Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs First Report


4  Offences

57. Clauses 1 to 5 set out the offence provisions of the draft Bill. We discuss clauses 1 to 3 below. We received almost no evidence on clauses 4 or 5, apparently because submitters endorsed the provisions, and we make no comment on them.

58. The approach taken to drafting the offence provisions in the draft Bill has been informed by section 1 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911, as amended by subsequent legislation. Section 1 is the key offence provision in current animal welfare legislation; it contains the core cruelty offences. Clauses 1 and 2 of the draft Bill are based on the offences in section 1 of the 1911 Act. The table below sets out the relevant offences from section 1 and the corresponding clause in the draft Bill.

Correspondence between Protection of Animals Act 1911 and draft Bill
Section 1 of the Protection of Animals Act 1911[58] Corresponding clause in the draft Bill
Section 1(1)If any person—
1(1)(a)shall cruelly beat, kick, ill-treat, over-ride, over-drive, over-load, torture, infuriate, or terrify any animal, or shall cause or procure, or, being the owner, permit any animal to be so used, or shall, by wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do any act, or causing or procuring the commission or omission of any act, cause any unnecessary suffering, or, being the owner, permit any unnecessary suffering to be so caused to any animal; or Clause 1(1) and (2)
1(1)(b)shall convey or carry, or cause or procure, or, being the owner, permit to be conveyed or carried, any animal in such manner or position as to cause that animal any unnecessary suffering; or Caught within clause 1(1), although secondary legislation appears to be anticipated (clause 6(2)(a))
1(1)(c)shall cause, procure, or assist at the fighting or baiting of any animal; or shall keep, use, manage, or act or assist in the management of, any premises or place for the purpose, or partly for the purpose of fighting or baiting any animal, or shall permit any premises or place to be so kept, managed, or used, or shall receive, or cause or procure any person to receive, money for the admission of any person to such premises or place; or Clause 2
1(1)(d)shall wilfully, without any reasonable cause or excuse, administer, or cause or procure, or being the owner permit, such administration of, any poisonous or injurious drug or substance to any animal, or shall wilfully, without any reasonable cause or excuse, cause any such substance to be taken by any animal; or Clause 1(7) and (8)
1(1)(e)shall subject, or cause or procure, or being the owner permit, to be subjected, any animal to any operation which is performed without due care and humanity; or Clause 1(9)
shall tether any horse, ass or mule under such conditions or in such manner as to cause that animal unnecessary suffering Caught within clause 1(1); code of practice proposed under clause 7[59]
such person shall be guilty of an offence of cruelty within the meaning of this Act …
Section 1(2)For the purposes of this section, an owner shall be deemed to have permitted cruelty within the meaning of this Act if he shall have failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision in respect of the protection of the animal therefrom … Clause 1(10)(b)

59. In addition to updating the 1911 Act, the draft Bill would also create a new offence of failing to take reasonable steps to ensure an animal's welfare, set out in clause 3.

Clause 1: cruelty offence

60. The offence of cruelty set out in section 1 of the 1911 Act is the bedrock of current animal welfare legislative legislation. It provides the key means by which offenders have been prosecuted for animal welfare offences and, as such, could be described as the key definition of what constitutes acceptable animal welfare standards.

61. Clause 1(1) of the draft Bill would be the nub of the cruelty offence under the draft Bill. It provides that an offence will be committed if a person causes unnecessary suffering to a protected animal, where the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that that suffering would result, or would be likely to result, from his or her act or omission to act. Clause 1(1) needs to be read in conjunction with clause 1(3), which lists factors to be considered in determining whether suffering is "unnecessary", and with clause 54(2), which defines "protected animal".

62. Clause 1 also creates other offences, all of which could be described as falling under the umbrella of 'cruelty'. These other offences can be summarised as follows:

63. The Government has said that clause 1 "is intended to retain all protection in the 1911 Act which remains relevant today and which has not been provided elsewhere in the [draft Bill]."[60] The Government considers that the provisions of the 1911 Act "no longer reflect modern practice, lack legal certainty in modern circumstances and are not consistent with the [proposed] scheme of protection for vertebrates under the [draft Bill]".[61] The Government's intention therefore seems to be re-enact the substance of section 1 of the 1911 Act, in an improved and updated form.

64. Few submitters commented on the provisions of clause 1 in any detail.

Complexity of clause 1

65. Mike Radford described clause 1 as "unduly complicated", on the basis that it covers several distinct (although related) offences, which are capable of standing alone. He suggested that the various offences in clause 1 should be separated out, to improve clarity.[62]

66. Defra officials agreed that clause 1 "is too unwieldy at the moment" and explained that they "are trying to break it down":[63]

One way in which we are trying to simplify it is to separate out permitting cruelty as a separate clause … [in clause 1(2)] a keeper of an animal commits an offence if he permits another person to cause an animal to suffer, separating that out, and possibly then even separating out the other specific things such as administering poisonous drugs to animals as well.[64]

67. We consider that the clarity and utility of clause 1 would be greatly improved if it were divided into separate clauses, each setting out one offence. We recommend that each of the following sub-clauses or groups of sub-clauses should be separated out:

  • sub-clauses (4), (5) and (6) (mutilation)
  • sub-clauses (7) and (8) (administering injurious drugs)
  • sub-clause (9) (performing an operation without due care).

