Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 640-659)

MR RICHARD BRUNSTROM, MR ANDREW GRIFFITHS, MR PETER SMITH, MR GRAHAM CAPPER, MS ABIGAIL MAHONY AND MS PAULA WILLIAMSON

12 OCTOBER 2004

  Q640 Joan Ruddock: Have all of you had discussions with the RSPCA on this Bill, on the very issues we are discussing? Have you tried to obtain any clarity and consensus about the way forward?

  Mr Brunstrom: I personally have. I have no problem at all with the current position of the RSPCA and, as far as I can predict, how they intend to operate in the future. I am very certain, like the local authorities, we could strike a satisfactory MOU. What I cannot be certain of is what the RSPCA is going to do tomorrow because they are not under Government control. You can be fairly certain what I can do because Parliament can tell me.

  Q641 Alan Simpson: Who do you see as being responsible for the administration either of an accreditation scheme or a statutory code? Would it be the police who had a statutory responsibility for the oversight of that or the local authorities? You are saying it needs to be someone other than the voluntary sector. Where would that legal responsibility lie?

  Mr Brunstrom: If you are going to have an oversight code of some sort it must rest in the public sector. It can only rest with local authorities or the police, or it could be joint. We have such processes for crime and anti-social behaviour nowadays through partnerships which are extremely effective. It would be possible to replicate some process like that; but of course there is a different player in this field because the policy here is Defra's and not the Home Office or the regions. If you are going to have an oversight code it has to have some sort of local implementation and somebody who can be held responsible locally. I see no reason why that should not be the Chief Constable but I see no reason why it has to be. We would not object if it was, provided there was a mechanism which did not leave us the only one holding the baby.

  Mr Griffiths: Local authorities do have a wide experience of such schemes within the environment health world and the current housing legislation going through. There are accreditation schemes for landlords and they are well run and understood. There is a national scheme to do just that. I think local authorities would be well placed to run such a scheme.

  Q642 Alan Simpson: Are you saying that would be your preference? It is not so much holding the baby as feeding the cat. Is the responsibility for that best placed, in your eyes, with local authorities?

  Mr Griffiths: I would think it probably is, yes. The Chartered Institute is not a local authority body, but many of our members work in local authorities. I think many of them would welcome that opportunity because it does actually provide a framework for co-ordination and for communication, and would actually provide an opportunity for all parties to sit round the table and understand where each is coming from—which does not happen much at the moment. This is why we welcome the Bill's provisions, to bring a lot of disparate legislation under one roof. There is still some need for clarity under certain areas but, at the moment, this is definitely the right way forward and local authorities could have a part to play in that. I think they would see that as a benefit, because litigation is expensive and anything which can be done to reduce those costs would be welcomed by local authorities.

  Mr Brunstrom: I should say, Chairman, for absolute clarity that the RSCA, as I understand it, do not seek and do not particularly welcome the concept of accreditation and it might be better to find a different mechanism. The reason for that is a very valid one: the esteem with which they have been held in society would change dramatically if they actually had powers. It is not necessarily a good idea for them or society to empower the RSPCA. I would not wish to pursue that as the only option. Certainly trying to enforce something on an unwilling private body is not likely to be a recipe for success. I know it does not find a lot of favour in Defra either, but there are other means of achieving this. I would not wish us to get locked into accreditation that was simply an idea.

  Mr Capper: Some of the issues when we are talking about local authorities, an accreditation scheme, Memorandum of Understanding or whatever route is chosen, is that we must realise there are so many different types of local authorities as well. We have district councils; we have got unitary authorities; we have got county councils. They would all have to be brought together to discuss these schemes, probably through LACORS, the LGA or one of the national bodies.

  Q643 Mr Wiggin: There is an Assembly angle on this?

  Mr Capper: Yes.

  Q644 Mr Wiggin: Can I come back to the "Not me, guv" we were on earlier because there is another side to this which is very concerning which is: what protection does the animal's owner get from this Bill? From the panel today nobody really wants to touch this at all, but these people also need to be protected from excessive prosecution by a charity or body and nobody seems to want to protect them either.

