Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
6 DECEMBER 2004
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR DAVID
FROST AND
MR TIM
BARROW
Q40 Mr Hamilton: Foreign Secretary, still
on the subject of Cyprus and Turkey, one of the issues that was
brought to our attention, and is of enormous concern to all Greek
Cypriots (and many Turkish Cypriots in fact) was the presence
of all the troops. I will just ask for your confirmation of something
that is pretty obvious, but I assume it is utterly inconceivable
that should Turkey accede to the European Union those troops would
be allowed to stay on Cyprus. It must be a precondition, surely,
that they are removed?
Mr Straw: The issue of the troops,
as you know, goes back to what happened in 1974. What we seek
is normalisation and once you add the writ of the government of
Cyprus, of the State of Cyprus that we recognise, covering the
whole of the territory of Cyprus, the issue of whose troops can
be on its sovereign area would be a matter for its sovereign decision.
Just as we have foreign troops in this country, so do plenty of
other countries, it is a matter for their decision. Do you want
to add anything on this?
Mr Barrow: Maybe to say that we
should not forget that as well as special negotiations, if there
is agreement at the European Council there is still the question
of settlement negotiations with Cyprus, and I do not think we
should think that the accession negotiations supplant the settlement
negotiations, and we had the Annan Plan, we had referendums; we
accept that the Greek Cypriots had genuine concerns about the
plan and look forward to seeing Greek Cypriot proposals, and we
would welcome any political dialogue between both sides in Cyprus
to see if agreement on proposals could be reached, and the UN
Secretary-General has indicated that the onus is now on the Greek
Cypriots to indicate the way forward towards a settlement. So
it is important that the EU does not appear to supplant the UN
in the role of sorting out a lot of these issues.
Q41 Mr Hamilton: I think that is absolutely
right, but of course there are certain things that simply cannot
happen once Turkey becomes a member of the European Union. One
is, as Mr Pope referred to, the free movement of goods and services;
you cannot have one EU country not recognising another; you cannot
have a situation where there are troops of one EU country on the
soil of another against the wishes of that country. So I think
while they cannot clearly supplant what the UN does, the very
nature of the fact that Turkey is applying to join the EU and
the fact it may accede to the EU must of course deal with some
of those issues that are current that the Annan Plan tried to
deal with, and was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Can I move
back to the points that Mr Pope was raising with you, Foreign
Secretary, about Turkey and its accession? Can I just move back
to the points that Mr Pope was raising with the Foreign Secretary
about Turkey and its accession? We were in Turkey in March 2002
and I seem to recall that one of the things that was said to us
on more than one occasion by many of our interlocutors, when talking
about Turkey's ambition to accede to the European Union, was,
"Look: we want to know if you want us or not". We have
moved a lot closer since then; I accept that, but next week when
you meet will you be discussing not just Turkey's accession but
giving them a date, because one of the points they made to us
was, "If you give us a date, and it may be 10 or 12 years
hence, we can work towards that and we know what we are working
for. What we do not want is a vague agreement that yes, one day
we can join but there is no firm date for that". What will
you be discussing next week?
Mr Straw: I understand what they
were saying. I was just trying to remember whether, when you were
there before, there had been the general election. I think it
was very close to it.
Q42 Mr Hamilton: The general election
in Turkey?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Q43 Mr Hamilton: No. The old government
of Mr Ecevit was still in power.
Mr Straw: Yes. One of the striking
things about Turkey is how much it has moved in the intervening
period, interestingly enough, under an Islamic party, and there
are big messages from that fact alone. What we will be discussing
at the Council next week is a date to start the negotiations and
I do not anticipate any conclusions. There will be a target date
for them to finish. My recollection, and I stand to be corrected,
is that, for example, in respect of the negotiations with Romania
and Bulgaria, we did not get around to specifying an end date
until some time into the negotiation. They are not being treated
any differently. This is substantively a quality driven process
rather than a time driven process. If they get to a position where
substantively they are delivering in every one of the chapters
then they sign them off.
Q44 Mr Hamilton: It could be sooner rather
than later?
Mr Straw: Yes, of course.
Q45 Mr Hamilton: May I ask you what is
the attitude as far as you are aware of Greece towards Turkey's
accession?
Mr Straw: Petros Moliviatis, who
is the Greek Foreign Minister, came in to see me last week and
he said—and I am happy to quote him because he said it publicly—that
Greece supported Turkey's membership. The Greeks, both parties
in parliament, made a strategic decision a few years ago actively
to support Turkey's membership of the European Union. They have
been nothing but constructive in respect of that.
Q46 Mr Hamilton: That must be helpful.
Mr Straw: It certainly is.
Q47 Chairman: On October 6, as you said,
Foreign Secretary, the Commission said that Turkey had fulfilled
the political criteria. The broad picture appears to be the principle
that Turkey should have the same conditions for entry, no more,
no less, as other countries. To what extent will other countries,
perhaps Austria, seek to impose additional conditions when we
come to the Council?