The Government should consider how the clause 1(10) definition of "keeper", which is relevant to each of these offences, can best be incorporated into each offence.

68. Although the offences of mutilation, administering injurious drugs and performing an operation without due care are specific cases of the 'parent' offence of "causing unnecessary suffering", rather than new and unrelated offences, the clause 2 offence of fighting is equally a specific case of causing unnecessary suffering, and it has been—helpfully—made into a separate clause. We consider that separating out the cruelty offences will assist clarity and will not affect the ability to bring prosecutions under the various offences.

Clarity of clause 1(1)

69. We expressed our concern to the Minister that the definition of the offence of cruelty set out in clause 1(1) was too complex. We asked why the draft Bill did not simply provide that a person commits an offence if "an act of his or a failure of his to act causes a protected animal to suffer".[65]

70. Defra officials explained that the offence was drafted so as to break it down into its component parts:

… the way it is drafted is to read that, if you cause an animal to suffer and that, firstly, you knew that you were going cause it to suffer, secondly it is a protected animal and, thirdly, the suffering is unnecessary. All those three things have to happen before you commit an offence. It is not just causing a protected animal to suffer. It has to be unnecessary suffering and you have to have known that you would be causing it.[66]

However, officials did undertake to consider whether the drafting of the offence could be simplified.[67] We welcome the Government's undertaking that it will seek to simplify the drafting of clause 1(1).

Mens rea of cruelty offence: clause 1(1)—causing unnecessary cruelty

71. The main cruelty offence can be broken down into two categories: offences where the offender him or herself caused the unnecessary suffering to the animal and offences where the offender procured or permitted the unnecessary suffering to be caused. We deal with these two categories separately; procuring or permitting unnecessary suffering is discussed below.

Current law

72. The offence of cruelty set out in the Protection of Animals Act 1911 has both an actus reus (or action) element and a mens rea (or mental) element. This means that, in prosecuting a charge of cruelty, the prosecution must show not only that the defendant committed the illegal act but that he or she had the requisite 'guilty mind' at the time of the offence. The wording of the mens rea element of an offence should indicate whether the defendant is to be judged according to a subjective or an objective test. If the former, the prosecution will have to show that, as a matter of fact, the particular defendant before the court knew the consequences of his or her conduct (or must be assumed to have known them, on the basis of the evidence). If the latter, the prosecution will have to show that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have known the consequences of his or her conduct—effectively, that the defendant should have been aware of the consequences, regardless of whether the defendant was in fact so aware.

73. The mens rea element of the cruelty offence in section 1(1)(a) of the 1911 Act is indicated by the use of the words "cruelly" and "wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do". Case law has established that the appropriate test to be applied, in respect of the person directly responsible for the cruelty offence, is an objective test.[68] Crucially, the application of an objective test in respect of this offence means that the offence applies not only to deliberate infliction of suffering but also to suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect. This provides protection for animals in a much wider range of circumstances than would be the case if a subjective test were to be applied in respect of this offence, because factors such as a defendant's ignorance, domestic or financial situation or health or mental state are irrelevant.

Proposals in the draft Bill

74. Clause 1(1) provides that a person would commit an offence where the person knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that his or her act or omission would cause an animal unnecessary suffering, or that it would be likely to have that effect.

75. The test to be applied in assessing whether the mens rea element of the clause 1(1) offence has been satisfied is therefore not entirely clear. Clause 1(1) refers to "ought reasonably have known", which indicates that an objective test is appropriate. However, clause 1(1) also refers to the concept of 'knowledge', which could be argued to indicate a subjective test. Given the approach taken in existing animal welfare law, we would have assumed that the Government intended that an objective test should be applied under clause 1(1). However, in the context of discussing the appropriateness of the proposed penalties in respect of the clause 2 fighting offence, the Minister stated:

Cruelty is not lack of attention … lack of attention comes under the welfare offence. Cruelty is deliberate cruelty which results in pretty serious suffering …[69]

This clearly suggests that the Government intends that the clause 1(1) cruelty offence should apply only to deliberate infliction of suffering and that it should not extend to suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect.

Mens rea of cruelty offence: clause 1(2) and (10)—procuring or permitting unnecessary cruelty

Current law

76. Section 1(1)(a) of the 1911 Act also creates an offence of causing or procuring another person to cause an animal unnecessary suffering or, in the case of an owner, permitting unnecessary suffering to be caused to his or her animal. Section 1(2) of the 1911 Act extends the 'permitting' aspect of the cruelty offence by providing that an owner shall be deemed to have permitted cruelty if he or she failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision in respect of the animal; where an owner is convicted in accordance with section 1(2), however, a lesser penalty will apply than in the case of conviction under section 1(1)(a).

77. Case law has established that the appropriate test to be applied, in respect of a person who causes, procures or permits unnecessary suffering, is a subjective test.[70] This means that the offence applies only where the prosecution can establish that the defendant knew, or must be assumed to have known, that unnecessary suffering would result from his or her actions. However, the courts have also held that the 1(2) provision that "permit" includes failing to exercise reasonable care and supervision must be assessed objectively; the section 1(1)(a) offence of permitting unnecessary suffering can therefore be extended to apply to instances of negligence or neglect, by way of section 1(2).

