Select Committee on Environmental Audit Written Evidence


APPENDIX 14

Memorandum submitted by the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research

  The Tyndall Centre brings together scientists, economists, engineers and social scientists, who together are developing sustainable responses to climate change through trans-disciplinary research and dialogue on both a national and international level—not just within the research community, but also with business leaders, policy advisors, the media and the public in general.

  The Tyndall Centre welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence and would like to be kept informed of the development of the inquiry and the committee's responses to it.

  The overall objective of the inquiry will be to assess the feasibility of emissions trading systems (including Contraction and Convergence) as a framework for negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement. It will examine whether such systems can be enforced and the practical difficulties involved, taking account of what has been learned from the development of the EU ETS and the growth of carbon trading initiatives such as the Chicago Climate Exchange. From this perspective, the Committee will examine the objectives to be pursued by the UK during its presidencies in 2005 of both the G8 and the EU, and the contribution of the various departments involved such as the FCO, DEFRA, HMT, DfT, and DFID.

  In particular, the Committee is interested in:

    —  whether an international ETS is feasible, given that targets and compliance penalties would need to be rigidly enforced and bearing in mind the political pressures to which an international ETS would be subject;

    —  what other alternatives to an international ETS exist; and whether an ETS would be more effective than such alternatives in maximising carbon reductions worldwide and in channelling investment in low-carbon technologies into less developed countries;

    —  what approach and specific objectives in relation to climate change the UK Government should adopt during its presidency of the G8 and EU in 2005; and

    —  what contribution individual departments can make (eg FCO, DEFRA, HMT, DfT, and DFID), and whether they are sufficiently "joined-up" in delivering a coherent UK agenda.

1.   Is an international ETS is feasible, given that targets and compliance penalties would need to be rigidly enforced and bearing in mind the political pressures to which an international ETS would be subject?

  The Tyndall Centre considers that the essential point here is that any effective international climate regime will need both "push" and "pull" elements.

  By "push" we refer to policies that are able to promote the development and commercialisation of innovative low-carbon solutions in terms of technologies (but the same arguments may apply to the development of innovative new institutional and social arrangements). By "pull" we imply measures that will promote the uptake of such sustainable low-carbon solutions in the world economy.

  Thus an international emissions trading system would play the role of "pull" on the global economy. The first thing that we can say then is that, based upon extensive scientific research, it is becoming increasingly apparent that a sophisticated suite of technology and innovation policies would be required in addition to an international ETS. The same point applies in the context of the EU's ETS incidentally.

  An important and emerging area of debate and enquiry in both the research and policy communities is then about how an emission trading system can best be harmonised with technology policy, whether this should happen at a national, EU, or global level, and what some of the potential conflicts may be between an emissions trading system and technology policy on the one hand, and between these two and other international mechanisms on the other hand (such as WTO rules for example).

  A second important point is that technology policy without a pull from carbon taxes, an ETS etc is unlikely to produce the rate of commercialisation of low-carbon technologies that will be required in the coming decades. (The Tyndall Centre would be happy to provide further evidence/briefing on this issue if required.)

  Finally, we can ask whether the ETS rather other forms of "push" policy or measure would be most appropriate at the international scale. There is also the question of whether an international ETS would truly need to be "international" would it not be more efficient and practical to just include say the EU plus world 8-12 biggest emitters?

  Further information is included in three annexes setting out: (A) specific analysis of the C&C proposal; (B) lessons from EU emission trading system; (C) elaboration of the technology policy issue.

2.   What approach and specific objectives in relation to climate change the UK Government should adopt during its presidency of the G8 and EU in 2005?

  Formal negotiations will start on a second commitment period at the SBSSTA (Subsidiary Body for Technical, Technological and Scientific Advice), a subsidiary body of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) in 2005. We believe that Tony Blair and the UK Government have an historic opportunity to provide global leadership on these key issues, and present the USA with the undisputable case for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and establish the path towards a post Kyoto framework.

  The priority should be to ensure that the UK plays a constructive role in the negotiations and that crucially, it injects creative and far-sighted suggestions for an architecture that would genuinely address the concerns of developing countries, and as far as possible the concerns of the US and others who have not yet ratified.

  It is also important at this time to take bold action on the adoption of a target for stabilisation (the ultimate objective of the convention)—the UK has an adopted target of a 2C temperature rise. The UK should adopt this target (or a similar concentration-based target of 450-550 ppm) and make it clear that this is what the international climate regime should be trying to achieve.

  Recently there have been signs of a debate within Europe over the burden of economic costs of meeting emission reduction commitments. Here the committee should be aware of the following:

  We can afford climate change policy—A key intellectual debate in the academic community is the question of just how much emissions reductions will cost, and whether current economic and Integrated Assessment Models[23] predict excessively high estimates of the long-term costs of GHG mitigation. Recent advances in the field of technology modelling and technology policy suggest that when models attempt to fully incorporate eg the fact that a new low-carbon energy technology may become much cheaper as its uptake increases, the predicted costs of mitigation can decrease drastically. Hence, this active area of academic research should be properly incorporated into the political discourse on what is possible both within Europe and in a second commitment period.

  We believe that there were too many compromises made to the EU Renewables Directive for member state interest (eg UK's non binding target of 10% by 2010). The UK should ensure that frameworks are established to allow renewables targets to be compatible with climate policy. We need to examine what mix of renewable energy and technological innovation is needed to reach emission reductions post 2010 under various policy scenarios. The Tyndall centre is actively researching in this area.

  Various attempts are being made to engage with eg USA on diplomatic and scientific levels over the issue of climate change. Areas where efforts can be maintained include to: to encourage constructive engagement between UK and EU scientists and scientists from countries who have not yet ratified; for the UK to send out a very strong signal that it will meet its commitments under the protocol whether it actually enters into force or not. In terms of the US, the UK's current approach of building bridges where possible is appropriate.

