House of Commons - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Sixth Report

6 Improving UK and EU information and compliance

72. Non-compliance amongst fishermen is a serious problem in the UK, with high levels of illegal fishing and misreported landings. A recent survey showed that almost 30% of English fishermen said they illegally land fish 'quite often' or more frequently.[89] The SU report stated:

Poor compliance with management rules is viewed as a root cause of unsustainability in parts of the UK fishing industry. The current levels of non-compliance are a problem because they disrupt efforts to recover stocks, undermine trust in the system and corrupt incentives within the industry.[90]

73. The SU report acknowledged that, to some extent, non-compliance was caused by the inadequacies of the current quota system.[91] In some sectors, a large number of fishermen would go out of business if they followed the agreed catch limits "unless their income was supplemented in some way".[92] Another recent survey showed that 70% of skippers considered violating quota restrictions as 'basically wrong, but an economic necessity'.[93] However, the SU report stated that another reason why levels of non-compliance were so high was that "the chances of being caught breaking the rules are too low to act as an effective deterrent".[94] The SU report aimed to address this through a series of measures to improve compliance and enforcement, which we cover below.

74. We support the Strategy Unit report's general aim of improving compliance levels amongst fishermen in the fishing industry. Whilst we acknowledge that there are inadequacies with the current quota management system which encourage non-compliance, we believe that honest fishermen are disadvantaged by others who behave illegally, and fish stocks are illegally plundered because of it. The Government has a responsibility to deal with these inadequacies.

A 'high-transparency' system

Strategy Unit recommendation 8(a)

Fisheries departments should introduce a high-transparency system where all catches and landings are traced through markets and processors

75. The SU report claimed that the introduction of a "high-transparency system", where all catches and landings are traced through markets and processors, would have "multiple benefits".[95] It would assist in promoting a culture of compliance and improve the accuracy of data, and would also help satisfy the ever-increasing demand from multiple retailers for supply reliability and quality consistency. At present, these retailers tend to source their product from outside the UK.[96] The SU report argued that a more transparent and traceable system would ensure that the UK industry was more competitive in the global market.[97]

76. The Minister for Fisheries told us that "proper traceability is essential for any country that wants to have a sustainable fisheries management system, and we do not have that at the moment".[98]

Evidence received

77. Most witnesses recognised the need to improve transparency and traceability and welcomed the Strategy Unit's recommendations in this area. Seafish and the Scottish Seafood Processors' Federation were particularly supportive: these organisations are involved with fish processing and marketing and thus could be said to have the most to gain from improved traceability.[99]

78. The catching industry was more sceptical. The NFFO was in favour of the proposals on the condition that the industry was closely involved in the evolution of a high-transparency system and that, where short-term losses arose during the transition to such a system, government financial underpinning would be made available.[100] Defra told us that "opportunities" would be available within the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance grant regime for funding to assist with marketing and other activities related to traceability.[101]

79. The SFF was unsure whether further government regulation was the most appropriate means of improving traceability. It claimed that:

… it does not matter what the Government does. If you are selling fish to Marks and Spencer they will put far more controls on you than the EU or the British Government could ever dream of.[102]

However, the Minister for Fisheries commented that not all retailers had the same strict standards as a company like Marks and Spencer.[103]

80. The SFF believed that the measures could hinder the "flexibility which fishermen need in order to make a living".[104] The SWFPO suggested that full traceability in itself was an "absolutely impossible task" and that consumers were more interested in the quality of the product than in its origin.[105]

Our conclusions

81. We recommend that the Government adopt the Strategy Unit's proposals to introduce a 'high-transparency system'. The development of such a system should involve the input of industry representatives and financial assistance should be provided to those affected in the short-term by the transition to the new system. Unlike the Strategy Unit, we consider such a system would operate primarily as a measure to improve compliance levels, rather than a way to satisfy consumer and retail concerns.

Enforcement measures

Strategy Unit Recommendation 8(b)

Enforcement should focus more on forensic accounting, on-board observers and risk profiling.

