by HEFCE.

  Q33 Mr Gibb: I was just trying to wonder who was responsible for the senior management.

  Sir Howard Newby: The senior management of Opco was the responsibility of the Opco board and its non-executive directors.

  Q34 Mr Gibb: Who appointed the Opco board?

  Sir Howard Newby: Formerly the Opco board was appointed by the holding company, through whom we channelled the funding.

  Q35 Mr Gibb: So you had no responsibility for that either, then?

  Sir Howard Newby: No, I have absolute responsibility, as accounting officer, for ensuring that the money that we forwarded to the operating company, via the holding company was properly spent.

  Q36 Mr Gibb: And you did not have any say in who was appointed to the operating company board.

  Sir Howard Newby: Absolutely not.

  Q37 Mr Gibb: Or the holding company board.

  Sir Howard Newby: The holding company board, yes, because that was a matter on which the Funding Councils, all of us, and the standing committee of principals were involved.

  Q38 Mr Gibb: So you are responsible but you are just trying to disassociate yourself by saying that indirectly these different people had a decision. There seems to be nobody who is to blame for this.

  Sir Howard Newby: I am responsible for the funding of the operation.

  Q39 Mr Gibb: Right.

  Sir Howard Newby: And for ensuring that public money was properly accounted for and properly spent.


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