House of Commons - Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Select Committee on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs First Report

5 Delegated powers

139. Clause 6 sets out the principal delegated power in the draft Bill; clauses 1(5) and 53(3) also contain key delegated powers. Clause 7 contains a power to issue codes of practice.

140. In this part, we primarily consider clause 6. Clause 1(5) provides a delegated power relating to the definition of mutilation: in this part, we consider the appropriateness of the clause 1(5) power and its place in our proposal for pre-legislative scrutiny of draft regulations. Other issues relating to clause 1(5) are discussed in part 4. Clause 53(3) provides a delegated power relating to the definition of an animal and is considered in part 3.

Clause 6

Operation of clause 6

141. Clause 6(1) would delegate a power to the appropriate national authority to make regulations setting out such provision as the authority thinks fit for the purpose of promoting the welfare of animals kept by man. Clause 6(2) lists matters which the appropriate authority may regulate under clause 6(1), although the list is stated to be without prejudice to the generality of the clause 6(1) power. Clause 6(3) provides that regulations made under clause 6 may create offences, provide for fees and, in relation to regulations providing for licensing or registration, may amend or repeal primary or secondary legislation currently regulating this area.[113] Clause 6(6) provides that any regulations made under clause 6 would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure in each House.

142. At annex L to the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) accompanying the draft Bill, Defra has set out its intended timetable for the regulations and codes of practice which it proposes to make under clauses 6(1), 1(5) and 7 over the next six or so years. Defra has given an indication of its proposed policy direction in relation to some of the planned regulations and codes of practice; these are set out in other annexes to the RIA. We consider the detail of the annexes to the RIA, and the evidence we received on the policy proposals contained in them, in greater detail in parts 8, 9 and 10.

Evidence received

143. A majority of the evidence we received was supportive of clause 6, on the basis that it would allow greater flexibility and responsiveness in law-making, meaning that animal welfare law could therefore be more readily kept up-to-date. However, some submitters were critical of clause 6. Some felt that the Government was in fact proposing to leave many difficult policy decisions to secondary legislation; they suggested that the 'hard decisions' likely to be contained in much of the secondary legislation ought instead to be on the face of the Act. For example, Protect Our Wild Animals submitted:

We are very concerned about the absence of radical reforms in the Bill. It appears that instead of outlawing outmoded, unnecessary and unsavoury forms of animal exploitation the government instead seeks to rely on regulations, licences and codes of practice.[114]

Similarly, the Association of Circus Proprietors of Great Britain said it was regrettable that the draft Bill did not seek either to impose standards or to set down a procedure for assessing standards but merely empowered the appropriate national authority to make regulations.[115]

144. Other submitters criticised the breadth of the delegated power. The Countryside Alliance described the powers to be delegated as "virtually limitless in scope" and thought the wording of clause 6(1) was "particularly imprecise".[116] The Alliance noted that clause 6 "could also be used to prohibit lawful activities, without the need for primary legislation", pointing in particular to the wording of clauses 6(2)(k), (l) and (m). The National Farmers' Union drew attention to the "extremely broad" powers in clause 6 and "encourage[d] the public and MPs to monitor very closely the way Ministers behave in the operation of these powers."[117] The National Sheep Association was "surprised at the lack of precision in some of the drafting" of the draft Bill and described it as "a liars' paradise, for want of a better phrase".[118] The National Gamekeepers' Organisation described clause 6 as giving "almost unlimited scope" for the appropriate national authority to make regulations:

subject only [in England] to rather cursory scrutiny by Parliament (clause 6 (6)). We are uneasy about this and would prefer a stronger system of parliamentary scrutiny of any material changes to be made by the Secretary of State.[119]

145. The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons was supportive of the breadth of the regulation-making power, but expressed concern about the degree of specificity in clause 6(2).

Extent of clause 6(1) delegated power

146. The power that would be delegated under clause 6 is very broad. Clause 6(1) currently reads:

The appropriate national authority may by regulations make such provision as the authority thinks fit for the purpose of promoting the welfare of animals kept by man.