  Mr Capper: All local authorities operate under the enforcement concordat which is agreed with the Home Office, and a lot of reliance is placed on that within local authorities. That lays down the road on which we would approach an investigation and prosecution. It gives us guidelines to give advice, enforcement, help and aid. Prosecution through local authorities is the last resort. There is a lot of protection built into the enforcement concordat to look after the owner of the animals

  Q645 David Taylor: The Pet Care Trust has put to us (and I would like to put this to Mr Capper or Ms Williamson) that the draft Bill appears strong on recovering the enforcement and legal costs but short on ensuring adequate compensation if inappropriate action is taken. This can have a serious effect if the subject of the inappropriate or excessive action is a business. Could I ask Ms Williamson her views on what the Pet Care Trust say?

  Ms Williamson: In terms of protection for the individual we have hitherto relied upon the court's own judgment. When we have investigated an individual we have applied our own enforcement concordat and that is heavily regulated in itself. Although we are not the police our investigations are subject to PACE and, therefore, they are afforded a certain level of protection there. When we prosecute them the situation up until now has been that the public purse has had to foot the bill for a lot of the investigations, and there has been no statutory regime whereby local authorities can recover their costs, not only of bringing the matter before the courts but also, as things currently stand, actually caring for animals in the interim. I think the Bill does assist local authorities in recovering costs. In terms of protection afforded to the individual, I have not seen that to be the case that the individual was not going to be protected and would not be compensated if an action was brought wrongfully.

  Mr Capper: I can repeat what I have said before. There is a system in place within all local authorities that we are not overzealous on prosecutions, we are not out to harm the industry and the protection for the owner of the animals is looked after by the court.

  Q646 Chairman: One of the things I am intrigued about from both the police and local authority standpoint is channels of information that come to you which determine whether you actually will, if this becomes law, (a) look into welfare issues and (b) into cruelty issues. My impression up until now is that the flow of information has come as a result of members of the public communicating—say, to the RSPCA or possibly to the police—certain concerns; but the Bill invites local authorities to effectively make up for any deficiencies in its own experience by the appointment of inspectors, however those may be defined—they could be the RSPCA or other persons. You have just made an interesting point that, "We want a light touch. We do not want to go after people"; but the implications of the Bill is a bit more proactive. Could you help us to get the balance between the new opportunities to deal with welfare issues, the powers it confers upon authorities to appoint inspectors, and how you envisage in the real world local authorities actually using those powers? Are you going to send inspectors out or simply wait for information to come in?

  Mr Capper: I repeat what I said earlier, as far as local authorities go in my experience, which is mainly large farm animals, we have inspectors—and in Wales there are 110 of them—who are out there every day, some seven days a week. Some authorities cover the area seven days a week on a rotating basis. Our inspectors are out there already visiting farms, visiting cattle markets and livestock auctions. They are actually looking for problems because we enforce a whole host of other legislation to do with farm animals. Therefore, we do not rely on the public as much as maybe the RSPCA do. Our own inspection force has routine programmed inspections.

  Q647 Chairman: Could I just raise with you a point out of your evidence that picks up on that point. In paragraph 4.1.2 you pose this question: "Is it the intention to widen enforcement of animal welfare during transport and at markets to District and Borough Councils?" Could you just expand on that point? It is almost saying the current situation is okay but if we dilute resources and bring more authorities in there could be problems. Could you just develop that point?

  Mr Capper: Basically the Animal Health Act is a function that is operated by county councils, by unitary authorities, by London boroughs and metropolitan authorities. Those authorities all enforce animal health legislation. What we are actually asking there is not whether we will dilute those authorities and include the districts; what we are asking is, is it the intention with the Welfare of Animals (Transport) Order and the Welfare of Animals at Market Order (which are a statutory responsibility on those authorities I have asked) if they come under this Bill (a) will they be statutory, and we lose statutory power because they have got EU Community obligations which gives our inspectorate force greater powers which we need to enforce that legislation; and (b), more importantly, the last thing we want is to have duplication of workings. If the Bill is not defining which local authority does what, we could be in the position that we have three or four different types of local authorities in one area running round doing the same work.

