Written evidence submitted by Brigadier
Francis Henn CBE
I enclose a Memorandum for the information of
the Foreign Affairs Committee. It relates to a fundamental aspect
that has long been an obstacle to progress towards a settlement
in Cyprus, but which too often has been overlooked. I am not a
member of, or associated with, any organisation connected with
Cyprus, Greece or Turkey, and the views expressed are entirely
my own. Throughout the two years that culminated in Turkey's military
intervention in 1974 I was serving in the United Nations Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as its Chief of Staff and Commander of its
British Contingent. I have followed the Cyprus story closely ever
since and have visited the island several times for lecture or
research purposes, most recently in 2002, when the Cyprus government
wished to discuss with me aspects of the 1974 events which had
a bearing on its impending application to join the European Union.
During 1980-83 I served as a Special Adviser
on Cyprus to your Committee, but its inquiry on Cyprus was conducted
in desultory fashion, other more important matters intervening,
and was eventually shelved for the reasons given in paragraph
five of the Committee's Third Report (Session 1986-87). (I was
not appointed to advise the successor Committee, which produced
that Report.)
A book of mine entitled "A Business Of
Some Heat" (Othello, 1, 2) is to be published this autumn.
With a Foreword by Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Under-Secretary
General for Special Political Affairs, it is a generally factual
(and, I believe, impartial) account of events during the period
of my service with UNFICYP. Although mainly concerned with the
latter's activities, it also explains the complexities of the
Cyprus problem and its international dimensions.
CYPRUS THE GEO-STRATEGIC DIMENSION
THE STRATEGIC
FACTOR
For long the Cyprus problem has been seen by
those seeking a settlement as being primarily an intercommunal
matter. While the intercommunal dimension is a highly important
ingredient, the fundamental factor that lies at the heart of the
problem today is no different from that which has been the island's
misfortune throughout history, namely its geo-strategic importance,
especially for Turkey. In 1974 the Turks intervened militarily
ostensibly to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority, but there
was for them an overriding undeclared national interest—
the prevention of enosis and the threat to Turkey's own security
that this would have created. Although enosis is no longer an
issue, the determination of the Turks, especially the military,
to preserve their own security vis-a"-vis Cyprus is no less
today.
The reason is clear: in the west Greece's Aegean
Islands press close and instabilities to the north and east (the
nature of which may have varied over the years) cause Turkey genuine
anxiety. Secure access to its southern ports and airfields, all
of which are readily dominated from Cyprus, is thus a vital strategic
interest. For decades the Turks have made clear the importance
of the island in this context (see Annex). There can be no doubt
that it has been a long-standing Turkish objective to ensure that
Cyprus does not succumb to any potentially hostile power, especially
the traditional enemy Greece (common membership of NATO has never
diminished the Turks' concern on this account). Securing physical
control of the island's north, citing the protection of the Turkish
Cypriot community as justification, has been seen as the surest
guarantee to this end. In 1964 and again in 1967 the Turks were
thwarted by external pressures from achieving this objective,
but in 1974, when the ideal opportunity presented itself, they
did not let it slip.
Most impartial observers agree that the failure
of the numerous initiatives and negotiations of the past thirty
years to achieve an intercommunal settlement can be attributed
in large measure to the intransigence of the Turkish Cypriots
led by Rauf Denktashh, and that in this respect the tune has been
called by Ankara, ever watchful to ensure that the fruits of its
1974 intervention are not forfeited. Since the Annan Plan posed
no such risk (and served, incidentally, to bolster Turkey's prospects
for accession to the European Union), it is little surprise that
Turkish Cypriots were persuaded to vote for it in the referendum
held on 24 April 2004.
THE ANNAN
PLAN
The Greek Cypriots' criticisms, which to the
intense frustration of the UN Secretary General led to their rejection
of the version of his Plan put to them in that referendum, have
been set out in a letter dated 7 June 2004 from President Papadopoulos
to Kofi Annan. With respect to defence and security aspects of
the Plan, Papadopoulos states that particular Greek Cypriot concern
is centred on proposals for The permanent stationing of Turkish
military forces in Cyprus, even after Turkey's eventual accession
to the European Union, and the expansion of the guarantee powers'
rights emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee through the inclusion
of an additional protocol. These proposals, the ostensible purpose
of which is to provide security for the Turkish Cypriots, coincidentally—and
no less importantly from its point of view—also serve Turkey's
own strategic interest.