Proposals in the draft Bill

78. Clause 1(2) provides that a keeper of an animal would commit an offence if he or she permitted another person to cause the animal unnecessary suffering. Clause 1(10)(b) states that a keeper will be treated as having permitted unnecessary suffering if he or she failed to exercise reasonable care and supervision in respect of the animal.[71]

79. It is therefore clear that, in assessing whether the mens rea element of the clause 1(2) offence has been satisfied, an objective test is appropriate because of the use of the phrase "reasonable care and supervision". The offence of permitting unnecessary suffering would therefore extend to suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect on the part of a keeper but only where that suffering is caused by another person who is not the keeper.

Our position

80. We are extremely concerned that the Government apparently intends that the clause 1(1) cruelty offence should apply only to deliberate infliction of unnecessary suffering and that it should not extend to unnecessary suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect. As currently drafted, unnecessary suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect would appear to engage the cruelty offence only where the suffering is caused by another person who is not the keeper, as a result of the keeper's negligence or neglect. The Government's apparent position would represent a backward step in terms of animal protection: it would lessen the current protections in existing animal welfare law and would significantly restrict the scope of the cruelty offence.

81. We assume it is the Government's intention that unnecessary suffering which arises as a result of negligence or neglect should be dealt with under the clause 3 welfare offence. We consider such an approach is inappropriate for two reasons. First, the penalties available under the welfare offence are less serious than those available under the clause 1(1) cruelty offence. Second, and more importantly, we understand the purpose of the welfare offence to be to deal with those cases where the standard of care given to an animal is clearly inadequate, but where it is not possible to demonstrate that the animal has suffered unnecessarily. The distinction between the cruelty offence and the welfare offence should be whether the animal has suffered unnecessarily, not the mental state of the person who caused that suffering. The extent of an offender's mental culpability can best be reflected at the sentencing stage, where we would expect those whose negligence or neglect has caused unnecessary suffering generally to receive a lesser sentence than those who intentionally or recklessly caused such suffering.

82. We therefore recommend that the Government amend the draft Bill to make it clear that the mens rea element of the clause 1(1) cruelty offence should be assessed by means of an objective test, so that the defendant's conduct will be assessed on the basis of what a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have known about the consequences of his or her conduct.

Mental suffering of an animal

83. The cruelty offence under section 1(1)(a) of the 1911 Act clearly applies not only to causing physical suffering to an animal but also to causing an animal mental suffering, because it includes an offence of infuriating or terrifying an animal. The RSPCA expressed concern that clause 1 of the draft Bill would not clearly cover suffering caused by psychological, as well as physical, factors:

We believe that there should be an express provision to the effect that "suffering" includes suffering caused by physical or psychological factors. This is implicit under section 1(1)(a) [of the Protection of Animals Act 1911] which makes it an offence to do various things including "infuriate, or terrify an animal", but in our view it should be made explicit …[72]

The same concern was raised by Mike Radford: "once you take away "terrify", there is no specific indication that mental suffering is still relevant."[73] Mr Radford explained why it is important that the offence of cruelty should apply to mental suffering, as well as physical:

… Mental suffering [on its own] is horrendously difficult to establish beyond reasonable doubt, but certainly it is useful in cases where there is both physical suffering and, if there is bad physical suffering, it can be easier to prove associated mental suffering.[74]

84. We recommend that the Government amend clause 1 so as to make clear that it is an offence to cause unnecessary mental suffering to an animal, whether or not that mental suffering is accompanied by physical suffering.

Clarity of clause 1(3)

85. Clause 1(3) sets out the considerations to which "it is relevant to have regard" when determining whether suffering can be described as "unnecessary", for the purposes of clause 1(1) and (2). The considerations can be summarised as being whether:

86. Clause 1(3) is likely to be applied primarily by prosecutors, seeking to establish whether a prosecution can be mounted under clause 1(1) or (2), and by the courts, in seeking to determine whether a charge has been proven. As the draft Bill currently stands, animal welfare offences would be dealt with in the Magistrates' Courts.[75]

87. Mike Radford also thought clause 1(3) was unduly complicated and suggested that, in practice, its complexity could make it difficult for a prosecutor to secure a conviction under clause 1(1) or (2). He suggested that the complication arose because of the attempt, in clause 1(3), to reflect two relevant, but separate, lines of case law:

… what is going on there is that [paragraphs] (c) and (d) are taken from one line of case law which dates back to 1889, a case called Ford v Wiley, where the court talked about a legitimate purpose and proportionality, and [paragraph] (e) refers to case law dating from the early 1990s where the High Court laid … down as a test [whether the conduct concerned was in all the circumstances that of a reasonably competent and humane person].[76]

88. We consider that clause 1(3) is unclear in its intent and application. The drafting of the sub-clause raises a number of questions, including:

  • Although "it is relevant" for the prosecutor and the courts "to have regard" to these considerations, are they required to do so?
  • Must all of the five relevant considerations be met, or is it sufficient that only some of them are met?
  • If some of the considerations are met, what weight should be placed on each consideration?
  • Is it possible to establish unnecessary suffering if none of the five relevant considerations are met?
  • If paragraph (b) is met—that is, the conduct which caused the suffering complied with law—is that an absolute guarantee that the suffering was not unnecessary?

Further confusion is caused by the fact that, if suffering is to be established as unnecessary, paragraph (a) requires a 'yes' answer whereas paragraphs (b) to (e) require a 'no' answer.