  Mr Smith: We get many complaints, either from the general public or from other organisations, and one of the problems we have is if other organisations receive complaints they are reluctant to pass the information of the complainant and the details to us. They prefer to deal with the complaint themselves, even if it relates to a premises licensed by our local authorities. That is one of the comments we have made in the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health's response that all bodies that receive information regarding animal welfare should forward those on to the licensing authority, or the inspectors, or the constables or wherever the role ends up. We often get complaints, for argument's sake, with regard to two kittens in a pet shot which have got no water. When we have to prioritise that against visiting a health and safety incident or a food safety premises where a suspected food poisoning may have occurred you can see the position we are in as a local authority. We have got to try and prioritise these things and it is a difficult situation for us in local authority to deal with.

  Q648 Mr Drew: I am interested in what you were saying a moment or two ago and I pose this as a dilemma. As we become apparently more mobile as a society and, in the case of large animals, there are less markets because the idea is that farmers will, for one reason or another, send their animals to the most appropriate place, how do you balance these two issues of the transport of animals (which for some animals is essentially going to be a quite difficult experience) as against more local facilities that may not be as good? Is this something you are discussing amongst your profession association?

  Mr Capper: There is a great deal of discussion not only amongst ourselves and through our associations regarding transportation but it is area which has had major discussion within Europe as well on reducing the length of time that animals can travel. We are discussing it. The problem is that for some reason the animal movements within the UK are vast and enormous even within the UK without actually exporting livestock and it is controlled by the open market, the free market, and that is our major problem. Certainly as far as slaughter animals go the position is that the large retailers now control the market and they have their own slaughterhouses or contracts. In Wales we have the silly situation where we have the largest density of sheep and we actually send sheep to Scotland to be slaughtered, and on a wagon coming down there will be sheep coming from Scotland to be slaughtered in Welsh slaughterhouses. That is the free market and those issues we cannot get over. Particular attention is paid to transportation and whether, in the end, transport will be reduced but that will be on the legislation that takes care of that.

  Q649 Mr Drew: I would be interested to know on what grounds you could take action against someone who is transporting animals—and there are obvious ones such as lack of water—but overcrowding, for example, is a very subjective view. Some people say animals can cope with that; others would say it is horrific. How can you make judgments? Is this legislation in any way going to affect that, or this is outside of it? You shake your head. Should we be looking at these areas, because we are picking up what I call some of the "specialist interest areas" but we are not looking at the huge area of transportation?

  Mr Capper: Transport is a whole area on its own. When we talk about "stocking densities" it is in each inspector's mind and eye what he sees, because there is no laid down law on stocking densities. There are guidelines both in the EU Directive, which our national legislation puts in place, and in the guidance that is issued by Defra for the welfare of animals during transport. There are guidelines. It is very difficult to work out stocking densities. Certainly I was involved in investigating live export and I did a lot of work on stocking densities and I just could not come up with the answer. It is a visual thing that has to be taken on the condition of the animals on the vehicle and the way they are travelling. I do not think you can actually lay down that "You can have three animals in that compartment and four in that". I think that is unworkable. It is the experience of the inspector who has gone to see the problem.

  Q650 Alan Simpson: In the submission from both the Local Government Association and the Chartered Institute there is a reference you each make welcoming the improved powers of inspection. Specifically in the document from the Chartered Institute you make a reference to the difficulties experienced currently by members who have sought to gain entry to premises that are part used by a private dwelling. You just trail off interestingly saying, "We would welcome the opportunity to contribute to further discussions on these matters", presumably on the specifics of how those powers of entry should be strengthened. Would you like to elaborate on those points now?

