Memorandum submitted by The Blue Cross
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(i) The Blue Cross generally welcomes the
Defra initiative to update and bring order to the many, often
outdated pieces of existing animal welfare legislation designed
to protect companion animals. Enabling legislation makes sense
in some areas, however, animal welfare involves some very complicated
concepts and whilst it is intended that the Bill be supplemented
by further regulation and the development of codes of practice,
it should be recognised that such an approach may serve to create
some significant interpretation problems. Whilst it is to be welcomed
that as codes of practice are developed, interested parties will
be consulted, we are concerned that it will fall to the Secretary
of State to determine who will be consulted rather than offering
further opportunities for more widespread public consultation.
Thus valuable input may be lost. It is pleasing to see that it
is intended to review the legislation within five years of it
becoming law. We hope that the review process will be regular
thereafter and that there will be opportunities to amend legislation
as necessary rather than wait another 100 years.
(ii) It is understood that comparable legislation
in Scotland, The Protection of Animals Act 1912 is also currently
under review. However, it is of considerable concern that there
appears to be no intention to apply similar legislation in Northern
Ireland. The welfare of companion animals in Northern Ireland
is not generally accorded the same level of priority as elsewhere
in the United Kingdom. As an example, a very significant percentage
of the total of stray dogs still being euthanased in the United
Kingdom takes place in the province.
(iii) Key to the success of achieving the
aims and objectives of the Animal Welfare Bill as set out in the
draft will be the issue of enforcement. It seems that local authorities,
which may already be overburdened, will be expected to bear the
brunt of such activity with little or no additional resource to
support it. Accordingly, we have grave concerns about (a) the
claim that implementation of the Bill will have little or no cost
impact on local authorities, and (b) as a result, there
is the real potential for the Bill to become somewhat `toothless'.
Currently, charities such as The Blue Cross support local authorities
when discharging their responsibilities under other legislation,
for example, as retention centres for stray dogs under the auspices
of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. It seems likely therefore
that despite your assertion that the charity sector is unlikely
to be adversely affected by the Bill, local authorities will continue
to look to the sector to provide enhanced support, at nil or minimal
cost. Is it expected therefore that such costs will be absorbed
by the charities? Additionally, methods and criteria for enforcement
should be clearly defined and standard across all local
authorities throughout England and Wales.
(iv) We appreciate that as a piece of enabling
legislation, the `devil will be in the detail', however, there
are a significant number of issues that need to be fully addressed
at the next stage of development of the Bill.
TURNING TO
THE DETAIL
2. Clause 1
(i) The provision which enables the proscription
of the docking of dogs tails (and other mutilations) in 1(4) is
mitigated by 1(5). We believe this is an opportunity for Government
to take a firm stance on this issue and one that should not be
missed.
(ii) 1(3d) illustrates our concern regarding
interpretation. Who is qualified to determine whether or not suffering
is proportionate?
(iii) The Blue Cross loans out equines in
its care but retains ownership. Under 1(10), would we be liable
for prosecution if a keeper of a Blue Cross horse adopted say,
two years ago, committed an offence under clause 1 and would strict
liability apply? We would wish to see a test of `reasonableness'
applied in such circumstances.
3. Clause 3
(i) 3(2)—our comment under 2(iii) above
applies equally.
(ii) 3(3)—there should be a definition
of abandonment.
4. Clause 4
(i) Government should take note of other
regulations relating to sales of goods and services to persons
below a minimum age, ie cigarettes and the proposed fireworks
regulations where notices are required to be displayed and proof
of age required.
(ii) This regulation will be extremely difficult
to enforce with regard to the sale of pets over the Internet and
via printed media.
5. Clause 5
(i) Are fish (a commonly given prize at fairs
etc) included in your definition of animal? If not, we believe
they should be as there is increasing evidence that they may feel
pain.
6. Clause 6
(i) Some terminology is muddled and in particular
the use of the word slaughter. Whilst the term might be
appropriate for the despatch of farm animals and horses etc, its
use is inappropriate within a companion animal context. As such,
we would suggest that the term killing is used throughout.
(ii) Your explanatory note 45 when referring
to 6(2h) uses the term flexible and consistent in relation
to licensing. It is difficult to understand how one can be both
flexible and consistent at the same time. Indeed, the problem
with the existing system is that it is far too flexible. Consistency
is the key. Consistency in the standards to which inspectors work
and consistency in how those standards are applied across all
of England and Wales by all local authorities.
