Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 760-769)

MR MIKE RADFORD

12 OCTOBER 2004

  Q760 Chairman: Should they ever be allowed to keep animals again?

  Mr Radford: Not unless they can show the court that their attitude to animals has changed, and I think there should be a very high threshold on that. Fighting and baiting is cruelty of a different order to negligence or ignorance.

  Q761 David Taylor: You referred there to animals in a general sense but in your written evidence you talked about animals of the relevant kind, so someone who kept dogs for fighting could be allowed in your view to retain the right to own or keep other species, could they?

  Mr Radford: My personal view is that they are not fit to keep any animals but, of course, all this legislation will take place against the background of the Human Rights Act. Now, Westminster has retained the power to legislate incompatibly with the Human Rights Act but clearly it is in everybody's interests, not least on questions of certainty, if legislation can perform the object that one wants it to perform compatibly with the Human Rights Act. If it was an automatic disqualification of all animals it might run into problems of being disproportionate, because depending on the circumstances it might mean that somebody lost their livelihood, for example.

  Q762 Chairman: Can I raise with you a question about enforcement, because there has been some concern expressed by a lot of witnesses, for example, about the role of the RSPCA as a potential prosecutor and they would appear to have indicated to us that it is not a role that they want to adopt or have as a responsibility. Could you say a word about how the current animal welfare legislation is enforced and how that, in your judgment, is affected by the proposals in the Bill?

  Mr Radford: In your question, Chairman, you use the word "prosecutor", and I think we have to be careful here. At the moment the RSPCA is a prosecutor in the sense that, like any one of us, it exercises its right to bring a private prosecution. The reason is historical: Richard Martin and his friends got legislation enacted in 1822; it was aimed primarily at cruelty in Smithfield market. In 1822 there was no state body to enforce the legislation, so Richard Martin went down to Smithfield and started bringing prosecutions himself. He had got things to do in the House of Commons so he could not be down at Smithfield all the time so he employed a man, and he bought the man a uniform, and then he and his friends got together in a coffee house in Old Slaughters Coffee House in the City, and formed what was then the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which had the dual role of prosecuting and educating. Now, at that time criminal prosecutions were brought by the person who had been wronged, so if you stole my table I would prosecute you privately because you had violated my property. Clearly the animals could not bring prosecutions so Richard Martin, then Richard Martin's employee, then the employees of the SPCA, as it was then, brought prosecutions privately and, like so much in constitutional arrangements, if you were starting now with a blank piece of paper no one would come up with that idea but as you have a system that works and, it has to be said, is saving the state considerable amounts of money, and is also founded on a body of trained expertise, nobody is seriously going to do away with it. If I could compare the situation with Scotland where there is not the same tradition of private prosecutions, what happens there is the Scottish SPCA, which is a completely different organisation, investigates complaints in exactly the same way as the RSPCA inspectorate do, but if they feel there are grounds for prosecution, they then have to pass the file to the Procurator Fiscal because there is not the tradition of private prosecution. The number of prosecutions under the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912, which is the equivalent, are very few indeed and the reason is quite simply that the Procurators Fiscal have limited resources, a huge amount of criminal work, and animals are low down the pecking order. So the RSPCA are doing this. My understanding is that the legislation will make absolutely no difference to the RSPCA's position in terms of their power to prosecute. That will go on as, indeed, it has been since 1824. Where I think the confusion is is not in their role as prosecutor but whether in investigating complaints and gathering evidence they should get more powers, and again my understanding is that they do not seek those powers and, indeed, those powers are not going to be given to them under the Act, so essentially the RSPCA's position is one of status quo.

  Chairman: That is helpful.

  Q763 Joan Ruddock: As you mentioned the position in Scotland, we heard another witness suggest that there could be new Scottish law which would be inconsistent with England and Wales and that that could cause some problems. Are you yourself familiar with how these two legislative proposals are developing and where inconsistencies lie?

  Mr Radford: Yes. The Scottish Bill is significantly behind this Bill. It started later; the Executive issued a consultation document, it must have been earlier this year; it was a much more substantial document than the consultation document that Defra issued but I think that was because they have watched and, indeed, participated to a certain amount in the consultations which have gone on. In that consultation document there are clearly some differences. For example, certainly in the consultation document they proposed extending the definition of "animals" to at least some invertebrates. Now, whether that will appear in the Bill remains to be seen. I suspect that the measures will be very, very similar with just a touch of difference to show that devolution is worthwhile, but I would be surprised if the differences went to the substance of the legislation.

  Q764 Joan Ruddock: That is helpful because we know that animals are now being moved all over the United Kingdom, so it could be significant if there was some aspect of the new laws that differed.

  Mr Radford: I would be very surprised if the substantive principles differed.

  Q765 Joan Ruddock: And do you know the definition of "animal"? Are the Scottish proposals simpler, closer to Northern Ireland, than the ones we have?