  Mr Smith: On the particular case I dealt with where we had a successful prosecution on a lady with 22 counts of cruelty, this inspection and the following prosecution was following a warrant under the Breeding of Dogs Act which prevented me going into the lady's house. The police officer accompanying me (because she had threatened to shoot me before) went into her house under his powers of PACE and said that the conditions in her house were worse than the kennels on which we successfully got 22 prosecutions. In this particular instance the animals in her house (and she was breeding a particular breed in her domestic accommodation) I could not touch and they had to stay there. We certainly believe the powers should include domestic accommodation. It would rest again with the professionalism with the inspectors or the police constable and the use of PACE and the enforcement concordat to ensure that the domestic accommodation, and the rights of that person regarding his or her domestic accommodation, were not violated.

  Mr Griffiths: One of the problems I know a lot of our members have experienced very specifically—and I have to confess I am not absolutely clear, from the way the Bill is drafted, whether this is covered or not and I am happy to be reassured if it is—is where a pet shop is operating and selling animals but does not have a licence, as is required by law, and there is no power of entry so if the owner of the pet shop refused access physically to an inspector that that would not be an offence. That is a very specific issue which we would like clarity on. It is not clear to me whether in fact the Bill does provide that.

  Mr Capper: I think the major criteria here is that it has to be used sensitively. I think my colleague mentioned it. We in large animals are used to having this power to enter a dwelling; it is used as part of the business and is contained in a lot of our legislation, such as Cattle Identification Regulations, the By-products Order and various other regulations because most farms, and certain unlicensed premises, use their dwelling as part of their business. To enforce the legislation we enforce we need to look at records. When we are talking about welfare we need to look at medicines records and other issues. Apart from the licensing there is also the recordkeeping that we need to be able to deal with. If we do not have powers to enter those dwellings, or that part of the dwelling that is used in the course of the business, we will struggle.

  Q651 Alan Simpson: In other parts of criminal legislation and in childcare legislation the powers of entry are based on "reasonable grounds to believe that an offence is being committed". Is that the sort of catch-all phrase you would wish to see in animal welfare legislation?

  Mr Capper: The vast majority of our legislation gives us the power to enter a dwelling which is used not solely as a dwelling. There is no caveat with it; it is an open-ended one because most of the records or the offices in farms are certainly kept within farmhouses normally, or in 90% of the cases. We need access to those records and to medicines records as well. That is why, in most of our legislation, it is an inbuilt open-ended issue.

  Q652 Alan Simpson: I need to bring that back to the local authority experience in terms of your example of not being entitled to enter someone's house?

  Mr Smith: The particular premises did not have a licence. As Mr Griffiths has said, without a licence I had no rights of entry, so we had to apply for a warrant to go into that premises. We had received information from private individuals who had worked at that premises they were so disgusted with what they had found they reported it to us; but without a licence we had no rights so we applied to the court for a warrant. We still could not get into her domestic premises but it did allow us to go onto the rest of her premises, which was a farm, and was used for breeding dogs.

  Mr Brunstrom: Unsurprisingly the question of access to dwelling houses is under almost constant review in other aspects of the criminal law. The Home Office has a great deal of experience in this and we would very much welcome more consistency in powers. I think it would be very much in the public interest if there was one set of justifications for entering a dwelling house, and not dozens and dozens depending on where the power appears. I think that would be reasonably easy to achieve. Of course, we would fully recognise that there is a need for the police to be present when things get awkward.

  Q653 Chairman: I want to turn to Ms Williamson because we have asked you to comment on various issues which have come out of our discussion, but you were kind enough to send in a paper of your own as evidence, which I think particularly focuses on clause 26 of the Bill which refers to disqualification of people from engaging in activities involving animals. I wonder if you would care to say a few words by way of introduction to your paper and the very specific point based on one case you were involved in which makes you question this particular clause.

