8 Possible EU mission to Iraq
| (26147)
15207/04
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| Draft Joint Action establishing an expert team with a view to a possible European Union integrated police, rule of law and civilian administration mission for Iraq
|
| Legal base | — |
| Department | Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
| Basis of consideration | Minister's letter of 9 February 2005
|
| Previous Committee Report | HC 38-i (2004-05), para 22 (1 December 2004)
|
| To be discussed in Council | To be determined
|
| Committee's assessment | Politically important
|
| Committee's decision | Cleared (decision reported on 1 December 2004)
|
Background
8.1 At the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 2
November, EU Foreign Ministers agreed a package of assistance
for Iraq (consistent with the EU medium-term strategy for Iraq
agreed at the European Council in June 2004), which was presented
to Iraq's Prime Minister Allawi at the 5 November 2004 European
Council. One element of the package was to despatch an expert
mission to Iraq before the end of November to work with the Interim
Iraqi Government (IIG) with a view to a possible EU integrated
police, rule of law and civilian administration mission starting
after the January election. That decision to go ahead with the
expert mission was based on the findings of an earlier EU fact-finding
mission. We cleared the Joint Action that set out the expert
mission's terms of reference on 1 December 2004.[29]
The Minister's letter
8.2 In his letter to us of 9 February 2005, the Minister for Europe
(Mr Denis MacShane) says that "the Iraqi Interim Government
(IIG) has made clear its desire to see the EU deliver on its commitments
to help Iraq. We do not expect this to change under the elected
Transitional Iraqi Government". He then reports on the outcome
of the expert team's work:
"The Expert Team deployed to the region on 30 November 2004
and worked in Iraq and Jordan. Meetings were also conducted in
Geneva, Berlin, Kuwait and Dubai. Preparatory work and security
training was conducted in Brussels. In all, over 140 Iraqi and
international interlocutors were consulted, including the Chairman
of the Iraqi Council of Judges, Iraqi police generals and prison
governors. The Expert Team produced a report at the end of January
2005 setting out detailed options for a mission, supported by
detailed analysis of both the feasibility of the options, their
added value in terms of existing and planned national and international
initiatives in this field and the security constraints. The Expert
Team's recommendations, which the Government supports, include:
- The mission be headquartered in Baghdad where a small team
(4-5) can liaise with the Council of Judges and the Iraqi
Ministries of Justice and Interior.
- Training in Europe or the region for 520 mid
to senior officials across the criminal justice system and 250
investigating magistrates and police.
- An incremental approach to assess whether the
mission could train in Iraq should the security situation and
availability of infrastructure allow for such activities in the
future.
- The planning team be established immediately
so that training could start as soon as practicable after agreement
is reached with the Iraqi government.
- Completion of the mission within one year from
the inception of the first course.
"The Expert Team's recommendations were discussed
by the Political and Security Committee[30]
(PSC) on 4 February 2005. The PSC agreed that planning for an
ESDP mission would commence. But decisions are yet to be made
on the location of training (in EU Member States or in the region),
a Baghdad liaison office, coordination efforts in Brussels, the
Head of Mission, and the financing mechanism for the Mission.
The PSC will next meet on 11 February 2005 to discuss these options.
We expect a Joint Action for the establishment of this mission
and a Council Decision for its head to be presented to the Council
for agreement at the 8 March EcoFin Council.[31]
"The Government is keen for the planning of
this mission to start as soon as possible and the mission to be
launched no later than the summer. After discussions with Iraqi
experts, decision-makers and international advisers in the criminal
justice field, the Expert Team concluded that there are serious
gaps in the Iraqi criminal justice system, both in terms of management
and technical skills and in terms of coordination between relevant
actors. For example, almost no criminal investigation is taking
place after serious incidents such as shootings, bombings and
kidnappings, which are taking place with impunity. This needs
to be urgently addressed and the Government is eager that the
EU is able to provide assistance in a timely manner."
8.3 On the timing of the next steps, the Minister
explains that:
"In the unlikely event that the Joint Action
and Council Decision are completed during parliamentary recess,
for example if the decision was brought forward to the 21 February
2005 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) I
may have to override parliamentary scrutiny. As my letter of 6
January 2005 indicates, the Government will make every effort
to ensure that it can meet its scrutiny obligations in ESDP, as
in other areas of CFSP. However, the nature of ESDP and the relative
speed at which decisions are agreed will mean that there will
inevitably be times when the Government will have to decide to
take part in EU decisions before scrutiny is completed."
Conclusion
8.4 The Expert Team's approach appears to have
been commendably thorough, and its recommendations to be sensible.
The security situation plainly remains dangerous. The EU can
help, but if human life in what is a civilian mission is not to
be jeopardized, a cautious, testing-the-water approach is right.
8.5 We have no questions to put to the Minister
at this stage, and are again grateful to him for his continuing
endeavours to reconcile the need for scrutiny and the fast-moving
nature of European Security and Defence Policy. As he says, it
is likely that we shall be able to scrutinise the final Joint
Action and Council Decision in advance of them being agreed.
But we may not be able to. In view of Iraq's unique political
importance, we considered that — since the essentials are
unlikely to change — it would be appropriate to report what
is known now in a short Report.
29 (26147) 15207/04; see HC 38-i (2004-05), para 22
(1 December 2004). Back
30
The committee of senior officials from national delegations who,
under article 25 of the EU Treaty, monitor the international situation
in areas covered by the CFSP and, under the general responsibility
of the Council, exercise political control and strategic direction
of crisis management operations. Back
31
The Economic and Finance Council. Back
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