Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 320-337)

MR JAMES CAMERON

15 DECEMBER 2004

  Q320 Joan Walley: Who is doing that?

  Mr Cameron: The Commission is leading it. They need a lot of support from Member States, the cooperation from people who have expertise in Customs & Excise and VAT areas and from the accountancy profession, from the Financial Services regulators. There are lots of market issues that have not been properly resolved, which are all barriers to people doing business.

  Q321 Joan Walley: So what is the mechanism by which that joined-up approach to work through all of those difficulties could come about, and will it be something that could be taken up through the UK Presidency?

  Mr Cameron: Yes.

  Q322 Joan Walley: What is in situ at the moment?

  Mr Cameron: I hope a lot of those things will be resolved before the Presidency begins, but certainly if they have not been, absolutely the Presidency will be very helpful; it is enormously helpful to have these twin Presidencies next year at the G8 and the EU, that really is a boon for us here in the UK.

  Q323 Joan Walley: But the investment community is taking these barriers seriously?

  Mr Cameron: Yes. You want to get the mainstream involved. I happen to be delighted that the mainstream is just a little bit behind the pioneers, but really from a policy point of view you want the mainstream involved, and they have too many reasons for not getting involved when these things are not sorted out. For some people there is money to be made in the incoherence. They will always do well with arbitrage between errors, glitches in the system once they find out what they are. But to get the system to work smoothly so that it is relatively easy to transact, to take large amounts of carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, and it just keeps running on so that the dynamism in the system keeps delivering emission reductions. That is what you want, you want the market people to do it, get on with it, and then you, the policy makers, keep fine-tuning the machine. So they all get up, they trade and trade and trade away and what we are doing is they are reducing carbon, reducing carbon and that is what you want. To do that, so that the system is well oiled and efficient, you have to take away these glitches and tax glitches and regulatory glitches. If I want to do business in Spain, to trade with a Spanish utility with them selling me some of their allowances—or it might be better the other way around, with a UK power station selling some of their surplus to a Spanish operator, and if I do that, having met the gentleman in Spain, and I transact, am I allowed to do that? Does the Financial Services regulation entitle me to do it or must I be registered with the Spanish authority to do that transaction? These are little but important things which are not quite sorted out.

  Q324 Joan Walley: Who is charged with taking the lead on that? Who are the people who can get those going?

  Mr Cameron: The people responsible for Emissions Trading in government here are Defra, who take the lead on these things. They are a very good team and are working extremely hard on all of these issues. They are fully aware of these questions and they just need a bit of help and support, with others, and they need for it to be a priority to dedicate negotiating time too, and they need good expertise to help them to iron out these things, and they need cooperation from the Financial Services and the tax authorities and these sorts of things.

  Q325 Chairman: Are you engaged in advising Defra on all this?

  Mr Cameron: We have very good relations with Defra and indeed other parts of government and we have meetings lined up with Treasury as well, which will be helpful to conclude swiftly.

  Q326 Joan Walley: And with the CBI?

  Mr Cameron: No, not this directly.

  Q327 Joan Walley: One of the things that you refer to again is transparency and you refer to the situation in Japan where they are thinking of introducing a mandatory monitoring scheme. Do we need that here? Is that something you would like to see taken forward globally in the UK and in Europe? Or can we have trading without it?

  Mr Cameron: It comes down to trust in the system; people need to feel comfortable that when they do business they are transacting in something known and understood. So high levels of transparency are good for the system. That is not to say that there will not be people who are very happy to do very well in the rather darker regions of the market place. But to make the system function effectively transparency is a good thing.

  Q328 Chairman: If mandatory, yes or no?

  Mr Cameron: I think probably yes.

  Q329 Joan Walley: Without going into the detail of the Company Law Review which took place, is there scope within that to enable that degree of mandatory monitoring, or could there be, easily?

  Mr Cameron: You have to be careful in one regard. You cannot disable trading because everybody knows your position. There is a certain type of transparency that is totally counterproductive because people will hide their position in various ways. But you need to be able to trust that what passes through your account is the real thing, and so it is fairly understood that although I will answer to your question yes, that I would want to be very careful with what it is that is mandatory. I would not want there to be a rule that requires somebody that has a position in the market place to disclose that to their competitors.

  Chairman: I am aware that time is passing and we have another important witness to listen to, so if we can move swiftly through the next set of questions.

  Q330 Mr Challen: Given that you were heavily involved in the drafting of the CDM part of the Kyoto Protocol, how do you view its subsequent development?

  Mr Cameron: Yes, I was heavily involved with my colleagues at FIELD, advising all the Alliance Of Small Island State countries and my perspective of it comes from that experience. There was a genuine bargaining between north and south that offered real opportunity for investment into the developing world to enable them to have a better technological input into their particular energy production and consumption, and I am a fan of using the CDM to add flexibility now to our European market. However, for various reasons, notably concern in the non-governmental organisation world that the Clean Development Mechanism would be used as a sort of excuse for inaction in the developed world, it has been burdened with a number of ancillary rules to the original one that I helped draft, which I think are problematic. In essence I would like to see the CDM operate with a bias towards volume, lots of projects, with the risk that some of those projects—every now and again there is a fraudulent one, every now and again one does not deliver what they said they would, and the monitoring of those projects is crucial—but take that risk in order to get lots of capital to flow for lots of projects. I want the bias that way and I think the CDM is a waste of everybody's time and effort if you do a handful of Mary Poppins' projects a year, "practically perfect in every way", and of no use. So the CDM is potentially a rather beautiful device for bringing together the north and south and the collective solving of the Climate Change problem, but only if its mechanisms function efficiently and a lot of projects can pass through it in a calendar year. At the moment I am worried that insufficient projects will pass through, that there is a misguided notion, misinterpretation of what we meant by the concept of additionality. I do not know whether you want to go into this level of detail but there is a real problem with how that works, and in essence that mechanism was designed only to prevent public money aid being diverted away from poverty into these projects. At no stage was it designed to prevent profitable projects being conducted in the developing world.