89. We are concerned that, as presently drafted, the complexity of clause 1(3) will create uncertainty for prosecutors and the courts, which could make it difficult for a prosecutor to secure a conviction under clause 1(1) or (2). We recommend that the Government consider how clause 1(3) can best be clarified.

Clauses 1(4) and 1(5): mutilation

90. Clause 1(4) would make it an offence to mutilate a protected animal, or cause a protected animal to be mutilated, or permit the mutilation of an animal of which you are a keeper. The draft Bill does not define "mutilation". For the clause 1(4) offence to be made out, evidence of suffering as a result of the mutilation would not be required.

91. Clause 1(5) would delegate a power to the appropriate national authority to specify circumstances in which the clause 1(4) ban on mutilation would not apply. Although we discuss aspects of the clause 1(5) delegated power in this section, we deal with the appropriateness of the power more fully in part 5. We discuss evidence we received on proposed exemptions under clause 1(5) in part 9.

Current law on mutilation

92. Defra officials explained that there is currently a great deal of secondary legislation banning or permitting certain mutilations, in certain circumstances:

… certain mutilations are already regulated so some quite unpleasant sounding mutilations are already banned in regulations. There are other mutilations which are regulated in the sense you have to try something else first. So, for example, you are not allowed to do tail-docking on piglets as a routine thing. You have to try and address their needs for environmental enrichment to stop them fighting each other first. There are also other mutilations which only certain people can do. For example, only a veterinary surgeon can do a certain operation or only under certain anaesthesia.[77]

93. Officials indicated that the intention behind clause 1(4) and (5) is to bring all these current regulations on mutilations together into one place.[78] The Department confirmed that, if the draft Bill is enacted, clause 1(4) will not come into force until the secondary legislation providing for exemptions, to be made under clause 1(5), is in place.[79] Officials told us that secondary legislation could be put into place fairly promptly because "the vast majority of what is now the situation on mutilations is already in secondary legislation."[80]

Scope of clause 1(4) offence

94. Submitters expressed concern about the likely scope of clause 1(4), in particular whether tail docking, wing pinioning or wing clipping were likely to amount to mutilation.[81] Tail docking in dogs is an area on which Defra has put forward a proposed policy; evidence received on specifically on this point is therefore discussed in part 9.

95. We understand that Defra intends to amend the draft Bill so as to include a definition of "mutilation".[82] The definition adopted will be based on the wording suggested by the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, in which mutilation is defined as:

All procedures, carried out with or without instruments, which involve interference with the sensitive tissues or the bone structure of an animal, and are carried out for non-therapeutic reasons.[83]

96. In order to make the scope of the proposed mutilation offence clear, we consider that it is crucial that a definition of "mutilation" is included on the face of the legislation. Without such a definition, what constitutes "mutilation" would effectively be defined by the appropriate national authority, on the basis of what mutilations the authority chose not to exempt from clause 1(4) by means of clause 1(5). The definition should also assist in rendering "mutilation" a less emotive word in the context of animal welfare legislation, because it will have a clear meaning in both a legal and a veterinary context.

Likely exemptions under clause 1(5)

97. There was particular concern amongst farmers' organisations about which mutilations were likely to be exempted under clause 1(5). The NFU emphasised that "what may be appropriate provision for companion animals is not necessarily appropriate for animals kept for commercial purposes as in farming" and sought reassurance that the draft Bill would not jeopardise farming practices such as "teeth clipping in pigs and castrating animals[,] which are not necessarily normal practices in terms of companion animals".[84] The NFU also pointed out that, in some circumstances, farmers are required to carry out mutilations:

In terms of taking the horns off cattle, under welfare codes and farm assurance, I have to do that as part of my good farming practice to be a farm-assured farmer … Surely, what you have to do is make sure that you look at what is necessary for the welfare of the animal …[85]

98. The RSPCA welcomed the outright ban on mutilation set out in clause 1(4), but then gave a list of ten circumstances which it considered would need to be exempted from the ban. These included neutering domestic animals, microchipping or otherwise marking an animal, disbudding young livestock and docking and castrating lambs, piglets and cattle.[86]

99. We understand that Defra has yet to take any final decisions about which mutilations will be exempted by means of the clause 1(5) delegated power. Defra has told us that the Secretary of State is likely to exempt mutilations that are necessary for reasons of welfare, good management practice, including mutilations used in traditional farming practices, and necessary companion animal mutilations such as castration and neutering.

100. Defra's position at present appears to be that tail docking in dogs will not be exempted "except for therapeutic or welfare reasons"—that is, tail docking for cosmetic reasons would be an offence under the draft Bill.[87] In respect of wing pinioning, Defra's intention is currently that an exemption will be provided in respect of waterfowl pinioned for conservation purposes, although:

There is work currently going on within the zoo industry on the best methods of pinioning and also its necessity. We would want to look at the evidence that comes out of this work before we make any definite statements on whether or not [wing pinioning] will appear [as an exemption].[88]

101. On the basis of the evidence we have received, it is evident that the list of exemptions to the clause 1(4) mutilation offence is likely to be lengthy. We have therefore considered whether it is in fact appropriate or meaningful to have an absolute ban on mutilation on the face of the legislation, given that the ban is likely to be considerably less than 'absolute' in practice. This is particularly true given that farmed and companion animals can have quite distinct welfare needs and practices in this respect, and any exemptions made under clause 1(5) will need to distinguish between these.