Mr Straw: I cannot anticipate
what other countries may do. It is worth bearing in mind that
the issues before the European Union which cause difficulties
for Member States vary. There is no symmetry about this at all.
This is not an issue on which there is any controversy for this
country whatsoever, interestingly. There is general agreement
that we want to go for it, and we should thank God for that. However,
there could be an issue on which there is a difficulty if you
happen to be Austria, a close neighbour, with a very different
and much more complicated history with Turkey than we have had.
Q48 Chairman: Jan Sobiesky.
Mr Straw: Yes, so it is bound
to be inherently more controversial but Chancellor Schuessel of
Austria is someone who has got great diplomatic and political
skills and is very committed to the success of the European Union,
so we will see.
Q49 Andrew Mackinlay: Just for the record,
I consider the franchise flawed because it included people who
were not citizens of the Republic of Cyprus voting and nobody
has come up with adequate figures on this. Moving geographically,
if I may, to the Balkans, I very much welcome the advancement
of Croatia and its candidacy. Nevertheless, we have had evidence
that there is some inconsistency because Croatia is not yet complying
fully with ICTY[6]Bosnia
and Herzegovina (I think they use the term "the state",
but the national body which represented it at the United Nations)
cannot deliver because the harbouring of people wanted by ICTY
is within the geographical area and they could only be arrested
with the collaboration of the Government of Srpska, so the rest
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is penalised in its European Union aspirations
by the inability of one of its constituent parts to deliver. Montenegro
cannot deliver people who are wanted in respect to ICTY, who are
in the de jure, rather fictional federation of Serbia and
Montenegro, so it seems to me these are dilemmas and inconsistencies
which need to be addressed. I wonder what you can say about that.
Mr Straw: As far as Croatia is
concerned our position is that we would like to see an opening
of accession negotiations with Croatia provided it has shown full
compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague,
and I think, Mr Mackinlay, you will be familiar with the recent
view of Carla del Ponte, the Chief Prosecutor for the Tribunal,
that there had not been effective co-operation by Croatia in respect
of the remaining indictee, Ante Gotovina, being located and transferred
to The Hague. That is our approach there and that is the approach
that will inform our own discussions at the European Council next
week. In respect of the other countries in the Balkans, yes, it
is complicated. What we are dealing with here is the break-up
of the old Yugoslavia and behind that all the long-standing tensions
which have made the Balkans such a crucible of conflict and war
over many centuries, so resolving those is going to take some
time. All I am saying is that I think the best hope for the future
for all the people within the old Yugoslavia is membership of
the European Union.
Q50 Andrew Mackinlay: Absolutely, I agree.
Croatia actually has candidacy status. Is that now going to be,
as of this Council, frozen, as it were? Is it going to be stopped
in its tracks? If it is not, if it is going to be advanced, that
seems to be inconsistent in relation to the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina who cannot advance because a bit over which their
writ does not run, namely Srpska, will not collaborate. Montenegro
would like to have their interests advanced in Europe but are
still, for at least another two years, in this federation.
Mr Straw: I would say you make
a fair point. One of the things that we are concerned about is
to ensure that Croatia is treated in the same way, no worse but
no better than any of the other parts which used to make up the
Republic of Yugoslavia in respect of their obligations to comply
with the tribunal.
Q51 Andrew Mackinlay: On Kosovo, representations
have been made to us in relation to another inquiry but implicit
in that is that the big players in the European Union could do
more rather than just returning the aspirant refugees to Kosovo
by allowing them to work in western Europe and send remittances
back to Kosovo, the reason being that there is 80% male unemployment
in Kosovo (that is a guesstimate, nobody really knows), which
would make sense and relieve some of our problems and probably
diminish the tensions in Kosovo with the dangers of renewed conflict
with the new wave of refugees and asylum seekers and so on. It
might help if one embraced this and had a more regulated system
whereby Kosovans could stay in western Europe and pay tax and
be legitimised rather than the position which is very much that
of the United Kingdom but also other countries, such as Germany,
of returning people to Kosovo, only compounding the problems.
Mr Straw: I am going to ask Mr
Barrow to make some remarks about the position of Kosovo as a
territory and its future. Just allow me to say this, that in Easter
1999 there were intensive discussions between the European interior
home ministers about each of us taking a certain number of refugees
from Kosovo, given the situation that then existed, and we agreed
to do so, and we took something like 10,000 refugees. The deal
was very clear, that we took them for a specific reason and then
they went back. Our overall approach was that it was far better
for people to be refugees on the borders, mainly in Macedonia,
so that their return to their own homes was that much easier.
We said to people, "We will let you into this country for
a limited period until the emergency is resolved. When it is resolved
you go back". We stuck to our side of the bargain; we have
expected them to stick to theirs. Most have gone back; some have
not. If they have not got permission to stay we look to them to
go back.