If the Bill is enacted, the appropriate national authority will therefore be empowered to make any regulation which, in the opinion of the authority, will "promote" the welfare of animals which a person owns, or is responsible for, or in charge of.[120]

Evidence received

147. Several submitters put forward suggestions for tightening up the wording of clause 6(1), in order to provide some limits to the regulation-making power. The Society of Conservative Lawyers suggested that clause 6(1) should be re-worded to read:

The appropriate national authority may by regulations make such provision as they certify fit for ensuring the welfare of animals kept by man.[121]

and the Countryside Alliance suggested an almost identical re-wording.[122] Both organisations considered "ensure" to be a more precise word than "promote", and noted that "ensure" is already used in clause 3. Both organisations also felt that the requirement for the appropriate national authority to "certify" the draft regulations would ensure that regulations were either justified on the basis of scientific evidence or that they met a genuine welfare need "evidenced by the consultation responses before introducing or amending regulations.[123] A sub-clause setting out the certification procedure would need to be included in clause 6.

Government's position

148. The Minister described the delegated power as necessary if the legislation was "to have the flexibility to meet the changing demands and increases in understanding of the animal welfare field".[124] The Minister appeared to seek to justify the breadth of the delegated power on the basis that, if some animal welfare matters are to be regulated by secondary legislation—as farmed animals currently are, a situation which the Government proposes to continue—then all animal welfare matters should be:

… in the case of farmed animals, regulation-making powers in the Bill carry over the existing powers in the [Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions)] Act 1968 which the Bill will replace. In the case of non-farmed animals, the regulation-making powers will be used largely to replace existing licensing regimes and provide detail on the welfare offences. Performing animals, pet sales, dog and cat boarding, dog breeding and riding schools are all already regulated by Acts of Parliament and these Acts will be repealed as and when their provisions are consolidated, modernised and replaced by new regulations. We believe that there is no justification therefore for having some provisions of the licensing on the face of the Bill, as some of the welfare organisations have advocated, and others in regulations. And it is for that reason that we are seeking to undertake all regulation in secondary legislation while having the parameters of the powers on the face of the Bill.[125]

149. As the Minister states, some primary legislation regulating the keeping of certain animals currently exists: for example, the Performing Animals (Regulation) Act 1925, the Cinematograph Films (Animals) Act 1937 and the Pet Animals Act 1951. The Government's intention seems to be to replace this primary legislation with secondary legislation made under clause 6(1); clause 6(3)(f) allows regulations which make provision for licensing or registration of specified activities involving animals to amend or repeal primary (or secondary) legislation.

150. The Minister and his officials did not accept that the appropriate national authority should be required to certify that draft regulations were justified either on the basis of scientific evidence or because they met a genuine welfare need demonstrated by consultation responses. The legal adviser on the Defra Bill team commented:

To be honest, I am not sure what a certification procedure would add really … If the Secretary of State makes a regulation that is patently stupid and has no purpose whatsoever in any sort of veterinary justification for actually promoting welfare, then I suspect that people would be queuing up to judicially review those regulations and say that those are unreasonable regulations … I think it almost goes without saying … that there would need to be some form of justification, almost certainly taking the form of scientific evidence, or some sensible basis for the regulations.[126]

Our position

151. We are unconvinced by the Minister's justification for the breadth of the clause 6(1) delegated power. In seeking to justify the breadth of the clause 6(1) delegated power, the Minister relied on the fact that the welfare of farmed animals is currently regulated by secondary legislation as the basis for arguing that the welfare of kept and companion animals should be dealt with in the same way. This fails to acknowledge that farmed animals' welfare is regulated by secondary legislation because this area is governed by EU Directives, which are implemented in English law by way of secondary legislation. Nor does the Minister offer any justification for the proposal to move into secondary legislation those aspects of the welfare of kept animals which are currently regulated by way of primary legislation.

152. The suggestion that the mechanism of judicial review would provide a sufficient limitation on the exercise of the clause 6(1) power is unacceptable. If Parliament is to delegate certain of its powers to Government, it is up to Parliament to do so in a clear and defined way, and to ensure that proper limitations are imposed on the way in which the delegated powers may be exercised. If Parliament delegates the power in question in a clear and appropriate way in the first place, the circumstances in which judicial review might become necessary will be greatly reduced.

153. Furthermore, if it "goes without saying" that any draft regulations put forward under clause 6 will be justified on the basis of scientific evidence or because they meet a genuine welfare need evidenced by consultation responses, then why should the Government hesitate to say as much on the face of the legislation? While the present authorities may have the best of intentions with regard to making the regulations planned for the next five years, this is no guarantee that future authorities will adopt a similarly rational approach. The mainstay of current animal welfare legislation, the Protection of Animal Act 1911, has been in force for nearly a century; the present draft legislation may well be in force for a similar period of time. Who is to say how the appropriate national administrations may seek to exercise the clause 6 delegated power in another 50 or 100 years? Again, if Parliament delegates the power in question in a clear and appropriate way in the first place, there should be reduced scope for future abuse of the delegated power.

