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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 132-iii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

European Scrutiny COMMITTEE

 

 

EU's Constitutional Treaty

 

 

Tuesday 25 January 2005

MR JO LEINEN MEP, MR RICHARD CORBETT MEP, MR ANDREW DUFF MEP,

MR ALEXANDER STUBB MEP and MR GYÖRGY SCHÖPFLIN MEP

Evidence heard in Public Questions 191 - 232

 

 

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Oral Evidence

Taken before the European Scrutiny Committee

on Tuesday 25 January 2005

Members present

Mr William Cash

Mr Michael Connarty

Mr Wayne David

Sandra Osborne

Angus Robertson

Mr Anthony Steen

Mr Bill Tynan

 

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr Michael Connarty was called to the Chair

________________

Witnesses: Mr Jo Leinen, a Member of the European Parliament, Chairman, Mr Richard Corbett, a Member of the European Parliament, Co-rapporteur on the Constitutional Treaty, Co-ordinator - PSE, Mr Andrew Duff, a Member of the European Parliament, Co-ordinator - ALDE, Mr Alexander Stubb, a Member of the European Parliament, Deputy Co-ordinator - PPE-DE and Mr György Schöpflin, a Member of the European Parliament, PPE-DE, European Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee, examined.

Q191 Mr Connarty: Can I welcome our colleagues from the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament and also welcome some of our colleagues from the Slovenian Parliament, who are here to observe the operation of a public evidence session. I believe, Mr Leinen, there is a wish to make a statement. I do not know whether every one of your delegation wishes to make a statement?

Mr Leinen: No. If you want I will say a few words and then we will go into the debate.

Q192 Mr Connarty: You wish to speak on behalf of your Committee? Before starting, can I say to you we have had a letter from one of your Committee - who is not here - saying he believes - and it is Mr Alistair who believes - he represent a different view from the members who are here. Can I ask when we ask questions of the Committee that you might deal with his concern in trying to give us a view of the breath of opinion in your Committee about anything we ask rather than the individual opinions of the members who are here. That takes care of the concern he had.

Mr Leinen: Chairman, and indeed colleagues, many thanks for the invitation. We are delighted to be here. It is our first visit as European Parliament to our colleagues in the national parliaments, and we will have some 10 or 12 more visits mainly to the countries where there will be a referendum on the new treaty. Our delegation is composed of Mr Stubb from Finland, Mr Duff from Britain, myself from Germany, Mr Corbett from Britain and Mr Schöpflin from Hungary. In a vote on 12 January, and an overwhelming majority recommending the ratification of this new treaty, our analysis came to the conclusion that there is not one single step back compared with the existing Treaty of Nice but there are many steps forward for a European Union that is more transparent, more democratic and more efficient. Some states are more ambitious, some others are less ambitious. Of course, our vote was 500 in favour and 137 against. You can dispute whether you like this new treaty or you do not like it. This morning coming to this place I looked into a paper that is distributed in Brussels, New Europe, and there was an article by an honourable member, Roger Helmer. Roger Helmer was expressing his feelings which the 137 might share and I would like to quote two phrases: "This is the Constitution that makes the end of Britain as an independent nation" and "This is the end of freedom and democracy as we know it". This is, of course, as you see a wide range of opinions that we get in the debate and we will have that in the next 18 months on the ratification in the 25 countries. Just to answer your remark about the composition of our delegation, the European Parliament is defining its delegations according to the well known d'Hondt system and this delegation of five members is two from PPE, the biggest group, two from PSE and one from the Liberals. In our debate in the Committee we said every group in the Parliament will have the chance to participate. We may have 10 or 11 more missions, but it is not a habit in any way in the Parliament that if you have voted you compose your delegation out of majority and minority, you compose it out of political groups, so others will be part of the delegation on other occasions.

Mr Connarty: That is helpful, thank you for your opening statement. As you know, we are involved as a Committee in taking evidence from a number of sources on the Constitution, sometimes in detail and sometimes in the generality of its impact. We are going to stick to that format, and I am sure your evidence will be very helpful to us in our report to the United Kingdom Parliament.

Q193 Angus Robertson: We are looking at nine particular aspects of the Treaty and the first aspect which we are keen to find out a little bit more about is the subject of the Council of Ministers meeting in public: the idea of transparency and openness, meeting in public as an important decision-making body so the public can see what goes on, also debate in this Committee too. To what extent do you think that there would be genuine discussion in public in the Council when legislating and is there a risk of much of the real discussion taking place in Coreper, and being referred upwards to the European Council, or simply carrying on in the corridors when one is not under the gaze of the public or journalists who might want to cover such meetings? Are there any loopholes in the Treaty text that we should be watching out for? There are two questions there: firstly, the issue of the effect of transparency in the Council of Ministers and, secondly, are there any loopholes in the Treaty text to watch out for in this context?

Mr Leinen: Mr Stubb worked in the Council before coming to the Parliament, he might answer your question.

Mr Stubb: I have had ten years as a civil servant, within the realm of the Council. I have two main points. The first one is that it is possible already for the Council to meet in public; that decision was taken in Seville in 2001. The second point is the European Parliament was pushing for a so-called "legislative council", a clear second chamber, if you will, which then would have always met in open, but perhaps one should never under-estimate the capacity of Member States to want to keep some parts of the negotiations behind closed doors. It would be very optimistic to say that everything would move directly from Coreper to the European Council, there is of course the Council in between. There is a general tendency in Council meetings to try to keep so called "heavy business" a little bit outside the meetings. What has happened, a factor after the Seville decision, is that many of the main decisions are now taken over lunches and in those lunches even civil servants are kept outside the room. But I do think the new treaty does give a glimmer of hope and basically, especially if parliamentarians or anyone who wants to see the Council legislate in public, it forces it to do so more often. I do think that areas related to justice and home affairs and, of course, pure foreign policy, which are not necessarily purely legislative, in the future will still remain within closed doors. I do find this very unfortunate because - the last point I want to make - many times in the Council I have seen ministers have tapped each other on the back and said "Wonderful compromise", five minutes later they have gone in front of their national press and said: "Sorry, cannot do anything about it, the EU decided over our head".

Mr Duff: Good afternoon everyone. Can I supplement that. I think that it is a very important step forward for democracy. The drafting of the clause is quite clear that it must be the deliberations and the decisions, in other words the voting and the discussions which formulate the decisions. Of course, there will be private discussions, that is necessary, there is a negotiation. It is a thing which we, you and the European Parliament have been pushing for, for a very long time. It will greatly facilitate the scrutiny from national parliaments of the performance of their ministers in Brussels. There is an extraordinary transformation from a minister who is a member of the executive here, when he flies to Brussels he becomes a legislator, and it is important that he performs and speaks in public. This will see that this happens. I think if there is a pitfall it is that the European Council of the Prime Ministers and Presidents will become even more closeted and secretive. If I can offer you a friendly word of advice, if it was me here scrutinising what is going on, I would try to get the Prime Minister to speak to you before meetings of the European Council and afterwards, as is the practice in Finland and I know elsewhere.