(iii) 6(2i)—there should be a definition
of the term farm. We assume you are referring to the term
in the commonly used agricultural sense. However, within a companion
animal context, puppy farms are often referred to and there
should be no potential for confusion between the two—the
former being acceptable, the latter not.
(iv) 6(2p)—this is essential and we
assume you are referring to the development of the Animal Welfare
Enforcement Database. However, it is unclear exactly which individuals,
organisations or statutory bodies would have access to the information
provided. Accepting that there are inevitable data protection
issues, the information contained on the database is likely to
be of considerable welfare value and so should be widely available.
(v) 6(2q)—it is unclear to what this
refers. The Pets Advisory Committee (PAC) and the Companion Animal
Welfare Council (CAWC) already exist. Both are non-statutory but
have the remit to advise national and local government on companion
animal welfare issues. Is it your intention to grant one or both
statutory status as I believe is the case with the Farm Animal
Welfare Council? Or are you intending to create another body?
We would recommend the former course of action given the infrastructure
and base of knowledge already exists within both PAC and CAWC.
(vi) 6(5)—Defra confirmed very early
on in the development of the Animal Welfare Bill, that the Dangerous
Dogs Act (DDA) would not be considered for review as part of the
process. However, given this section appears to have a public
safety rather than an animal welfare slant (and thus a cross over
with the DDA), might this not represent an opportunity to revisit
that decision? It would seem like an ideal opportunity.
7. Clauses 8 and 9
(i) It is essential that codes of practice
be produced in consultation with as wide a range of groups and
bodies as possible. It is hoped that the Secretary of State will
be minded to consult with the Pets Advisory Committee, Companion
Animal Welfare Council, Association of Dogs and Cats Homes, National
Equine Welfare Council and others as part of the process.
(ii) We are concerned that whilst codes of
practice may be made only after consultation, it would appear
that the Minister is under no such obligations when it comes to
the making of regulations eg 1(6). Why should this be so?
8. Clause 11
(i) 11(1) et seq—the term constable
requires definition. Does it refer to all police officers, regardless
of rank and include Special and Community Officers whose training
may not be as robust?
(ii) 11(1a)—the term welfare requires
definition. Does it include for the physiological and/or psychological
welfare of the animal? A veterinary surgeon will be able to determine
the former and possibly the latter, however, 11(2) states that
veterinary intervention may not be necessary if in the opinion
of the constable (see 11(1) above), the situation warrants earlier
action. How would he know? We are greatly concerned that the welfare
of the animal may be seriously compromised in some situations.
(iii) 11(3a)—the retention period of
eight days is considered to be insufficient within the context
of investigation and possible action and should be extended (11(5)
notwithstanding).
(iv) 11(3b)—a definition of relevant
proceedings is required. This may alleviate some of the concerns
under 11(3a) above.
9. Clause 12
(i) 12(1b) (ii)—what would be the arrangements
for identifying ". . . such other places as he thinks
fit"? local authorities commonly enter into contracts
with premises that retain stray dogs on their behalf under the
auspices of the Environmental Protection Act. Do you envisage
a similar arrangement for animals seized under the auspices of
this Bill?
(ii) 12(4)—A significant difference
between the Animal Welfare Bill and the Environmental Protection
Act is that under the latter, the retaining facility is able to
reclaim expense incurred direct from the local authority. Whereas
with the Animal Welfare Bill, with one exception (31(5d)), the
retaining facility has to recover monies from the owner of the
animal in question summarily as a civil debt. This course of action
can be costly, with no guarantee of a positive outcome for the
retaining organisation—in our case a charity. This is certainly
one area where your assertion of no additional costs does
not hold true and may well lead to local authorities and those
acting on their behalf having difficulty in locating facilities
in which to hold animals pending further action being taken.
10. Clause 13
(i) 13(3) appears to allow a lay person to
kill an animal without the presence or authority of a veterinary
surgeon and without any requirement to do so in a humane manner—is
this correct? If so, there must be reference to, and a definition
of the word humane. There must also be reference to the person
killing the animal to be appropriately trained and competent (see
my (8i) above).
11. Clause 14
(i) 14(4)—we are concerned that an
inspector may not enter premises, (not private, 14(3) notwithstanding)
between the hours of 11pm and 5am without a constable to exercise
powers conferred by 14(1). Given the very rural nature of some
parts of England and Wales and the fact that police forces are
already overstretched and thus spread very thin on the ground
during those hours, such a clause may lead to a protracted delay
between the animal in distress being identified, and the inspector
being able to take action. As a result, the welfare of the animal
may be severely compromised.