The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, see these
aspects of the Plan as being inconsistent with the sovereign independence
of the Republic of Cyprus (whether or not united as a future federal
State) and prejudicial to their own security. But, given the power
of the military voice in Ankara, it is not likely that Turkey
can easily be induced to give ground on these two important aspects,
even if in its desire to join the EU the present Turkish government
might be inclined to do so. If progress is to be made on the many
other contentious issues, a way needs to be devised to resolve
this fundamental conflict of interests to the reasonable satisfaction
of both sides. This will necessitate concessions by and compensations
for both Turkey and the Greek Cypriots.
A WAY FORWARD?
Turkey's long military occupation of the whole
of northern Cyprus, achieved by overwhelming force of arms, and
its support for the otherwise unrecognised "Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus" are damaging to its international reputation
and adversely affect its ambition to accede to the EU. However,
Turkey's own security cannot be said to require military control
of such an extensive area—a base on the island that enjoys
international recognition and legitimacy should suffice. Various
possibilities for such a base might be considered: for example,
a long lease might be allowed to the UN, EU or NATO specifically
for use by Turkey; alternatively, a lease might be granted to
Turkey itself, or, in the last resort, a base might be ceded to
Turkey as sovereign territory. (The suggestion is not new—it
was an important feature of the Acheson Plan proposed by the US
in 1964, but rejected then by Makarios in very different circumstances
from those that prevail today, when Turkish forces are already
ensconced in strength over the whole of northern Cyprus.)
Such a proposal could be expected to satisfy
Turkey's national interest and provide reassurance for the Turkish
Cypriots, but in the absence of substantial compensating measures
it would be certain to encounter strong Greek Cypriot opposition.
It is here that Britain could make a crucial contribution. Its
offer, in the event of the Annan Plan being accepted by both communities,
to surrender to the Republic of Cyprus substantial parts of its
Sovereign Base Areas is clear demonstration that these are no
longer essential for Britain's own defence purposes. They might
now be offered to the Greek Cypriots as a quid pro quo for a Turkish
base in north Cyprus (centred, perhaps, on the airfield at Lefkoniko
with rights of access to the ports of Famagusta and Kyrenia).
Agreement for this would allow Turkish troops to be withdrawn
from a large area of the island's north, foster closer relations
between the two communities, and create a climate more conducive
to progress on other issues.
THE QUESTION
OF GUARANTEES
However, such a proposal is unlikely to be sufficient
for it to be accepted by the Greek Cypriots, unless accompanied
by parallel action on the question of guarantees—the second
concern expressed by Papadopoulos in his letter to Kofi Annan.
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee (which stipulates that "the
sole aim" of any action should be to re-establish "the
state of affairs created by the current Treaty"), although
cited by Turkey in justification for its military intervention
in 1974, was in the view of others by then out-dated. (In evidence
to the House of Commons Select Committee on Cyprus (Session 1975-76),
Lord Callaghan of Cardiff, Foreign Secretary at the time, said
that in practical political terms Britain had no right under the
Treaty to intervene "because the [Cyprus] Constitution had
not been working since the early 1960s".) The Turks, nonetheless,
insist on the continuing validity of the Treaty. Given the manner
in which they interpreted its terms in 1974, it is not surprising
that in his letter Papadopoulos refers to this as "an issue
of paramount gravity for our side", and protests that the
Greek Cypriot proposal for adoption of "a triggering-off
mechanism for exercise of the right of intervention under the
Treaty" had not been addressed by the UN Secretary General
or his Special Representative.
The need for an external guarantee for the independence
and territorial integrity of a future united Republic of Cyprus
is clear enough, but authority to invoke its provisions should
be vested in an international body such as the UN, EU, or NATO
in such a way as not to permit any one nation to act unilaterally.
While the Turks must be expected to resist any proposal for the
repeal of the Treaty of Guarantee (which, as they see it, entitles
them to such action), their ambition for membership of the EU
offers a lever to this end, for it can be argued that it would
be inappropriate for any one member to have a unilateral right
of intervention in another. Taken together with surrender of parts
of the British SBAs to the Greek side in compensation for the
grant to Turkey of a base in northern Cyprus, a new form guarantee
of this nature might overcome the current impasse on defence and
security aspects of the Annan Plan.