154. In this context, we note the example of the Food Standards Act 1999. Section 8 requires the Food Standards Agency to monitor developments in science, technology and other relevant fields of knowledge in order to ensure that the Agency has sufficient information to enable it to take informed decisions. Although this example does not directly correspond with the present proposal, to require draft regulations to be justified on the basis of scientific evidence, it nevertheless demonstrates that a public body can be required to base its decision-making on scientific evidence.

155. We are disappointed by the Minister's reluctance to consider redrafting the clause 6(1) power in order to limit its breadth. We recommend that the Government amend clause 6 so that:

a more precise word than "promote" is used: "ensure" seems sensible, provided that it continues to be used in clause 3

the appropriate national authority must certify that any draft regulation proposed to be made under clause 6(1) is justified either on the basis of scientific evidence or because it meets a genuine welfare need evidenced by the consultation process on the proposed draft regulations.

We discuss the need for such a consultation process further, below.

Placing licensing requirements on the face of the legislation

156. One power which would be encompassed within the clause 6(1) delegated power would be power to make provision for licensing in relation to specified activities involving animals, as it is described in clause 6(2)(h) (although it should be noted that the 'examples' given in clause 6(2) are in no way intended to limit the generality of the clause 6(1) power). Licensing powers are likely to be delegated to local authorities.

157. A great many of the concerns raised in the evidence we received related to matters to do with proposals to license activities involving animals, many of which are set out in the annexes to the RIA accompanying the draft Bill. This evidence is discussed in parts 8, 9 and 10. However, it seems to us the concerns raised arose in no small part because the draft Bill itself gives no indication as to the extent or nature of licensing powers to be delegated and yet, under these powers, whole areas of animal ownership and practice could be made legal or illegal, and owners could have additional costs and burdens imposed upon them. Furthermore, as the Bill is currently drafted, there is no guarantee that licensing practices will be uniform between different licensing authorities.

Evidence received

158. We heard helpful evidence on this point from Advocates for Animals, who expressed surprise that the question of licensing did not feature particularly in the draft Bill:

… local authority licensing is one of the real cornerstones of the way that animals are protected in this country … [most existing statutes] make it absolutely clear that the local authority may and indeed should attach conditions to that licence designed to protect the animal's welfare. My slight worry about the new Bill is that the whole question of licensing is dealt with in a line and a half in clause 6 … I would feel happier if it made it clear that when formulating a new licensing regime the Secretary of State would have the power to make it clear in the new regime that the authority had the power and possibly even the duty to attach relevant conditions … Otherwise it would be weaker than the existing licensing regimes.[127]

159. Advocates for Animals referred to the precedent of licensing provisions in the Zoo Licensing Act 1981. The 1981 Act sets down requirements relating to the way in which a zoo must apply for a licence, the way in which a local authority must consider the applications, including consultation requirements and relevant considerations, and to the period of time for which a licence shall be granted. The Act also provides that a local authority may attach such other conditions as it thinks "necessary or desirable for ensuring the proper conduct of the zoo during the period of the licence …"[128] In deciding what conditions to attach, the local authority must have regard to any standards specified by the Secretary of State under the Act: the standards "specify standards of modern zoo practice … with respect to the management of zoos and the animals in them."[129]

Our position

160. We support the Animal Protection Agency's suggestion that more information should be provided on the face of the legislation about licensing conditions, particularly in relation to the need to ensure that welfare conditions are attached to licences. Clearly, individual local authorities cannot each have the expertise to know what welfare conditions should be attached to licences for different activities involving animals: the licensing regime will cover a broad range of activities, including animal fairs, animal sanctuaries, pet shops and greyhound tracks, and many others besides. We therefore consider that the legislation should make it clear that, firstly, a central set of standards exists, in the form of codes of practice issued by the appropriate national authority under clause 7, and, secondly, that licensing authorities are required to have regard to those standards in deciding whether to issue a licence and, if so, what conditions should be attached to it.