  Q331 Mr Challen: So additionality was one of the extra rules introduced, was it?

  Mr Cameron: It is not even an extra rule, it is just an interpretation that seems to have developed, utterly irrational and, I am afraid, totally counterproductive from an environmental point of view. It carries no merit from the environmental point of view. What it means is that it encourages a kind of doublethink first and a double-speak later on behalf of the project developers. So somebody who wants to do a big emission reduction project in Brazil has first of all got to go to their Ambassadors or their Board and say, "We are going to do this because it is fundamentally a good idea," and then they have to pretend that it is actually fundamentally a bad idea from a commercial point of view in order to ensure that the carbon finance element is additional, or constitutes additionality, and this is a really very bad way to proceed. The only point to additionality—I am sorry, I have gone there and I did not mean to—is to stop public money being diverted, it is not to prevent profitable projects being done.

  Q332 Mr Challen: Does that mitigate against trying to capture the low hanging fruits?

  Mr Cameron: You want profitable projects to be done. All you need to focus on is the "but for" test. If this project did not exist would we get these reductions? That is what you have to focus on, and you need to have a robust baseline, a good verification and all sorts of technical skills apply, and careful monitoring and scrutiny because there will be people trying to try things on. But after a while practices will develop that are robust and can be trusted and the Executive Board will pass projects, methodologies will be improved and then investors will be able to look at that list and say, "Right, we will build a fund just to deal with these sorts of projects," and you watch the money flow into places that they would not otherwise go. It will be a lower risk investment to generate a certified emission reduction, which has currency in the rest of the world, than to take a risk of investing in some of the countries that are beneficiaries of these projects.

  Q333 Mr Challen: As it stands though would you say that the CDM is not the most effective way of channelling money into the least developed countries?

  Mr Cameron: At the moment the least developed countries will not be big beneficiaries in the CDM, no, I am afraid to say. They ought to be but they will not be initially. We are going to have to do a lot more work to make that system easier to use, more efficient and we may have to alter the rules to advantage the least developed countries.

  Q334 Mr Challen: You have been very sceptical of the entire concept of Business-As-Usual, largely I think because of its variability. How can you be so supportive of the CDM in that case, given the fact that it is essentially built on this baseline and credits approach which is at the heart of the Business-As-Usual concept?

  Mr Cameron: Baseline credit has its real value when it is connected to the cap and trade system, so the great beauty about the linking directive in the EU, connecting the EU scheme and the Kyoto credits, is that you create demand for these credits in the developing world. So what might start as a baseline and credit type system is given value by an absolute constraint. I am afraid I do believe that it is useful for the developing world as you bit by bit try to involve them in the taking of obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, the next phase. Baseline and credit is actually quite a good technique for bringing people on who do not have obligations today.

  Chairman: We have to move on, I fear, very quickly to Mark Francois.

  Q335 Mr Francois: The framework for post-2012, do you think that a post-2012 agreement needs to be based on the current Kyoto approach, ie national targets for states decided on the basis of political negotiations, supplemented by Emission Trading regimes, and what some people call Kyoto-plus?

  Mr Cameron: Yes.

  Q336 Mr Francois: If so, what aspect of the present treaty do you think needs to be developed or changed for a post-2012 agreement?

  Mr Cameron: In the written memorandum we go through a number of the options, which are currently being debated. I need to be careful that I am not being precious about this—you get very proprietorial about things you have negotiated, and I hope that that is not what drives my answer—but I do believe that Kyoto-plus is the only realistic way—and I cannot believe I am saying realistic, I am such an idealist by nature—of proceeding, yes, I do. It is not that the treaty system is anywhere close to perfect, nor that it would be impossible to create a complete alternative, but I do believe that there is sufficient momentum now in Kyoto to warrant concentrating effort in a post-Kyoto regime that is based upon what we have already agreed. That does not meant that it has to replicate; it is not just a question of going through the same allocation process and saying, "We are going to give you less next time and the following countries are going to have to carry the same burden as the first." I do not believe that we need to replicate Kyoto, but the next regime needs to have absolute targets that are meaningful and connected to the original obligation in Article 2 of the Framework Convention, the one that governs the whole system. They have to be able to accommodate the very rapidly industrialising developing world and will need to get over the developed versus developing world dichotomy, which it is of no value or relevance to the Climate Change debate—it just needs to go. So we need new categories of people under the original principle of common but differential responsibility, which is in the Framework Convention, and we need to get another category of countries to begin to reduce their emissions even on a relative basis, and I have a very optimistic view about that. I know what is going on in China and India and Brazil; I am not in the doom and gloom camp with those countries, they are already doing more in terms of policy put in place than many of the OECD countries.

  Mr Francois: You described yourself as an idealist and perhaps being an idealist tempered with realism is no bad combination, so thank you very much.

  Q337 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. Unfortunately we have run out of time. It may be that the Committee has a few more questions and if so could we put them in writing?

  Mr Cameron: I would be delighted, and if other colleagues can assist on aspects of your questioning we would be happy to have our officers collect them together and present them to you.





 
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