Mr Connarty: Do any other members want to contribute?

Mr Steen: First of all, welcome. I do not know whether you are aware but several months ago this Committee had a short debate about whether we should meet in public here. I am glad to say the Conservatives carried the day and they agreed that we should meet, against the minority, the Labour Party were in the majority...

Mr Connarty: Mr Steen, I am not sure we are here to discuss that in this Committee.

Mr Steen: I thought you would like to know about this because it reflects very much on what you are saying. Having agreed we should meet in public, the Leader of the House of Commons said we should meet in public but that was about six months ago. There is no appetite for meeting in public because of the complexity of the matters we are discussing. I do not think it is wanting to keep behind closed doors but it is because of the problems of the amount of papers we go through and all the rules and regulations and directives. I am wondering whether you feel that meeting in public will require an enormous education of the public to understand what you are about, just as there is an enormous problem in this country with the public understanding what we have doing here, mind you they have not had the opportunity yet but if they did come they would not understand.

Mr Connarty: I presume that is in reference to the Council meeting in public?

Q194 Mr Steen: Yes.

Mr Leinen: All of our committees are public. We have only on decision points that are non public. The European Parliament is public, the media are there and the interested public are there. I think the Council have a double function: it is an executive and it is a legislator. This publicity is only meant for the Council as a legislator - when they vote legislation, laws that apply to all the 450 million citizens, I think the citizens have a right to know how they voted in that meeting - not when the Council are deliberating about other matters, as a body that is the executive of the European Union, then they stay like every government in the meeting room, not in public.

Q195 Mr Connarty: Can I ask an additional question on that. How much difference will public meetings of the Council make - I think it is a principle - to the actual legislative process and relationships? For example, do you think a transcript will have to be produced of those meetings with everything that is said in that public meeting being available to the public?

Mr Corbett: That will be a matter for the Council. I expect they may well wish to because if the meeting is in public there may be other people, such as journalists, making their own transcript, and they would rather have an official transcript which is agreed and is an accurate reflection of what everybody says but that is for the future. The key thing, I think, is in terms of public perceptions, that legislation, as a matter of principle, should be adopted in public, seeing here how your representative voted, but also just to give people an idea. For instance, we all have an idea of what the UN Security Council looks like because we have seen it on television, we know how they sit, we know that it is representative of the states around the table, they sometimes vote and so on. None of us has seen that on television from the Council. The Council, which is the least known of the EU institutions in the wider public, despite being the most powerful, will become better known.

Q196 Mr Connarty: Can we turn to another question. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is available and there is a debate about whether putting the Charter of Fundamental Rights into this treaty will change its relevance and will change its powers. We have been given the explanation that the Charter will apply when Member States "...act in the scope of Union law..." and the wide interpretation which could be given to this on the basis of Article II-88. How firmly based is your Committee's claim - which I believe you have made - that the incorporation in the Charter will not result in the extension of EU competence, especially in social and economic matters?

Mr Leinen: I think in the Articles of the Charter itself there is a double security there, it is not an extension of EU competences but really being obliged only in the scope of matters which are in the competence of the EU and only to public acts that are coming from the EU. So it is not applying to acts that are coming from the Members States or from regional or local authorities. I think there is a double security already in the Articles of the Charter but Mr Duff was a member of that Convention so he knows.

Mr Duff: I was, and indeed rapporteur for the Parliament on the Charter. The purpose of the Charter is to safeguard the citizen from an abuse of the great power that is now exercised in Brussels by the EU authorities. It is important that it is seen in the context of the whole Constitution, the principle of subsidiarity, the principle of respecting the domestic dispositions of all the Member States, the conferral of competences, which is clearer I hope, if not completely simplified at least an awful lot clearer than it is under the present treaty. The Charter, of course, will change the performance of the courts. At present, a plaintiff - and there have been several plaintiffs who waived the Charter, as it were, to substantiate their plea without success because the Court has said: "This is very interesting but it is voluntary, it is a political code of conduct, it is not mandatory." As soon as the Constitution is in force it will become binding upon the EU itself, which is important, and the agents of the EU, including Member States, regional and local authorities and things like Europol, who are charged to carry out the law and policy that flow from the decisions of the EU. In theory, the scope of the Charter, therefore, is quite strictly limited and quite clearly defined, I think more clearly defined in the horizontal clauses which have emerged from the IGC than we succeeded in the convention or indeed in the first convention which drafted the Charter. I think that the British, despite much controversy, have improved the clarity of the legal certainty as far as the Charter is concerned. What will happen in practice depends upon the courts and we have all sorts of courts in 25 Member States who could do different things, but we have the Supreme Court in the ECJ, which is in the process of developing great expertise in the field of fundamental rights, very sophisticated, in close conferral with the Strasbourg Court. I am sanguine about the prospects. I think it will assist the institutions but, above all, the citizen.

Q197 Sandra Osborne: In relation to clarity and the role of the courts, we have received evidence during our inquiry from several witnesses who I do not think would agree with your interpretation. They submit that the impact of the treaty has interfered in a number of areas and most comprehensively so in respect of the interpretation and application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, therefore much will depend on interpretation by the European Court of Justice. Is it satisfactory, do you feel, for citizens to be asked to make a decision in the treaty when the impact of important parts of the treaty are unclear? Do you accept that is the case?

Mr Duff: If you are asking me if I am in favour of a referendum or not, I have to be quite honest with you, I am not. We are where we are. I agree with you that decisions are very sophisticated and complex and, to be honest, as well, I think I would have preferred the Westminster Parliament to have shouldered responsibility for the decision.

Q198 Sandra Osborne: That is interesting.

Mr Duff: I think that might be slightly off the issue of the fundamental rights.

Sandra Osborne: It is not unanimous in your Committee.

Mr Cash: On the specific question, on the Article II-111 it is stated in the explanation that "the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the Union context is only binding when they act in the scope of Union law". We have taken evidence from Professor De Bürca and Professor Eeckhout, et cetera, and the question I would like to focus on is the application of this with respect to the question of the right to strike, which is, to say the least, a pretty important question and much fought in English law because there is not a right to strike in English law as it happens, people think there is but there is not. What it says here is that Article II-11-88 asserts that workers have, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to take collective action to defend their interest including strike action. Now the same implication arises in Article II-30 in relation to unfair dismissal which speaks of the right to protect against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practice. The question really is this, is it not clear from the practical implications of the problem which I have identified that in the context of what the judges say in the European Court with regard to the legislation in a given Member State, take the United Kingdom which at the moment does not have a right to strike, that clearly if it is laid down in the Constitution that these matters are to be determined in accordance with Union law and within the scope of Union law, that our laws will be changed here in this Parliament, to confer the kind of right to strike and the kind of protection against unjustified dismissal which is scattered throughout all our employment acts and, quite frankly, will be a highly contentious issue?