161. We recommend that clearer requirements about the way in which licensing powers are to be exercised should be included on the face of the legislation, rather than being left for the appropriate national authority to specify under delegated legislation. It should be clearly stated that the licensing authority has the power to attach welfare conditions to a licence and to revoke a licence. The legislation should also require the licensing authority to have regard, in issuing a licence, to relevant guidance laid down in the form of codes of practice issued by the appropriate national authority under clause 7.

Specificity of clause 6(2)

162. Clause 6(2) particularises instances in which the appropriate national authority could choose to make regulations under clause 6(1). Clause 6(2) states that it is "without prejudice to the generality of the power" under clause 6(1). The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons expressed concern about the degree of specificity in clause 6(2). The College questioned:

… whether it is wise for [clause 6(2)] to go into so much detail about the matters which the regulations may cover. The subsection is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the regulation-making power, but the clause may nevertheless be in danger of circumscribing the power by giving such specific indications of how it might be used.[130]

163. The nub of the issue raised by the Royal College is whether the courts are likely to interpret clause 6(2) as what might be described as a 'for example' clause—the delegated power is contained entirely within clause 6(1) and clause 6(2) is merely a 'commentary' on that power—or as an expansion on the clause 6(1) power—setting out the instances in which clause 6(1) should be used, and creating an assumption that it should not be used in other circumstances. We recommend that the Government re-examine the issue of whether the degree of detail in clause 6(2) could potentially circumscribe the generality of the clause 6(1) delegated power in ways which the Government does not intend.

Clause 1(5)

164. The operation of the delegated power contained in clause 1(5) is discussed in greater detail in part 4. Clause 1(5) would empower the appropriate national authority to specify by order circumstances in which the draft Bill's proposed ban on mutilations would not apply.

165. Our comments about the extent of the clause 6(1) delegated power apply equally to the clause 1(5) delegated power. Although that power is not broad, in that it applies to only one specified area of policy, it is nevertheless open-ended. No directions are given or criteria set down to specify the way in which the power should be exercised. There is nothing, on the face of the legislation, to prevent the appropriate national authority from using clause 1(5) to effectively 'hollow out' clause 1(4). Exemptions given under clause 1(5) could be so broadly drawn that the clause 1(4) ban on mutilations would be diminished or meaningless.

166. We recommend that the Government amend clause 1 so as to require the appropriate national authority to certify that any draft order proposed to be made under clause 1(5) is justified either on the basis of scientific evidence or because it meets a genuine welfare need evidenced by the consultation process on the proposed draft regulations. We discuss the need for such a consultation process further, below.

Clause 6 and clause 1(5)

Lack of a duty to consult

167. Clause 6 contains no requirement for the appropriate national authority to consult appropriately about a draft regulation. Similarly, there is no requirement for the appropriate national authority to consult on a draft order to be made under clause 1(5). Under clauses 8 and 9, however, there is a requirement for the appropriate national authority to consult on a draft code of practice issued under clause 7.

168. Regulations made under clause 6, and orders made under clause 1(5), will form part of the law of the land; regulations made under clause 6 may create criminal offences and repeal primary legislation, amongst other things. Codes of practice made under clause 7 will be issued for the purposes of practical guidance and will not be law, although they will carry some evidential weight in proceedings taken under the Act.[131]

169. A number of submitters and witnesses criticised the lack of a duty for the appropriate national authority to undertake any consultation on draft regulations proposed to be made under clause 6. For example, the NFU described a statutory obligation for the appropriate national authority to consult before making regulations as "absolutely vital" and urged that the draft Bill be amended "so as to guarantee that consultation happens".[132]

Government's position

170. We raised this matter with the Minister and his officials in the course of taking oral evidence. The Minister rejected our suggestion that a requirement to consult on any draft regulation should be added to clause 6:

… Cabinet Office rules say that we do have to consult. I would be resistant to putting such a commitment on the face of the Bill. You yourself have already indicated that any secondary legislation would have to go through the normal parliamentary process … At the moment we are not convinced of the need to put an explicit commitment to [undertake] consultation on the face of the Bill … it is taken as a given that we consult on these things.[133]

Adding to the Minster's statement, a Defra official described the effect of Cabinet Office rules as being that "consultation is … built into the procedure in any event".[134]

171. We questioned the Minister about the apparent anomaly in including an obligation, in clauses 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b), to consult on draft codes of practice, when there is no equivalent requirement to consult on draft regulations. Defra officials explained that the "historical reason" for the apparent anomaly was that "the need to consult is enshrined in … the 1968 Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act , and it has been carried over [in respect of draft codes of practice]".[135]

