Further written evidence submitted by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus
Since Turkey's military invasion and occupation
of the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, the Cyprus
Government and the Greek Cypriot community have vigorously pursued
the end of the forcible division and the achievement of the reunification
of the Island and its people through a negotiated, just, functional,
viable and lasting settlement that would respect human rights
for all its citizens.
A. THE LATEST
EFFORT TO
FIND A
SOLUTION TO
THE CYPRUS
PROBLEM
The UN Secretary-General presented his first
draft Plan in November 2002 and later produced a second draft
just before the European Union Copenhagen Summit. The Turkish
Cypriot leadership failed to engage in any negotiations on the
basis of the Plan, nor did it turn up at Copenhagen to conclude
the effort. On 26 February 2003, the Secretary General produced
a third draft of the Annan Plan. President Papadopoulos had just
won the Cyprus Presidential elections on 16 February 2003. As
President-elect he presented his views on the Annan Plan in a
letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 28 February 2003,
raising a number of fundamental reservations and objections to
its provisions.
The UN Secretary-General convened a meeting
at The Hague on 10 March 2003. Mr Denktashh, the Turkish Cypriot
leader, and President Papadopoulos participated at the talks.
Mr Denktashh immediately indicated that he rejected the Annan
Plan entirely, its philosophy, its parameters, its trade-offs
on core issues. President Papadopoulos, on the other hand, indicated
that he was prepared not to raise the "core" issues
of the Plan, provided that the other side did the same. He repeated
and insisted on the points raised in his letter of 28 February
2003 to the Secretary-General, and expressed his readiness to
negotiate in good faith and good-will on these points. At the
same time, he reiterated his concern about the functionality and
viability of the Plan and indicated that he would be making proposals
for making the Plan more functional and viable, without re-opening
important trade-offs agreed by his predecessor on core issues.
In view of the absolute rejection of the Annan
Plan by the Turkish Cypriots, the talks broke down and the Secretary-General
issued a public statement, expressly laying the blame for the
breakdown on the Turkish side and commending the constructive
attitude of the Greek Cypriot side. For almost a year, nothing
happened because the Secretary-General refused to renew the talks.
Finally, the U.N. Secretary-General invited the parties to New
York, after President Papadopoulos by his letter, of 17 December
2003, requested a new initiative by the Secretary-General. On
13 February 2004, the Secretary-General announced the accord reached
by the two Cypriot parties to start negotiations as soon as possible
in the following format:
1. Negotiations between the two sides to
last four weeks under the auspices of his Special Adviser, Mr
Alvaro de Soto. During this time, the parties would negotiate
in good faith in order to reach an agreement;
2. If no agreement was found by the two parties,
negotiations would be continued for a further week with the collaboration
of Greece and Turkey; and
3. If no agreement was reached at the end
of the second phase, the Secretary-General was authorized to finalize
the text.
However, the Secretary-General committed himself
that this finalisation would be "on the basis of his Plan",
and would be using his right sparingly, when the differences on
the issues would be narrowed down and in cases of persistent deadlocks.
No other commitments were entered into at the
New York meeting, except for the parties to submit the finalised
Plan to referendum. The parties were invited to submit their proposed
amendments to the Plan, which ought to be in line with the Plan
and limited within the parameters of the Plan. The Greek Cypriot
side abided strictly to these guidelines (as accepted by the Secretary-General)
and limited its proposals to only seven "Headings".
Unfortunately, the Turkish Cypriot proposals
impinged at the core issues of the Plan, upsetting its balance
and basic tradeoffs while being mostly outside the basic parameters
of the Plan. These Turkish Cypriot proposals were protested by
the Greek Cypriot side to no avail. Though the Greek Cypriot side
reserved the right to raise core issues only if the other side
did so, showing its good will, it chose not to do so, remaining
within the framework and the parameters of the Annan Plan III,
being confident that, given the assurances of the Secretary-General
and the 4th Point of the New York understanding, any demands by
either side, which would be outside the parameters of the Plan
would not be taken into account.