Q199 Mr Connarty: I think there have been a lot of points made there on which you do or do you not agree with Mr Cash on the effect of. Will they be changed by this Charter?

Mr Corbett: Without wanting to enter into debate about whether under our domestic law there is a right to strike or not, which I think there is a matter of controversy rather than acceptable behaviour, how would it be affected by this wording in the Charter? Firstly, a lot of those causes that you emphasised were added at the behest of those governments that wanted to minimise the scope for the Charter to be interpreted in a way that could interfere with national provisions, so those clauses are added as a protection. What it does mean, and this is generally true from the Charter, but perhaps especially in these cases, is that the Court of Justice could be called upon to overturn European legislation which sought to restrict, if ever it were to adopt such legislation, the right to strike, that could be overturned. It is a protection of national provisions, whatever they were. On the fact which was alluded to by the previous questioner that ultimately this can be a matter of judgment of the European Court of Justice, one big difference between the EU system under this Constitution and indeed as it is now, with the US Supreme Court, which is often the comparison made, is that in the US the Supreme Court judges are appointed by the federal institutions. In our case, our European Court of Justice, the members are not appointed by the Commission or the Parliament or without any involvement but by the Member States themselves. If there is any possible bias in the line taken by the Court, it is more likely to be protective of States' rights and national interests perhaps than is the case of the US Supreme Court. I think it was a British President of the Court of Justice who once said: "The Court never makes a political judgment but it sometimes has to remind politicians of what they have agreed".

Q200 Mr Cash: Except to say that certainly the oath that the justices take emphatically takes them outside the political arena of their own Member State.

Mr Corbett: They are judges, of course.

Q201 Mr Cash: Exactly. You are making a more general point, and I think maybe you are right in a certain sense that there is a tendency for people to be influenced by their background but as a matter of law there is no doubt that the members of the Court of Justice have to be above all that.

Mr Corbett: They are judges not politicians.

Q202 Mr Cash: In our Constitutional Reform Bill, which I am interested in at the moment, we have a guarantee of continued judicial independence on which I have got a lot to say on hopefully next week.

Mr Duff: Can I add a supplement to Mr Cash. I have read your Bill with great interest. On the article in the Charter that you referred to, it says also that the Charter does not extend the field of application of Union law. Then in Article III-210 subparagraph 6, which concerns social and employment policy, it says "This Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike ..." so I think you can slumber comfortably.

Q203 Mr Cash: I think they have written it quite well.

Mr Duff: No.

Q204 Mr Cash: Not you, I am saying "they".

Mr Duff: In drafting, we were inspired by the necessity to be able to confront Mr Cash at a meeting of the Scrutiny Committee.

Q205 Mr Connarty: All of that effort, Mr Cash, was not for nothing! Can I come back to the point made by Sandra Osborne. We had evidence last week and, some quite conflicting evidence and opinion from Professor Dashwood and Martin Howe QC, about what was really meant by Article I-6 about Union law which says "The Constitution and law adopted by an institution of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States". It does seem in the question asked by Sandra Osborne really is it satisfactory for citizens to be asked to make a decision on a treaty when the impact of the important parts of the treaty is unclear, in other words, the evidence we got, I think they agreed the courts would decide how to interpret what was given primacy, whether it was a legislation of the states, the nations or whether it was in fact the legislation of the European Union, and that is where there is still some serious doubt. They seem to come to the conclusion when the courts make that decision then you will know. Does your Committee think it is right to make that decision, when there is so much uncertainty, when we will not know what the courts will decide until they decide it and whether they will take decisions, in fact, on economic and other matters? At this moment, your Committee says it is safe from the interference of the EU.

Mr Leinen: From the very beginning of the European construction - the Common Market and the Treaty of Rome - it was the principle that so far competence has been transferred to the Union, legislation in that field has primacy over national law. That is a characteristic of the Community methods expressed from the very first treaty to today, so it is nothing new. It is now written because you have a basic treaty and you write it down but the principle was applied from the beginning. The courts come in on cases of conflict where you need interpretation and hopefully it is not too often that you need interpretation because things are clear when they are ruled. You have this complexity of life, that there are cases where you refer to a court, a third power to interpret, and, of course, the European Court of Justice is part of the system and their judgments are accepted so far by all the members. I do not know any case where members have not accepted what this Court of Justice has stated. I do not know whether this treaty makes things unclear, the effort was to make it clearer. Let us say you have in this competence order quite clearly what is the exclusive competence of the Union and you will discover it is not very much, it is tariffs, trade, monetary union, fishery, marine and biological. Then you have the big bag of shared competences where the Union mostly makes framework goals and the Member States or others are filling it by their own legislation. I think in a multi-layer system, as we have, of course, you have this bag of shared competences where you always struggle - is it too much, is it not enough - we have both sides to look on it and I think the Constitution is improving this situation dramatically. The principle of subsidiarity was strengthened, the national parliaments get a say in the whole process, this early warning system is a weapon, I would say, where the national parliaments come in EU legislation and the competence order makes it clearer than it was before. I think we have improved the situation and not worsened it.

Mr Cash: Chairman, on a point there, I think you introduced this subject and the primacy issue particularly, and I would not want to trespass on your having opened that up without it being followed through.

Mr Connarty: I thought you had missed it. Please, Mr Cash, if you have a point.

Mr Cash: I will try to summarise the position. We have taken evidence from some very eminent European lawyers including Alan Dashwood last week, who I am sure you know. On the question of primacy, with great respect, Mr Leinen - and this is not a criticism - it is a very complex and rather opaque question. Under the Costa case in 1964 the European Court declared that they had superior jurisdiction over laws and over constitutions. Now that has been disputed by a number of Member States. We have a special problem here in this country, and I would say it was a special advantage which I am addressing amendments to the Constitutional Reform Bill next week, because if we pass an enactment - and, for example, to give it a practical tinge, it could be on this question of right to strike - if, for example, despite what you said we were to end up with a change in our law, let us put it no higher than that, whichever way it goes, it would be open, under our Constitution, for Parliament on behalf of the voters in a general election to pass a subsequent enactment after the European Communities Act, i.e. next week, I would say, also, after the European Constitution but that is a separate issue. If we were to legislate inconsistently and clearly against what the law prescribed by Europe stated at that time, then our later enactment would be something which our courts would have to give effect to. I will leave it at that. There is a serious problem about the constitutional relationship and jurisprudence understood in Europe and understood here in the United Kingdom, although I fear we are being taken further down a route which I would not like, but I will not enlarge on that.

Q206 Mr Connarty: I think there is a question there, and it is in fact are Mr Cash's fears justified?

