Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Memorandum submitted by Charles Donovan

1.  THE AUTHOR

  Charles Donovan is the Commercial Manager of the Climate Change Policy Group of Enviros Consulting Ltd., one of the UK's largest environmental consulting firms. Enviros Consulting is a leading advisor to industry and Government on issues related to climate change and the application of market-based mechanisms to environmental protection. The company's experience in environmental markets includes consulting work on the UK Emissions Trading Scheme, the Climate Change Levy Agreements, the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, and the Renewables Obligation.

  Mr Donovan is also Chairman of the Executive Committee of the London Climate Change Services Providers Group (LCCSPG), a new business association of UK companies with expertise in greenhouse gas emissions reductions. The LCCSPG has been formed to capitalise upon the "first mover" advantage of British companies in delivering climate change solutions to a global market. The LCCSPG expects to be formally incorporated in the spring of 2005, drawing upon the support of over 70 UK organisations in the fields of engineering, consulting, law, accountancy, verification, information technology, education, and financial services.

  Mr Donovan's written and oral testimony is provided in a private capacity. His comments may not be construed as being the policies of either Enviros Consulting Ltd. or the London Climate Change Service Providers Group.

2.  INTRODUCTION

  Emissions trading has been embraced by international governments as a tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions for good reason. Experience from other emissions trading schemes indicates that the flexibility afforded by trading may allow environmental objectives to be achieved at reduced cost. Due to the scale of investment required to accomplish a low-carbon global economy, the issue of costs and cost minimisation must be of paramount importance to UK and international policymakers. To pretend that we can stabilise greenhouse gas emissions irrespective of cost would not just ignore the realities of our modern global economy, but more importantly, would reduce our chances for success.

  As demonstrated by previous testimony given to this Committee, there are widely divergent views about the capacity of emissions trading systems to deliver greenhouse gas reductions on the timescale required to avert severe climate change. While some of this criticism is indeed well founded, all stakeholders in this debate should keep in mind that emissions trading is a tool for accomplishing objectives, not an objective in itself. The element currently lacking that would make emissions trading a truly potent tool for combating climate change is the political leadership to implement it effectively. If such political will surfaces, emissions trading will be a powerful tactic we can employ to cost-effectively reduce GHG emissions at a domestic, European, and international level.

3.  EMISSIONS TRADING IS A CRITICAL ELEMENT OF A GLOBAL SOLUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE

  European and international emissions trading systems are both feasible and desirable methods of reducing greenhouse gas emission. Before exploring the details of why I believe this to be true, it is useful to quickly review the basics of how the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) will work.

  Obligated installations across Europe will soon be allocated a specified quantity of allowances to emit carbon dioxide (CO2). Firms must manage these allowances in a way that ensures that by the end of the trading period, the number of allowances held is commensurate with the amount of CO2 emitted. For the scheme to work there must be a scarcity of allowances; that is, there must be, on aggregate, fewer allowances available to firms than they need.

  By appealing to the profit motives of a firm, emissions trading encourages installations not to meet their individual caps, but rather to optimise their output given a new marginal cost, the cost of emitting carbon dioxide. Installations with low-cost opportunities to reduce CO2 are expected to continue to make emission reductions so long as the cost incurred to do so is less than the revenue gained from selling carbon allowances. At the right price, all firms are capable of making carbon reductions.

  With demand created by the installation-level carbon caps and supply available by firms with low-cost carbon abatement opportunities, a market is created and CO2 reductions can be achieved. The concept of emissions trading is in fact quite simple. However, the implementation of such a scheme has proven to be highly complex, raising concerns from Government and industry about both its viability and its desirability.

  In considering which approach and specific objectives the UK Government should adopt during its presidency of the G8 and the EU in 2005, a number of potential benefits and potential failures of greenhouse gas emissions trading must be kept in mind. I wish to emphasise three issues in particular. These are:

    —  the economic benefits to the UK economy from emissions trading;

    —  concerns about the fairness of emissions trading; and

    —  the need for a durable long-term strategy.

