Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Written Evidence


Supplementary memorandum submitted by Clive Dibben

  1.  Further to the Committee's oral evidence hearings of 22 and 29 June 2004, I would like to clarify and add to some of the points raised in connection with my earlier submission to the Committee.

  2.  During the hearing on 22 June, Mr Jack stated that I had submitted evidence suggesting that assurance scheme standards were no more than legal compliance. I think it is important to point out that my memorandum makes clear that these comments were in connection with what the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food described as "baseline schemes", subsequently known as "foundation schemes".

  3.  There are, as Linda Campbell of PAI pointed out in her evidence, schemes that exceed legal minima to varying degrees. For the most part this is not true of the foundation schemes, which are based primarily on legal compliance and compliance with Codes of Practice. Most of the Codes of Practice have been produced and published by Government and its agencies and are themselves guidance on how best to achieve legal obligations.

  4.  As my written evidence stated, this is not solely my conclusion. It was the view of the Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food, the Food Standards Agency and others who have investigated the schemes.

  5.  The Committee also raised the issue of the integrity of the supply chain. Mr Wiggin suggested that purchasers were inclined to specify assured supplies unless commercial considerations meant it was more advantageous to buy from non-assured sources. In fact this tendency applies equally well to foundation assurance schemes themselves.

  6.  The assurance "chains" underpinning the Red Tractor logo are, in places, less complete than the Committee and others might have been led to believe. For example under the rules of the Red Tractor scheme (as at March 2004), beef and sheep destined for the food chain need not have been on an "assured" farm from birth. Beef cattle need only have been resident on "assured premises" for 90 days and lambs for 60 days (of a life span that may last from nine to 30 months for beef and up to a year for lamb). This residency period may also be "shared" between farms. It is quite possible therefore that a significant proportion of the early stages an animal's life may not be covered by assurance standards at all.

  7.  It is also the case that whilst animal feeds from commercial manufacturers must be purchased from businesses certified by the feed industry's recognised assurance system, farmers may buy feeding-stuffs from other sources based only on self-certification that it is free from contamination and fit for use as animal feed.

  8.  This is not to suggest that food resulting from foundation schemes is anything other than that which it has always been, but it does illustrate the fact that assurance schemes merely deliver food produced to a particular standard. Unless you know what the standard is and how it is enforced the mark is meaningless. This problem is exacerbated because, for those promoting the marks, it is tempting to overstate their benefits.

  9.  In this respect, I believe there is considerable overlap between evidence the Committee has received on the issue of diet and health and evidence on systems of production. Both involve highly complex systems and interactions that are seldom readily or meaningfully translated into a simple, single label. What would be of greater merit, in my view, is a system that ensures that if a food product makes a claim (whether about nutrition, system of production or provenance) that claim is clear, justified and verifiable. I believe an independent and impartially awarded mark showing that a label can be trusted to do what is says would be welcomed by all, especially if supported by a wider campaign of information about food and its provenance.

  10.  A further point was raised during the session about who pays for assurance. Mr Wiggin suggested that it was always the farmer.

  11.  For baseline or foundation schemes this is almost invariably true. In some cases there is a small premium paid for products from foundation assured sources, but both the cost of compliance with assurance scheme standards and the cost of inspection fall on the farmer who has little power to pass on those extra costs to purchasers.

  12.  However, given the widespread uptake of foundation schemes it would, perhaps, be odd for a premium to be paid for a non-premium attribute. Indeed an economist might observe that if purchasers and the end consumer are unwilling to pay a premium for products achieving foundation level assurance, perhaps they attach no additional value to it.

  13.  This may be either because they believe that what foundation assurance delivers is a basic requirement of the food they buy (ie a standard feature rather than an optional extra), in which case why would they pay more? Or it may be that the foundation schemes have failed to communicate what "added value" their schemes offer to purchasers. In which case consumers don't understand why they should pay more.

  14.  It is probable that both are true to some degree, but given that other types of assurance scheme seem to be able to attract premium prices (eg Organics, high welfare systems, EU protected food name products etc) it may be more of the former than the latter. It is also the case that some purchasers (eg manufacturers of baby foods) are prepared to pay a premium to foundation scheme producers willing to comply with additional obligations as part of their supply contract.

  15.  Purchasers may, in fact, see foundation assurance simply as a means of ensuring producers' legal obligations are adhered to in a climate where doubt has been cast on the ability of industry and enforcement bodies to deliver that legal base. Effectively the "assured" status of the farmer then becomes the key that allows access to major markets.

