Annex 1
Letter to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations from the President of the Republic of Cyprus, dated
7 June 2004
Excellency,
With reference to your Report on the mission
of good offices in Cyprus (S/2004/437), dated 28 May 2004, and
further to our recent meeting of 4 June 2004, I would like to
convey to you further my relevant position.
This reply is presented in full respect for
your action in the framework of your mission of good offices and
has been prepared in a constructive and forward looking manner.
Indeed, I take this opportunity, to once more, reiterate my gratitude
and appreciation for your sustained personal efforts towards a
settlement in Cyprus.
When reading this Report, one should, nevertheless,
bear in mind that it has been primarily drafted by those entrusted
by you with the role of honest broker and were active participants
throughout the process. Through this Report they assess effectively
the outcome of their own efforts, whilst at the same time attempting
to portray and evaluate the attitude of the parties involved.
In other words, the authors of the report play essentially the
role of the judge and jury of the overall outcome of the negotiation
process they presided over.
I welcome, in particular, the recognition, in
the Report, that serious concerns of the Greek Cypriot community
had not been adequately addressed in the final Plan of 31 March
2004, a fact which weighted heavily on the results of the referendum
held on 24 April 2004.
It is regrettable that these concerns, which
I had explained in detail, both orally and in writing, in Nicosia,
through various documents, numbering more than 200 pages of comprehensive
proposals, amongst which one of the most important was the document
of 8 March 2004 concerning the crucial issue of security, were
to a great extent, ignored.
Let me remind you that these legitimate concerns
refer mainly (a) to the question of Turkish mainland settlers,
an issue which I also raised in my two letters I addressed to
your Excellency, on 23 and 25 March 2004, without any response;
(b) the permanent stationing of Turkish military forces in Cyprus,
even after Turkey's eventual accession to the European Union;
and (c) the expansion of the guarantor powers' rights emanating
from the Treaty of Guarantee, through the inclusion of an additional
protocol.
You very rightly point out, in your Report,
that there is disagreement over the interpretation of the rights
of the Treaty of Guarantee, between the Republic of Cyprus and
Turkey. Given that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 by invoking this
very specific right, this issue has been of paramount gravity
for our side. In order to tackle this issue, we have proposed
the adoption of a triggering off mechanism for the exercise of
the right of intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. However,
Mr de Soto refused to discuss the issue and Your Excellency also
did not contemplate this possibility. Even after the presentation
of the text of the final Plan, Cyprus tried to secure a strong
resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in any event
the adoption of a triggering off mechanism. This attempt of ours,
as you very well know, was once more, unsuccessful due to the
strong opposition of the other side.
Another issue of significance, negatively affecting
the negotiating process, which you also include in your Report,
was the lack of sufficient time and the tight deadlines provided.
These factors did not allow either substantial negotiations to
take place, or for an agreed solution to be reached between the
two communities.
This is all the more regrettable, since I had
been repeatedly advising, after the collapse of the talks, at
the Hague, in March 2003, that we should not be faced with another
artificial deadline, giving anxiety to the Cypriot people that
they would be besieged and that their legitimate concerns were
not given appropriate consideration. This flawed negotiating method,
which resulted in a 10-month delay in the resumption of the talks,
has proved inadequate and counterproductive. We bear witness to
the results of such a method, not only in the case of Cyprus,
but also in other regional conflicts, leading, at best, to short
lived arrangements incapable of bringing about stable and lasting
solutions.
May I point out that the crucial period of more
than a month of the first phase of negotiations, in Nicosia, as
you also point out in your Report, was allowed to elapse without
any progress due to the intransigent position and demands of the
Turkish Cypriot side, which laid well outside the key parameters
of the plan.
Let me underline that there have been serious
inaccuracies, as well as wrong assumptions, in your Report, which
are pointed out in the attached Annex. The most serious of them
is the erroneous interpretation of the choice of the Greek Cypriot
community at the referendum of April 24, namely that by the disapproval
of this specific Plan Greek Cypriots have voted against the reunification
of their country.
Such a claim is unfounded and insulting. It
should not be forgotten that a substantial number of those voting
were refugees, 70% of which voted "no", and who for
more than 30 years have been deprived of their human rights, particularly
their rights to return and to property, due to the presence of
35,000 troops and 119,000 illegally implanted Turkish settlers.
Another fallacious assumption of the Report
is that the Greek Cypriots are turning away from a solution based
on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. I would be very interested
to look into any credible evidence, put forth in good will, pointing
out to even a single reference in our written proposals, submitted
in Nicosia and Bürgenstock, which will support this assumption.
The same can also be said for our comments submitted orally. Moreover,
our firm position taken through all these years of deliberations
does not justify in any way the inference of such a claim.
