Implications for Turkey's accession
157. We set out the history of Turkey's longstanding
efforts to join the EU in our 2002 Report on Turkey
In a speech in 1924, Atatürk said "The
decline of the Ottomans began when, proud of their triumphs over
the West, they cut their ties with the European nations. This
was a mistake which we will not repeat." It was this context
that drove Turkey to be among the first countries to apply for
membership of the European Economic Community, signing an Association
Agreement as long ago as 1963. However, Turkey's progress towards
membership has been slow. The Customs Union envisaged in the Association
Agreement was put in place only in 1995. Turkey's rejection as
a formal candidate for membership of the European Union at the
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, when many countries
were accepted as candidates which until only a few years before
had been communist dictatorships, engendered much anti-European
feeling in Turkey. Turkish leaders claimed that Turkey's candidacy
was being blocked on religious grounds, following comments by
the Chairman of the European People's Party that "the European
project is a civilisational project. Turkey's candidature for
full membership is unacceptable", and reports that the then
German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, had described the EU as "a
Christian club". This negative atmosphere altered at the
Helsinki European Council in December 1999, when Turkey was accepted
as a candidate to join the EU.[224]
158. On 17 December 2004, the EU Council of Ministers
agreed that Turkey should be invited to commence accession negotiations
from 3 October 2005, provided certain conditions are met. Turkey
must reform some of its laws, improve its human rights record
and end torture. Most controversially, Turkey must also extend
its customs union agreement with the EU to include the ten new
member states, among them Cyprus. Turkey has not been explicitly
required to recognise Cyprus, but by entering into a customs union
agreement which includes Cyprus, Turkey will have to deal with
Cyprus in the way it deals with other member states. Most observers
accept that this will amount to implicit or informal recognition
of Cyprus by Turkey.
159. Nowhere in the conclusions of the December 2004
Council of Ministers is it stated that the Cyprus problem must
be solved before Turkey may join the EU, nor is it specifically
required that she must withdraw her forces from Cyprus. On the
other hand, for Turkey to join the EU without formally recognising
one of its member states, or with forces still present on part
of the territory of a member state without that state's agreement,
is impossible. We have shown elsewhere in this Report that the
continued presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus is obstructing
moves towards a final settlement; a withdrawal of some of those
forces could only be of assistance both to a settlement in Cyprus
and to Turkey's relations with the EU.
160. Minister for Europe Denis MacShane summed up
the position for us in a series of statements: "it will be
an anomaly of increasing magnitude that Turkey is seeking to negotiate
with a union of 25 Member States, one of which it does not recognise";[225]
"it behoves Turkey, though it is not for me to give advice,
to show that in the Eastern Mediterranean it can find ways to
solve the Cyprus problem as soon as possible";[226]
and "I do not see how Turkey can join the EU on the basis
of a partitioned island."[227]
161. We invited distinguished former Turkish diplomat
Özdem Sanberk to give us his personal perspective. He told
us that "I do not believe that it is possible for Turkey
to join the European Union without a solution to the Cyprus problem
and I do not believe it is desirable because it relates to the
stability of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and also our relations
with our Greek friends in Athens."[228]
He went on to say
one of the reasons why we are facing now this
deadlock in Cyprus is the fact that the balance which was struck
by the Lausanne Treaty and which was reconfirmed by the 1960 London
and Zurich Treaties, was upset by the unilateral admission of
the Greek Cypriots, and even when Turkey will be under the same
umbrella like Greece, then of course there will be Turkish Cypriots
and Greek Cypriots and this balance will be re-established in
the Eastern Mediterranean and, definitely, it will help a lot
to the solution of the problem. This is something which is so
very important that I do not [know] how to re-stress it.[229]
162. We agree with the premise which underlies Mr
Sanberk's position, which is that Turkish Cypriots who are part
of a bi-zonal, federated United Republic of Cyprus which is inside
the EU, will enjoy greater political equality than they could
ever have in an unrecognised, self-declared statelet outside the
Union. And with Turkish Cypriots inside the European Union as
part of an overall solution of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's path
to accession would be greatly eased.
163. We reiterate our previous strong support
for Turkish membership of the European Union. We conclude, however,
that in practice Turkish accession will be impossible for as long
as there is no settlement of the Cyprus problem. We also conclude
that Turkey has the power greatly to assist both a settlement
in Cyprus and its EU aspirations, for example by withdrawing some
of its many thousands of troops from the island, and we call upon
it to do so.
147