82. The SU report considered that "the risk that non-compliance will be detected at a later stage has a strong deterrent effect".[106] It therefore recommended the development of forensic accounting techniques and offender-profiling "to reconcile information and check that landings data truly reflects the size of catches".[107] It also recommended the greater use of on-board observers and contracted fishermen's data sources.[108]

83. Although some witnesses expressed frustration at the increasing amount of regulation imposed on the industry, most agreed in principle to the measures to improve enforcement.[109]

Our conclusions

84. We welcome the greater use of forensic accounting, risk profiling and on-board observers as enforcement measures, and recommend the Government adopt this Strategy Unit recommendation. It is important that industry representatives are fully involved with the formulation of such measures. We also stress the importance of proportionality and practicality in the placement of observers. However, it must be noted that over the years the intensity of enforcement has increased in direct proportion to the continued decline in key fish stocks. Any lighter touch enforcement regime could only be contemplated if the industry throughout Europe is able to adopt the necessary policies that will result in rebuilding of stocks to levels where the spawning stock biomass of key commercial species could truly be said to be safe.

Administrative points and penalties

Strategy Unit recommendation 9

Fisheries departments should introduce a simple administrative penalties and 'points' system where the costs of infringements are transparent and predictable to the industry and most offences are decriminalised.

85. The Strategy Unit report stressed that, at present, only a "small proportion" of fishing offences in the UK result in fishermen being taken to court and fined. It believed that this was not an effective deterrent and that a more predictable and efficient system of prosecution was required. It recommended the adoption of administrative penalties, arguing that:

Criminal penalties are only of use in a limited number of circumstances, and should be reserved for persistent and extreme 'criminal' behaviour. For the rest, the imposition of administrative penalties, on-the-spot fines and a points system on licenses would be a sufficient deterrent.[110]

86. Administrative penalties were said to have two main advantages over the current prosecution system. Firstly, they would "provide a measure of certainty" to the industry regarding the outcome of specific offences. Defra told us this uncertainty was persistently flagged up by the industry as one of the difficulties with the current regulatory regime.[111] Secondly, administrative sanctions would be "faster to implement and less expensive" than the current criminal procedure.[112]

Evidence received

87. Many witnesses recognised that the current prosecution system was uncertain and protracted, and that the introduction of administrative penalties could effectively address these problems. The proposal to decriminalise most offences was likewise seen as a positive measure—the Scottish White Fish Producers' Association (SWFPA) claimed that, under the current system, it was very difficult for a fisherman to leave the industry and start a new business onshore if he had a number of criminal convictions.[113]

88. Some concerns were raised, however, regarding the practicalities of the proposal—for example which particular infringements the penalties would be applied to.[114] The RSE was also concerned that introducing administrative penalties could "send out the wrong signals to the industry", even if introduced on a progressive scale.[115]

Breach of human rights?

89. The most common concern raised by the industry, however, was that the penalties could potentially breach human rights by denying fishermen the right to a trial if they felt they had been wrongly arraigned. The SWFPA told us that it would not resist sensible measures but they had to fall within the boundaries of the European Convention of Human Rights.[116] The SFF stated that it was not entirely opposed to the introduction of administrative points, but it was opposed to it being the only possibility, arguing that "everyone should have their day in court if they think they have been wrongly arraigned".[117] This view was echoed by the South Devon and Channel Shellfishermen (SDCS), who in principle, had "no problem with the punishment being an administrative punishment", but claimed:

It is against British justice… to have a fisheries officer who may be on the quayside with you every day being in a position to impose a fine. That is wrong. We would rather… that it go through the normal procedure. Get rid of the criminal aspect if you wish, but it should not be judged by one person; it needs to be judged by our peers …[118]

90. The Scottish Minister for Environment and Rural Development acknowledged that there were complexities with introducing such a system. He told us that, for the more severe offences which could potentially threaten the livelihood of a fishermen, the accused should be entitled "not just to an administrative process but the whole due process of the law". However, he told us that there would be difficulties determining what this "threshold" would be.[119]

91. When questioned on the matter of human rights and the right to a trial, Defra told us that any legislation introduced would not be allowed to undermine human rights legislation. It added that some of the more practical details of the administrative penalties proposal were currently under discussion with stakeholders as part of the SFP.[120]

Our conclusions

92. The current prosecution system is uncertain, lengthy and expensive. This is detrimental to both the industry and regulators. We support the Strategy Unit's recommendation that a system of administrative points and penalties system should be introduced, and most offences decriminalised. We recommend the Government takes steps to introduce these proposals.