Mr Corbett: I have got the transcript of what Professor Dashwood said and I think he might not have put it quite the same way as you did.

Mr Cash: He did, he agreed with me.

Q207 Mr Connarty: I think Martin Howe might have different view. I said in my comments that they did disagree about the question.

Mr Duff: Just on the primacy issue, the Simmenthal case of 1978 expressly addresses the issue of constitutional primacy. Mr Cash is perfectly correct to say this has not always been accepted without demur by constitutional courts in all Member States, but despite their anxieties and reserves, they have always performed loyally to sustain the integrity of the acquis and the strength and force of the corpus of EU law. I would include in that the British courts, in the 30 years or whatever it is we have been in the EU there has not been a single case where the issue of primacy of EU law is contested in an English court or I think a Scottish court.

Q208 Mr Cash: We have not had a notwithstanding enactment yet.

Mr Duff: No, that is right and, also, you have not had the principle of the primacy codified as it will be in this Constitution.

Q209 Mr Cash: That is exactly the point.

Mr Duff: I am not seeking to say that this is not a significant step forward.

Q210 Mr Connarty: Mr Corbett, do you want to comment?

Mr Corbett: On the issue of primacy of European law, which is so fundamental to the whole system, may I ask what would be the point of jointly agreeing common laws in a particular field, like the environment across Europe, if everyone is then free to ignore them. That is whole point of having common legislation, that we are all bound by the same set of rules that we enacted through with our neighbours in the European Union.

Mr Leinen: Exactly. The Union is under the rule of law that is applying then to all the members. I will still stick to my statement that the Constitution is not adding something new, it is codifying something that has been accepted for years.

Mr Cash: With great respect, Mr Leinen, it is not.

Mr Connarty: I think Mr Leinen had not finished speaking.

Q211 Mr Cash: I beg his pardon, and yours.

Mr Leinen: I have to repeat what Andrew Duff and Richard Corbett have been explaining. Since Britain has been a member, in no case has it refused to accept a judgment of the European Court of Justice. The rule is accepted as a characteristic of this Union. It would be really new if a Member State was to start to argue about this basic principle: if you have a common law made by the Council of Ministers, sometimes on unanimity agreeing to it and then they go home and say: "We are not applying it" then, of course, you have another European Union, it would no longer be the same one. This Article is just qualifying what has been done since the beginning.

Mr Stubb: Can I make two quick points. The first point is on implementation, I am happy to say that the United Kingdom is always number one or number two in implementing legislation.

Mr Duff: It is not actually.

Mr Stubb: It is very close, one, two or three. The second point is when it comes to interpreting the primacy of law, of course, we must remember that it is a little bit to interpret unless no law has been legislated in a particular area. Of course, we must remember that not all areas are covered by the European Union, their natural primacy of national law stands.

Q212 Mr Cash: I thought Mr Duff very fairly described the issue as it will be presented to the United Kingdom Parliament and what he said speaks for itself. But as regards Mr Leinen's comment there is a change, with great respect, because under clause 4 of the final provisions, the transitional arrangements at the end of the treaty, what it says in effect is that all the treaties and the entire acquis are repealed and revoked and then are substituted by a successor, which is the European Union, which contains this provision, which my colleague referred to, which is Article I-6, which gives primacy and the right of the European Court to interpret. So combining all that together, as I put it to the Prime Minister the other day, you get a fundamental change. That is really all I am saying.

Mr Duff: No, not a fundamental change.

Q213 Mr Cash: You say that, I say it is.

Mr Schöpflin: If I might add a brief point, and also thank the Committee for hearing me out. It seems to me that what we have been discussing is a narrowly focused problem. It may arise but the possibility of it arising is not very high. It seems to me the great bulk of the Constitution is not all that contentious. The Constitution as a symbolic entity maybe contentious but the actual provisions will mostly be self-operating, I suppose self-enforcing. There will always, however, be complex cases and I think it is this we are talking about; I do not think there are going to be that many. In a sense I have a feeling that the discussion we have been having is speculative. It is very interesting, but I am not sure it will happen that way. We know that no legal system in the world can make provision for every contingency, it is just impossible and I think there has to be some space given to interpretation by any judiciary that we are looking at, I think that is the case here.

Mr Cash: One last point, Chairman, if we have a "no" vote in the referendum which rejects the Constitution and then there is the obligation, as there will be, on that government to legislate, you are going to be faced with a interesting example of what I have been saying.

Mr Connarty: I think that is more a comment than a question. Mr Steen, I believe you have a question.

Mr Steen: Absolutely. This is something I have been majoring on, really on behalf of myself and my party, and it is rather like an Agatha Christie, which you may be familiar with, we do not know where the culprit is and we do not know whether there is a culprit. This is the question: what do you think the consequences would be if the United Kingdom, and only the United Kingdom, refused to ratify the Constitutional Treaty by way of a referendum? By way of a background, I want to explain from a strictly legal point of view the consequences of the UK not ratifying the treaty seem to be clear, and that is that all Member States have to ratify the new treaty and if one Member States does not ratify the new treaty, then the existing treaties remain in force. That seems to be what the position is. However, we have had a considerable number of different views from witnesses as to what might happen. Professor Hartley takes one view, he suggests that if the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by the United Kingdom or another Member State everything will be open for negotiation, whereas Professor Dashwood by contrast writes - and I quote - "If only one or two Member States failed to ratify ... there would be very strong pressure from the governments of the other 23 Member States to go forward with the new Constitution. It is possible that a compromise formula might be found (as was done with respect to Denmark in order to secure the eventual ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by that country), but this could not entail altering the text of the Treaty itself since it is inconceivable that the other Member States would be willing to re-run the process of ratification. In all likelihood ..." and this the punchline "...the only practical option for the Member States unable to ratify the Constitution would be to withdraw from the Union and negotiate some kind of associate status". Bearing in mind we have a referendum here for the public by October 2006, and the Conservative Party is committed to campaign for a "no" vote, as does the UKIP party, and one or two others, although the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party are going to campaign for a "yes" vote, the answers to these questions are terribly important for the public.

Q214 Mr Connarty: I think this will go down in history alongside the West Lothian question as the Totnes question, Mr Steen's constituency, but it is one that I think is very fundamental.