  Ms Williamson: Worcestershire County Council prosecuted various individuals in its county repeatedly spanning approximately three years. We got convictions for cruelty to their cattle. They owned six farms in the locality; they certainly were not penniless farmers. They had a lot of property and a lot of land. We prosecuted them successfully, we got convictions and we also got two lifetime Disqualification Orders—in other words, they were banned from keeping animals for life. They appealed and we went to the local Crown Court.

  Q654 Chairman: I noticed you mentioned that in your evidence. I raise the question in the context of this Bill as to whether, if somebody had carried out acts of such cruelty, you might say, "You're not fit to keep an animal at any time in the future". I was quite surprised that this power existed. Is that under the Farm Animal Welfare legislation?

  Ms Williamson: It is under an Act, not as old as the 1911 Act, made in 1954 Protection of Animals Amendment Act. It gives the courts a power to ban somebody from having custody of an animal if, but only if, they have been convicted of one offence, which is causing unnecessary suffering to an animal under the 1911 Act. The circumstances in which a court, under the existing legislation, can ban somebody is much more restricted than that anticipated by this Bill, which is why we welcome section 26 because it enlarges the circumstances in which somebody can now be banned from keeping an animal.

  Q655 Chairman: But not banned for life?

  Ms Williamson: I anticipate banned for such term as the court thinks fit, and that can range from a year, two years or for life. In our case we were able to successfully ban three individuals from keeping animals for life. The problem we then encountered was that we had no statutory power to go onto their land take away their animals in the event that they would breach that Disqualification Order. We were absolutely powerless. We are creatures of statute and we cannot do that which statute does not empower us to do.

  Q656 Chairman: That is under the current legislation?

  Ms Williamson: That is under the current law, yes. We sought help from the civil courts which is why we went through the High Court and through the Court of Appeal to ask for an injunction. The Court of Appeal, although they wanted to help us, basically said, "We're not here to cure loopholes in the criminal law. Go away and get it cured in this way". This is where this Bill helps us. At the moment section 26 of the Bill provides that a court can disqualify an individual from carrying out certain activities in connection with animals and it provides for four scenarios: owning animals, which we say is a welcome addition; keeping, arranging or participating in the keeping of animals; dealing in animals; or transporting them, or being connected with the transporting of animals. My concern is this: that in cases we brought against the individuals in our locality we were only able to successfully convict them in relation to certain offences because we relied upon the existing definition of "custody of an animal", which is where it is defined in case law at the moment as "control of an animal" or "the power to control an animal". Hitherto a court has looked to a case for a definition of custody because it is not statutorily defined, unlike now when it is. Although I can see that courts might like to rely upon statutory definitions, such as we have got contained in the Bill, rather than having to rely on case law, we actually found it very helpful to rely on quite a broad definition. The reason we found it helpful was because, in our case, the defendants concerned argued that they no longer owned the animals; they argued they no longer kept the animals; they argued they no longer arranged or participated in the keeping of the animals; they argued that they did not deal in the animals; and we could find no evidence that they had transported them or arranged for the transport of the animals. They were clever defendants and it was unusual circumstances. I accept in the majority of the cases the Bill would be very helpful. My concern is with the more complex situation where the local authority has to engage in convert surveillance in order to be able to prove that a defendant falls within one of these four categories in order to be able to successfully disqualify them from keeping animals.

  Q657 Chairman: Just to clarify, because it has come up before in evidence we have received that during the process of prosecution cruelty having been identified people then take steps to divest themselves of any responsibility for the animals—in order words they could sell them to third parties; so that by the time the case comes to court they can say, "They don't belong to us any more", and they get round the procedures where the animals may be taken away from them and their ability to do something with them is removed. Are you saying you either want a better definition of cruelty in the context of the Bill, or you want to go back to the wider definitions which are conferred by reference to precedent of previous cases? Which would you prefer?