102. On balance, we support the inclusion of clause 1(4) on the face of the Bill because it will send a strong message about animal welfare to the courts and the public. The inclusion of mutilation as a separate class of welfare offence is also important for evidential reasons: if acts of mutilation were left to be dealt with by clause 1(1) and (2), evidence of suffering as a consequence of the mutilation would be required.

103. We discuss the need for consultation on draft orders proposed to be made under clause 1(5) in Part 5, and the appropriateness of likely secondary legislation on tail docking in dogs in Part 9.

Clause 2: fighting offence

104. The offence of fighting is currently contained in the Protection of Animals Act 1911, but is subsumed under the general heading of "offences of cruelty", in section 1(1)(c). The draft Bill is intended to reproduce the substance of the current offence "but with changes to reflect modern circumstances".[89] Clause 2(3) defines an "animal fight" to mean an occasion on which a protected animal is placed with an animal, or with a human, for the purpose of fighting, wrestling or baiting. Clause 2 seeks to criminalise all aspects of the organising and staging of an animal fight, including arranging, publicising, attending, recording and giving or receiving money for such a fight.

105. We received very little substantive evidence on clause 2. Submissions relating to the appropriateness of the proposed penalties are dealt with in part 6. Mike Radford raised a question about the drafting of clauses 2(1)(a) to (e), which relate to arranging, publicising, using or keeping a place to be used for a fight, or permitting such use of keeping, and receiving money for admission to a fight. Mr Radford asked whether the prosecution would need to show that a fight actually took place, or whether it would be sufficient to show that a fight was intended to take place.[90] The offences in clauses 2(1)(a) to (e) are all acts likely to take place in the run up to an animal fight; the question is whether an offence would be committed as soon as the act took place, or only once the fight towards which the act was directed took place.

106. We consider that each of the acts specified in clauses 2(1)(a) to (e) of the fighting offence should be deemed to be offences at the time at which each act takes place. Provided that sufficient evidence exists in the absence of the fight, prosecutions should be able to be pursued in respect of such acts without the need for the animal fight to take place. The enforcing authorities should not have to wait for a fight to take place before being able to take enforcement action. We recommend that the Government amend clauses 2(1)(a) to (e) accordingly.

Clause 3: welfare offence

107. Clause 3 would provide that a keeper's failure to take reasonable steps to ensure an animal's welfare would amount to an offence. Defra has indicated that the key purpose of the new offence is to allow action to be taken in respect of foreseeable harm, which is not possible under current legislation. Where a keeper is treating an animal in such a way that harm is likely to occur but has not yet occurred, the draft Bill should enable enforcement action to be taken.

Analogy with the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968

108. The Government has presented the clause 3 welfare offence as updating the law protecting companion and kept animals in order to bring it into line with the existing law on farmed animals' welfare. The Minister told us that "there is already a duty of care for farm animals which allows intervention to take place before suffering actually occurs and that is the critical difference between the existing legislation and what we hope to achieve with this Bill regarding non-farm kept animals."[91] Similarly, Defra has described section 1(1) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968 as imposing "a positive duty to ensure the welfare of livestock situated on agricultural land".[92]

109. The "duty of care" for farmed animals to which the Minister refers is contained in section 1(1) of the 1968 Act, which provides:

Any person who causes unnecessary pain or unnecessary distress to any livestock for the time being situated on agricultural land and under his control or permits any such livestock to suffer any such pain or distress of which he knows or may reasonably be expected to know shall be guilty of an offence under this section.

Evidence received

110. The Society of Conservative Lawyers commented on this point:

The furthest reach of the … 1968 [Act] offence is where a person permits livestock that are on agricultural land and under his control to suffer any unnecessary pain or unnecessary distress and he has actual or constructive knowledge of it. This is a much higher threshold for committing an offence than [that proposed under] clause 3(1): the 1968 Act [refers to] causing or knowingly permitting "unnecessary pain" and "unnecessary distress" [which] is much closer to causing "unnecessary suffering" … than it is to failing to take reasonable steps to ensure an animal's welfare under clause 3(1) of the draft [Bill].[93]

Our position

111. We commend the Government for the introduction of the welfare offence under clause 3. This clause will allow preventive action to be taken at a point at which harm has yet to occur to the animal in question, something which is not possible under current animal welfare law. It should make a significant and important contribution towards enhancing animal welfare.

112. However, we consider that the Government is being disingenuous in presenting the proposed clause 3 welfare offence as a simple extension, from farmed animals to all kept and companion animals, of an existing duty to ensure welfare. The existing offence on which the Government relies, section 1(1) of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968, is not analogous to the proposed welfare offence. We consider that clause 3 would in fact extend the protection currently offered by section 1(1) of the 1968 Act. We entirely support this extension, but we consider it is important that the Government should accurately represent to Parliament the nature of the proposals to which it is seeking Parliament's agreement.