Mr Stubb: I guess my first reaction, I thought you would never ask! I have a three-part answer. The first one is that I think politically this is not about a referendum for the UK on whether you are going to accept the Constitution or not, it is about whether you are going to be Members of the European Union or not. I think that is really the fundamental question. I do not think a "no" of one, two or three Member States will stop this Constitution entering into force. I believe firmly that there has been too much political energy, and frankly this Treaty is too good to be rejected, and going back only to Nice. The second point is, of course, if you want the United Kingdom to exit the European Union you might have to approve this treaty and pass it on and use at least former Article 49 - I do not remember which article it is now - which allows a Member State to exit the European Union. The third point I want to make is this is not a treaty like the Maastricht Treaty or like the Nice or Amsterdam Treaty where you can opt out from something, because essentially that was what Denmark did, it opted out of the euro, it opted out of a common defence, and it opted out of Schengen, this is not really that, so you cannot opt out of the institutional structure which we have established. The UK cannot go along with a different system of number of commissioners, number of European parliamentarians or weighting on votes. The final point I want to make, and looking at the British debate and speaking perhaps as a Nordic, I think it would be extremely unfortunate, both for the United Kingdom and, indeed, for the European Union, if the UK voted against this new treaty and at the same time had to leave the European Union. I think that would change the course of history and in that sense I do think this is one of the most fundamental votes the UK has ever had.

Mr Schöpflin: I would like to associate myself very much with what my colleague, Alexander Stubb, has just said. Perhaps I should add that I come from one of the two countries that has already ratified. Hungary ratified the Constitution before Christmas, Lithuania was the other one; I think Slovenia is the next. We do not have a problem with it. I really do see this as a historic turning point for the United Kingdom. I should add I lived here for many years, I am halfway to being an insider. The decisions taken in the next 18 months to two years I think will be irreversible and will affect the future of the United Kingdom profoundly. Integration will not stop if the Constitution is vetoed, I think it will in any case accelerate because there are a number of British features built into the Constitution that the existing Member States do not want necessarily. What I have always found difficult to communicate is that most of the existing states of the European Union want to merge their sovereignty, they want to press ahead with this process, quite unlike the United Kingdom, I fully accept majority opinion in the UK staying out, which is not inconceivable but I think we should compromise. It will be a loss of authority and influence in Europe, I think it will mean that Britain will become a smaller state in Europe. Part of the authority of the global reach that the United Kingdom has at the moment, the seat at the top table, punching above your weight, all of these phrases with which you are very familiar, derive from membership of the European Union. Secondly, I think there would be a loss of status as the United States' best friend in Europe because part of that relationship is about what the United Kingdom is capable of achieving in Brussels which has been quite considerable. One should confront the possibility, also, that the United Kingdom will, by opting out, lose its attractiveness as a focal point of inward investment. I think it will have economic consequences, I am not an economist, but I read enough of the papers to be able to say this with confidence. I would add, perhaps as a footnote, I think highly ironically "opting out of Brussels" will not mean the end of EU regulations. Look at what has happened to Norway, it sits in the antechamber, half way out, barely in and has to take on board practically everything in the acquis which the existing Member States do without much of a voice. The United Kingdom's relationship in practically every field which is already governed by Union regulation means that EU standards will still prevail. Then there is a problem which I think has made Brussels highly unpopular, certainly at the level of popular discussion, the over-regulation but I would add that the over-regulation, from which this country suffers and suffers acutely, I would say, is the work of Whitehall, not of Brussels. I am talking about "gold plating" and I think that is a UK problem. The United Kingdom has created its own acquis communitaire, which no other country has, it is a unique problem.

Mr Leinen: If I just tell you what the Treaty is saying on your question. The Treaty is saying in Article 443 "If, two years after the signature of the Treaty amending this Treaty, four fifths of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the matter shall be referred to the European Council". What is this article telling us? If it would be automatically the case that one country says "no" and the thing is dead, we did not need that provision in the treaty. It is not the end if one country says "no", it is referred to European Council dealing with the crisis and looking for a solution. We had that already, it is nothing new. Myself I swear I can hardly imagine if 23 or 24 countries have ratified, it is politically unreal that one country could, let us say, ask to start, again from the beginning, the negotiation of the treaty or could even block it. There will then be opt outs for a second chance and then, somehow, I do not know.

Q215 Mr Connarty: Can I ask specifically, you referred to Article IV-443, paragraph 4. If this treaty is not ratified, how can that power be imposed? You are asking to implement something in the treaty and if it is not ratified it cannot be implemented.

Mr Duff: You are absolutely correct. A crisis meeting of the European Council is seldom an answer to anything very much. If I can just return briefly to your question, it depends on the circumstances of a Member State, the size of the Member State and the size of the majority. One can see circumstances in which a certain Member State might be asked to think again as we did with the Irish and the Danish. If France, however, were to decide to reject ---

Mr Corbett: --- and they themselves wanted to.

Mr Duff: Yes, and they themselves wanted to. If France decided to reject the vote, that would be the end of the Constitution.

Q216 Mr Cash: Why?

Mr Duff: Because France is an important and central player in the scheme of things. Unfortunately, Britain has become so marginalised that if Britain were to reject, the Conservative Party would not find partners in the 24 that were willing to renegotiate. The 24 feel that they have made sufficient concessions already to the UK in the Convention and the IGC so the only thing that could happen would be an IGC to change Article 48 of the existing Treaty which says that all Member States have to agree on any treaty reform and all Member States have to ratify to say that the thing could be brought into force before it had been ratified by all Member States. It would pose, then, of course, a great political problem for us again in this country, we would have to decide, probably through a further referendum, but the choice would be starker and I think the decision would be more sensible.

Q217 Mr Connarty: Does Mr Stubb want to come back with a comment?

Mr Stubb: Briefly. Andrew is always so diplomatic.

Mr Duff: Am I?

Mr Stubb: Yes. On this one you are. I think there are three options. One; the UK votes against and then it has to reconsider its membership of the European Union. Two, France or Poland vote against, then we are going to have to re-negotiate the treaty. Three, one of the smaller Member States votes against and we make them vote again.

Mr Schöpflin: This is purely speculative.

Mr Cash: Could I say - it is too big a subject to go into in a short session - the crucial issue which lies at the heart of British objections ---

Mr Connarty: Mr Cash, if you could put that as a question. You are always telling us.

Mr Cash: Chairman, I cannot ask them to comment on what the position of the British people is because they are themselves coming from different countries.

Mr Connarty: We are taking evidence on the Constitution on the European Parliament's Constitutional Affairs Committee view on things.

Q218 Mr Cash: I am saying, if I may, the crucial question is one of democracy and accountability. I think that is where a lot of these problems turn into other questions such as low growth, high unemployment, over-regulation, fraud, et cetera. The issue which I would ask you to consider is - those of us who take this particular view and it happens to be in the Conservative Party but there are others throughout the country, by a large percentage on recent opinion polls - our concern at the end of the day is this business of democracy which is so fundamental. All the arguments I have heard from you, if I may say, pale into insignificance compared with the question of if voters decide in a general election that they have decided they want to be governed by certain laws, and they happen to be inconsistent with the European acquis and happen to be inconsistent with the treaties, do you not agree that they should have the right to be able to say that and not to be accused of wanting to be somehow or other anti-European?

