Written evidence submitted by Indonesia
Human Rights Campaign and West Papua Association UK
INDONESIA
1. This memorandum is submitted jointly
by TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign and West Papua Association-UK
(WPAUK). TAPOL is an independent NGO, which has campaigned for
human rights in Indonesia for over 30 years. WPAUK is a coalition
of individuals and organisations, which support the people of
West Papua in their struggle for human rights and self-determination.
The submission addresses issues raised by the Foreign Office at
pages 60-63 (Aceh and Papua) and 154-154 (East Timor justice)
of its Human Rights Annual Report for 2004 ("the report").
2. TAPOL and WPAUK acknowledge that the
transition from dictatorship to democracy is difficult for a country
which has emerged from decades of authoritarianism, but are concerned
that since the downfall of the Suharto regime in May 1998, Indonesia
has made little or no overall progress in key areas. They include
resolving the conflicts in Aceh and West Papua, reducing the power
and influence of the Indonesian military (TNI) and bringing it
under civilian control, improving respect for human rights and
the rule of law, and ensuring accountability for human rights
violations. Without meaningful progress in these areas, TAPOL
and WPAUK fear that Indonesia's democratic transition will continue
to falter.
3. This year's parliamentary and presidential
elections were relatively peaceful and without incident, but the
oppressive military presence in both Aceh and West Papua made
free and fair elections impossible. The people of Aceh and West
Papua were furthermore denied an outlet for their democratic aspirations
by an ongoing ban on local political parties. Activists are still
imprisoned for exercising their right to express their support
for self-determination and independence. Two West Papuans, Filep
Karma and Yuask Pakage are on hunger strike in protest against
their detention for raising the West Papuan flag on West Papua's
national day, 1 December.
No improvement in human rights
4. There has been no improvement in the
human rights situation in the past year and TAPOL and WPAUK are
surprised that the FCO says it is encouraged that "some military
personnel are being held accountable for human rights violations".
The unfortunate reality is that impunity remains the norm and
that gross violations routinely go unpunished. After some early
progress under the presidencies of Habibie (1998-99) and Wahid
(1999-2001), the situation deteriorated under Megawati Sukarnoputri
(2001-04) who allowed the TNI to regain their powerful influence
over political and security affairs.
5. Megawati increasingly relied on military
solutions to long-standing political problems in Aceh and West
Papua. The year-long martial-law offensive in Aceh from May 2003
to May 2004 claimed over 2,000 lives without bringing a resolution
of the conflict any closer. Two other disturbing features of the
Megawati presidency, which were major setbacks for the democratic
transition, were the attacks on human rights defenders and the
increase in the number of political prisoners.
6. In September 2004, Indonesia's foremost
human rights defender and a fierce critic of the TNI, Munir, died
of arsenic poisoning while on a flight to Amsterdam. His widow
subsequently received a dead chicken with a message warning her
not to connect the TNI with Munir's death. Police investigations
into this sensitive case have not progressed and the President
has reneged on his initial agreement to establish an independent
investigation team. The clear intention of those behind the killing
was not only to get rid of an extremely effective and high-profile
human rights advocate, but also to intimidate others and deter
them from carrying out their work. Munir's murder was symptomatic
of a campaign of threats and intimidation against human rights
defenders. West Papua's leading human rights organisation, ELS-HAM
has been a particular target. In Aceh, human rights defenders
and political activists are among the hundreds of political prisoners.
7. Under the Megawati presidency there was
an explosive growth in the number of political prisoners. Up to
2,000 people are now in prison because of their actual or alleged
political beliefs or activities. The majority are Acehnese, but
they include a significant number of Papuans and government critics,
labour activists and journalists from elsewhere (see also Human
Rights Watch, "A Return to the New Order? Political Prisoners
in Megawati's Indonesia" and Amnesty International, "Old
laws—new prisoners of conscience" both 10 July 2003).