93. It is clear, however, that certain legal issues need to be clarified before such a system can be introduced. There is serious concern in the industry that a system of administrative points and penalties could breach fishermen's right to a fair trial. The Government should not introduce any system of automatic administrative sanctions which does not give fishermen any right to contest the case against them.

94. Consultation with the industry is also needed on the more practical details of such a system, such as which offences the penalties apply to, the appropriate levels of charges and who should be responsible for enforcement and imposing penalties. We are pleased to hear that these discussions are already taking place within the SFP and trust that an outcome can be reached which is fair to, and satisfactory for, all.

Cost-recovery of management costs

Strategy Unit recommendation 10

Fisheries departments should introduce progressive cost-recovery of management costs from industry to give greater buy-in and incentives for compliance.

95. The SU report also recommended the introduction of cost-recovery from the fishing industry in respect of its own management and enforcement costs in order to give "clear incentives for industry itself to work to improve compliance".[121]

96. The report cited the examples of New Zealand, Australia and Iceland—the UK's "main competitors"—which already have "significant and increasing levels" of cost recovery for management costs as reason to introduce a similar system in the UK.[122] This point was reiterated by the Minister for Fisheries, who told us that "in the successful fisheries management systems you see in other countries, the management of the fishing industry is funded by the industry itself, not by the taxpayer". He added:

I do not think it is unreasonable, if we are talking about developing a system in which the fishing industry has a real say in the management of the stocks, to say that in exchange for new rights come new responsibilities

The Minister told us that a similar cost-recovery debate was also taking place within several other EU countries.[123]

Evidence received

97. The recommendation was heavily criticised by industry representatives. It was described as "flawed" (SWFPA), as having "a number of shortcomings" (SFF) and as being, at present, "inconceivable" (NFFO).[124]

Lack of money

98. Several witnesses told us that the industry could not afford to pay for its own management costs at present. Both the NFFO and the Shetland Islands Council and North Atlantic Fisheries College told us that they were not opposed to the concept of cost-recovery in itself. However, the NFFO stated that, under the current economic circumstances, "there simply is not the money in the fleet to make a contribution to management costs" and that such a move would "push many vessel owners further away from the viability that is one of the Strategy Unit's principal goals".[125] The Shetland Islands Council and North Atlantic Fisheries College likewise commented that the measure should be considered only "after the fleet becomes sufficiently profitable to bear the costs involved".[126]

Lack of trust in the system

99. A number of witnesses said there was currently too much hostility and scepticism towards the management system to expect the industry to contribute to its costs.[127] This point was reiterated by the Scottish Minister who was less enthusiastic about this recommendation than was his counterpart in Westminster. The Scottish Minister argued that the priority should be reforming the management system rather than risk "losing the confidence of the fishermen" by charging them for its costs.[128]

Competitive disadvantage

100. The SU report cited the examples of New Zealand, Australia and Iceland—countries which have already implemented partial or full cost-recovery of management costs. Some witnesses pointed out that the UK is in greater, and more direct, competition with its EU neighbours than it is with other countries. Furthermore, the majority of other EU countries do not currently contribute towards their own management costs. The NFFO therefore called for a "level playing field" within Europe to ensure the UK was not put at an economic disadvantage as one of the few member states paying for enforcement.[129]

Our conclusions

101. We acknowledge the validity of the Strategy Unit's motivation for proposing the cost-recovery of management costs from the industry—namely, as a means by which to involve the industry in its own management as well as a means by which to improve compliance. However, we believe there are several reasons why cost-recovery is not feasible at present.

102. There is not enough money in most of the industry at present to pay such costs. Profitability needs to be improved first and then, perhaps, a suitable threshold could be agreed with industry representatives as to the level at which cost-recovery could begin. There is also a considerable lack of trust within the industry towards the current management system. Asking fishermen to put money towards a system which, to a large extent, they blame for the industry's decline would be an extremely unpopular move. We understand the Strategy Unit's argument that the introduction of cost-recovery would, in itself, help address this. However, the establishment of a more inclusive and popular management system should be seen as a pre-condition of the introduction of cost-recovery, not vice-versa.

