Conclusions and recommendations
1. After
careful consideration, we conclude that it was right that all
those on the electoral roll in northern Cyprus were able to participate
in the referendum held in April 2004, and we recommend that the
same arrangements should apply in respect of any future referendum
on a solution to the Cyprus problem. (Paragraph 80)
2. We conclude that
there is as yet little evidence that the Republic of Cyprus has
fully taken on board that its membership of the EU involves obligations,
as well as opportunities. We recommend that the Government work
on a bilateral level, and with its European partners, to encourage
Cyprus to adapt to European Union values and methods of working.
(Paragraph 103)
3. We are greatly
disappointed that it has so far proved impossible to gain agreement
on the modest but important proposals to improve the operation
and usefulness of the Green Line Regulation on intra-island trade.
We recommend that the United Kingdom work closely with the Luxembourg
presidency to secure early implementation of these changes and
to streamline procedures for making further amendments. We further
recommend that the EU should take steps to bring in genuinely
free trade, with traders in the South of the island being free
to move goods and products across the line to the North. (Paragraph
115)
4. We regret that
valuable aid for the people of northern Cyprus is being held up
by political and procedural disputes within the EU. We recommend
that the Government use its good offices to persuade all parties
to remove the remaining obstacles to disbursement of this aid.
(Paragraph 122)
5. We conclude that
undertakings given to Turkish Cypriots by the international community
must be honoured. We recommend that the Government do more to
turn its words into action, by working with the Luxembourg presidency
of the EU to remove obstacles to direct trade with and travel
to northern Cyprus, and that it encourage the wider international
community to do the same. (Paragraph 135)
6. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, if not sooner, the Government
clarify whether it has the power to authorise direct passenger
flights between the United Kingdom and northern Cyprus. We further
recommend that, if it does possess the power to authorise flights,
the Government announce a date from which such services will be
permitted, subject to satisfactory safety inspections of the facilities
at Ercan and other assurances. (Paragraph 146)
7. In the absence
of an early overall settlement, we recommend that the Government
support practical measures which will enable Turkish Cypriots
to trade with the United Kingdom and other countries, such as
refurbishment and then joint operation to EU standards of the
port at Famagusta, as proposed by the government of Cyprus. (Paragraph
152)
8. We reiterate our
previous strong support for Turkish membership of the European
Union. We conclude, however, that in practice Turkish accession
will be impossible for as long as there is no settlement of the
Cyprus problem. We also conclude that Turkey has the power greatly
to assist both a settlement in Cyprus and its EU aspirations,
for example by withdrawing some of its many thousands of troops
from the island, and we call upon it to do so. (Paragraph 163)
9. we conclude that,
despite assertions to the contrary, there is no wish or intention
on the part of the British Government to perpetuate the present
state of affairs on the island, still less to move towards a permanent
and legal partition, which would be in no one's best interests.
(Paragraph 172)
10. We conclude that
the Government's decision to offer to transfer sovereignty over
almost half of the United Kingdom's sovereign base areas on Cyprus
to the island's two communities as part of an overall settlement
was a constructive and useful gesture, with no negative consequences
for the United Kingdom's interests. We recommend that the Government
be prepared to renew the offer with the same conditions as before
in the event that progress towards a settlement is resumed. (Paragraph
182)
11. We recommend that
in any future negotiations on a settlement based on the Annan
Plan, the parties be invited to consider accelerating the withdrawal
of Turkish and Greek forces and the demilitarisation of Cypriot
forces, so that all these are reduced to zero and security guarantees
are provided by an external force acting under the terms of a
mandatory resolution of the United Nations Security Council. (Paragraph
195)
12. We note the very
strong feelings of the Greek Cypriot people about the need for
restitution of property to its rightful owners and conclude that
the property issue remains one of the most crucial to be addressed
in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. We conclude
that in any revival of the talks process it will be necessary
to find ways of addressing Greek Cypriot concerns which do not
disadvantage Turkish Cypriots. An element of outside financial
support may be helpful in this regard. (Paragraph 199)
13. We conclude that
British citizens who intend to buy property in northern Cyprus
risk exposing themselves to legal action by Greek Cypriots who
may be the rightful owners of those properties. We recommend that
the Government lose no opportunity to warn prospective purchasers
of this risk. (Paragraph 200)
14. We recommend that
a population census be held in northern Cyprus, funded by the
European Union and carried out either by an appropriate international
body or by the Turkish Cypriot authorities under close international
supervision. (Paragraph 205)
15. We recommend that
in any resumption of negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus
problem, the Government seek to persuade the parties of the need
for an increase in the number of Turkish settlers who will be
required to return to Turkey as part of a solution, together with
improved financial compensation for them. The precise figures
should be for negotiation between the parties. (Paragraph 208)
16. We conclude that
a substantive financial gesture by Turkey on the property compensation
issue would be a magnanimous and positive move which would reflect
well on Turkey and should be of some assistance in reducing Greek
Cypriot opposition to a solution which stops short of full restitution.
(Paragraph 211)
17. We conclude that
the costs of a settlement in Cyprus may be considerable, but that
the international community is able and willing to make a substantial
contribution to them. We recommend that the Government seek to
ensure that, before any further referendum is held on the island,
clear information is available to the people of Cyprus on the
extent of the financial contribution which will be made by countries
other than Cyprus. We further recommend that the Government and
the European Union look sympathetically at ways of alleviating
the financial burdens of a settlement on ordinary Cypriots. (Paragraph
216)
18. We conclude that,
in the absence of an overall solution to the Cyprus problem, a
step-by-step approach is likely to be better than no progress
at all. We also conclude that confidence-building measures have
a role to play, but only if they are consistent with the principles
which underlie the Annan Plan, and only if they do not diminish
the prospects of an overall settlement. We recommend that the
Government consider lending its support to any worthwhile and
practicable confidence-building measures which meet those criteria.
(Paragraph 223)
19. We conclude that
a lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem is overwhelmingly in
the interests of the people of Cyprus and that it offers important
advantages for the European Union, for Turkey and for the international
community. We further conclude that, although the prospects for
success may not be great, the opportunities which will arise in
mid-2005 must be seized. As one of the Permanent Five on the UN
Security Council, as President of the EU in the second half of
2005 and as a guarantor power in relation to Cyprus, the United
Kingdom is in a uniquely special position to assist the process.
We recommend that the Government make the achievement of a solution
to the Cyprus problem a priority of its foreign policy in 2005.
(Paragraph 236)
| 