8. The response to the election of retired
general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (known as SBY) as President of
Indonesia in September 2004 has been generally positive. Despite
his military background, he is regarded by many as a moderate,
a potential reformer and a more capable politician than Megawati.
It is questionable, however, whether he will provide new impetus
to the reform process. The early signs are that he will adopt
more of the same policies as Megawati. In November 2004, he extended
Aceh's civil emergency status, dashing hopes that he would seek
a resumption of peace talks. He has also allowed the escalation
of military operations in the central highlands of West Papua,
which have claimed a number of lives and caused a humanitarian
crisis.
9. A major concern is the lack of access
to Aceh and West Papua by diplomats, international agencies, NGOs
and journalists. Combined with the severe restrictions on, and
intimidation of, local people and organisations, this has rendered
the tasks of providing humanitarian assistance and carrying out
human rights monitoring difficult, if not impossible. Three days
after the election of SBY, the government reportedly imposed a
ban on foreign journalists entering Aceh and West Papua until
further notice. While not formally announced, the ban is now in
effect as journalists have been refused permission to visit either
area.
West Papua
10. TAPOL and WPAUK welcome the FCO's increasing
concern about human rights violations in Papua and its statement
in the report that "any settlement of the issue of Papua
would need to take account of the aspirations of the Papuan people".
This should translate into increased diplomatic and economic pressure
on Indonesia to improve its human rights record and to resolve
the conflict according to the wishes of the Papuan people.
11. The Megawati administration left a legacy
of chaos in West Papua as a result of her divisive attempt to
split the territory into three provinces against the wishes of
local people. In January 2003, she issued a presidential decree
ordering the division of Papua in direct contravention of the
special autonomy law passed in October 2001 (Law 21/2001). The
TNI are suspected of being behind the move since it would enable
them to increase the number of troops in the territory, put them
in a better position to crush the independence movement and allow
them to consolidate their economic and political power. In November
2004, Indonesia's Constitutional Court ruled that the 2003 Presidential
Instruction was invalid, but added to the state of confusion and
potential for future conflict by recognising the de facto establishment
of one of the new provinces, West Irian Jaya.
12. Megawati failed to implement Special
Autonomy Law 21/2001 and establish a Papuan People's Assembly
(MRP) as a Papuan consultative body as required by the Special
Autonomy Law. This was despite the fact the Law stipulates that
any decision to divide Papua should first be considered by the
MRP. It is disquieting that whereas SBY has stated his intention
to press ahead with special autonomy, he has not taken any steps
to deliver on his commitment nor explained how special autonomy
will work if West Irian Jaya continues to exist.
13. In any event, special autonomy falls
far short of the self-determination desired by the overwhelming
majority of West Papuans since the fraudulent "Act of Free
Choice" in 1969 (see memo submitted to the Committee by WPAUK
in relation to its inquiry into the Human Rights Annual Report
2003, at pp Ev 102-103). The FCO fails to mention the "Act
of Free Choice" in the report. The fundamental grievance
of the Papuan people about the denial of their right to self-determination
in 1969 must not be forgotten and should provide the context for
all the government's policy-making on West Papua.
14. There are increasing calls for the UN
Secretary-General to review the UN's conduct in relation to the
"Act of Free Choice". The British Government should
support these calls and review its own role in the process. It
should urge Indonesia to enter into peaceful all-inclusive dialogue
with West Papuan representatives to consider all options for the
future of the territory. It should maintain its own regular dialogue
with West Papuan representatives with a view to facilitating negotiations
with the Indonesian government.
15. The gravity of the human rights situation
in West Papua is apparent from the fact that the National Commission
on Human Rights recently found evidence that security personnel
had committed crimes against humanity during separate incidents
in Wasior in 2001 and Wamena in 2003. The Committee is asked to
encourage the FCO to press the Indonesian Attorney General to
complete his own inquiry into these incidents without delay and
to prosecute those responsible.