Q52 Andrew Mackinlay: I think that was
a very laudable position in 1999. I am just saying that just in
our own naked self-interest in the long term it would be much
better not to put more pressure on the kettle in Kosovo—this
is based on evidence we have had—and that it would be much
better if people were allowed to work in what is loosely called
the west and send remittances back to the families, but if you
press on this return you are only going to exacerbate the unemployment
situation with all the attendant "criminality" which
flows from that and political pressure and so on. Is that being
looked at in the Council?
Mr Barrow: The view in Council
is that what we need to be doing is tackling the problems within
Kosovo, and you will know the Eide report, trying to address some
of the frustrations over the economy, and there have been recommendations
which we support, and I do not think we want to have a situation
where people stay away from Kosovo because we do not want to end
up with a situation which is enshrined. We want people back and
working in Kosovo. That is the focus rather than freezing an unhappy
situation.
Q53 Andrew Mackinlay: I would like now
to refer to the very important area of Macedonia. What about Macedonia,
the European Union advancement?
Mr Barrow: In terms of the EU's
relationship with it?
Q54 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes.
Mr Barrow: There is nothing specific
to report there. We encouraged the implementation of the Ohrid
framework, as you know, and we are working in other areas. We
have also, as you know, had an EU/ESDP[7]mission
in Macedonia, but in terms of specific news there is nothing to
give the committee. It remains an area of attention and concern
in the Council and an area where too we see progress.
Q55 Andrew Mackinlay: I would now like
to move to central Europe, whereas most people in the Foreign
Office for a long time used the crude and inappropriate term "eastern
Europe", Belarus and the Ukraine. I notice that in Belarus
further sanctions are being put on. It seems to me that we are
not making any progress on Belarus. European Union sanctions in
relation to Belarus really have not delivered and I wonder if
there is any review of the strategy there against the backdrop
of there being some seismic changes perhaps going on in neighbouring
Ukraine, the contagious effect.
Mr Barrow: It is a frustrating
situation for the EU in that once again we are in a position where
we look at additional measures because of what happens in that
country. It is our view that one cannot respond to that. That
said, I think you were absolutely right to draw an important link
between what is happening next door because, while our relations
with the Belarusian Government are affected by their action, they
will see what has happened next door. They will also be aware
of the EU's policy with regard to the European Neighbourhood Projects
where there are Action Plans being drawn up for the Ukraine and
Moldova but specifically there is not an Action Plan being drawn
up for Belarus because of the situation with regard to democracy
there, and therefore the absence of progress may in itself carry
the message and that is the situation we find ourselves in. We
would all much rather the situation with the recent elections
and with democracy generally allowed greater engagement.
Q56 Chairman: Just one question on Croatia,
Foreign Secretary. You recall that in the summer we agreed to
developments on the agreement in respect of Croatia at the time
when Carla del Ponte said that they were co-operating with ICTY,
since when she has changed her tune and has given a pretty negative
view of the degree of co-operation. What effect does that have
in respect of our own policy on Croatia's accession?
Mr Straw: The policy is the same.
We support Croatia's gradual involvement with the EU, leading
hopefully in time to membership subject to its full co-operation
with the International Criminal Tribunal.
Q57 Chairman: So how do you explain the
apparent contradiction between what Carla del Ponte said before
and what she has now said?
Mr Straw: I do not think it is
an apparent contradiction. It is perfectly possible to make a
judgment that at one stage there is co-operation and then at a
later stage that co-operation has ceased, and that is what she
has done. The test is consistent for us. There was a moment in
the summer, as you rightly say, Chairman, where, because of what
Ms Del Ponte was saying, if for no other reason, it looked as
though they were co-operating and therefore we said, "Okay,
they have passed the test for the time being". She has now
come forward with a more up-to-date judgment.
Q58 Chairman: And the effect of that
more up-to-date judgment?
Mr Straw: In our judgment it makes
it clear that they are not co-operating to a sufficient degree
and we think that ought to be taken into account by the European
Council next week.
Q59 Andrew Mackinlay: It seemed to me
that there was not a major qualitative difference between the
Ukraine and Belarus under President Kuchma but there was a difference
of size and we had more engagement with the Ukraine. I do recognise
that in foreign relations there are horses for courses and sometimes
you can have a different response, and events might show that
we have not responded sufficiently well and put more investment
into the politics of the Ukraine, but there has been a shift,
but is there a danger of us not doing what we should be doing
in Belarus with perhaps more engagement and moving it on so that
you get a parallel situation, as we now see, in Kiev, happening
in Minsk?
Mr Straw: I do not think we applied
different standards to the two countries. For sure, the Ukraine
is bigger but there was certainly more engagement by the Kuchma
Government than there was by the Belarus governments and that
may have made a difference to the outcome, but we sought to apply
the same standards to both.
Chairman: Since we have opened the front
on the Ukraine I think it only fair that Mr Mackay should put
his question on the Ukraine.
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