Memorandum submitted by the Fishermens'
Association Limited (FAL) (W05)
FAL was incorporated on 12 September 1995 to
fight for the restoration of National Control. It is a UK fishing
industry trade protection association with some 360 members in
Scotland, England (particularly South Devon and Channel Shellfishermen),
and Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Fish Producers Organisation
Ltd). It not only represents the catching sector but also community
interests, as well as the onshore industries following the affiliation
to FAL of the Scottish Ship Chandlers Association at the end of
last year.
Member vessels range in size from under 10 metres
to 60 metres. Fishing is prosecuted all around the UK, Norwegian
sector, the north Irish Sea and in the west of Scotland waters,
both near and offshore. The species prosecuted are shellfish (crabs
and lobsters) prawns, scallops, white fish, the deepwater species.
The Strategy Unit report has now been turned
in to a series of Issues papers by the fisheries Administrations.
They are the best ones to answer what has been done to take forward
the Strategy Unit proposals. As to the effect on the industry
and fishing communities of the EU fisheries policy I attach FAL's
submission to the Committee.
THE CURRENT
DIRECTION OF
UK GOVERNMENT POLICY
This is governed by EU policy which has resulted
in the gradual run down of the UK fleet to enable other fleets
notably the Spanish to have access to the "common resource".
The SU Recommendations merely formalise the strategy to achieve
that.
The following Scottish statistics illustrate
the point. These are for operational Scottish boats over 10 metres
in length, with an average length of 18 metres and engine power
of 240 hp.
| Year | Boats
| |
| 1975 | 1,782 | EEC entry 1973—Scottish waters opened to boats of eight countries
|
| 1985 | 1,396 | Fish stocks in steep decline—decommissioning and licences introduced
|
| 1995 | 1,209 | Spain and Portugal enter CFP 1986—more decommissioning
|
| 1998 | 1,045 | Drastic reduction in fish stocks—yet more decommissioning
|
| 2002 | 845 | Collapse of fish stocks—panic restrictions by Brussels
|
| 2004 | c 780 | Brussels devoid of an answer except still more decommissioning
|
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Since joining the CFP there has been a reduction of 60% in
the Scottish fishing fleet, with corresponding downstream effects
on fish processing, boat building, etc. On the basis of recent
fishing industry studies by Stirling University and other professional
institutes, it is estimated that more than 1,080 boats will have
been removed from the fleet by the end of 2003. At current values
(an average of the past five years) each of these sold or decommissioned
boats would have grossed on average more than £310,000 annually
from around 330 tons of fish. The annual loss of direct income
to the catching sector is therefore a minimum of £334 million.
Of this, £110 million would have been crew wages, with the
remaining £224 million lost to the vessel services like fuel,
repairs, gear, insurance, banks, groceries, harbours, etc.
Added value, fish processing and marketing, etc, raise the
economic value of the annual loss considerably. The recognised
GDP impact ratio for fisheries is 2.35 times the landed value.
Thus the direct economic impact of the reduction of the Scottish
fishing fleet in 1975-2003 is now a current annual loss to the
Scottish economy of a staggering £785 million. The costs
to public funds of unemployment and other social benefits as well
as broader economic consequences, including loss of tax income,
probably bring the total loss nearer to £900 million every
year. This exceeds by a huge margin any economic benefits Scotland
receives from the European Union. We have no doubt that similar
figures can be produced showing the impact on the fleet and ancillary
industries for the whole of the UK.
There are no benefits to the UK of continued EU control that
could possibly compensate for this haemorrhage. These appalling
figures represent nothing less than a national disaster—brought
about for no better reason than the ideology of "sharing
the common resource" with other EU member countries. What
the figures cannot reveal is the amount of personal tragedy and
communal disruption that lie behind them: bankruptcies, the uprooting
of individuals and families, the destruction of thriving communities
with centuries-old cultural traditions and communal lives. Major
harbours, that were the focus of social and economic life 12 months
in the year, are now marinas for a handful of yachts over a few
weeks in summer. One can imagine the reaction if Brussels had
reduced the Spanish or French fishing fleets by almost two thirds
simply to make way for incomers. And fishing is by no means as
important to those countries as it is to particular UK local communities
where the dependence on fishing is extremely high.
REGIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCILS (RACS)
Advocates of these bodies, (and the environmental lobby is
a major supporter) seem to believe that they are an opportunity
to devolve management power to relevant stakeholders; to share
in the decision making process.
This is a myth.
RACs are:
(i) a manipulation by the Commission to further marginalise
Member States' input into EU decision making. To think that fishermen
in RACs are going to push for other than self-centred policy is
ludicrous.
(ii) purely advisory bodies, and do nothing to transfer
decision-making power away from Brussels. In fact the Amsterdam
Treaty explicitly rules this out.
In the EU Presidency Discussion Paper on RACs there is definition
of a Member State's "fisheries interest" within a RAC.
Spain would only have to declare an interest in UK waters to have
a legally unchallengeable place on that RAC!