Our position

172. The references by the Minister and his officials to "Cabinet Office rules" are to the Cabinet Office's code of practice on consultation, which sets out procedures for government departments to follow when undertaking consultation processes. The code of practice states that it is applicable to "all UK public consultations carried out by government departments". The code "does not have legal force, and cannot prevail over statutory or mandatory external requirements (eg under European Community law)"; nevertheless, it "should otherwise generally be regarded as binding on UK departments and their agencies, unless Ministers conclude that exceptional circumstances require a departure from it". The code of practice also states that, while the devolved administrations are free to adopt the code, it does not apply to consultation documents issued by them unless they do so.[136]

173. The requirement to consult under the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1968, referred to by Defra officials, is contained in section 3(1). Section 3(1) requires ministers to consult "with such persons appearing to them to represent any interests concerned as the Ministers consider appropriate" prior to issuing codes of practice about the welfare of livestock situated on agricultural land. It is this provision that the Government claims to be carrying over. Under clause 56 of the draft Bill, Part 1 of the 1968 Act (which includes section 3) would be repealed if the Bill is enacted; section 3 therefore requires replicating if the requirement to consult is to continue.[137] However, section 2(1) of the 1968 Act also imposes a requirement on minister to consult—a requirement which is parallel to the section 3(1) requirement except that it is a requirement to consult prior to making regulations, rather than codes of practice. Section 2(1) would also be repealed under clause 56 of the draft Bill.

174. The Government's explanation for the inclusion in the draft Bill of a requirement to consult in respect of codes of practice, but not in respect of regulations, therefore seems to us to be somewhat disingenuous. If the requirement of the 1968 Act for ministers to consult prior to issuing codes of practice merits being carried over, so does the requirement for ministers to consult prior to making regulations.

175. We endorse the inclusion of a duty for the appropriate national authority to consult on any draft code of practice which the authority proposes to make under clause 7, as set out in clauses 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b). We believe that an obligation to consult on draft codes of practice should improve the quality and relevance of the final codes.

176. Given the Government's readiness to include a duty to consult on draft codes of practice, we are extremely disappointed by the Minister's refusal to include a parallel duty to consult on draft regulations. Regulations made under clause 6(1), and orders made under clause 1(5), will form part of the law of the land—regulations made under clause 6(1) may create criminal offences and repeal primary legislation, amongst other things—whereas codes of practice will exist primarily for the purpose of guidance. We do not accept the Minister's argument that, as Defra intends to consult on draft regulations anyway, there is nothing to be gained by including a requirement to consult on the face of the Bill. The Cabinet Office code of practice has no legal force and cannot require government departments to consult; nor is there any obligation for the National Assembly for Wales—an appropriate national authority under clause 6(1) and clause 1(5)—to adopt the code of practice. If the Minister intends to consult appropriately on all draft regulations anyway, he can have no objection to a requirement to consult being included on the face of the draft Bill. It is possible that the Minister's refusal to include a requirement to consult arises from a concern that inclusion of such a requirement would expose his decisions to judicial review on the grounds of inadequate consultation. If this is indeed the case, we suggest this would constitute a poor reason for his refusal. Provided that the consultation process was undertaken in accordance with the Cabinet Office code of practice, the Minister's decision would be unlikely to be amenable to judicial review on such grounds.

177. We recommend that clause 6 should be amended to place a duty on the appropriate national authority to consult on any draft regulation which the authority proposes to make under clause 6(1). This duty should be in equivalent terms to the duty for the appropriate national authority to consult on any draft code of practice which the authority proposes to make under clause 7, as set out in clauses 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b).

178. Likewise, we recommend that clause 1 should be amended to place a duty on the appropriate national authority to consult on any draft order which the authority proposes to make under clause 1(5). This duty should be in equivalent terms to the duty for the appropriate national authority to consult on any draft code of practice which the authority proposes to make under clause 7, as set out in clauses 8(1)(b) and 9(1)(b).

