Impact of the changes
71. The Foreign Secretary told us that the Government
supported the provisions on enhanced cooperation, as these 'will
ensure that an enlarged Europe can be flexible where it needs
to be, allowing us or other countries to work closely with a group
of countries in areas others do not want to'. His view was that
'The provisions are more likely to be used than now, but only
time will tell'.[108]
72. Professors Edward and Dashwood thought that whether
enhanced cooperation was used more would depend on factors other
than the terms of the Constitutional Treaty, and in particular
on the enlargement of the EU to 25 States.[109]
Professor Dashwood doubted that enhanced cooperation would be
much used in the CFSP field, despite the broadening of its scope,
since 'Member States which do not wish to be bound by a CFSP decision,
but are willing to allow its adoption, already have the more attractive
option of "constructive abstention" '.[110]
He noted that enhanced cooperation in a CFSP matter 'would be
seriously weakened through the non-participation of the United
Kingdom, or of any other of the large Member States, and the possibility
of this happening seems, accordingly remote'.[111]
Professor Denza considered that 'if all these procedural safeguards
are there the result is that States either do nothing or simply
by-pass them', and that 'It remains unlikely that these provisions
would be a practical way forward in any area of Union activity'.[112]
73. On the other hand the Federal Union thought it
'likely that in the future, a grouping will emerge based on the
eurozone countries and seeking to establish more cooperation on
economic matters such as corporate taxation and the employment
rights of migrant workers'. This would result not from the provisions
of the Constitutional Treaty, but from the UK not having adopted
the euro, and might make it harder for the UK to adopt the euro
in the future.[113]
Professor Eeckhout considered that enhanced cooperation might
be used often in circumstances where a Member State had had recourse
to the 'emergency brake', but that it was 'less likely to be used
in social, fiscal, and economic policy areas, where there will
generally be competitiveness concerns', and there could also be
'free-rider issues', if non-participants benefited from policies
pursued under enhanced cooperation.[114]
74. Professor Dutheil de la Rochère drew attention
to two effects which the provisions on enhanced cooperation might
have. First, there might be an argument that, since the EU 'is
equipped with a reasonably operational mechanism for closer cooperation,
seeking solutions outside this framework (via the medium of international
agreements) should be excluded'; nevertheless, it was a matter
of choice for Member States which 'laboratory' they preferred
to use in order to experiment. Secondly, the use of enhanced
cooperation could be 'threatened against a reluctant Member State
as part of a wider process of bargaining', as had been done to
Italy and Spain (in the former case over the European Arrest Warrant);
in both cases this had been effective.[115]
75. The provisions on enhanced cooperation have,
to some extent, been simplified, but we agree with our witnesses
that such simplification will not, in itself, make enhanced cooperation
more likely. Of greater significance are political factors and
the fact of enlargement of the Union to 25 Member States. We
believe it is right to maintain strict conditions for the commencement
of enhanced cooperation, in order to protect the interests of
non-participants, but we accept that a procedure limited as in
the Constitutional Treaty might provide a useful safety valve.
On the other hand, we would regard as unacceptable any tendency
to use the procedure as a means of coercing individual Member
States into agreeing EU measures and policies.
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