3(a)   The economic benefits to the UK economy from international emissions trading

  The UK is the most significant social laboratory in the world with regards to the application of market-based mechanisms to environmental protection. The tradable permit schemes currently operating or in development include those to increase packaging waste recovery, reduce waste to landfill, increase the generation of renewable energy, and reduce greenhouse gases.

  With regards to the UK's experience with greenhouse gas trading, there are numerous points of legitimate criticism about the environmental effectiveness of the schemes and their value for money. Nonetheless, a number of important benefits must be recognised. Because of the UK ETS, we have a much improved understanding of the quantity low-cost GHG reduction opportunities that remain in the UK economy. Because of the EU ETS, some of the UK's largest tanks and financial intermediaries are now active contributors to the policy debate about CO2 reductions. Because of the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UK renewable energy companies are actively seeking business opportunities in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In short, we have learned enormously, engaged important stakeholders, and stimulated industry in a manner that could not have been accomplished by the alternatives to emissions trading schemes.

  The UK's forays into emissions trading have also developed a new domestic industry comprised of climate change service providers. Similar to the success of Denmark's energy policies in developing industry-leading wind energy companies, applications of emissions trading are making UK companies global leaders in delivering climate change solutions. As a result of their unique experience, UK companies are creating jobs and value added for the UK economy from their knowledge and technical skill on climate change issues.

  UK climate change service providers are key enablers for governments and industry to deliver the environmental objectives of climate change policies at minimal cost. The economic benefits of the UK's leadership on GHG emissions trading lend legitimate support to its desirability.

3(b)   The perceived fairness of the EU ETS

  While the EU ETS has so far been championed by the UK, attention must be given to short-term implementation issues to ensure that the European experiment with market-based greenhouse gas regulations achieves its objectives and, in turn, lays the foundation for coordinated global action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. One of the most pressing issues for consideration in the short-term is distribution of the costs and benefits of CO2 reductions across industry.

  The EU ETS has the potential to increase costs for industry in two ways. Installations that expect to exceed their CO2 caps will need to make emission reductions or purchase allowances from other market participants. These may be referred to as the direct costs of carbon trading. Companies also must adapt to changes in energy prices that result from the EU ETS. These are often termed the indirect costs; they do not arise from installation-level caps but rather, the way in which the market responds to CO2 caps.

  While much attention has been paid to the direct costs of carbon trading, the indirect costs pose the greatest financial risk to industry. For UK industry in particular, financial risk will become manifest most immediately through an increase in electric power prices. Despite the complaints from some economic sectors about these prices rises, this is how carbon trading is intended to work. The EU ETS was designed to send a price signal to electricity users indicating the environmental cost of consumption.

  While this is likely to work in the UK, the price signal will not be seen in all EU Member States. In countries where tariffs remain highly regulated, electricity prices will not accurately reflect the cost of carbon. A legitimate argument can be made that in this respect, the EU ETS will create an unfair playing field. However with low carbon prices, the distortion is likely to be quite small.

  Perhaps a more compelling issue with regards to the perceived fairness of the EU ETS is the potential for a transfer of wealth from power consumers to power generators. Power generators, particularly those in the UK's liberalised electricity market, will seek to increase the price at which they sell electricity by the marginal cost of emitting CO2. This is how a competitive market is intended to work. The problem is that the total revenues that will be gained by power generators by passing carbon costs to consumers will far exceed the total costs from carbon trading. This is a direct result of the decision taken at a European level that most carbon allowances should be given away for free.

  It is surprising—as well as potentially damaging to the viability of the EU ETS—that this issue has not received wider consideration. Perhaps less surprising is that power generators have not yet explained to consumers and the Government the magnitude and eventual use of the revenues they will gain.

  Concerns regarding wealth transfer have also been raised with regards to allocation by some EU countries of more CO2 allowances than are needed by their industries. A surplus of allowances attributable to unrestrictive carbon caps is expected in several EU Member States. Over-allocation is not just counterproductive with respect to the underlying objective of reducing greenhouse gases, but also raises troubling questions about the underlying logic of the scheme itself.