In any event, I take this opportunity to emphatically
reiterate, once more, on behalf of the Greek Cypriot side, the
commitment of my people, as well as my strong personal one, to
the solution of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. At the same
time, I am compelled to reject the notion that the Plan submitted
on 31 March 2004 constitutes the one and only, unique, blueprint
of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Does anybody today claim
that the previous versions of the Plan, which were similarly presented
as unique opportunities for the achievement of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation, were not so?
Turning to the Section of the Report, outlining
the alleged improvements inspired by the Greek Cypriot concerns,
I wish to point the following: the allegation that "the overall
amount of property in the Turkish Cypriot State eligible to be
reinstated to Greek Cypriots would be roughly doubled as compared
with the previous version of the plan" can be described as
inaccurate. As you very well know, the Plan includes a number
of preconditions for reinstatement of properties, which limit
substantially the exercise of the right of Greek Cypriots to reinstatement,
as well as the percentage of properties that were to be reinstated
to Greek Cypriots in comparison to previous versions of the Plan.
Furthermore, the section outlining the improvements
of the sides bears an uncanny resemblance to a well-known document
of a permanent Security Council Member, widely circulated at the
time of the Bürgenstock phase of negotiations, which strangely
enough even follows the same sequence for the improvements gained
by both sides. The most noteworthy element, however, of this section
of the Report is the omission of any reference to the benefits
that Turkey, and others, accrued from the provisions of the Plan.
Let me just outline just some of the benefits
gained by that country under the finalised version of the Plan.
Turkey true to her past role demanded (and obtained) divisive
bi-zonality provisions, strategic economic benefits, and "security"
arrangements, with sufficient troops, even if reduced in numbers,
to allow her again to intervene militarily through a bridgehead
in Cyprus, a right Turkey still insists she enjoys, and her continuing
role make full independence impossible. Although, scarcely touched
on in the Plan and then only by reference, Turkey's powers of
intervention and supervision, are in reality enormous, because
of its continuing military presence in and near Cyprus. She has
also insisted, through the Turkish Cypriots, on binding the UCR
by treaties which they entered into with her and which provided
for the integration of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state into
Turkey, persuading the UN to accept this and a new right for the
Turkish Cypriot State and Turkey to make agreements on investment
and provision of financial assistance. Turkey had also insisted
on putting a brake on the UCR's economic development by securing
provisions in the Law on the Continental Shelf that prevents the
UCR from exploring and exploiting her maritime resources in the
seas of Cyprus whilst interfering with the Treaty between Egypt
and the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive
Economic Zone, which is an ill-omen as to how Turkey would in
future have operated. Another such example is the imposition of
the "Cooperative Agreement on Civil Aviation with Turkey"
on Cyprus over the strong objection of the GCs. This treaty would
have imposed on Cyprus a common policy with Turkey in civil aviation
thus making the condition to changes in the management of Cyprus
air space subject to Turkey's consent. It would have also allowed
Turkey to take all necessary actions (even military action) in
the event of any threat to aircraft passengers, airport or aviation
facilities.
In the aforementioned list, which by no means
is exhaustive, the greatest benefit for Turkey, secured to the
detriment of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots and consisting a
clear departure from the provisions of Annan III, has been the
stationing of Turkish troops on the island in perpetuity.
All these new provisions clearly serving Turkish
interests and aims in Cyprus explain to a large extent why the
Plan was overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, approved
by the Turkish Cypriot side and so emphatically endorsed by the
Turkish Government. The Greek Cypriots have every right to wonder
how the United Nations, the very guardian of international law,
could adopt proposals inspired by the Turkish side, which deliberately
and unjustifiably limit the sovereignty exercised by one of its
Member States. In other words, the main objection by the Greek
Cypriot community to the Plan was the fact that foreign interests,
primarily Turkish ones, were satisfied, instead of those of the
Cypriot population, Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike.
Furthermore, the Turkish side avoided conscientiously
to reveal its thoughts on the issue of territory, thus depriving
the whole process of a significant element of potential meaningful
trade-offs. Maybe the Turkish side adopted this attitude having
valid reasons to expect that its demands would be more or less
fully satisfied without having to make any concessions on territory.
In any event, the insinuation that the GC side avoided somehow
to discuss the territorial issue or missed an opportunity as far
a Karpas is concerned betrays, at best, failure to understand
the nature of GC concerns as expressed during the whole process
or bad faith at worse. In any event, this issue should have been
dealt with by the United Nations proprio moto when the percentage
of displaced persons to return to their homes in the area under
TC administration was further curtailed by 3%.