16. There are concerns that similar crimes
are currently being committed in the Puncak Jaya area of West
Papua's central highlands. Reports indicate that eight people
have been killed, more than 5,000 have been forcibly displaced
from their homes and villages, and 18 or more people have died
from hunger resulting from starvation and exposure. It is suspected
that Indonesian special forces, Kopassus, are behind the attacks
and that they were launched to further destabilise the situation
and send a message to the new President about the continuing need
for a military presence in West Papua. The situation has been
exacerbated by the prohibition on access to the Puncak Jaya area
for humanitarian agencies and human rights monitors. The Committee
is asked to encourage the FCO to press Indonesia to allow unrestricted
access to West Papua and for an independent investigation into
crimes committed in Puncak Jaya. The FCO should also press the
government to end all military operations and start a process
of demilitarisation of the territory.
17. The FCO provides significant diplomatic
support for UK-based multinationals—BP and Rio Tinto—operating
in West Papua. This is extremely problematic in the context of
a territory whose people are denied the right to self-determination
and suffer routine abuses of their basic rights, often in the
vicinity of multinational assets. There is increasing concern
that BP's new Tangguh liquified natural gas project could add
to the problems. Over 300 Papuan individuals and organisations
recently wrote to BP protesting about the company's failure to
establish credible human rights monitoring and reporting processes,
its inadequate transparency in dealing with Indonesian authorities,
and its failure to acknowledge the wider West Papuan political
context of continuing repression (See http://tapol.gn.apc.org/st041208BPWP.htm).
The Committee should press the FCO to make its support for the
Tangguh project contingent upon these concerns being fully addressed
by BP.
Aceh
18. Despite changing Aceh's status from
martial law to civil emergency in May 2004, the Indonesian government
has maintained its troop levels in the province and persisted
with its largest military undertaking since the invasion of East
Timor in 1975. Human rights abuses have continued unabated. Extra-judicial
executions, disappearances, torture and arbitrary detentions are
commonplace.
19. Data on casualties is difficult to obtain
because of the restrictions on access. However, most estimates
put the number killed since the start of martial law at over 2,000.
The authorities invariably refer to the victims as members or
supporters of the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM), but many
are civilians, including women and children. Statements by political
and military leaders have encouraged a "shoot to kill"
policy, which has resulted in many instances of "GAM suspects"
being extra-judicially executed in non-combat situations.
20. The report states that civilians have
suffered at the hands of both GAM and the security forces. Whereas
it is true that GAM has committed serious human rights violations,
it is clear that the Indonesian security forces have primary responsibility
for the pattern of systematic and grave abuses.
21. Aceh's emergency status has generated
hundreds of political prisoners convicted of rebellion against
the state on the basis of their alleged association with GAM.
Trials are being conducted in record time in flagrant breach of
international standards for fair trial. Suspects are routinely
denied access to a lawyer and convicted on non-existent or flimsy
evidence, including confessions obtained by torture or ill-treatment.
There are persistent reports of prisoners being kicked, severely
beaten and burned with cigarettes. Over 450 prisoners have been
transferred to prisons in Java, thousands of kilometres away from
their homes, in breach of accepted standards for the treatment
of prisoners. The Committee is requested to press the British
government, with its EU partners, to monitor trials wherever possible
and to visit prisoners, especially those in Java, in order to
obtain first hand accounts of their trials and their treatment
in detention. (See Human Rights Watch, "Aceh at War: Torture,
Ill-Treatment and Unfair Trials", September 2004, and Amnesty
International, "Indonesia: New military operations, old patterns
of human rights abuses in Aceh (NAD)", October 2004.)
22. TAPOL welcomes the FCO's efforts to
improve access to Aceh, but believes it should be more insistent
about the need for diplomats, NGOs, international agencies, and
journalists to visit the province, to travel freely and carry
out their work free from harassment. The report states that embassy
officials visited Aceh in February 2004 and spoke with local NGOs.