Mr Leinen: May I come in again. The first item is pure speculation. I would say whether a big country or a small country is saying "no", it is the same situation, one country has not ratified and the European Council has to deal with the question. I would not qualify Malta against Poland, or France against Britain. It is a problem, a crisis, and we have to find solutions to come out of that crisis. In my opinion it is very unlikely that the big job which has been done over the years, with the Convention and the IGC to negotiate this treaty, that you could restart the negotiation of a new treaty, for me that is the most unlikely thing that is happening. You will find some solution to deal with a country and it is a problem. What Mr Cash is arguing for, and we have that in the Parliament from all the Euro-sceptics, is whether you have democracy only on a national level or whether you have the same quality of democracy in the Union. The elections to the European Parliament by theory of democracy have the same legitimacy as the elections to a national parliament. We are elected in a direct free manner for all people in the countries. Westminster is elected to the national level. In Germany I would say we have 16 regional parliaments, they are elected as legislators to their regional level. In Germany you cannot say when you are a Bavarian "Bavaria is a free state. They have never ratified the German Constitution." This is something I mention in the Parliament openly, I say in this world there is nothing that is not existing, Bavaria has never ratified the German Constitution, in 1948, but it is nevertheless part of Germany. A French colleague was saying Quebec has never ratified the Canadian Constitution as part of Canada.

Q219 Mr Connarty: We understand the point.

Mr Leinen: Sorry, I was getting carried away. My point is you deny that democracy could exist with the same quality on a Union level that you have chosen to be part of and that democracy could only exist on the national level that you are used to working. That is something, of course, one accepts or not accepts and this argument is coming from all Euro-sceptics who have the national dimension as the only dimension of democracy, but in the world of the 21st century where things are moving forward, the world gets so small.

Q220 Mr Steen: Maybe you are going backwards.

Mr Leinen: I think the European Union is the first model. You could say that the African Union being created a year and a half ago is a copy of what we are doing and in Latin America and Asia they will try to do the same, 10 or 20 years later. I think we have to get used in the modern world and the world of tomorrow sharing sovereignty, nobody is losing it but you are exercising it in a shared way. This principle, okay, you have to accept it, if it is not accepted it, you have a problem that is true.

Q221 Sandra Osbourne: I accept it is possible for democracy to exist at a European level and, indeed, it does through the MEPs, and I totally accept that. The concern about democracy and accountability is not only the preserve of the Conservative Party, some of us in general terms do have concerns about that when it comes to the European Union, even some of us who regard ourselves as pro-Europe. The fact is in Britain there is a problem of public perception about democracy and about accountability to Europe. There is a distance, physical as well as psychological, about that democracy and accountability, which is one of the reasons I think a referendum has been put forward. I will be interested to hear if it is a general view that a referendum is not a good idea. That is one of the ways we feel the British people can feel they have had their say. We must make the argument and turn that round, raise consciousness about what Europe does. I understood that one of the motivations behind the new Constitution was to try to bring democracy closer to the people. How do you think that could be done given - and I do not say the UK is typical but it is certainly the case and I think we can all admit it - the turnouts at European elections, given the general cynicism among the public about Europe, how is that going to be achieved within the Treaty?

Mr Schöpflin: Perhaps I might say something and also try to answer Mr Cash's question. It seems to me that the general idea of bringing politics closer to the citizens is one I am sure we are all agreed on. This is problematic throughout the democratic world. It is not easy, as society and the world becomes more complex, and I think as people are becoming less civically committed, the problem is in a way increasing exponentially. I would say that even what we are doing today has the potential, a little bit, to bring the whole problem closer to the citizens, the more discussion there is, the better it is. What worries me about the United Kingdom is the quality of the debate is not all that good. The quality of the academic debate and, in fact, the political debate is sophisticated but at the popular level it is appalling. It is highly prejudiced, indeed the way in which, let us say, France and Germany are described -fortunately Hungary never gets mentioned - in the British press would be racist in other contexts. I think it is appalling, it creates ways of seeing the world I find deeply distasteful. In answer to Mr Cash's question I think if a particular part of an entity consistently, over a period of time, wishes to say "no" then the democratic answer is that particular entity should be allowed to leave. After all this was the Velvet divorce in Czechoslovakia. I really turn the question back to you: would you accept that for Scotland and Wales?

Q222 Angus Robertson: Yes.

Mr Schöpflin: If Scotland and Wales consistently chose to opt out of the United Kingdom you would say "yes" on the principle of consistency.

Mr Connarty: Mr Cash?

Mr Cash: I do not think the Chairman is expecting me to engage in a dialogue on the basis of rhetorical questions.

Mr Connarty: I am hearing a voice from Mr Robertson saying "yes".

Q223 Angus Robertson: It is democracy.

Mr Corbett: To the question: do we all agree about the referendum being a good or a bad thing? The European Parliament has not said anything on this in either way, it is up to each Member State to decide what is best in the view of its own Constitution and its own traditions. We are not going to tell Member States how best to ratify. Similarly, we have not taken a position on what should happen if a Member State does not ratify, we were speculating as individuals and there are lots of scenarios that one can imagine but I will not try to repeat them, suffice to say that the UK would be in a rather weak negotiating position whatever solution was chosen. On multi-level democracy, I think we all agree that powers, responsibilities, competences in our job should be exercised at the smallest level possible, the European institutions are inevitably more distant from people than national or local institutions and that is an argument not to do things at European level if you can perfectly well deal with them at national and local level. In that there are things which we want to and maybe benefit from addressing jointly with our neighbouring countries at EU level, we want to make that level operate in as democratic a way as possible. I think if you compare the EU to any other international structure - the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, the WTO, you name it - it is the most democratic structure that we can manage to build above the level of the nation state. With the Constitution no legislation can be enacted without the double scrutiny of both the Council and the European Parliament, the elected governments of the Member States and the directly elected MEPs, a double quality control, if you like, a double check and balance, now we have a number of Czechs and Slovaks in the Union we need checks and balances as well! That is something we should be quite proud of. As to the question of what level do you address an issue, we have an onus after all. The onus is that the EU can only deal with the subject if it is in the treaty in the first place, if it has competence, and even then decisions involve the elected Member States' governments in the Council who need a pretty heavy majority to agree anything and even then they are legally obliged to respect the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality. There are a lot of safeguards against over-centralisation and keeping things at the lowest level of government but if and when we do decide to do things at the European level, we have started to build a pretty democratic structure that we should be proud of.