Over the four weeks of the first phase there
had been no negotiation. The Greek Cypriot side demonstrated repeatedly
its will to negotiate in good faith, submitting its proposals
both orally and in writing, only to find itself confronted with
the Turkish side's intransigent position once again. At the end
of this period the Turkish Cypriot leader declared that he would
not be attending the talks at Bürgenstock. Unfortunately,
no real negotiations were carried out at Bürgenstock, either.
Only one meeting of the parties was called by Mr De Soto, which
was eventually cancelled, one hour before the scheduled meeting,
at the request of the Turkish Cypriot representative. Mr Talat
had said that: "it would be better if the meeting be postponed
until after the arrival of the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr Erdogan,
at Bürgenstock". Mr Papadopoulos was not invited to
any other meeting for negotiations, during his ten days in Bürgenstock.
It was only at the last two days of the second
phase at Bürgenstock that the UN tried to produce a list
of priorities to enable "tradeoffs", especially when
Turkey's Under-Secretary Ziyal conveyed a two-page list of final
points demanding that the UN Secretariat include in the plan the
changes requested by Turkey. This request was to be met, with
the UN Secretary General telling the Prime Minister of Turkey,
upon the latter's arrival at Bürgenstock, on 29 March 2004,
that nine out of eleven points had been fully met and that the
other two were virtually met. All points were to be met on the
final version of the Plan of 31 March.
It should be noted that the "two-page list"
of Turkish demands, was never put before the Greek Cypriot side
and it was never negotiated either. To give but one example, which
is very telling: In previous versions of the Annan plan, it was
provided that the Turkish troops will leave the island within
15 years or upon Turkey joining the European union, whichever
occurred earlier. Without any negotiation, on this or any other
issues, Annan V provided that a number of Turkish troops, with
expanded powers, would remain in Cyprus for ever.
Malicious rumours were spread that President
Papadopoulos refused to talk with Mr Talat at Bürgenstock,
despite a public denial by the UN spokesman in Nicosia, Mr Brian
Kelly, on 13 April, who said that: "It appears that there
is a misunderstanding. The UN have never told Mr Talat that Mr
Papadopoulos refused to meet him (Mr Talat) and Mr Serdar Denktashh
face to face".
The truth is that no real negotiation, face-to-face
or otherwise, was carried out at Bürgenstock. The reason
is that everybody was so keen to get Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots
onboard, after 30 years of their utter intransigence, that all
efforts were directed towards satisfying all Turkish demands,
whilst, at the same time, not giving any concern or trying to
accommodate the concerns of the Greek Cypriot side.
On 29 March 2004, the Secretary General presented
a revised version of his plan, containing numerous amendments,
including changes on core issues and reopening substantial trade-offs,
previously agreed, and requested the comments of the parties within
less than 24 hours. In addition to the Foundation Agreement, the
revised version consisted of over 9000 pages, including 131 laws,
covering, for example, the important issues of citizenship/settlers,
the Federal Central Bank, international treaties, etc.
In spite of these constraints the Greek Cypriot
side submitted its comments, in writing, as requested by the Secretary
General.
On April 24, 2004, the People of Cyprus were
asked to approve or reject the U.N. Secretary General's proposal
for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (Annan
Plan V). It was not surprising that a clear majority of 75.8%
of Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, which was neither fair
nor balanced. It is significant to say that in these percentages,
70% of the refugees, that under the Annan Plan were supposed to
return to their homes, (up to a ceiling of 18% of the Turkish
Cypriot population in these areas, and, moreover, of those to
reside in the 8% of the occupied areas, which within three and
a half years would be returned to the Greek Cypriot constituent
state, voted "NO" to the Annan Plan).
B. CONSIDERATIONS
BY THE
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that
the Committee, in its examination, should take into serious consideration
the reasons why the Annan plan was not approved by the Greek Cypriot
side, including the majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees. In
the view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Cyprus, basic proposals of the Greek Cypriot side, all within
the parameters of the Plan, have been disregarded. The serious
concerns of the Greek Cypriot side were completely ignored. The
clear outcome of the referendum confirmed the initial assessment
of the Greek Cypriot side, that all third parties involved in
the process, concentrated their efforts towards satisfying the
interests of the Republic of Turkey and ensuring a positive result
of the referendum in the Turkish Cypriot community, while ignoring
the fact that Greek Cypriots also had to be convinced to approve
the Plan.