  If the benefits of emissions trading are to be fully realised, the supply of allowances into any emissions trading scheme must be the result of investment in emission reductions. This holds true for trading on any political level, whether it be domestic, European or international. If such a guideline is widely observed, there will be no doubt about the desirability of emissions trading systems as a tool for reducing greenhouse gases.

3(c)   The need to place emphasis on long-term goals as much as short-term objectives

  Depending upon the actual rate of economic growth within Europe over the next three years, the allowance deficit created by the National Allocation Plans of EU Member States will create demand for CO2 allowances of between 5-50 million tonnes per year during Phase 1. With respect to the long-term objective to stabilise atmospheric GHG emissions, it is almost trivial. Nonetheless, if the EU ETS is supported by a durable greenhouse gas policy framework, the reduction will be part of a greater achievement.

  While we must have some focus on short-term objectives of climate change mitigation policies, we can not afford to be myopic. Climate change mitigation is not primarily an environmental problem, but rather an economic one. For this reason, effective climate change policy development in the UK will require more significant participation from the Department of Trade and Industry, the Treasury, and other Government ministries charged with management of economic affairs. The task facing us is to fundamentally change the carbon-intensity of the domestic and global economy. Considering the pervasiveness of carbon energy sources in our economy and the level of investment that has been made in its infrastructure, it is clear that we face an unprecedented task. To reduce carbon intensity while at the same time improving quality of life, the only course of action available is not to contract, but to grow. This growth must, however, be based on new models of infrastructure investment.

  Due to the long-term nature of capital investment in the energy, transport and industrial sectors, we must focus on creating market conditions that will facilitate substantial GHG reductions into the future. Establishing a cost of carbon through market-mechanisms is a first step. This must be quickly followed by the establishment of a long-term signal to energy consumers about what future carbon costs are likely to be. With respect to the decision-making process of businesses, there is a growing body of evidence that without a reasonable level of certainty about the scope of future climate change regulations, firms will delay or cancel plans for investment.

  Without a durable climate change policy framework, the EU ETS will not reach its potential. For this reason, achievement of the UK's publicly stated target to reduce emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2010 can help shape the present-day choices being made by industry. Perhaps even more important is the goal of a 60% reduction by 2050 outlined in the Government's 2003 Energy White Paper. More concrete proposals are needed about how and at what rate the UK will achieve this goal in order to increase confidence on the part of business that low-carbon investment is the most prudent alternative.

  It is essential that politicians, people in business, and the general public develop a deeper shared understanding of the impetus for climate change mitigation. Significant levels of education and outreach will be required to convince all levels of society of the need to act. In particular, more dialogue outside of the United Nations Framework Convention process should be initiated to gain widespread consent for this urgent global project.

4.  SUMMARY

  Over 40 years ago, Americans were urged by their political leaders to support a massive financial undertaking in order to land a man on the moon. That first lunar voyage mobilised the resources of an entire nation on an urgent time scale to achieve a breathtaking goal. With a sustained and disciplined effort, the race to stabilise GHG emissions can capture the imagination of British citizens in just that same way.

  The UK has vast technological, financial and creative capabilities that can be organised for the purpose of climate stabilisation. The G8 and EU Presidencies provide a unique opportunity to inspire widespread mobilisation. As the UK already possesses all of the resources and talents needed, Government must now show its leadership by developing a major national commitment to technological and social research on climate change mitigation and by effectively implementing policies that will contribute to a low-carbon economy.

  While building its vision for the future, the Government should not lose sight of the remarkable aspects of the achievements to date. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme is the first cap and trade emissions trading system in the world to be implemented for the reduction of greenhouse gases and it is the first time that any government has so comprehensively regulated carbon dioxide emissions. But for the EU ETS to be truly successful, it must not be just an achievement of innovative environmental regulation, but also deliver real reductions in emissions that will lend support to our 21st century race to the moon.

10 January 2005





 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2005
Prepared 29 March 2005