Mr Duff: To return to Sandra Osborne's question about democratic malaise, you were talking about, of course, it not exclusively to the European Parliament. In Britain turn-out shot up in this last year by 14 per cent in the East of England, which I have the privilege of representing. It is not all my own work. I think the answer to your question concerns the quality of policy which flows out of the EU. Certainly we were driven in the convention to question why were we doing this difficult thing and it was because we wanted to create a situation where policy outcomes could be more effective in their formulation or consultative, more representative of the common interest, but also more efficient in their implementation. There are a huge number of reforms which have been incorporated which will do that. The primary virtue of the Constitution is that it strengthens the capacity of the EU to act effectively abroad and at home. It will permit us to stand on our own two feet in world affairs and, without opening up a whole debate about foreign and security policy, I think that will be very, very popular with the British people. Although I am opposed to plebiscites in principle on these matters, certainly I, and my party, will fight extremely hard to see that we have a positive outcome and we will be arguing on these grounds.

Mr Stubb: Two quick points. One is a direct answer to Mr Cash's question on democracy. I firmly believe that you should have democracy on a European, national and regional level. Your direct question was what if someone who has elected a national representative is displeased by a piece of legislation which comes from the European level. Well, in the Constitution you have an answer to that. We have an early warning system whereby national parliaments can lift up a yellow card and say "As a matter of fact, Europe has gone or the Commission has gone beyond its premises, beyond the principle of subsidiarity". In that sense, I think this treaty is a step forward. The second point is we talked earlier about transparency and the possibility for the public to hear what we are saying. I have been informed by three text messages that the audio system on the net is not working!

Q224 Jim Dobbin: Apologies for not being here at the beginning but I think I have missed a very stimulating debate here. My question is on the Union's values and objectives in Articles I-2 and I-3 and some of those objectives are the bases of the European Union's foundation. Can you just highlight one or two of them? Also, I want you to say something about those objectives which are not in the existing treaty and what impact they might have had. Examples are the promotion of peace and the well being of the Union's people, the promotion of social progress and fair trade, those areas.

Mr Leinen: I would say they are guidelines for Union policies. In a way the values might be conditions for membership. The applicant state should fulfil those values and it is, let us say, the soul of Europe. The market is not really bringing people together. From Poland to Portugal, what do the people have in common? It is not the Common Market, let us say, there is even competition, you could have a dispute of dislocation from one country to the other. I think what brings us together is this 2000 years of civilisation where we have certain values of how we live together, how we operate together, how we have a solidarity with each other, how we have freedom and democracy, you can read them out. I think it is very nice that the first and second article is giving an idea why we are doing the European Union, what is the division of it, and it is the soul of Europe, if I may repeat myself. This is a guidance of what we try to do as Europeans and I think it is a wonderful thing to communicate with our people because they get an idea right from the north of Scotland to the north of the Baltic and from Greece up to the north of Sweden that we try to be a Union.

Mr Duff: Certainly we trod over these clauses with great attention and every phrase, every word is there for a purpose. The order is important because they do establish a certain hierarchy and, of course, it is important to define with great accuracy our values and principles because we can expel or suspend the membership rights of a state which breaches them. I think that you are quite correct, if I may say so, to bring our attention to these clauses. I would say they are more than guidelines, with respect. I think they define absolutely the purpose of Europe and they are not only of relevance to the citizen and a code for the institutions, but of great interest to those who are seeking to decide whether they wish to apply to join us and there appear, despite our thoughts, to be many Third World countries that wish to apply to join us.

Q225 Mr Connarty: I have one more question myself which I find very intriguing. We are talking about a Constitution that has not yet been ratified, and there is a power under IV-443 to bring forward provisions. I notice in paragraph 8 of the European Parliament Resolution Statement it announces its intention of using the new right of initiative conferred upon it by the Constitution under Article IV-443 to propose improvements to the Constitution. We are asking people to vote on ratifying something which you have given notice you may wish to change, which does seem to me to be a hostage to fortune.

Mr Corbett: That came into the resolution by means of an amendment on the floor of the House which was adopted by an overwhelming majority after discussions among groups to meet the concerns of those who were saying: "Well, once this Constitution is approved, it is set in stone and it can never ever be changed again" which is not true, of course. It has the same amendment procedure as the current treaties, the current Constitution, if you like, in that it will need eventually the ratification of every Member State though the lead up to such a change is approved, in our view, because there would normally have to be a convention meeting in public which, as with the last convention, will have representatives of every national parliament, both from the government and opposition parties of every national government in the European Parliament, deliberating in public beforehand, before an IGC concludes the change. Interestingly, the new Constitution also gives us in the European Parliament the right to put forward proposals and suggestions to change, and we wish to draw attention to that. Obviously, like the current treaties, in due course there will be further occasions to sit down and say: "Can we improve things here and can we improve things there?" We are showing that as the democratically elected parliament, the only directly elected institution amongst the institutions, we will play a part in that and we wanted to highlight that.

Mr Duff: If I could put on record the fact that I and my Liberal group opposed the amendment that you drew attention to. I think you are correct in implying that it is premature to speculate on future provisions when we have not even got the thing in place. Also, I think that we need to imbue a sense of settlement that we are not always every five years having IGCs and conventions, and picking the thing up by the roots, that the thing where we have formulated very well, and I hope will come into force, enjoys a certain durable quality. But, of course, there are things in it which some of us do not like and that was quite clear in the convention, which was a consensual effort, we did not all agree with everything. Some examples: the reform of the Council Presidency; the election of the Commission's President is an example of something; the emergency break clauses. There are several things, and if we had six hours of this interesting afternoon then we could go into those but, frankly, I think that is for five years, seven years, once we have the Constitution in force, when we have practised it, when we see what it is like, and we will have made mistakes. Economic, social and political circumstances change requiring fresh formulations and procedures.

Q226 Angus Robertson: Can I reinforce that point to an extent. If you draw a comparison with the situation in the United States where the number of times their Constitution has been amended is the type of thing where in a primary school in America most kids can name the major amendments to the US Constitution. Can I share a concern that if there is a view that there will be a whole load of changes necessary in the short term, perhaps one of the problems Europe is going through at the present time is this constant sense of reinvention. The fact is the public, which we all agree is disconnected from it, finds it extraordinarily difficult to understand how it all works. Just when you get a settlement to say: "This may or may not, because some of us have some concerns about it" and "This is the settled way forward which already one is talking about changing", how on earth can the public keep up with this constant change?

Mr Leinen: You are completely right, and I think that the first and the second part of this new treaty is really a consolidated version of what we want and it will have continuity for a longer time. Part of the new treaty is Part 3, the acquis communautaire, so that is all the policies, and you know yourself how policies can change. Five years is 20 Internet generations. The work changes in five years' time sometimes completely and then you find something written down, accepted by ratification of all states, and it is no more adjusted to reality. I would say if we need some more improvement it will be on the Part 3, on the various policies that we have. It will not be on Part 1, on our values, our objectives, on our institutions, on the double majority

Q227 Angus Robertson: Competences?

Mr Leinen: Yes. There is everything there. I cannot say much on that.

Mr Corbett: It is a lasting settlement on those points.

Mr Duff: We do not need any more competences.

Mr Leinen: It is more the streamlining of policies and decision making.

