House of Commons - European Scrutiny

Select Committee on European Scrutiny Fourteenth Report

The values and objectives of the European Union

7. The Constitutional Treaty sets out a number of values in Article I-2:

'The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.'

8. These values are expressed in terms similar to those of Article 6 of the present Treaty on European Union (which refers to 'the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law') and the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (which refer to, among other things, 'equality between men and women'). Neither the EU nor the EC Treaty refers expressly to human dignity or respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities as a value. Nor do they refer expressly to concepts such as 'pluralism', 'non-discrimination'[8] and 'tolerance'.

9. The differences between the EU and EC Treaties and the Constitutional Treaty are more extensive in relation to objectives (see box). For example, Article I-3(1) states that the aim of the Union is 'to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples', a provision which has no exact counterpart in the EU and EC Treaties. Similarly, Article I-3(3) states that the Union 'shall promote social justice and protection', 'solidarity between generations' and 'protection of the rights of the child', whereas there is no such provision in the EU and EC Treaties.

Article I-3: The Union's objectives

1. The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.

2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted.

3. The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.

It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.

It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.

It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

5. The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Constitution.

10. The question arises of whether these differences from the existing Treaties are merely different formulations of aspirational language, or whether they mark a difference of substance. In particular, we sought to explore how the references to the Union's values and objectives would assist the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in interpreting EU law, and whether there was a risk of them being used to extend the EU's competences, either through ECJ rulings or by creating the possibility of legislation in new areas.

Impact on the ECJ

11. There were differing views as to the use the ECJ might make of the statements of values and objectives. Professor Sir David Edward pointed out that the stated objectives of the original Treaties were 'helpful guides to interpretation because they constituted a reasonably coherent and precise statement of aims and priorities', but that 'The effect of successive Treaties has been to include a growing number of less precise objectives (e.g. the "flowering of the cultures of the Member States") which amount to little more than a politically correct wish-list and are of little assistance to the Court as guides to interpretation'. Articles I-2 and I-3 were 'all-embracing, imprecise and give no guidance as to priorities';[9] indeed they were 'so comprehensive and wide-ranging that really it is possible to find an objective which would support almost any proposition you chose to select'. The objectives could be used only as 'a criterion or point of reference by which you choose between the two alternatives or decide how you are going to interpret a particular provision', rather than as a basis for creating rights or obligations.[10]

12. Professor Piet Eeckhout took a similar view, though he could recall 'a couple of cases where one could say that the values underlying European integration were central to the Court's reasoning in quite an important way'.[11] Professor Alan Dashwood considered that the provisions would be 'only a very rough guide' to the ECJ in interpreting the substantive provisions of the Treaty, but that they might be 'a little more useful to the Community legislator in determining the thrust of future legislation'.[12] The Foreign Secretary (Rt Hon Jack Straw) stated that the values and objectives could not be used to extend the competences of the Union, because Article I-3(5) provided that 'The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Constitution'.[13]

13. Several witnesses ascribed somewhat more significance to the values and objectives as regards the ECJ. Professor Anthony Arnull considered, first, that 'in cases of ambiguity, the Union Courts would be likely to prefer an interpretation of other provisions [of the Treaty] which is consistent with the Union's values and objectives'; and, secondly, that the values and objectives 'may be relevant if the Courts are called upon to find a solution to a problem for which the [Treaty] does not expressly provide'. In such a case, the courts would be 'reluctant to endorse a solution which would have the effect of undermining the Union's values and objectives as set out in a Treaty agreed unanimously by the Member States and ratified by each of them in accordance with their own constitutional requirements'.[14] Professor Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère[15] described the provisions of Article I-3(3) as striking 'a new (and more appropriate….) balance between economic goals and social values', which was 'likely to affect the balancing process which takes place when the Court judges the compatibility of a trade-restrictive national measure with free movement and competition rules' and which would 'provide an additional guarantee against any risk of future judicial backsliding concerning the importance of social values'.[16] Martin Howe QC believed the words 'do have some legal effect' because, although very general, 'we can see in the past the Court reaching out to things like preambles and general statements to justify decisions it wishes to take'.[17]

Other effects

14. There was wide agreement that the values and objectives were helpful in providing part of the definition of the Union. Professor Dashwood indicated that it was part of the conditions for becoming an EU Member State 'that a State should subscribe to those values and be willing to propagate them. They are also the values that have to be upheld by Member States and which are protected by special machinery which allows action to be taken against a Member State which is guilty of significant breaches of those values'.[18] The Foreign Secretary referred to them as a 'beacon' for States wishing to join the Union, and emphasised that the EU was not just a customs and economic union but was 'fundamentally a union of values, European values for which we have had to fight so hard'.[19]

15. Although the Foreign Secretary rightly referred to Article I-3(5) as preventing the values and objectives being turned into additional EU competences, several witnesses considered that they could nevertheless have some influence on legislation, particularly through their effect on the concept of subsidiarity. For example, Professor Eileen Denza referred to the words on respect for cultural and linguistic diversity and the safeguarding and enhancing of Europe's cultural heritage as being helpful to those who were seeking to improve the status of minority languages in the EU.[20] Professor Gráinne de Búrca cited children's rights as an example: the values and objectives might be used to justify legislation promoting consumer protection being directly oriented towards children in a way which under the existing Treaties might have been questioned on grounds of subsidiarity. She also believed it possible that the listing of objectives 'might indirectly create a new kind of power for the EU … through linking the objectives and values in Articles 2 and 3 with … the flexibility clause in Article 18', and gave the example of the promotion and protection of human rights,[21] though we note that the flexibility allowed under Article I-18 is stated to be 'within the framework of the policies defined in Part III' of the Treaty.

Conclusion on the values and objectives

16. Given the variety of views expressed by our witnesses, we find it difficult positively to conclude that the provisions on values and objectives in the Constitutional Treaty mark a substantive change from the similar provisions in the EU and EC Treaties, or that they will be treated differently by the ECJ. Nevertheless, we draw attention to the new concepts expressed in the Constitutional Treaty, such as 'social justice' and the rights of the child, which mark an emphasis on social rights, and to the views of some of our witnesses that the values and objectives in the Constitutional Treaty might affect the direction of legislative activity and the way subsidiarity is defined.

8 Article 12 EC does refer to discrimination on grounds of nationality. See also Article 1-4(2) of the Constitutional Treaty. Back

9 Ev 10. Back

10 Q 27. See also Ev 90. Back

11 Q 76. Back

12 Q 124. Back

13 Q 18. The Foreign Secretary paraphrased the Article in Q 18. Back

14 Ev 130. Back

15 Evidence submitted jointly with Anastasia Iliopoulou. Back

16 Ev 106. Back

17 Q 125. Back