Drafting of the clause 3(1) offence

113. Submitters representing a wide range of interests within the animal sector were almost universally supportive of the introduction of the concept of a so-called 'duty of care'.[94]

114. Mike Radford made two specific comments in relation to the drafting of clause 3(1). He pointed out that it "is insufficient to use the word 'welfare' without qualification. An animal's welfare can be good, bad, or indifferent; although the clause is clearly intended to be about good welfare, this needs to be specified."[95] He also noted that clause 3(1) "is already commonly being referred to as 'the duty of care'; it would be helpful if this concept were to be incorporated into the wording ..."[96]

115. The Society of Conservative Lawyers also considered that, as currently drafted, clause 3(1) does not create a "duty of care":

… the clause 3(1) offence has been misleadingly publicised. It does not, in fact, impose a positive duty of care, providing that an offence would be committed if that duty is not met. Rather, it is an offence of omission and would be more clearly expressed if the word "commit" was excised: "A keeper of a[n] … animal shall be guilty of an offence …[97]

The Society also commented on the mens rea, or mental, element of the clause 3(1) offence, noting that it:

… appears to be a strict liability offence of omission … we think it entirely appropriate from a public policy perspective that a mental element of culpability is introduced: a person should only be capable of committing the clause 3(1) offence knowingly or recklessly."[98]

116. We recommend that the Government re-consider the wording of the clause 3(1) offence, in order to clarify the nature of the offence. In particular:

  • A keeper should be required to ensure an animal's good or beneficial welfare. As currently drafted, an offence would be committed if a keeper fails to take reasonable steps "to ensure the animal's welfare". "Welfare" in itself is a neutral term; clarification of what kind of welfare a keeper needs to ensure is required.
  • The Government should consider whether clause 3(1) would not be better and more helpfully expressed as a positive duty of care, rather than as an offence of omission.

117. We consider it is appropriate that the welfare offence should have only an actus reus (or action) element and no mens rea (or mental) element. This would mean that a keeper who unknowingly or negligently failed to take reasonable steps to ensure an animal's welfare would be as culpable as a keeper who intentionally or recklessly failed to take such reasonable steps. However, our endorsement of the elements of the clause 3 welfare offence should be read in the context of our comments on the mens rea element of the clause 1 cruelty offence.

Clauses 3(4) and (5): meeting an animal's basic welfare needs

118. Clause 3(4) is a statement of an animal's basic welfare needs; for the purposes of the welfare offence, an animal's welfare is to be taken to consist of the meeting of these needs "in an appropriate manner". The five stated needs are:

a)  the need for a suitable environment in which to live

b)  the need for adequate food and water at appropriate intervals

c)  the need to be able to exhibit normal behaviour patterns

d)  any need to be housed with, or apart from, others of an animal's own or other species

e)  the need for appropriate protection from, and diagnosis and treatment of, pain, injury and disease.

119. Clause 3(5) sets out the considerations to which a court should have regard in determining whether a defendant has taken reasonable steps to meet an animal's needs "in an appropriate manner". An "appropriate manner" is defined as being a manner appropriate to the animal's species, degree of domestication, and environment and circumstances. Clause 3(5) is intended to address those circumstances in which the clause 3(4) needs are not attainable. Defra has referred to the examples of farmed animals, which often cannot exhibit all of their normal behaviour patterns, and pets, whose normal behaviour patterns are restrained by their 'unnatural' environment, such as living in a cage or in a flat.

The five freedoms

120. The needs set out in clause 3(4) are based on the so-called "five freedoms", which were set down by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) in 1993 as a statement of what constitutes good animal welfare.[99] FAWC describes the five freedoms as defining "ideal states rather than standards for acceptable welfare". The five freedoms are:

a)  Freedom from hunger and thirst—by ready access to fresh water and a diet to maintain full health and vigour

b)  Freedom from discomfort—by providing an appropriate environment including shelter and a comfortable resting area

c)  Freedom from pain, injury or disease—by prevention or rapid diagnosis and treatment

d)  Freedom to express normal behaviour—by providing sufficient space, proper facilities and company of the animal's own kind

e)  Freedom from fear and distress—by ensuring conditions and treatment which avoid mental suffering.[100]

Evidence received

121. Although submitters were generally supportive of the inclusion of the clause 3(4) needs on the face of the draft Bill, some reservations were expressed. Some submitters felt that the needs were aspirational, rather than practical, and were therefore not attainable in all circumstances. The RSPCA told us that it understood that Defra might wish to delete clause 3(4) from the draft Bill.[101]

122. The Meat and Livestock Commission was amongst those organisations which welcomed the fact that the draft Bill was "built around" the five freedoms.[102] The RSPCA was also strongly supportive of the inclusion of the clause 3(4) needs on the face of the draft Bill, saying that "it is not just about not being cruel to your animal, it is about actively caring for it".[103] But the RSPCA argued for the list of needs to be expanded, describing the existing list as "non-exhaustive" and arguing that it should also include "the need for adequate exercise, appropriate environmental enrichment, appropriate freedom to move and the need to provide, whenever reasonably possible, conditions which avoid mental suffering including protection from fear and distress."[104]

123. The Farm Animal Welfare Council was more cautious, emphasising that the five freedoms are intended to be aspirational:

… the five freedoms are still very robust but we should recognise they are ideals, so one sees them as the target of a system and it gives a very good steer to farmers, stockmen and so on to understand what they should be targeting, but they are a set of ideals. It is not always possible to allow freedom to express normal behaviour because sometimes animals will kill each other if you allow them the freedom to express normal behaviour, so there are limits …[105]

124. The Federation of Zoological Gardens was concerned that the five freedoms could not be applied entirely sensibly or appropriately to zoos and asked for the draft Bill to include instead, specifically in respect to zoos, the five principles enunciated in the Secretary of State's "Standards for Modern Zoo Practices":[106]