  There are many proposals on the table but it seems likely that the way forward must be through differentiated categories of commitments, where eg: (most) developed countries signed up to quantitative emission reduction targets; a second group of countries sign up to carbon-intensity based targets; and a third group of countries (mainly the official Least Developed Countries) don't make any emission reduction commitment but have adequate access to compensation funds (for adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change for example).

  Serious pressure, possibly including trade sanctions, should be put on countries that refuse to ratify the Kyoto protocol and future agreements to limit GHG emissions until they do so. The UK needs to play a role in finding a way forward on a workable architecture. This might be a leadership role or it might also be to play a constructive role in supporting an emerging developing country-led proposal, as in the case of the UK Overseas Territories (UKOT's). These are small low-lying island states, particularly at risk from the impacts of climate change. The UKOT's have fallen through the gap (FCO-DFID-CPACC) in terms of preparedness for climate change. Also they do not receive any of the adaptation funds available to other countries as they are UK territories.

  CPACC[24] does not extend to the UKOT's and FCO-DFID have not organised between themselves who is responsible to pay for the extension of the CPACC lessons to the OT's. The territories would like to extend the convention to their islands, but are unsure about their obligations to mitigate if it is extended.

  The UK might also learn from the experience of allocating commitments within the EU—there is in effect a North-South divide within Europe, and the agreed allocation of GHG emission reduction commitments cannot be separated from the massive amounts of finance that has been put into eg the Cohesion Funds (for Spain, Portugal Greece and Ireland).

ADAPTATION: HIGH IMPACT POLICY

  The types of adaptations that will enable the UK and other countries to confront climate change will vary considerably across geographic regions, economic activities and population groups. This "context specificity" means that adaptation is more likely to be successful if strategies are developed at the local level. The role of central government should therefore be to encourage meaningful, inclusive, devolved decision-making, and provide what support it can for local initiatives.

  Adaptation and mitigation are intimately linked—the less emphasis is placed on mitigation, the more difficult adaptation will be. Adaptation may be impossible in the face of rapid and large-magnitude climate change associated with rapid increases in atmospheric GHG emissions.

  Policies should recognise that adaptation is often reactive and somewhat ad hoc in nature—it is much easier to ensure mitigation through policy than to guarantee adaptation; mitigation is ultimately a technical issue (issues such as market penetration notwithstanding), whereas adaptation is much more of a behavioural one. Adaptation can be pursued through vulnerability reduction based on the mapping of climate hazards and social vulnerability to identify "hotspots" of high climate risk. Assessments of climate hazard based for example on a combination of future climate projections and assessments of local geographical factors (topography, geomorphology etc) could be incorporated into the planning process, identifying potentially high risk areas where industry, infrastructure and settlements might be particular exposed to the physical manifestations of future climate change (eg flooding, high winds, drought-induced subsidence etc).

3.   What contribution individual departments can make (eg FCO, DEFRA, HMT, DfT, and DFID), and whether they are sufficiently "joined-up" in delivering a coherent UK agenda?

THE ROLE OF DFID

  DFID's new focus on climate change as one of its four thematic areas is useful, but it should consider working closely with UK agencies as much of the knowledge about climate change adaptation is in the UK and this knowledge is transferable. Perhaps DFID could consider how it can transfer the lessons that have been learned in the UK to other locations. [25]We believe that it would be a mistake to ignore the work of UKCIP and other UK based agencies purely because of their UK focus.

  The Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) works with the UK's Overseas Territories (UKOT's), but they have largely been ignored in the development of climate change strategies. Recent advances by DFID's Overseas Territories Division (OTD) suggest that the Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change programme (MACC) [26]may be extended to the Caribbean OT's but there is still no activity in other areas.

  For climate change to truly influence policy, all departments need to believe it is happening and it needs to become part of their discourse. DEFRA could coordinate this "profile raising" campaign across government departments.

DFID RESEARCH

  What are the dangerous thresholds of climate change in different locations, particularly in the most vulnerable locations? The recent examples of tropical storm Jeanne and Hurricane Ivan reveal the differential vulnerability in different locations to differently sized impacts (eg Jeanne was very small storm—but led to three thousand deaths in Haiti; Ivan was biggest storm on record and killed only two people in Cayman). Understanding the threshold at which climate change becomes dangerous in different location depends on the vulnerability conditions.

OPPORTUNITIES

  Climate change is complex as a science and as a policy dilemma. DFID could assist in many ways: studentships for people in less developed countries to study climate change in the UK, capacity building courses such as those run at the Tyndall Centre/Overseas Development Group[27] could be useful. The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), the Netherlands Red Cross and the Tyndall Centre have discussed the co-production of PhD candidates with development NGOs. Candidates would be paired, one from a developing country, the other from a developed country. The research proposals would be co-developed by the two candidates and if the research was to be set in the developing country, both candidates would have to ensure that the research was ethical, met academic research standards and contributed to the development agenda in the host country.


23   For more information on Tyndall's IAM, see: http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/research/theme1/summary_it1_31.shtml Back

24   http://www.cpacc.org/ Caribbean Planning for Adaptation to Climate Change Back

25   Drawing on literature such as Gundel, S, Hancock, J and Anderson, S (2001) Scaling up strategies for research in natural resources management: a comparative review. Natural Resources Institute, Chatham, UK, pp 61. Back

26   Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change-http://www.oas.org/macc/ Mainstreaming Adaptation to Global Change (MACC) is a five-year Global Environmental Facility (GEF)-funded project for the Caribbean region. Additional support for MACC activities is being provided through the Canadian, French and Dutch governments. Back

27   http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/ODG/pages/course_vpsprog.html Back


 
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