Select Committee on Environmental Audit Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 359-379)

PAUL DAWSON, LOUIS REDSHAW AND CHARLES DONOVAN

12 JANUARY 2005

  Q359 Chairman: Good afternoon all of you. Thank you very much indeed for coming in and also for your excellent memoranda, which we have read with great interest. Can I start by asking Mr Donovan, as well as obviously being involved in Enviros I note that you are also involved in the London Climate Change Services Providers Group. Can you tell us about the work of that group, briefly?

  Mr Donovan: The London Climate Change Services Providers Group is a group of companies who have as their primary focus services related to climate change. That group of companies was, on the whole, starting to feel under represented by the business voice that was available to them through the other associations of which they may have been a part. These are companies that are part of the building blocks for a low carbon economy and for that reason have perhaps a different set of views with regard to climate change policy and for that reason they wanted to develop a business voice that would reflect their business interests. So this comprises a group that includes banks, it includes brokers, it includes engineering firms, it includes academic institutions in the UK, and it includes consultancies and law firms.

  Q360 Chairman: How often do you meet?

  Mr Donovan: There is an executive committee that has been formed, of which I am the chairman, that has been meeting, I would say, on a monthly basis to date, and there are open meetings that are being held quarterly. I should emphasise that this is a new group and a lot of work is ongoing to set up the structure under which it will exist.

  Q361 Chairman: We look forward to hearing of progress from that group. We want to do this afternoon is to look at the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the immediate issues; then Phase 2 issues and then post 2012, if we can handle it in that way. It is difficult not to observe that the whole thing seems to have got off to a pretty lousy start. Do you have any comments to make on the Press reports? There was a piece in the Guardian a couple of days ago saying that the UK may even be going to sue the European Commission over the disagreements over the National Allocation Plan.

  Mr Redshaw: I think it probably got off to quite a good start in terms of the trading, which is the focus of the scheme. Trading has been going on for over a year now, and in some more reasonable volumes it has been trading quite well since April law year; and in fact last Friday was a record day, half a million tonnes traded, only to be superseded by Monday of this week with one million tonnes traded, and we had 300,000 tonnes yesterday and probably another half a million tonnes traded again today. So on the trading side of things, which is where we come in, it has got off to a pretty good start.

  Q362 Chairman: So you do not think that a possible legal dispute between the UK and the EU over the refusal by the Commission to accept the EU's National Allocation Plans is a problem?

  Mr Dawson: I think any form of uncertainty like that is a problem for a market that relies on setting a target and then using trading as the most efficient means of meeting that target. So I would not dismiss it as a problem, but I think that Louis is right to emphasise that the scheme has actually got going and is meeting to that requirement to reduce emissions at least cost, well before the official start date of 1 January.

  Q363 Chairman: Presumably this involves an exchange of contracts, each party?

  Mr Dawson: Yes.

  Q364 Chairman: Those are legally enforceable, are they?

  Mr Redshaw: Yes.

  Q365 Chairman: Even though there is not an overarching legal context yet put in place by the EU?

  Mr Redshaw: Yes. I think companies got comfortable with the Emissions Trading Scheme when the directive was passed into law. Some companies have actually traded emissions—I think the first one was July 2003, although it traded rather sporadically between then and April 2004. The pick-up in trading came as companies got a realisation of what their shortfall and, in some cases, excess emissions' position was going to look like, and as the countries have passed the directive into law companies have got—including ours—comfortable that the Emissions Trading Scheme would actually start. We still have allowances trading today but they are actually trading for delivery in December 2005 because allowances still do not exist. So all the time it has been trading it has been with the expectation that the law had been passed and the allowances would actually be allocated and dished out. If the scheme went away altogether then the contracts would have no validity, but as long as the scheme exists and allowances exist then anyone who is committed to buy and sell those must deliver.

  Mr Dawson: I think that is an important distinction, that the scheme is actually passed into law and what the report on Monday reflected is to some extent the end game, arguing about how many allowances to allocate and to whom they should be allocated, but the obligation to surrender allowances and the monitoring of verification is already effective.

  Q366 Chairman: As far as you are aware, is the UK the only country with a significant problem with the Allocation Plan?

  Mr Redshaw: There are delays to the Greek, Polish, Czech Republic and—

  Q367 Chairman: Germany?

  Mr Redshaw: No, Germany has got it sorted. Italian of course. Greece only put their Allocation Plan in in December of last year and that was actually due in on 31 March of last year.

  Q368 Chairman: What price is carbon trading at or are these agreements trading at?

  Mr Redshaw: When I left the office we had just traded at 6 Euros 95 cents.

  Q369 Chairman: Is that high or low relative to previous trades?