Q228 Mr Connarty: We seem to have an echo of the same point there that in these major items there is a sense of settlement, in fact, which I agree with Mr Robertson would help the people I represent and others that this Parliament represents to get a sense of a grounding of what is the new European agreement.

Mr Corbett: I agree and I do not want to give the impression, when I initially answered your question, I thought there would be an avalanche of changes. I am just saying in due course there might be small ones.

Mr Connarty: Can I thank you, Mr Cash, for being very tolerant. We have got through a lot of business. I know you have many issues you want to raise, and if you have any others, please feel free.

Mr Cash: Just this one main point. In Mens ancient law there is what I think is a remarkable and very wise statement which is that justice is to be found in the interstices of procedure. It might sound rather grandiose to say that but in practice many of the things here one would not disagree with because it states unequivocally a lot of things which some people might regard as motherhood and apple pie. The question is how does it work in practice? What are the mechanics for the delivery of democracy? What are the mechanics for the delivery of accountability? To what extent is subsidiarity, which has never been implemented, capable of being put into effect in a proper fashion? Frankly, on the question that Mr Stubb raised about the cards, the question in a nutshell is this: if any one Member State happens to take exception to something, he does not have the right to be able to say no under this arrangement, it is down to a proportion of national parliaments, not just one. What I am trying to drive at in a nutshell is that although I understand the objectives, and anybody who had any sense of constitutional propriety or sense of history would know that the European Union in itself grew out of the last world war and many people have thought it ought to be perpetuated and to develop to the point of this Constitution, the Bill of which is going to be published tomorrow, the fact remains that ultimately the objection of some of us is that it is not properly democratic and it is not intended to be, it is not properly accountable and not intended to be, and that is the fundamental objection. I could ask you for your opinion about that but I thought that I would put that on the record.

Q229 Mr Connarty: As the Chairman, I do intend asking our witnesses to give us their opinion, if they wish to give an opinion on that, because I do not think statements should be hanging in our minutes like that as if it is somehow giving credibility.

Mr Stubb: A direct answer to Mr Cash on two points. It depends completely on the issue and it depends on the decision making procedure whether a Member State indeed has the possibility to block the particular decision. Point number two, if you look at the history of qualified majority voting, the United Kingdom has always got in on top. It does not matter what the issue, the UK has been in many cases, for example, champion of the internal market where decisions are based on qualified majority voting and it has always benefited the UK. Now, unfortunately, the UK Government put down five or six red lines and unfortunately got those five or six lines which remain in unanimity. I do hope that the next time we change the treaty something will happen but you cannot categorically, I believe, say that there is no possibility to stop the decision in the EU, of course there is, it just depends on the decision making procedure and the issue at stake, but usually the UK wins the case anyway.

Mr Corbett: Mr Cash said that the Constitution is not intended to be democratic, which I think is an astonishing statement to make. That was much of the focus of the whole debate about it, how to improve democratic accountability at the EU level. You might say it is insufficient acts, we can all have our views on that, but to say that was not even the intention is a remarkable statement, of course that was the intention. In looking at it we have to say "Does it compare it to the current Constitution, the current treaties, de facto the Constitution of the EU as it is now? Does it improve things from a democratic accountability point of view or not?" The answer can only be "yes", maybe it could have improved them more but the answer is "yes", it increases the role of double scrutiny, as I said, at the Council and the European Parliament and it improves the role of national parliaments. The yellow card, frankly, I think is a minor part of that because that concerns only subsidiarity and I think subsidiarity is very adequately protected at the moment by the requirement for legislation to have the approval of a very high majority of national ministers, members of national governments accountable to their national parliaments in the Council. It will be very unusual to find a Commission proposal which does not respect subsidiarity. Where I think the real improvement is for national parliaments is in receiving all the documents directly with sufficient time to help shape your country's position before the minister goes off to the Council and not hear about it afterwards. You have that period to sit down and help shape your country's position before the Council meets, that is the real improvement for national parliaments.

Mr Schöpflin: I thought Mr Cash made a quite amazing assertion that the Constitution is not democratic and not accountable. It is as if by implication he is saying either he has a monopoly on the definitions of democracy and accountability or maybe the United Kingdom does. It seems to me that there are different ways of structuring democracy. The United Kingdom is in many ways a very democratic country but democracy exists, also, elsewhere. It is finding the different discourses of democracy - I am sorry to use language like that in this august place - and finding a compromise among them which is in a sense what this Constitution is saying, that the various different strands of democracy that we have built in Europe produce something better than the sum total. If the United Kingdom does not wish to be a part of that, well it is a pity, but I think the United Kingdom does have a contribution to make and certainly the proposition that less democracy, less accountability, less transparency once you cross the 40 kilometres to Calais, I find really rather bizarre, I am sorry.

Mr Duff: I agree strongly with my colleagues, as you would expect. I would just like to ask Mr Cash what he thinks of Article 45 ---

Q230 Mr Connarty: Let us not do that.

Mr Duff: --- on the principle of democratic equality, 46 on the principle of representative democracy, 47 on the principle of participatory democracy. All of these are brand new, they have not existed before in any previous treaty. They are an unprecedented formulation of the profoundly democratic character and parliamentary character of the EU.

Q231 Mr Connarty: Can I ask, Mr Leinen, as the chairman of the committee, do you wish to say a few words before we finish?

Mr Leinen: Yes. We thank you for the questions and I hope this exchange of ideas has been constructive and useful for you. We are dealing with these questions day by day. You have heard from various countries the view on this new treaty. A few months ago an American, Jeremy Rifkin, wrote a book about the European Union and he gave it the title The European Dream. I made the effort to read that book and it is amazing looking from the outside at the EU how much admiration is given to the fact that 25 countries and 25 populations voluntarily share sovereignty and do things together. It is admired around the world more and more and therefore I would say our scepticism is a little bit too narrow and should look more at what is achieved. When the founding fathers had the idea of peace, okay, the young generation may in the area of globalisation look for security and jobs and quality of life, and I think together we are doing better in the globalised world than everybody in the middle. In this sense, I think the Constitution brings us a step forward and we welcome very much when the British people can find something positive in this common effort. I thank you very much for inviting us.

Q232 Mr Connarty: Can I thank you and recognise the fact that we have here a delegation from Finland in the North to Hungary in the South and East of the European Union to our own Kingdom and Germany. In fact we have a delegation which comes from the Internet age with someone who was born in the same year as my son to a Member who was actually even born a decade before I was. We have a broad interest and clearly a focused interest also on the European Constitution. Before finishing, can I recognise that we have received also a written submission from Brenden Barber, General Secretary of the TUC, to our deliberations. In fact it is very interesting to read how closely he focuses on the impact of the Charter of Rights for the people he represents in the trade unions of the United Kingdom. Can I thank everyone for their participation.