  16.  Taken in this context, it is perhaps more understandable why producers find it difficult to pass the cost either of inspection or compliance (mostly with legal obligations) further down the supply chain. An economist might suggest that this only becomes a realistic proposition where purchasers or consumers are convinced that a mark delivers additional value for which they are prepared to pay. This would imply that those whose involvement in assurance schemes is driven by a desire to achieve a price premium will need to think both about exceeding the foundation level and considering consumers' wishes and expectations—which are diverse.

  17.  In this context, it should be noted that the Strategy for Sustainable Farming and Food agreed with the Policy Commission's suggestion that "all food should attain" the baseline assurance standard. As such, the strategy document and the Policy Commission have effectively sought to peg all food production systems (whether organic, high-welfare, integrated farming, foods of specified provenance etc) to the Red Tractor system.

  18.  Both the Strategy document and the Policy Commission also stated that the baseline standard and the Red Tractor mark should be controlled by Assured Food Standards (AFS).

  19.  As a recent Parliamentary Question confirmed (Hansard 17 May 2004: Column 655W), AFS is a private company, running a private scheme(s). It may therefore seem a little strange that AFS has, effectively, been given dominion (seemingly as part of Government policy through the strategy document) over other private companies and charities operating other private schemes.

  20.  As "gate keeper" to the national baseline farming standard, if all food is to be covered by the baseline scheme (the Red Tractor) all those other schemes and bodies will have to comply with AFS rules and standards, which may be less demanding or less appropriate in some circumstances.

  21.  This "one-size-fits-all" approach is potentially damaging to all as it threatens to erode existing standards, market differentiation and price premiums for those who have achieved them. It may also diminish the incentive for others to move away from the lowest common denominator.

  22.  I would reiterate that, in my view, it is of greater importance to show that any food production system delivers common outcomes, than to pretend all food is produced to a common system. Quite clearly, it is not.

  23.  With reference to the Committee's hearing on 29 June, whilst there is much of Dr Baines' evidence with which I would concur, I do not share his narrow definition of an assurance scheme. As stated in my previous evidence, by reference both to the Food Standards Agency and International Standards Organisation, it is evident that any certification scheme which involves elements of farming practice is de facto a farm assurance scheme—hence the inclusion of Organic schemes within the FSA definition of assurance. As such, his estimate of the number of schemes focuses on a handful of mostly large and mainly farmer-controlled schemes. There are others and, as Linda Campbell noted in her evidence of 22 June, the number of schemes is likely to keep rising. Indeed, it is arguable that the focus of the Fischler reforms on quality products and improving standards rather dictates that, at least on a European scale, it is desirable that this should be so.

  24.  Nor should the definition of an assurance scheme be restricted to whether or not a scheme has EN 45011 accreditation. The FSA has advised that all schemes should have such accreditation, but that does not suggest that prior to accreditation it is not a scheme—the issue is one of credibility through EN 45011 (the accreditation process itself requires that schemes have a track record before seeking EN 45011).

  25.  Finally, despite my view that there is much that can be improved in the assurance sector, whether within the so-called foundation level schemes or others, I do not share Dr Baines' view that they are without merit. Even the foundation schemes provide an additional tier of inspection, at the cost of farmers, that would not otherwise exist across a large proportion of farm output in the UK. They also have the potential to be an invaluable tool in helping to change the culture of an entire industry in a way that regulation alone never could.

  26.  Unlike Dr Baines I do not, and would not, advocate that farmers withdraw from assurance. To do so would be to withdraw from the one mechanism that could deliver many, if not all, of the things Dr Baines and others wish to see for the food and farming industry of the future—including a hazard/risk based approach to farming practice. It would also be a withdrawal from the only mechanism that will allow farmers to recoup the cost of operating to higher standards than required by law, whether viewed in an international or domestic context.

  27.  My concern is not that assurance, in all its diverse forms, should be dismantled, but that the systems of delivery and labelling are improved in a way that delivers a better degree of assurance to consumers and allows schemes with differing objectives, standards and markets to work together more harmoniously. Unless this happens it is difficult to see how the full potential of the Fischler reforms and the Strategy for Sustainable Food and Farming can be realised in the UK.

  28.  If this is to happen, those who control assurance at the foundation level should, perhaps, do more listening before they start communicating. They must ensure that when they communicate with others they have a verifiable message that others want to hear. The current situation seems to be predicated on telling people what you want them to believe, and if they don't, saying it louder.

  29.  The NFU's evidence revealing the disparity between consumers' recognition of the Red Tractor logo and their understanding of it, is a case in point. Not unlike the caricature of the English abroad, the assumption seems to be that if the message is loud enough (or in this case sufficiently ubiquitous) this will, of itself, lead to understanding. A better approach might be to ask whether the right things are being said, in the right way and whether the systems are there to support it.

  30.  For a policy of "reconnection" to be effective, there must first be a dialogue in language that all understand.

July 2004


 
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