We were willing to accept, on humanitarian grounds,
that a number of Turkish settlers should have the right to stay
in Cyprus as citizens under the new state of affairs. What however
we were not willing to accept, as you very well knew, was that
each and every settler, indeed all, should be entitled to remain
and ultimately acquire citizenship. Neither we were ready to endorse
new provisions allowing fresh settlers flows in the future, thus
altering further and distorting the demographic balance on the
island.
However, under the final Plan not only the entirety
of settlers were to remain in Cyprus and the possibility for a
permanent flow of settlers form Turkey was left open, but all
of them were allowed to vote during the referendum. This was so,
despite established international law and UN practice, and persistent
repeated calls of our side to the contrary, which were utterly
disregarded. The end result, is that once more the settlers have
participated in formulating the will of Turkish Cypriots during
the referendum of 24 April, and this against every norm of international
law and practice.
Functionality is not exhausted to the composition
of the Presidential Council or the setting up of a Court of Primary
Federal Jurisdiction. Functionality covers all the areas of the
operation of the state and our concern for functionality was reflected
in all of our proposals during the process covering, inter
alia, federal legislation and its practical application, the
Central Bank, fiscal and monetary policy, the curtailing of the
various transitional periods, ensuring conformity with EU obligations,
the administrative structure and function of the federal government,
the decision-making process at all levels, the territorial aspect
and the issue of the missing persons. All of the GC suggestions
concerning functionality are fully documented, have been within
the parameters of the Plan and did not affect in any way the rights
afforded by the Plan to the Turkish Cypriots.
The objective of most of the GC side's suggestions,
viewed, as an integral whole, have been to achieve the functionality
and the workability of the solution, thus ensuring its viability
and smooth operation. The attainment of these objectives (functionality
and workability) could not be the automatic result of the adoption
of a few marginal elements contained in our relevant proposals
in exchange for some new Turkish Cypriot demands. Thus, on no
account can be claimed that "functionality and workability"
requirement had been met.
In addition, we maintain serious doubts on whether
the final Plan is compatible with the acquis communautaire.
As it is well known the European Commission did not, in any case,
examined one by one the provisions of the final Plan. The Commission
simply examined Annan I, not subsequent versions. Thus, it would
be interesting to know what the legal and jurisdictional organs
of the EU have to say on the final Annan Plan.
At any case, as it is well known, what is of
equal importance with the compatibility of the Plan with the acquis,
is the ability of Cyprus to function effectively within the EU
as a Member State, something that clearly has not been achieved
by the Plan.
It is utterly inaccurate to state, in paragraph
69, that I have never presented proposals on security to the members
of the Security Council. They are well cognisant of an aide
memoire distributed by the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to
the UN, on 20 April 2004, during the deliberations on the British-American
draft resolution. The inclusion of this allegation is offensive,
to say the least, because I have personally pointed out this inaccuracy
after Mr Alvaro de Soto alleged so publicly.
Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side did not bring
up the issue of security for the first time on 20 April. In fact,
on 15 March, we submitted a comprehensive voluminous paper concerning
the security issue, wherein our suggestions were elaborated in
detail and with absolute clarity. Either Your Excellency, advised
by Mr de Soto, did not give serious consideration to our positions
on such a crucial issue or Mr de Soto did not bother to read our
paper with due care and attention.
We share the view that membership in the European
Union adds to the general feeling of security and we hope that
Turkey's European aspirations will lead her to display more respect
for international law norms and the implementation of UN resolutions.
However, it remains an uncontested fact that we still have serious
security concerns as a result of the presence of Turkish occupation
troops and Turkish overall behaviour. Recent illustrations of
the latter are the Resolutions relating to Strovilia, that required
the withdrawal of Turkey's occupation troops a few meters away
that had not been complied with. Even more disturbing and insulting,
for the United Nations itself, is the unheeded call by the Security
Council for Turkey to lift the restrictions imposed on UNFICYP.
Acceptance and implementation of the Plan would
have had profound consequences. Given, that all parts of the Plan
constituted an integral whole and were of equal importance, it
was imperative that before embarking on its implementation all
the proper iron cast guarantees should have been in place that
each and every party concerned would comply with all of its obligations
arising therefrom.
Regrettably, contrary to the Secretary-General's
aims in formulating the Plan, the arrangements for implementing
territorial adjustments under Annan V would have resulted in a
"win-great risk of losing" situation and not in a "win-win"
situation, as intended by the Secretary-General. The arrangements,
as envisaged under Annan V, would have given the Turkish Cypriots
real and considerable benefits governmentally, politically, internationally,
economically, security-wise etc, from the very first day of the
Foundation Agreement coming into operation. In contrast, the two
benefits for Greek Cypriots, namely territorial adjustments and
reductions in the size of the Turkish Army in Cyprus, would not
begin immediately, and would have taken a number of years to be
phased in.