There is not a word about the allocation of ecologically
sustainable catching capacities among the Community members in
proportion to their own waters and coastlines.
There is nothing about priority of access for local fishing
interests, which means that the current arrangements continue
with the addition of local talking shops. Agreement is by consensus
so the lowest common denominator "wins" the day. In
truth the EU Commission wins as it will ignore any RAC view that
has no consensus but a variety of views on managing a particular
stock.
The one apparently positive feature is the acceptance of
the principle that fishermen are to have the majority of places
on the RACs. BUT those fishermen will be ring-fenced by regulations
to prevent them doing anything that would contravene the authority
of Brussels,
They will be powerless to prevent countries like France and
Spain, to say nothing of the new EU members, demanding their rights
under the open access regulations.
RACs cannot provide for a more devolved fisheries management.
Subsidiarity does not exist in the CFP. Competence for fisheries
was transferred to Brussels. It would be contrary to the legal
and institutional framework of the Treaty to grant RACs increased
responsibilities in the decision making process.
At least with National Control we have influence with our
decision makers with a ballot box judgement day and a publicity
sensitive political machine. If that occurred then a properly
devolved Regional Management system for the UK would make sense.
FISH STOCK
CRISIS
There is no fish stock crisis. Fishermen are finding fish
almost everywhere on the traditional grounds. Because of the lack
of feeding especially in the North Sea, brought about by Industrial
fishing (see the RSPB Report Assessment of the sustainability
of industrial fisheries producing fish meal and oil September
2004), fish stocks have been stimulated to move in to areas where
food is abundant. The EU Commission has created a beneficial crisis.
How otherwise would they have been able to annihilate the British
fishing fleet to accommodate their relentless programme of EU
integration beyond 2003. The CFP system itself must be the strategic
target .
National control and a complete reappraisal of the management
system is necessary. The policy is flawed and misguided (though
not in the overall EU philosophy) as it is dictated by Brussels.
QUOTAS
Many owners have paid highly for quota and should benefit
from that investment.They have been forced/encouraged to purchase
additional quota to remain legal. Regrettably that is being devalued
as a result of the EU fisheries policy. Decommissioning has flooded
the market. There is also a problem with quota speculators and
banks which control quota. As a result of the last decommissioning
scheme the Royal Bank of Scotland it has been alleged "owns"
40% of the Scottish white fish quota. Currently that is being
managed for the benefit of the local fleet but for how long will
that last as ITQs become the method of improving efficiency—reducing
the fleet with ownership in fewer hands possibly non-UK.
New entrants are being prevented from joining the industry
not only by the costs involved but the risk of investing by that
party and backers has to be weighed against the very uncertain
future under the EU fisheries policy. This would alter if there
was a UK controlled industry.
It is not efficiency but economic power which will permit
survival and thereafter expansion. That will not be achieved under
the EU fisheries policy nor the recommendations in the SU report
as they are designed to assist the EU achieve its aim of a EU
integrated fleet.
There is no such thing as a UK quota only the UK share of
the EU quota.
If there was National Control then UK transferable quotas
would make economic sense.
UK should follow the lead of Faroe (rejected ICES advice
and white fish stocks are dramatically improving) and exercises
national control.
The UK has suffered dreadfully from EU policies.
Since no treaty empowers the European Union to reduce employment
in one member country in order to benefit employment in another,
the systematic reduction of the UK fishing industry must be not
only halted, but reversed. The goal must be a planned restoration
to its previous status as regards catching capacity and employment
prospects, without regard to EU integrationist ideology.
CONCLUSION
The SU Report and its recommendations is predicated on further
and stricter compliance (partly paid for by industry) by a greatly
reduced fleet (decommissioning, tie ups and ITQs) within an EU
framework which integrates environmental legislation in to fisheries
management based on effort control. It offers a tantalising glimpse
of "gain after pain" by promoting community quota and
regional management based on best practice of other countries
without acknowledging that these countries all have one common
strength—National Control.
The problem with the CFP, in the view of the authors of the
report centres on non compliance, lack of transparency at sea
and the slow central decision making process.
Their solution is to regionalise (Regional Advisory Councils—a
toothless concept dedicated to promoting the CFP objectives) and
to modernise the institutions backed up by strong control, monitoring
and enforcement applied evenly throughout the EU.
It is the view of the SU authors that Relative Stability
is the major factor to assist economic viability. It is the red
line that underpins the economic viability of the UK industry.
But that view is promoted despite them being made aware that
Relative Stability is a derogation and like all such it will come
to an end.
The report is fundamentally flawed basing its recommendations
on a premise that other Member States are going to be content
for all time to allow a discriminatory principle to over-ride
EU law of equal access to the common resource.
The report is justifying existing EU policies some of which
the Report's authors admit are weak. But in their naive view it
just needs the UK to show the rest of the EU how to modernise
and then with decentralisation coupled with the painful restructuring
that is forecast to make the fleet efficient, a rosy future awakes.
21 September 2004
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