  Mr Redshaw: It is actually relatively low. The high over the last year and a half's worth of trading has been 13 Euros, although those were trades on the back of pretty much no information. A lot of the early trades were testing systems and to prove that it could be done contractually. Then it settled in the range seven to nine Euros in the last nine months and it actually reached a low of 6 Euros 30 cents this week and bounced back up as people realised it had been oversold.

  Q370 Mr Challen: Can I ask if the volume is increasing?

  Mr Redshaw: It is, yes, it is exponentially increasing.

  Q371 Mr Challen: What sort of volume are we talking about now?

  Mr Redshaw: We probably traded between 10 and 11 million tonnes over all, across all trading through the brokered market. I only have access as a trading organisation to reported trades that come through brokers. There are obviously bilateral deals going on in the background also. But the amount of volume of trades per day, we would have been lucky to get half a million in a month over the summer last year and now we are getting half a million in a day, and to have a million tonnes, as I have mentioned, is unprecedented. That volume is starting to pick up now that it is a real scheme.

  Q372 Chairman: Can I turn to you, Mr Donovan, again? In your August 2004 brief, which you kindly sent through, I think you said that on the basis of the draft National Allocation Plans, as they then stood, that emissions could in fact increase between five and 11% over the next three years. Obviously there has been some jiggery-pokery over the actual level of the Allocation Plans since then. What is your estimate of the likely possible increase now?

  Mr Donovan: The trend for emissions in the EU is absolutely on the upward. In the EU ETS, as it currently stands, even with the revised National Allocation Plans, it will do very little to dent that. We do expect there to be demand for allowances in the first phase of the EU ETS but we do not expect it to significantly reverse the trend upwards in emissions in the EU 25. So while those numbers would need to be revised in order to reflect the most recent version of the NAPs I am comfortable still with the general indication that, yes, over the three years of the first phase emissions in Europe will be increased.

  Q373 Chairman: Which begs the question of whether there is any point in the whole scheme?

  Mr Donovan: You have to remember that the point of the scheme is to cap emissions at some level and if emissions are growing fast to have them grow less fast is indeed a constraint. So placing any amount of burden on industry or any of the sectors included in the EU ETS is a first step. However, it is very true that there must be a scarcity for this market to work, and for real change to occur that scarcity must grow over time and we are not yet at the point where we will see significant scarcity, in my opinion, where real substantial investments in emissions reductions will occur.

  Mr Redshaw: I think it is worth pointing out that presumably Charlie's forecast of emissions across the EU, including aviation, transport, et cetera, but not covered by the EU ETS, clearly the emissions from those sectors cannot increase because there is a capped amount of allowances—basically people cannot pollute without those allowances.

  Mr Donovan: I will respond to that by saying actually that does include the trading sector. The cap refers to capping their emissions at some point. The allocation methodology that has been employed by most Member States is looking at what are emissions in the business-as-usual case and then let us look at how we would change emissions based on that business-as-usual. So if we are constraining from business-as-usual, which is for high rate of growth, we can still constrain those companies but still see growth. So actually putting the cap does not mean capping them at zero, it means capping them at some level and the level is of course the critical question that has to be resolved by each Member State.

  Q374 Chairman: Is it not the case that even more critical is the Phase 2 cap and the agreements that are going to be reached about that, because part of the point of Phase 1 is seeing whether it works at all, and I think we probably have the beginnings to establish that it physically can be made to work. Given that the setting of the first phase NAPs was hugely contentious and subject to some pretty lengthy horse-trading between Member States and within industries within Member States, do you think that Phase 2 is going to be equally contentious or more difficult?

  Mr Redshaw: I would hazard a guess that Phase 2 would be simpler because everybody knows what the actual reduction targets of their country must be, and people have a better idea of what allocations they are going to be able to make to the covered sectors. Our view is that the covered sectors in the trading scheme should be expanded to all sectors. In our view there is no one obstacle that cannot be overcome in order to include supply to domestic consumers of gas and emissions of the transport sector.

  Q375 Chairman: We are coming on to investigate that more a little later.

  Mr Redshaw: It should be more straightforward because everybody knows what they need to do. The difference with Phase 1 was that we had a bunch of countries that did not want to constrain their industry relative to their neighbouring country and every country was incentivised to be as generous as possible. Under Phase 2 we have the Kyoto target to meet and therefore the amount of room you have for manoeuvre is limited.

  Q376 Mr Challen: This question is for Mr Donovan. There is a part of your report I did not quite understand and it is about the issue of windfall profits for power generators. You say that the problem is that the total revenues that that will be gained by power generators by passing carbon costs to consumers will far exceed the total cost from carbon trading and this is a direct result of the European decision that most carbon allowances should be given away for free. I just want you to expand on that, to somebody who puts all his savings into building society accounts.