[The five principles are] not a subset [of the five freedoms], [they are] an improvement, [they are] less generic. The five principles actually were derived from the five freedoms but they were worded to specifically apply to the keeping of exotic animals, therefore they are more appropriate to apply to zoos than the much less precise five freedoms that are presently listed in the Bill. We think that using those would not be to the benefit of animals in zoos …[107]

125. Similarly, the Federation of British Herpetologists suggested that the five freedoms might not apply sensibly to animals which exist both in the wild and in captivity; in relation to the need to be able to exhibit normal behaviour problems, the Federation asked how this would relate to feeding captive snakes with live prey: "… snakes in the wild feed on live prey … so that would mean we are not going to be able to feed them frozen food; we are going to have to feed them live mice … we would be opposed to having to introduce that".[108]

126. The RSPCA suggested that clause 3(5) should be amended to mirror the factors set out in regulation 3(3) of the Welfare of Farmed Animal (England) Regulations 2000. Regulation 3(3) reads:

In deciding whether an animal's needs have been met, the court shall have regard to their species, and to their degree of development, adaptation and domestication, and to their physiological and ethological needs in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge.

Government's position

127. We understand that the Government is concerned that clause 3(5) could be so broadly drawn that, in practice, it would effectively undermine the protection in clause 3(4). Defra is considering the RSPCA's suggestion of replacing clause 3(5) with the wording used in regulation 3(3) of the Welfare of Farmed Animal (England) Regulations 2000.

Our position

128. We support the Government's approach of setting out a modified version of the five freedoms on the face of the draft Bill. The five needs in clause 3(4) provide a strong statement of the ideal animal welfare circumstances towards which those responsible for animals should be working. We consider it imperative, however, that the five needs should continue to be framed as aspirational, and therefore not achievable in all circumstances.

129. In respect of clause 3(5), we support the RSPCA's suggestion of amending the existing clause 3(5) so that it mirrors the factors set out in regulation 3(3) of the Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2000. The factors listed in regulation 3(3) should be more helpful to the courts in distinguishing the circumstances in which the clause 3(4) needs are not attainable. It also seems sensible to us to aim, wherever possible, for consistency in definitions in animal welfare legislation.

Clause 3(3): abandonment

130. Abandoned animals are covered in current legislation by the Abandonment of Animals Act 1960. Section 1 provides:

If any person being the owner or having charge or control of any animal shall without reasonable cause or excuse abandon it, whether permanently or not, in circumstances likely to cause the animal any unnecessary suffering, or cause or procure or, being the owner, permit it to be so abandoned, he shall be guilty of an offence of cruelty within the meaning of the [Protection of Animals Act 1911] …

Clause 3(3) is intended to re-enact the 1960 Act "in substance".[109] It provides that, if an animal has been abandoned, any person who immediately before that time was the keeper of the animal shall continue to be the keeper for the purposes of the clause 3 welfare offence. "Keeper" is defined in clause 3(3).

Evidence received

131. Submitters were concerned about two aspects of clause 3(3): that it was inappropriate to include abandonment within the welfare offence and that it could result in the last traceable owner being deemed to be the keeper, rather than the true last owner, and so acquiring all the responsibilities attributable to ownership.

132.The RSPCA commented that:

[Clause 3(3)] does not, in its application, adequately replace the Abandonment of Animals Act 1960, which created an offence of cruelty. The effect of s3(3) is to downgrade abandonment to a welfare offence. We believe this is inappropriate and that its more serious status should be restored by maintaining within the AWB a specific offence of abandonment. It also seems to us that the welfare offence is committed only when the animal's needs are not met. The old offence of abandonment was committed as soon as the abandonment occurred.[110]

133. The NFU was concerned that clause 3(3) was ambiguous: where person A sold an animal to person B and person B subsequently abandoned the animal but person B could not be traced, the NFU considered that clause 3(3) could be read to mean that legal responsibility for the animal would revert to person A, who would be deemed to be the keeper of the animal.[111] The Farmers' Union of Wales (FUW) asked at what point a sheep might be considered to be abandoned, in the context of Welsh farming practices. The FUW noted that there have been hefted sheep on the hills of Wales for generations, with these animals being turned onto the open mountain in early May, to be gathered only for shearing, dipping and weaning the lambs, and suggested that a sheep could be considered to be abandoned only if it was untagged or without an earmark.[112]

Government's position

134. Defra has indicated to us that it considers the NFU's concerns about responsibility as a "keeper" reverting to the last traceable owner to be unfounded; it considers that only the 'new' owner could be found to be guilty of the welfare offence. We understand that the Government's current intention is nevertheless to delete clause 3(3) from the final Bill altogether, on the basis that the clause 3 welfare offence adequately covers the present legal position without the need for separate provisions specifically relating to abandonment.

Our position

135. It appears to us that, in the current scheme of the draft Bill, abandonment is mentioned under the welfare offence in order to deal with the difficulty of bringing a person who has abandoned an animal under the current definition of "keeper"; a keeper must either own, or be responsible for, or in charge of, the animal. The mention of abandonment in clause 3(3) would not prevent abandonment forming the basis of a charge laid under the main cruelty offence, clause 1(1).