103. We are concerned that such a measure would place the UK industry at a competitive disadvantage with its EU neighbours. The UK fleet has already suffered to a greater extent from decommissioning when compared to many EU fleets. Before any significant cost-recovery measures can be introduced, assurances are needed that similar steps are being taken elsewhere in the EU. If the Government is serious about the introduction of such a measure in the future, it must put pressure on other EU governments to do the same, including at Commission level.

104. At this stage, we do not support the Strategy Unit recommendation that progressive cost-recovery for management costs should be introduced. The recommendation is given too much prominence within the SU report and cannot be considered a serious policy proposal in the short-term.

Effort-based systems in mixed fisheries

Strategy Unit recommendation 11

Fisheries departments should commission detailed technical analysis and plans on the practicalities of introducing effort-management systems in mixed North Sea, Irish Sea and Channel fisheries.

An alternative to quota management systems

105. Non-compliance is, to some extent, caused by the way in which the quota management system operates, because fishermen often resort to discarding by-catch and misreporting landings in order to avoid being penalised. In respect of highly mixed fisheries inhabited by different species of fish, the SU report argued that the quota management system was completely inadequate. The report described European mixed fisheries as the "most complex in the world" in terms of the number of species, countries pursuing them and the resulting density of fishing effort. It is almost impossible for fishermen to selectively catch only those species for which they have quota, and levels of discards and illegal landings are usually higher than in most mono-species fisheries.[130]

106. The SU report recommended that an effort-based system should be the "preferred option" for managing highly mixed fisheries, and called for detailed analysis to examine the feasibility of replacing the quota system in highly mixed fisheries with an effort-based system. Such a system would restrict the number of days fishermen can fish at sea, as opposed to the amount of fish of each species which they are allowed to catch. The SU report identified the following benefits of such a system:

An effort system does not attempt to manage species individually but recognises that the species form a complex. Fishermen are no longer restricted in how much fish they can land, thereby removing the present incentive to hide their landings and provide inaccurate info. Fishing effort, rather than catch, is regulated. This is, by nature, easier to enforce and reduces the scope for non-compliance.[131]

107. The idea of effort-based systems is not a new one. There has been a growing demand for the introduction of such systems amongst fisheries experts, academics and the industry itself, particularly since the extent of the discard phenomenon has become more well-known. A functioning effort-based system has also been in operation in the Faeroe Islands since 1996, where it was introduced to replace the previous unsuccessful quota system. The SU report noted that the Faeroese system is "strongly supported by the [Faeroese] fishing industry and has, so far, produced good results".[132]

Evidence received

108. UK industry opinion was divided on the issue of effort-based management systems. There was widespread acknowledgement that the current quota system was flawed and largely to blame for the high levels of non-compliance and discards within mixed fisheries.[133] Whether an effort-based system was the most appropriate solution, however, was not so clear-cut. Several potential problems and difficulties with the system were raised in evidence.

Targeting of higher-value species

109. Some witnesses warned that, whilst effort-based systems could significantly reduce the current level of discards and illegal landings in mixed fisheries, the system could have a negative impact on stocks in other ways. The RSE—which strongly recommended the introduction of effort-based management systems in its own report of March 2004—warned there could be difficulties protecting high value species outside safe biological limits from being targeted.[134] It told us that additional measures would have to be taken in conjunction with effort-control to prevent such an eventuality:

there will be a tendency for fishermen to try and fish for the most valuable species, and that is why [an effort-based system] has to be combined with closed areas and real time closures… in order to try to avoid that problem.[135]

110. The RSPB also identified targeting of higher-value species as a potential problem within effort-based systems. It believed there needed to be "stringent checks and balances" to ensure that "you did not create a market for the very sort of fish that you had previously tried to avoid catching".[136] RSPB still believed, however, that controlling days-at-sea was a "sounder system" than the current quota system.[137]

111. Both the Minister for Fisheries and the Scottish Minister for Environment and Rural Development acknowledged the risk that high value and vulnerable species would be targeted within effort-managed mixed fisheries; they agreed that further analysis was needed in this area.[138]