  Mr Donovan: If you will allow me a moment let me explain a bit of the background for the scheme so that I can answer what you are asking directly so that it makes sense because there have been a lot of instances where people have tried to answer or direct some amount of analysis towards this question without really considering the scheme as a whole. So if you will let me explain that? The EU ETS is what is known as an upstream trading scheme. For many years, particularly in the United States, there have been both practical experience as well as academic research on the use of these schemes. The EU ETS will take regulation at the point of fuel combustion. Where the EU ETS is quite different from anything that we have done before is in its coverage. We are including two parts of the energy value chain, if you will. That is those people who are combusting fuel to make electricity as well as those people who are using electricity, and that is going to lead to some potential impacts that may not have been totally envisioned. So the question about profitability, we need to think about it in the terms of both the marginal costs that power generators will face in terms of producing their electricity and also the average costs that they will face by complying with the scheme. When you have a scheme where allowances are given away for free—and that is this allocation method known as "grandfathering"—the difference between the marginal cost and the average cost is quite considerable because the average cost is based on what they paid for the allowances—in this case very little—and the marginal cost is the decision that they have to make each time they produce an additional unit of electricity. So it is this feature of the EU ETS as a type of Emissions Trading Scheme which is giving rise to this disparity. I think it is quite a basic relationship that has been noted by a number of organisations, that the increase in revenues associated with marginal costs being passed through the power sector will be in excess of the average cost they will face in complying with the scheme.

  Q377 Mr Challen: I shall have to study the transcript on this one! Do I take it then that this is going to be a permanent feature of the scheme? It is not just a start-up situation, an initial windfall, but it is a permanent built-in feature of the scheme because the allocation is free?

  Mr Donovan: If grandfathering were to continue—and the directive does say that in Phase 2 no more than 10% of allowances could be distributed by some other means than grandfathering—then, yes, you would have a situation that in a liberalised electricity market, such as the UK, one would expect to see marginal cost pricing lead to higher revenues for power generators; yes, indeed.

  Q378 Mr Challen: The power generators in the UK appear to face tougher targets under the National Allocation Plan. How does this square with that perception? They are going to make more money out of something which appears to be tougher. The public are not going to warm to the idea of a trading scheme in carbon if that appears to be the case.

  Mr Dawson: I think the scheme was drawn up and the free allocations were designed primarily to mitigate the impact of introducing Emissions Trading on some of the other industrial sectors, to the extent that if a company in the EU faces international competition they may not be able to pass on the cost of buying in carbon to meet their emissions, and the allocations were designed to mitigate that impact on the competitiveness. I think the fact that power generators also receive those allowances and, as Charles has articulated, have the ability to pass that cost on in the price of electricity means that the general nature of the scheme may be more or less applicable to particular sectors, and whilst there may be a windfall for power generators that feature of the scheme is a very useful one for other industrial sectors.

  Mr Donovan: It might be worth noting that there are some people who have asserted that there could be a windfall for all industries who are within the EU ETS. That is, that if each industry behaved the same way as power generators they would be in the exact same situation. But I will tell you quite honestly that my conversations with managers across a number of the industries that are included in the EU ETS, very few of them outside of the power sector are looking at it in that same way; they simply do not operate in both closed—and by "closed" I mean in the absence of international competition—and also competitive markets; they simply do not have the same type of market structure. Many of them are also looking at environmental compliance for the EU ETS in the same way that they would for other types of environmental issues; so, "Tell me what it is going to cost. We will pay that and we will get on with doing business." While this feature is not unique to power generators in terms of the way that the scheme is set up, it may be that due to the market structure and the actual type of competition within these other industries that the power generators are one of the few that actually end up behaving in this "economically rational way".

  Q379 Joan Walley: Mr Donovan, I am following very closely what you are saying and I realise that we are talking about something which is very new and which does not have a common currency in terms of widespread understanding of this issue outside the industries that are most acutely affected. I am wondering whether or not in your first response to Mr Challen's last question you could perhaps summarise it in terms of a bottom line position about the windfall, and if I could ask you to explain that in such a way that, for example, if you were on my local radio station my constituents could actually understand what the real issues are. They are complicated issues and it is almost a new language that is needed to discuss all of this and I would hate to go from here thinking that I had quite grasped the kernel of what it is you are saying and what the implications are. You clearly live with this all the time, we do not; so I would be very grateful if you could just do that, please.

  Mr Donovan: I will attempt to do that as compact as I can, and let me also ask my colleagues here if there is another way that they would rephrase that. Profitability in the power sector is dependent upon the difference between the cost and revenue. When revenue exceeds cost there will be profitability. It is impossible to say what the profits of the power sector would be in the absence of the EU ETS, just as it is impossible to say what they will be with it. But it is very clear that there will be additional revenues that will be earned if power generators obey what we expect in a very free UK electricity market.


 
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