The outcome of those conversations is not clear. TAPOL is in regular
contact with a range of human rights NGOs, but none of them recall
meeting the officials. The Committee is requested to question
the FCO about the meetings and to encourage a greater level of
engagement with NGOs.
23. TAPOL is concerned that SBY appears
to have no strategy for ending military operations in Aceh and
reinstating the peace process. The FCO states in the report that
it continues to stress the need for a political solution and the
need for both sides to return to the negotiating table. TAPOL
welcomes this, but notes that the government appears to ignore
the critical role that civil society has to play in the peace
process. Its exclusion from earlier negotiations was a mistake.
The Committee should urge the British Government to do all it
can to press for an end to military operations and for immediate
all-inclusive dialogue with all sections of civil society properly
represented.
Transitional justice
24. The report rightly highlights the failure
of Indonesia's ad hoc human rights court to deliver justice
for the victims of gross human rights violations in East Timor
and Indonesia's refusal to co-operate with East Timor's serious
crimes process. However, the FCO fails to articulate a policy
response. It is incumbent upon the British Government, as a permanent
member of the UN Security Council and the UN core group on East
Timor, to ensure that the alleged perpetrators of serious crimes
under international law are prosecuted and punished if found guilty.
There is increasing support for the UN Secretary-General to establish
a commission of experts to evaluate existing justice processes
and recommend future action including the possible establishment
of an international tribunal on East Timor. The Committee is asked
to press the FCO to ensure that action is taken on this initiative.
25. In general, the Indonesian government
appears to have adopted a piecemeal approach to transitional justice
as is evident from the experience of the ad hoc court for
East Timor. Ongoing problems include the influence of the military
over legal proceedings, shortfalls in the capacity and technical
competence of judges, prosecutors and legal personnel and judicial
corruption. The Committee should press the FCO to provide appropriate
technical support for the legal system and encourage political
commitment to legal and judicial reform.
26. The perpetrators of human rights violation,
especially senior officers, are rarely prosecuted. The lack of
accountability fosters a culture of impunity in which patterns
of abuse are regularly repeated, especially in areas of conflict.
The Committee should encourage the FCO to press for credible investigations,
according to international standards, of gross violations of human
rights so that those responsible-including those with political
and legal command responsibility-are brought to justice.
Concluding comments: the UK role
27. The UK has substantial economic ties
with Indonesia. Historically, it has been the second largest foreign
investor after Japan, it is a significant trading partner and
a major strategic partner through the supply of arms and other
forms of military assistance. TAPOL and WPAUK are concerned that
FCO policy on Indonesia is primarily determined by these economic
and strategic considerations and that insufficient emphasis is
given to the human rights dimension of foreign policy. The Committee
should press the FCO to devote more time to seeking regional stability
by actively facilitating conflict resolution in West Papua and
Aceh and to securing respect for human rights throughout Indonesia.
28. The sale of military equipment to Indonesia
remains hugely contentious. The use of British equipment in Aceh
since the start of martial law, the British government's ineffective
monitoring of exported equipment and its reliance on end-use assurances
"not worth paper they are written on" have been heavily
criticised by the Quadripartite Committee in its report on Strategic
Export Controls for 2002 (at pp 26-31). A recent High Court case,
which revealed the payment of a £16 million bribe to secure
a contract for the export of British tanks subsequently deployed
to Aceh, underlined the corrupt nature of the trade, its cost
to British and Indonesian taxpayers, and its adverse impact on
poverty reduction strategies ("UK firm accused of £16
million arms bribe", The Guardian, 7 December 2004).
TAPOL and WPAUK ask the Committee to support calls for an investigation
into the deal and for an embargo on military ties with Indonesia.
29. In 2005, the UK will take over the presidencies
of the EU and the G8. It will continue to play a role as a major
donor in the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). This will
place it an ideal position to further the objectives advocated
in this submission. The Committee is asked to impress on the FCO
that this should not be a lost opportunity.
Indonesia Human Rights Campaign
and West Papua Association UK
13 December 2004
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