BRITISH POLICY
Few of the contingencies, for which the SBAs
were originally required, now exist, but the importance to Britain
(and the west) of the strategic airfield at Akrotiri and of monitoring
facilities elsewhere remains; Britain should refrain from any
action which might prejudice the unfettered continuing operation
of these. For long there have been calls by some Greek Cypriots
(as earlier by the old Soviet Union) for Britain to surrender
its bases and withdraw all its forces from the island. Any policy
which tends to favour the Turkish side at the expense of the Greek
side, such as recognising the administration in the island's north
or continuing to support an un-modified Annan Plan, can be expected
to generate more vociferous anti-British agitation among Greek
Cypriots and adversely affect British interests on the island
generally.
Given its relationship with the parties, its
permanent membership of the Security Council, and its membership
of the EU and NATO, Britain is uniquely well-placed to lend influential
support for the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal united
Republic of Cyprus and should continue to do so, taking care not
to antagonise any of the parties while encouraging the (frustrated)
UN Secretary General not to lessen his effort to achieve a settlement
acceptable to all on the basis of a modified Annan Plan.
The present situation in Cyprus is relatively
stable (although less than satisfactory for the Turkish Cypriots
who are denied the benefits of accession to the EU) but, so long
as the island's complex problems remain unresolved, a potential
threat to peace and security in the region will remain. President
Papadopoulos has denied that in rejecting the Annan Plan his community
has thereby voted against re-unification, declaring, rather, that
Greek Cypriots remain determined to strive for achievement of
a united federal State. To this end he has offered a number of
immediate measures designed to improve the economic lot of the
Turkish Cypriots pending a settlement. Although the latter consider
the attached conditions to be unacceptable, the measures constitute
a constructive first step towards resumption of meaningful intercommunal
negotiations on the many other issues. They deserve British support.
August 2004
Annex
SOME TURKISH STATEMENTS ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF CYPRUS
Speaking in London in 1955, the then Turkish
Prime Minister Zorlu said:
All these southwestern ports are under the cover
of Cyprus. Whoever controls this island is in the position to
control these Turkish ports. if the Power that controls this island
is also in control of the western [Aegean Islands, it will effectively
have surrounded Turkey. 1
These words were echoed in 1964 by Foreign Minister
Erkin, also speaking in London. Stressing the strategic importance
of Cyprus, which (he argued) should be seen geographically as
a continuation of the Anatolian peninsula, he concluded:
All these considerations clearly demonstrate
that Cyprus has vital importance to Turkey, not merely because
of the existence of the Turkish community in Cyprus, but also
on account of its geo-strategic bearing. 2
Ten years later a prominent Turkish academic,
commenting on his country's 1974 military action, wrote:
The geo-political situation of Turkey and the
outlook of the countries encircling her in the north are such
as to force Turkey to keep secure her southern defences. Consequently
Cyprus maintains vital importance . . . as far as Turkey is concerned.
3
Describing a meeting of the National Security
Council in Ankara on 16 July 1974 (the day after the coup d'etat
in Cyprus) an exceptionally well-informed Turkish journalist has
written:
Ecevit [Turkish Prime Minister] once more stressed
the serious implications of the Sampson coup for the security
of Turkey. He reviewed the situation in the Aegean. He pointed
out that it would now be a simple matter for the Greeks to proclaim
enosis and thus create a Hellenic island base from which, for
the first time, central and southeastern Turkey would come within
range of the Greek airforce bombers. Finally, he expressed concern
that oppression and even massacres of Turkish Cypriots might follow
the coup. 4
(This leaves little doubt as to the priorities
governing Turkey's military action in 1974.)
In 1985 a British journalist reported:
Mr Rauf Denktashh, the Turkish leader, has told
the UN Secretary General, Mr Perez de Cuellar, that he expects
to play host indefinitely to several thousand mainland Turkish
troops after a peace treaty is signed. He has indicated that he
has the support of Ankara for this firm stand. 5
There have been many Turkish statements in similar
vein since. For example, Turkey's Chief of Staff, General Karadayi,
was quoted in 1997 as saying:
The Turkish presence in Cyprus will live forever
under the guarantee of the Turkish aimed forces. 6
References
1. Haluk Bayulken: "The Cyprus Question",
Dis Politika, Ankara, February 1975.
2. Criton G.Tornaritis: "Cyprus and
Constitutional and Other Legal Problems", Daily Bulletin,
Nicosia, 23 March 1984.
3. Professor Suat Bilge: "The Cyprus
Conflict and Turkey", Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition,
ed. Kemal H.Karpat, E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1975.
4. M.A.Birand: 30 Hot Days, Rustem &
Brother, Nicosia.
5. John Torode: "Turkish Cypriots to
Keep Island Troops"', The Guardian, London, 23 May
1985.
6. The Daily Telegraph, London,
14 January 1997.
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