  Mr Radford: No. They are talking about, for example, including the octopus and some invertebrates. There has been public consultation and they have gone away to think about it and then I suspect they will come back to interested parties with further ideas. What I would suspect, and this is totally informed, is that if Westminster decides to restrict the definition of "animal" on the face of the Act to vertebrates they will do similar but, as is envisaged in this Bill, with the provision to add to it which again is a principle which already exists. It is exactly what is contained in the Animal Scientific Procedures Act. The Act itself applies to all vertebrates apart from humans with an enabling clause to add, and the octopus has been added by way of regulations.

  Q766 Patrick Hall: Could I ask you if you can cast any light or give any advice on the issue of pet fairs? The Committee has had some different evidence submitted to it regarding the question of legality and some groups have suggested that pet fairs by definition are illegal and cannot be licensed. Others have pointed out that this is not necessarily so and in some instances some local authorities do license them. Any views?

  Mr Radford: My view is that they are not unlawful, that pet fairs are lawful, but that is a view which is not, as you are aware, universally accepted. I think the important thing about what we will describe as pet fairs is not what they are called; the crux of the issue is can the animals' welfare be secured. If animal welfare can be secured, I do not see a problem, that is the test, and to go back to the definition of "welfare", what is so important about the concept of welfare is that it is about outcomes. We have to be very careful here that we do not end up with a tick box mentality which says that if you have enough boxes ticked then everything is hunky dory. Things may not be hunky dory or, indeed, they may be perfectly acceptable with only some of the boxes ticked. I think, Chairman, on the question of companion animals and welfare and the duty of care it is important to say this: first of all, that I do not think it would be desirable to be overly prescriptive. The idea is not that everybody keeps their dog in the same way or their cat in the same way: there will be people in this room who have a variety of animals and we keep them in different ways and hopefully the welfare of those animals is fine. So there has to be autonomy. Secondly, companion animals raise very different issues from the other classes of animals to which welfare legislation applies. If you think of farm animals, for example, there are relatively few species of farm animals. They are all being kept for the same purpose or similar purposes; they tend not to have terribly long lives, they do not get old and by and large the equipment, the housing, is similar because there is a relatively few number of manufacturers, so there is a commonality which simply does not exist with companion animals. You have a huge number of species being kept in very varied circumstances. Even if you take the dog, to secure high welfare for a chihuahua requires very different conditions from securing high welfare for a labrador. Even with the chihuahua, are we talking about a six month old chihuahua, a five year old chihuahua, or the geriatric chihuahua on its last legs, but has a perfectly acceptable quality of life but a very different type of life to that which it had when it was a puppy. So it is very difficult to be prescriptive about input because of the variety. The test should be on outcomes—what is the quality of life for this animal and the welfare to individual animals.

  Q767 Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. I think on the basis of what we have heard your lectures must be very interesting!

  Mr Radford: Having been forewarned and prepared for the answer, may I answer Mr Taylor about disqualification orders?

  Q768 Chairman: Yes. That would be helpful.

  Mr Radford: The situation at the moment is that, under the 1911 Act, where the owner is convicted the court has a discretionary power to confiscate the animals which were the subject of the prosecution. It also has, regardless of who is convicted, a power to disqualify the offender from having custody of either a particular type of animal, particular types, or all animals for whatever length of time the court sees fit, so you are absolutely right, the discretion lies entirely with the court. Now, if you will indulge me for just a couple of minutes, essentially the Bill seeks to re-enact existing provisions. The difference is that at the moment the court, if it decides not to make one or other or both of these orders, does not have to give any reason. What the Bill seeks to do is to place a duty on the court if it decides not to make an order to give the reasons why, and clearly that has the advantage of, first of all, concentrating the mind of the court and secondly, if its reasons are either bad law or unreasonable, it clearly will open the way to an appeal. I draw attention to this in the paper but I have a problem with the wording of both orders, because the wording simply repeats the existing legislation and the problem is that the implication of these orders is that they are part of the punishment, so they can be given as well as or as an alternative to a fine or imprisonment. Now, these were introduced after 1911 by primary legislation, my view is that these orders should be seen not as part of the punishment but as animal protection measures. In other words, somebody has been found to be unfit to look after an animal. They get their fine or their imprisonment or whatever but these orders—disqualification, confiscation—are not part of the punishment, they are an animal protection measure.

  David Taylor: I hope, Chairman, that those very recent comments there will form part of the observations and recommendations as it is very, very important and central.

  Q769 Chairman: I am looking to you to make certain that point does not get ignored in the plethora of detail which will come to us. Mr Radford, can I thank you most sincerely on behalf of the Committee for a very clear and helpful tour through a number of very important points in the Bill. I am sure we could have spent the rest of today going through this line by line, clause by clause, but I think we have touched on some of the main and very important issues and for that we are very grateful. We look forward to your subsequent little piece of paper which I think you are going to produce for us. Thank you very much again for coming.

  Mr Radford: Thank you very much for inviting me.





 
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