3 Asian Tsunami
55. Although the tsunami of 26 December 2004 was
a humanitarian, rather than human rights, issue, we feel this
is an appropriate place to cover that devastating event, and its
aftermath. The tsunami was a natural disaster of appalling proportions
which the Foreign Secretary described in the following terms in
evidence to us:
The tsunami was the second largest earthquake
on record and one of the worst natural catastrophes in living
memory. Within a matter of hours the tsunami had hit thirteen
countries in two continents affecting thousands of kilometres
of coastline. The final death toll of the tsunami will never be
known but the Red Cross and Red Crescent have given an estimation
of 295,708 people.[72]
56. Among these victims were 190 British nationals
who are dead or missing, feared dead. The Foreign Secretary described
the scale of this loss when he told us that "it is likely
that the final casualty toll from the tsunami will represent the
largest loss of British life overseas in a single incident since
the Second World War".[73]
57. The response to the crisis has been overwhelming.
The United Nations has co-ordinated a massive aid operation with
contributions from across the international community, and has
received pledges of $6.28 billion from or through governments,
non-governmental organizations, business and private sources.[74]
The European Union as a whole has pledged €1.5 billion and
the UK £75 million.[75]
The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK has received £300
million from the British public and closed its appeal on 26 February.[76]
58. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and in particular
the Consular Crisis Group which co-ordinated the FCO's response
to the crisis, faced an enormous challenge, both in the immediate
aftermath and in the weeks that followed. An emergency telephone
service was set up in the UK within hours of the disaster and
Rapid Deployment Teams of FCO staff "with consular experience
and …trained to deal specifically with large-scale consular
emergencies" were sent out to Sri Lanka and Thailand the
next day, followed later by more members of staff. The FCO provided
a wide range of services in the countries affected, in collaboration
with NGOs and other agencies, including assisting UK nationals
(and others, where necessary) to leave the areas, supporting families
and victims and aiding the identification of the dead, and in
the UK for those returning from those countries and for their
families. By the end of January the FCO had sent a total of 105
extra staff to Thailand, where the majority of British victims
were missing, of whom 16 still remain in the country.[77]
59. In the weeks following the disastrous events,
there were a number of criticisms made in the British press of
the Government's response. The FCO also advised us of a "relatively
small number of complaints that we have received either directly
or via MPs from members of the public". The criticisms focussed
on the initial inadequacy of the emergency telephone inquiry service,
which was overwhelmed by the volume of calls (11,000 calls per
hour at its peak); a dearth of information on the FCO website;
refusal from the FCO to assist with the repatriation costs of
the dead and injured; criticisms of assistance by FCO staff in
the affected areas; and delays in publishing the numbers of fatalities
and in identifying and repatriating the dead.
60. The Foreign Secretary has provided us with a
thorough description of the actions taken by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and a detailed examination of the criticisms made, as well
as the many tributes received.[78]
An internal review of the response has been conducted by the FCO,
in collaboration with external agencies involved in the relief
effort, and a number of lessons have been drawn from it. The National
Audit Office, already engaged in a review of the FCO's consular
services, has been asked to include the department's response
to the tsunami in its study.
61. We conclude
that the response by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the
appalling consequences of the tsunami was generally comprehensive,
well co-ordinated and indispensable to those British nationals
and their families affected by the disaster, both in the UK and
the affected areas. We commend the strenuous efforts of FCO staff
who worked selflessly in the aftermath of the event to help the
victims and their families. We also commend the departmental crisis
management structures which were in place before the disaster
happened, and which were used so effectively in the event.
62. Notwithstanding this generally positive story,
it is clear that some people experienced an inadequate service
from FCO officials, at a time in which great sensitivity was needed.
Where there were problems with the FCO response, such as with
the capacity of the emergency telephone line, we note that solutions
are now being sought to prevent similar problems in the event
of a similar catastrophe in the future. We
conclude that the generally good response of the FCO provides
little consolation to those people who did experience problems,
in extremely difficult circumstances of great personal stress.
We recommend that the FCO continue to improve its processes, in
the light of further assessment of its response to the tsunami
crisis, and that the Government inform Parliament of any developments.
63. The humanitarian catastrophe of the tsunami intersects
with human rights concerns in Indonesia. In January the authorities
imposed new security restrictions on movement in the Aceh region,
ostensibly because of the long-running internal conflict in that
region, leading the UN to express concern that the humanitarian
operation there might be hampered.[79]
At the beginning of March the Indonesian Foreign Ministry was
reported as considering asking the UNHCR to leave the region.[80]
In January it was reported that the Indonesian military had ignored
a truce agreed with the rebel GAM (Free Aceh Movement) after the
tsunami, when the Indonesian army chief of staff, General Ryamizard
Ryacudu, said that "in the past two weeks we were forced
to kill at least 120 members of GAM and seize their weapons".[81]
In recent weeks, however, more positive signals have emerged from
the region, and talks in Jakarta ended with a commitment from
GAM to try to reach a peace settlement with the government at
further talks planned for August.[82]
64. The FCO report says that
the central government treatment of separatist
movements in Aceh and Papua remained a problem [in 2003-04]. The
Indonesian government has taken steps to improve its human rights
record… But we continue to encourage them to take further
action to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.
65. We received evidence from the Indonesia Human
Rights Campaign and the West Papua Association UK which stated
that, in Aceh, "extra-judicial executions, disappearances,
torture and arbitrary detentions are commonplace", and that
"whereas it is true that GAM has committed serious human
rights violations, it is clear that the Indonesian security forces
have primary responsibility for the pattern of systematic and
grave abuses". The evidence also described human rights abuses
in West Papua, stating that "reports indicate that [in the
Puncak Jaya area] eight people have been killed, more than 5,000
have been forcibly displaced from their homes and villages, and
18 or more people have died from hunger resulting from starvation
and exposure" and blaming the Indonesian military for those
attacks. [83]
66. We conclude
that any attempt by the Indonesian government to use the cover
of the tsunami to perpetrate human rights abuses in the Aceh region
would be iniquitous. We recommend that the Government make the
strongest representations to the Indonesian government to ensure
that this is not taking place. We further recommend that the Government
do all it can to help both sides reach a peaceful settlement of
that conflict. We recommend that the Government put further pressure
on the Indonesian government to improve its protection of human
rights in West Papua.
72 Ev 180 Back
73
Ibid. Back
74
"Two months after tsunami only some UN agencies have received
full funding", United Nations Press Release, 25 February
2005, available at http://www.un.org/ Back
75
HC Deb, 10 January 2002, Col 21 Back
76
"Tsunami Appeal Closes", Disasters Emergency Committee
Press Release, 26 February 2005, available at http://www.dec.org.uk
Back
77
Ev 180 Back
78
Ibid. Back
79
"UN hails tsunami appeal response, seeks clarification on
Indonesian restrictions", United Nations Press Release, 12
January 2005, available at http://www.un.org/ Back
80
"Jakarta threat to UN agency's role in Aceh", Financial
Times, 5 March 2005, p 9 Back
81
"Indonesians Ignore Tsunami Ceasefire To Attack Rebels",
Independent, 21 January 2005, pp 30-31 Back
82
"Aceh peace talks agree August target date for deal",
Financial Times, 24 February 2005, p 2 Back
83
Ev 125 Back
|