(ii) 14(6a)—whilst recognising that
it is correct that individuals in private property are informed
of the intention to apply for a warrant, we are concerned that
it offers the `offender' the opportunity to dispose of the animal/evidence
in the intervening period between notification and entry.
(iii) There should be a definition of public
and private premises.
12. Clause 19
(i) 19(1)—in the context of identification,
reference is made to an ear tag or by any other means. Whilst
an ear tag may be relevant for agricultural animals, it certainly
isn't for dogs and cats. We believe reference should be made to
permanent identification in the form of a microchip.
13. Clause 26
(i) 26(1b)—disqualifying a person from
participating in the keeping of animals where other animals are
kept in the home would appear to be unenforceable.
14. Clause 34
(i) 34(2a)—we believe the one-year
rule in relation to an application to have a disqualification
order revoked is too rigid. The courts should be given flexibility
to extend the period as it sees fit dependent upon the severity
of the original offence.
15. Clause 36
(i) 36(3)—the implications of the Data
Protection Act will need to be carefully considered in the context
of this clause and sub-section.
16. Clause 44
(i) 4(2)—it is noted that the Secretary
of State will draw up a list of persons whom he considers suitable
for appointment by the local authority . . ., it is assumed
that local authorities will be compelled to select inspectors
from an approved panel—but who will approve the said panel?
It is to be fervently hoped that the criteria employed by local
authorities for selection will be common throughout England and
Wales. Of current and significant concern is that the appointment,
training and standard to which inspectors of establishments are
working is variable in the extreme dependent upon where in the
country one lives and the resources the local authority has at
its disposal—this must change. It is essential that the
key criteria for the selection, appointment and training and subsequently
the standards to which inspectors work is common and adhered to
by all local authorities throughout England and Wales.
17. Regulatory Impact Assessment
(i) 19—we are disappointed that Defra
has decided not to include regulation to control the sale and
use of electronic training aids within its timetable. Contrary
to the view of `commercial interest', there is scientific evidence
of the harm such devices can do (Schilder and van der Borg
2003 and others).
(ii) 33-36—we simply do not accept
your argument that there will be no significant additional costs.
Given the scope of the Bill, we have doubts that the level of
increased cost suggested is anything like realistic. We know from
our own experience how overstretched and under-resourced many
local authorities are when it comes to issues such as licensing
and enforcement. The Animal Welfare Bill and its provisions can
only add to that burden and if so, with what consequence? Will
all or part of the revenues generated be "ring fenced"
for use by local authorities for selection and training of inspectors
etc?
18. Annex E—Proposal to Licence/Register
Animal Sanctuaries
We welcome the intention to licence animal sanctuaries,
however we are concerned with regard to your proposed methodology,
ie the larger to be licensed, and the smaller to be registered.
It is the latter that are of concern to the larger organisations
such as The Blue Cross. All too often, the smaller. `One man band'
facility is mismanaged and administered and whilst the intention
may be good, the consequences can be dire for the individual and
the animals concerned. Your proposal to register rather than licence
those smaller facilities will achieve very little. They should
be licensed and expected to conform to minimum standards. If they
consistently fail, then closure should not necessarily be viewed
as a negative thing.
19. Annex F—Proposal to Licence Livery
Yards
We agree with your proposals to licence at 18-month
intervals, however, there should be a requirement for renewal
applications to be received by a specified date, ie three months
prior to expiry. There have been instances where under the current
Riding Establishments Act (a 12-month licence) where (because
of resources) the local authority has not been able to carry out
a renewal inspection prior to the expiry of the existing licence
with the result that the establishment has for up to 6 months
remained unlicensed.
The concern is pertinent in all situations where
a licence is required, ie boarding, pet shops etc.
20. Annex H—Proposal to Licence/Register
Kennels at Dog Race Tracks
We are disappointed that Defra does not intend
introducing regulation until 2010. Much has been and continues
to be done by the welfare organisations regarding the improvement
of racing greyhounds during and after their racing career. The
greyhound industry is at last becoming more proactive on welfare
issues and the Animal Welfare Bill is the ideal platform to accelerate
that process. We urge Government to reconsider its regulatory
timetable on this important issue.
13 August 2004
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