136. In respect of the clause 3 welfare offence, the Government appears to have concluded that a person who has abandoned an animal will still be able to be brought under the definition of "keeper" even in the absence of clause 3(3); that is, the courts will accept that such a person still owns or is responsible for the animal, as a matter of law. We do not object to the removal of clause 3(3) provided that the Government is certain that abandonment of an animal would not serve to divest a person of legal ownership or the responsibilities that follow on from it, and that a charge could therefore be laid and successfully prosecuted under clause 3(1). We have taken no evidence on the law and case law with respect to ownership and are therefore unable to comment on whether the Government's legal advice is correct.

137. However, we are concerned that the draft Bill would represent a significant weakening of the current law on the abandonment of animals. Under the Abandonment of Animals Act 1960, an offence is committed at the time at which abandonment occurs; no evidence of the animal having suffered is required, and a person who is found guilty of abandonment is deemed to be guilty of a cruelty offence within the meaning of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. Under the draft Bill, although an act of abandonment could form the basis of a charge laid under the main cruelty offence, clause 1(1), evidence of the animal having suffered would be required. Evidence of abandonment without evidence of the animal having suffered could form the basis only of a charge laid under the welfare offence, clause 3(1), which carries lesser penalties than the clause 1 cruelty offences.

138. We recommend that the Government amend the draft Bill so that the act of abandoning an animal continues to be treated as a cruelty offence without the need for evidence of the animal having suffered as a consequence of the abandonment. The present law presumably does not require such evidence for the very good reason that an abandoned animal may not be able to be traced, in order for its suffering to be able to be demonstrated. No doubt the 1960 Act was enacted in the first place to deal with the requirement in the 1911 Act that unnecessary suffering be demonstrated. The fact that the act of abandonment, in and of itself, constitutes an offence is a key animal welfare protection in current law and it is crucial that it be maintained.


58   As amended by subsequent legislation. Back

59   http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/welfare/ Back

60   Explanatory notes, para 23 Back

61   Explanatory notes, para 23 Back

62   Q 742 [Mike Radford] Back

63   Q 999 [Defra] Back

64   Q 999 [Defra] Back

65   Q 991 [Defra] Back

66   Q 992 [Defra] Back

67   Q 994 [Defra] Back

68   Ford v Wiley, (1889) 23 QBD 203; Hall v RSPCA, (unreported, QBD, 11 November 1993) Back

69   Q 1071 [Defra] Back

70   Ford v Wiley, (1889) 23 QBD 203; Hall v RSPCA, (unreported, QBD, 11 November 1993) Back

71   The offence of causing or procuring another person to cause an animal unnecessary suffering is effectively subsumed within clause 1(1) of the draft Bill. Back

72   Ev 11 [RSPCA] Back

73   Q740 [Mike Radford] Back

74   Ibid. Back

75   Clause 24 Back

76   Q 742 [Mike Radford]; references to early 1990s case law are to Hall v RSPCA (unreported, QBD, 11 November 1993) and RSPCA v Issacs [1994] Crim LR 517. Back

77   Q 1016 [Defra] Back

78   Ibid. Back

79   Q 1022 [Defra] Back

80   Q 1022 [Defra] Back

81   For example, ev 394 [Dogs Trust] Back

82   Q 1020 [Defra] Back

83   Qq 1003 and 1004 [Defra]. The definition is set out in RCVS, 'Mutilations report', annex to Guide to Professional Conduct; available at www.rcvs.org.uk. Back

84   Ev 131 [National Farmers' Union] Back

85   Q 260 [National Farmers' Union] Back

86   AW161, B1-B2 Back

87   Q 1006 Back

88   Q1002 Back

89   Explanatory notes, between paras 33 and 34 Back

90   Ev 288 [Mike Radford] Back

91   Q 1 [Defra] Back

92   Explanatory notes, para 34 Back

93   Memorandum from Society of Conservative Lawyers [not printed in its entirety], paras 3.25 to 3.26 Back

94   For example, the Companion Animal Welfare Council (Q 93); the Kennel Club (Q 95); the Pet Advisory Committee (Q 96); the International Fund for Animal Welfare (Q 147); the Federation of British Herpetologists (Q 149); the Animal Protection Agency (Q 173); the Bio Veterinary Group (Q 174) Back

95   Ev 288 [Mike Radford] Back

96   Ibid. Back

97   Memorandum from Society of Conservative Lawyers [not printed in its entirety], para 3.27 Back

98   Memorandum from Society of Conservative Lawyers [not printed in its entirety], para 3.26 Back

99   FAWC, Report on Priorities for Animal Welfare Research and Development, (1993), paras 8 and 9 Back

100   Available at www.fawc.org.uk Back

101   Q 53 [RSPCA] Back

102   Q 232 [Meat and Livestock Commission] Back

103   Q 74 [RSPCA] Back

104   Qq 53 and 87 [RSPCA] Back

105   Q 243 [Farm Animal Welfare Council] Back

106   Available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-countryside/gwd/ Back

107   Qq 464 and 465 [Federation of Zoological Gardens] Back

108   Q 162 [Federation of British Herpetologists] Back

109   Explanatory notes, para 37 Back

110   Ev 13 [RSPCA] Back

111   Qq 268 to 272 [National Farmers' Union] Back

112   Qq 294 and 295 [Farmers' Union of Wales]. Hefted sheep are unfenced, but belong to a certain patch of land. Back


 
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