DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSE
51. As we noted last year,[40]
the FCO has a generally very good record of responding to our
Reports on time. We also applaud its practice of issuing its responses
as full Command Papers. In 2004, six of seven responses were issued
as Command Papers within, or very slightly over, the conventional
period of two months. The exception was the government response
to the Report of the Quadripartite Committee, on which the FCO
leads, but which involves at least three other government departments.
52. The Quadripartite Committee's Report was published
on 18 May 2004. Recognising the difficulties of co-ordinating
a response by several government departments, the Committee agreed
with the Government an extension of the normal two-month interval
between publication of the Report and receipt of the Government's
response. The response was therefore expected in September. In
the end, it was published on 22 October, more than three months
over the usual deadline and several weeks after the agreed, extended
deadline.[41] This delay
followed an earlier delay in the provision of declassified evidence
to the Committee. The Chairman of the Quadripartite Committee,
Roger Berry MP, has pursued both these matters in correspondence
with the Foreign Secretary and we are hopeful there will be no
further such delays.
53. Aside from the timing and quality of responses
to our Reports, there are some aspects of the relationship between
the Committee and the FCO on which we hope to see further progress.
One of these concerns relates to classified papers. When we receive
a classified document, we are obliged to apply certain procedures
to storage and handling of it, which limit its value to us. Most
obviously, we are unable to publish such documents, or to cite
them in our Reports.
54. Although we appreciate the FCO's willingness
to share some types of classified information with us, we are
concerned, first, that information provided to us is too often
given an unnecessary classification and, second, that by receiving
such information we as a committee of Parliament are drawn inside
the web of secrecy, which may inhibit our ability to scrutinise
areas of policy from outside. The second of these concerns is
for us as a Committee to deal with: we may have to decide not
to accept a paper if we feel that it will compromise our independence
from the executive. The first concern, however, is one which we
have raised with the FCO, as is evident from the published exchanges
between Committee and Department concerning the provision of information
on asset sales.[42] We
hope that the eventually satisfactory outcome of those exchanges
will inform the FCO's wider policy on provision of information
to the Committee, and lead it to question both the need for and
the utility of security and other classifications on a case by
case basis.
55. We continue to have a related concern, about
access to intelligence-related information, which is and clearly
must be classified. This concern was the subject of a Special
Report to the House, which we discuss in the next sub-section
of this Report.
First Special Report of Session
2003-04: Implications for the Work of the House and its Committees
of the Government's Lack of Co-operation with the Foreign Affairs
Committee's Inquiry into The Decision to go to War in Iraq (HC
440)
56. We have had a long-standing difference with the
FCO over the implications of the Intelligence Services Act 1994
for the Government's relationship with the FAC. The Government
has been praying the Act in aid of its policy of refusing to provide
intelligence-related material to the FAC. In vain so far, we have
sought to explain in what we believe are very clear terms that
we have no wish to duplicate the work of the Intelligence and
Security Committee which was set up under the 1994 Act; that we
do not seek access to intelligence-related information for its
own sake; that our only concern is to ensure that we have the
tools necessary to do our job of holding the FCO and its Ministers
to account. There are few aspects of foreign policy which do not
have some intelligence dimension, and our work is being seriously
impeded by the Government's obdurate, irrational refusal to allow
us to include that dimension in our inquiries.
57. In March 2004, following publication of Lord
Hutton's report, we published a Special Report in which we set
out our case. We invited the House to consider and reach a view
on a number of important questions which arise from the Government's
refusal to provide us in confidence with evidence and witnesses
which it subsequently provided to a public inquiry. These questions
include, what procedures should apply when a Minister refuses
to appear before a Committee, or refuses to allow a named official
to appear, or refuses to supply information?
58. The Government, which controls the time of the
House, has yet to provide it with an opportunity to consider these
vital questions. Our colleagues on the Liaison Committee, however,
have raised them with the Prime Minister[43]
and with the Leader of the House, Peter Hain.[44]
Mr Hain has submitted proposals for amendment of the Government's
internal rules governing the provision of evidence to select committees,[45]
none of which answers our questions. It is deeply disappointing
that, as the Freedom of Information Act comes into force,[46]
the Government appears set on avoiding an opportunity to enhance
Parliamentary scrutiny of its affairs.
40 HC, 2003-04, 220, para 51 Back
41
Cm 6357 Back
42
HC, 2003-04, 745, paras 87 - 92 Back
43
HC, 2003-04, 330-ii Back
44
HC, 2003-04, 1180-ii Back
45
Memorandum submitted to the Liaison Committee by Peter Hain MP,
October 2004, available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmliaisn/1180/4101902.htm Back
46
On 1 January 2005 Back
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