179. In this regard, Defra has indicated to us that it has set up a number of working groups to assist it in deciding the content of the future regulations. We understand that the groups operate earlier in the policy-making process, working on proposals which, if endorsed by the appropriate national authority, will be put out to consultation. We emphasise that working groups are not a substitute for full and appropriate consultation. Although it is not entirely germane to our pre-legislative scrutiny process, we note that we have received a great deal of evidence and correspondence expressing disquiet about the membership of a working group set up by Defra, which reported to Defra on animal fairs, and Defra's means of appointing the group. We make no comment on the membership of that group or the quality of the work done by it. We suggest to Defra that, if it intends to continue to use working groups to formulate animal welfare policy, then it would be well-advised to formalise the process by which the groups' membership and programme of work is decided, in order to ensure transparency and build confidence in the quality of those undertaking this work.

Improved parliamentary scrutiny of future draft secondary legislation

180. Clause 6(6) provides that no regulations shall be made under clause 6(1) by the Secretary of State unless a draft of the instrument containing the regulations has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House. Clause 1(6) makes parallel provision in respect of orders to be made under clause 1(5).

181. As we have discussed above, the power that would be delegated under clause 6(1) is both broad and open-ended; the power that would be delegated under clause 1(5) is open-ended. The recommendations set out above should go some way towards providing appropriate limitations on these powers. However, it is important that any draft regulations made under clause 6(1), and any draft orders made under clause 1(5), should be subject to a greater degree of parliamentary scrutiny than is envisaged by clauses 6(6) or 1(6). The so-called 'affirmative' procedure set out in clauses 6(6) and 1(6) allows either House to do no more than accept or reject a draft regulation or order; neither House can substantively comment on or amend a draft regulation or order. We believe that a procedure is needed which would give this Committee the opportunity to comment substantively on the content of the draft secondary legislation, at a stage of the process where the Committee's comment can be properly taken into account by the Secretary of State before the final regulation or order is made. Such an arrangement would effectively be 'pre-legislative' scrutiny of draft regulations published under clause 6 and draft orders published under clause 1.

182. In oral evidence, the Minister was broadly supportive of such an approach:

You have expressed a desire yourselves as a Committee to engage in pre-legislative scrutiny of some of the secondary legislation. That is something that certainly, in principle, I would welcome as someone who believes that pre-legislative scrutiny can always help us improve our laws.[138]

The Minister added that, in terms of its overall workload, the Committee might wish to consider whether it would want to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny of all draft regulations proposed to be made under the draft Bill.[139]

183. If, as we recommend above, a requirement to consult is included in clauses 6 and 1, then regulations or orders would need to be published in draft for the purpose of consultation, and our pre-legislative process could fit in with the consultation process. If our recommendation to include a requirement to consult in clause 6 is not accepted, then some other mechanism would be needed to require the Secretary of State to publish regulations proposed to be made under clause 6 in draft, and orders proposed to be made under clause 1 in draft. The following recommendations are based on the assumption that the final legislation will incorporate our recommendation to include a requirement to consult on draft secondary legislation made under both clauses 6 and 1.

184. We recommend that the Secretary of State agree to enter into a 'memorandum of understanding' with this Committee, undertaking to:

publish in draft form any regulation proposed to be made under clause 6(1) or order proposed to be made under clause 1(5)

inform the Committee of such publication

allow the Committee a period of 30 sitting days in which to report to the House on the draft instrument

agree that no motion to approve may be made until either the period of 30 sitting days has elapsed or the Committee reported to the House on the draft instrument, whichever occurs first.

The memorandum of understanding should make it clear for what period of time such an arrangement should apply. It should also provide for the possibility that an exception could be made to this arrangement in circumstances of genuine emergency.

185. If such a process were adopted, the Committee would have flexibility to decide either to call for evidence on the draft regulation or order and to examine it thoroughly, or to decide at an early stage that the draft regulation or order did not warrant a thorough examination and to report to the House that it had no matters to raise.

113 Clause 6(3) Back

114 Ev 494 [Protect Our Wild Animals] Back

115 Ev 216 [Association of Circus Proprietors of Great Britain] Back

116 Ev 321 [The Countryside Alliance] Back

117 Q 274 [National Farmers' Union] Back

118 Q 304 [National Sheep Association] Back

119 Ev 174 [National Gamekeepers' Organisation] Back

120 "Kept by man" is defined in clause 54(3). Back

121 Memorandum from Society of Conservative Lawyers [not printed in its entirety], para 2.19 [emphasis added] Back

122 Ev 321 [Countryside Alliance] Back

123 Ev 321 [Countryside Alliance]; memorandum from Society of Conservative Lawyers [not printed in its entirety], para 2.20 Back

124 Q963 [Defra] Back