In this way, the implementation of the Plan,
especially those provisions of crucial interest to the GCs, would
have been contingent to Turkey's good will, which, for the last
30 years at least is far from forthcoming even in embryonic form.
When for the last 30 years, due lack of good will on the part
of the Turkish side, no progress whatsoever has been achieved
in relatively simple issues of profound humanitarian nature such
as the investigation of the fate of the missing persons, it would
be very imprudent to rely on Turkey's good will for the full,
prompt and proper implementation of a Plan purporting to provide
a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem.
More importantly, the present Turkish Government,
despite its efforts to present an image of a country ready to
cooperate and respect the norms of international law, continues
its unjustified hostile policy against Cyprus. Using its right
of veto, Turkey continues to hinder the accession of Cyprus to
a number of technical international organisations, amongst which
the OECD. The commercial fleet of Cyprus, a Member-State of the
European Union, is still denied the right to approach any Turkish
ports. The most recent and illustrative action of this deliberate
Turkish policy was the extension of its customs union agreement
to nine of the 10 new members of the European Union, the tenth
being Cyprus which was unreasonably excluded at the very moment
when Turkey aspires to future membership in the EU.
Under these circumstances, one must logically
wonder how much trust and confidence the Greek Cypriots can place
on vague promises, in the absence of concrete and ironclad guarantees,
that Turkey will fulfil all its commitments under the Plan. Experience
has unfortunately been pointing to the opposite direction, since
no signs by Turkey of an ending of its hostile acts against Cyprus
are witnessed.
While we appreciate your stated disapproval
of the idea of separate recognition of the secessionist entity
in the occupied part of Cyprus, we strongly object to the conclusion
of the Report. In particular, we can not accept the suggestion
contained in paragraph 93, that members of the Council "can
give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally
and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions
and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots,
deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council resolutions
541 (1983) and 550 (1984)". In any event, this suggestion
lies clearly outside the Secretary's General good offices mission
and is in direct contravention to the SC resolutions and international
law.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that our common
goal for the reunification of Cyprus will be negatively affected
for ever by such proposed actions, which undoubtedly will lead
to the upgrading of and creeping or overt recognition of this
secessionist entity. This would be done in direct violation of
Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) and the
prevalent norms of established international law. The adoption
by the Security Council of this particular suggestion will be
paradoxical, since it will amount to an incomprehensible negation
of its own categorical call to all States "not to facilitate
or in any way assist the aforesaid entity".
We strongly believe that the welfare and prosperity
of the people of Cyprus lie with the economic integration of the
two communities and the unification of the economy of Cyprus,
and not with the encouragement of separatist tendencies. In this
respect, any moves or initiatives, aiming at first sight to the
economic development of Turkish Cypriots, but with evidently hidden
political extensions, create nothing more than a disincentive
for a solution and promote the permanent division of the island.
Various methods elaborated by certain circles
for the direct opening of ports and airports in the occupied part
of Cyprus, as a mean of facilitating the direct trade with these
"Areas" of Cyprus, serve exactly this purpose. Such
moves lack any sound legal basis. In fact, based on outrageous
justification proposals they clearly try, unsuccessfully though,
to promote and present a situation of external trade with a secessionist
entity as lawful. Not only all these efforts fail to respect legality,
but also more importantly the end result is that they violate
the very norms from which they try to derive their legal validity.
The outcome is a doubtful attempt to legalise an illegal situation
in a territory of Member-State of the EU, where the application
of the acquis communautaire is suspended, whilst at the same time
creating serious practical problems, thus setting dangerous precedents
for the future.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is
the first to support the economic development of Turkish Cypriots;
an economic development based on the proper criteria that promote
the ultimate aim of facilitating the reunification of our country.
We have shown this in practice by the announcement and implementation
of two packages of measures, of 30 April 2003 and 26 April 2004
respectively. These measures have in essence freed the intra island
trade of agricultural and manufactured goods, fisheries and minerals,
produced in the northern part of Cyprus, as well as their exports
through the legal ports and airports of the Republic of Cyprus.
Unfortunately, due to political considerations, such far-reaching
measures are not being made use of, due to the insistence of the
occupation regime for direct trade through illegal ports and airports
in violation of international law.
It is more than evident that Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriot leadership are not genuinely interested about
the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community, but
primarily for the upgrading and ultimate recognition of the secessionist
entity. In this respect, I would also like to bring to your attention
the efforts currently under way for upgrading the status of the
Turkish Cypriot community in the Organization for the Islamic
Conference to a "Turkish Cypriot State". I urge your
Excellency to seriously consider the direct implications of the
suggestion contained in paragraph 93 of the Report for the reunification
of Cyprus.
I should be grateful if the present letter is
circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda
item 30, and of the Security Council.
Tassos Papadopoulos
President of the Republic of Cyprus
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