'Technical' or 'capacity' creep

112. Some witnesses raised the problem of how to prevent 'technical' or 'capacity' creep occurring within effort-based systems. This is the incentive for fishermen to increase the killing power of their vessels to maximise the amount of fish they catch per fishing day. The RSE warned that "once the system starts working the fishermen will figure out how to catch more fish than we expected given a certain amount of effort". It suggested a possible solution would be to install "some kind of rapid response in the administrative structure" to enable the baseline of effort to be adjusted at frequent intervals, depending on the state of the stocks. It admitted however that this could be a rather "contentious" solution.[139]

Change-over from quota system

113. Both the SWFPO and the SWFPA were concerned about the practicalities of changing from one system to another. The SWFPO warned that "adequate compensatory mechanisms" had to be installed to ensure there were no "victims" of the change-over.[140] The SWFPA told us:

It would be very easy to say that overnight we will do away with the quota, we may move to a balanced effort management regime, but how do you then transfer that asset value to an effort management regime?[141]

Relative stability

114. On a wider scale, some witnesses were unsure about how the move to an effort-based system would affect 'relative stability' between the different CFP nations. The NFFO warned that there was "a serious risk" that relative stability would be undermined by the move to effort-management, a point reiterated by Dr Palfreman.[142]

Other criticisms

115. The NFFO described effort-based management as a "very crude" system, primarily on economic grounds: "tying your principal asset to the quayside for a good part of the year does not make sense in terms of economic rationality".[143] It also believed that "no rationale" for an effort system remained if the Strategy Unit's other measures to improve compliance and transparency were to be successfully adopted.[144] The SFF was more supportive of the recommendation but warned that effort-based systems may not necessarily be suitable for every mixed fishery of importance to the UK.[145]

Our conclusions

116. The existing system of quota-based management within highly mixed fisheries does not, by and large, work. It encourages non-compliant behaviour amongst fishermen and has a detrimental impact on stocks. We therefore support the Strategy Unit's recommendation that fisheries departments should commission detailed analysis of the practicalities of introducing effort-management systems in mixed fisheries and any concomitant measures in respect of net-carrying rules which may be necessary. We recommend that the Government commission such analysis as soon as possible. This should include analysis of the potential disadvantages of effort-based systems, such as excessive targeting of high value/vulnerable species and the tendency for 'technical creep', whereby fishermen continually increase the killing power of their vessels.

117. Effort-based management may not be appropriate for all mixed fisheries of importance to the UK. If such a system were introduced for the North Sea, it could have a severe impact on the whitefish fleet because catch limits would be based on cod stocks—which are low—whilst other valuable fisheries, such as haddock, are relatively healthy. We recommend that the Government undertake a case-by-case evaluation of each mixed fishery of importance to the UK to establish which fisheries are suited to an effort-based management system. Where such a system is applied, we believe the administrative structure of the system should be sufficiently flexible to enable a rapid response to any short-term difficulties that may arise. Adequate compensatory mechanisms should also be developed to assist those fishermen who are negatively affected by the initial transition to such a system. We also recommend that any effort-based system should draw a distinction between steaming time and hauling time, provided that a system can be put into place to monitor such a distinction. The Government should investigate the technology available to enable this distinction to be monitored and enforced. We understand the Danish fishing fleet already uses such technology.

118. Whilst we acknowledge there will be difficulties with applying such a system, these pale in comparison to the appalling and wasteful practices resulting from quota-managed mixed fisheries, such as the mass discard of marketable fish. We believe this phenomenon is largely a consequence of applying a quota-based management system in a fishery where it is almost impossible to restrict which specific species are caught. As such, the system is flawed and serious consideration needs to be given to other alternatives.

89 Net Benefits: A sustainable and profitable future for UK fishing, p.52 Back

90 Ibid. p.127-128 Back

91 Ibid p.127 Back

92 Ibid. p.51 Back

93 Ibid.p.186. Survey by Hatcher & Gordon (unpublished) Back

94 Ibid. p.51 Back

95 Ibid. p.129 Back

96 Ibid. p.31 Back