Select Committee on European Scrutiny Eighth Report


8 Possible EU mission to Iraq

(26147)

15207/04

Draft Joint Action establishing an expert team with a view to a possible European Union integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission for Iraq

Legal base
DepartmentForeign and Commonwealth Office
Basis of considerationMinister's letter of 9 February 2005
Previous Committee ReportHC 38-i (2004-05), para 22 (1 December 2004)
To be discussed in CouncilTo be determined
Committee's assessmentPolitically important
Committee's decisionCleared (decision reported on 1 December 2004)

Background

8.1 At the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 2 November, EU Foreign Ministers agreed a package of assistance for Iraq (consistent with the EU medium-term strategy for Iraq agreed at the European Council in June 2004), which was presented to Iraq's Prime Minister Allawi at the 5 November 2004 European Council. One element of the package was to despatch an expert mission to Iraq before the end of November to work with the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) with a view to a possible EU integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission starting after the January election. That decision to go ahead with the expert mission was based on the findings of an earlier EU fact-finding mission. We cleared the Joint Action that set out the expert mission's terms of reference on 1 December 2004.[29]

The Minister's letter

8.2 In his letter to us of 9 February 2005, the Minister for Europe (Mr Denis MacShane) says that "the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) has made clear its desire to see the EU deliver on its commitments to help Iraq. We do not expect this to change under the elected Transitional Iraqi Government". He then reports on the outcome of the expert team's work:

"The Expert Team deployed to the region on 30 November 2004 and worked in Iraq and Jordan. Meetings were also conducted in Geneva, Berlin, Kuwait and Dubai. Preparatory work and security training was conducted in Brussels. In all, over 140 Iraqi and international interlocutors were consulted, including the Chairman of the Iraqi Council of Judges, Iraqi police generals and prison governors. The Expert Team produced a report at the end of January 2005 setting out detailed options for a mission, supported by detailed analysis of both the feasibility of the options, their added value in terms of existing and planned national and international initiatives in this field and the security constraints. The Expert Team's recommendations, which the Government supports, include:

  • The mission be headquartered in Baghdad where a small team (4-5) can liaise with the Council of Judges and the Iraqi Ministries of Justice and Interior.
  • Training in Europe or the region for 520 mid to senior officials across the criminal justice system and 250 investigating magistrates and police.
  • An incremental approach to assess whether the mission could train in Iraq should the security situation and availability of infrastructure allow for such activities in the future.
  • The planning team be established immediately so that training could start as soon as practicable after agreement is reached with the Iraqi government.
  • Completion of the mission within one year from the inception of the first course.

"The Expert Team's recommendations were discussed by the Political and Security Committee[30] (PSC) on 4 February 2005. The PSC agreed that planning for an ESDP mission would commence. But decisions are yet to be made on the location of training (in EU Member States or in the region), a Baghdad liaison office, coordination efforts in Brussels, the Head of Mission, and the financing mechanism for the Mission. The PSC will next meet on 11 February 2005 to discuss these options. We expect a Joint Action for the establishment of this mission and a Council Decision for its head to be presented to the Council for agreement at the 8 March EcoFin Council.[31]

"The Government is keen for the planning of this mission to start as soon as possible and the mission to be launched no later than the summer. After discussions with Iraqi experts, decision-makers and international advisers in the criminal justice field, the Expert Team concluded that there are serious gaps in the Iraqi criminal justice system, both in terms of management and technical skills and in terms of coordination between relevant actors. For example, almost no criminal investigation is taking place after serious incidents such as shootings, bombings and kidnappings, which are taking place with impunity. This needs to be urgently addressed and the Government is eager that the EU is able to provide assistance in a timely manner."

8.3 On the timing of the next steps, the Minister explains that:

"In the unlikely event that the Joint Action and Council Decision are completed during parliamentary recess, for example if the decision was brought forward to the 21 February 2005 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) I may have to override parliamentary scrutiny. As my letter of 6 January 2005 indicates, the Government will make every effort to ensure that it can meet its scrutiny obligations in ESDP, as in other areas of CFSP. However, the nature of ESDP and the relative speed at which decisions are agreed will mean that there will inevitably be times when the Government will have to decide to take part in EU decisions before scrutiny is completed."

Conclusion

8.4 The Expert Team's approach appears to have been commendably thorough, and its recommendations to be sensible. The security situation plainly remains dangerous. The EU can help, but if human life in what is a civilian mission is not to be jeopardized, a cautious, testing-the-water approach is right.

8.5 We have no questions to put to the Minister at this stage, and are again grateful to him for his continuing endeavours to reconcile the need for scrutiny and the fast-moving nature of European Security and Defence Policy. As he says, it is likely that we shall be able to scrutinise the final Joint Action and Council Decision in advance of them being agreed. But we may not be able to. In view of Iraq's unique political importance, we considered that — since the essentials are unlikely to change — it would be appropriate to report what is known now in a short Report.


29   (26147) 15207/04; see HC 38-i (2004-05), para 22 (1 December 2004). Back

30   The committee of senior officials from national delegations who, under article 25 of the EU Treaty, monitor the international situation in areas covered by the CFSP and, under the general responsibility of the Council, exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. Back

31   The Economic and Finance Council. Back


 
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