  Ms Williamson: I think that is an interesting question. I have seen LACORS' submission that they would like to see an enlarged definition. I myself am happy with the four activities included in the Bill, but in our own experience at Worcestershire County Council we feel there should be another category which would be "having custody of an animal where custody includes control of that animal"; or, and this is the crucial point, "the power to control that animal". I think that would then capture those defendants which are clever enough to argue that they have divested themselves of custody of an animal.

  Q658 Chairman: Is there any merit in having a situation where at the point at which the cruelty offence has been identified (in other words, the observations to which you referred earlier have been concluded) you should be able to somehow freeze the position of the people who have control, own or are in some way dealing with those animals? The impression I get is that as soon as people are discovered to cause welfare problems they then take steps to move away from the situation; whereas what you would want to do in a prosecution sense is say, "I have seen that at a moment in time and that is the situation we need to look at", and not some evolving situation?

  Ms Williamson: I can see merit in that, although by the time you get to court the court are not only interested in the relevant period, ie when the offence was committed, the bit you have captured, but they are also interested in how an individual defendant has behaved since they have been discovered up until the point when the case actually arrives at court. If they have behaved much better and are now toeing the line and are caring for the animal etc then they will be much more lenient on them and are much less likely to impose lifetime Disqualification Orders on those individuals than they would be if they had totally ignored any advice from Defra vets or local authority inspectors. The problem we face is I think the majority of cases would not be bothered by this particular definition of section 26 disqualification. The problem we have had is that we have spent an in ordinate amount of public money in enforcing current animal welfare legislation against certain individuals because it just would not have fitted neatly within this definition. I think individuals can be quite smart and on the face of it they have divested themselves of custody. I think it takes a lot of effort to get to the truth. A magistrates' court is not always best equipped and does not have the time to look at the minutiae of a case. Fortunately the Court of Appeal got to the truth of the matter in our case—our individuals had got legal tenancies—and were able to demonstrate they had passed animals to another person and they had granted that other person legal tenancy in relation to their farm dwellings. They turned out to be fictions, of course but we had to rely upon very unusual circumstances. If we were not able to argue that they had retained power to control that animal we would not have succeeded in convicting these individuals in relation to a large number of charges. The common scenario is that an individual would pass ownership or custody of an animal to a partner, wife, spouse or a girlfriend. From research I did in preparation of our Court of Appeal hearing my understanding is that a large number of local authorities were not enforcing Disqualification Orders simply because of that fact because of the resources it would take to actually investigate the matter further. I think the main concern we have is that although section 26 is good, we would not like the old definition of custody to go because we would not succeed in getting home a lot of our cases, because farmers are getting very clever.

  Mr Capper: I agree with everything my colleague has said, but I think the wider issue that bothers me, and the general public know about it, we all know about it, is where people are banned but because of the way appeal cases have gone and the way that legislation is at the present time under the old fashioned legislation it is almost meaningless. There are so many ways round the keeping of livestock even though you have a ban from the court. I know of a farmer that lives in North Wales being sent to jail three times because he was in breach of the ban. Everybody laughs at this and says, what is the point of having a ban if it is not going to work? This is why we ask in our submission for this custody to be widened so that there is no way out of it. Maybe our submission is slightly over the top. Our submission includes ownership and management, care or control of, or power to control any animal, and, whether accompanied or not. Then we go on to say about working with animals and we list all the issues. We need something which says that if a ban is served by the court then the definition of custody and control must be so tight that it does not make a fool of us like the present legislation is doing whereby it is so easy to get round the ban because of the definitions that we have a major problem.

  Q659 Alan Simpson: I am sure you will understand that as a Committee it may be of some interest for us to hear the difficulties that you faced in the past and about the ability of people to bob and weave around the existing legislation. For me the central point is to check with you the different wording around the same themes that each of you have submitted. If that were in the Bill then that would give you the enforcement powers to partake in legislation that gave you the ability to intervene and enable you to follow it through in effective terms.

  Mr Capper: Yes.

  Ms Williamson: I think for the most part it would, but there are going to be a large number of cases that we are aware of that would slip through the net because of this definition.


 
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