The Greek Cypriots would have been convinced
if their concerns about security, the removal of settlers, functionality,
the economic and general viability of the Plan, as well as the
fears for the implementation by Turkey, of the provisions of a
Plan which spanned a period of 21 years, had been addressed and
satisfied.
The final package presented to the sides contained
provisions, which could not be approved by the Greek Cypriots:
Greek Cypriots did not accept the continuation
of the Treaty of Guarantee for an indefinite period of time, with
an expanded scope, when compared to the 1960 Agreement. It should
be noted that it is this very treaty that Turkey used as a pretext,
in violation of the UN Charter, to justify its 1974 invasion of
Cyprus. It was not possible for Greek Cypriots to accept the indefinite
continuation of Turkey's guarantor status over a country, which
has suffered an invasion and subsequent occupation by this guarantor
power. In particular, Greek Cypriots did not accept the presence
of Turkish troops in perpetuity, which according to the Plan would
remain in Cyprus even after Turkey's eventual accession to the
European Union, and moreover, even the expansion of the guarantor
powers' rights emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, through
the inclusion of an additional protocol. In fact, in Cyprus on
8 March 2004, in its "Talking Points" on "Security-Ratification
of the Treaty related to the coming into effect of the Foundation
Agreement," the Greek Cypriot side rejected the Turkish Cypriot
side's view (expressed in their papers) that there was a right
of military intervention and insisted that the Treaty of Guarantee
did not empower intervention. At Bürgenstock on 30 March,
the Greek Cypriot side asked for clarification that the Treaty
did not empower unilateral military intervention. Following the
Bürgenstock meeting, the Government of Turkey circulated
to the Turkish Grand National Assembly a paper asserting that
the Plan gave Turkey "the right of intervention" either
alone or together with the United Kingdom and Greece. Since clarifications
were still being finalised, the Greek Cypriot side on 15 April
2004 insisted that the matter, which involved a jus cogens
rule of international law, must be clarified. It gave the
UN an Opinion by 19 of the world's leading jurists on the illegality
of unilateral intervention under the Treaty of Guarantee. The
UN ignored the disagreement over the interpretation of the rights
of the Treaty of Guarantee, between the Republic of Cyprus and
Turkey, although this issue has been of paramount gravity for
the Greek Cypriot side. In order to tackle this issue, and as
a last resort and ultimate further concession, the Greek Cypriot
side had proposed the adoption of a triggering-off mechanism for
the exercise of the alleged right of intervention under the Treaty
of Guarantee. However, Mr de Soto refused to discuss the issue
and the Secretary General of the UN also did not contemplate this
possibility. Even after the presentation of the text of the final
Plan, Cyprus tried unsuccessfully to secure a strong resolution
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and in any event the adoption
of a triggering off mechanism, to no avail, in view of objections
by Turkey.
Greek Cypriots rejected a Plan, which did not
contain ironclad provisions for the implementation of the agreement,
especially for those provisions where Turkey's cooperation was
necessary. It is noted that demands of the Greek Cypriot side
for additional guarantees and other safeguarding measures regarding
the gradual reduction of Turkey's occupying troops and the territorial
adjustment, were ignored, thus, increasing the feeling of insecurity
for the Greek Cypriots. The Secretary-General's proposals for
assurances regarding implementation did not address the Greek
Cypriot request that the UN be involved throughout the period
preceding transfer of the territory due to the readjusted, so
that return of the property in good order and repairs and avoiding
vandalisms, could be ensured. Acceptance and implementation of
the Plan would have had profound consequences. Given that all
parts of the Plan constituted an integral whole and were of equal
importance, it was imperative that before embarking on its implementation
all the proper iron cast guarantees should have been in place
that each and every party concerned would comply with all of its
obligations arising therefrom. Regrettably, contrary to the Secretary-General's
aims in formulating the Plan, the arrangements for implementing
territorial adjustments under Annan V would have resulted in a
"win—great risk of losing "situation" and
not in a "win-win" situation, as intended by the Secretary-General.
The arrangements, as envisaged under Annan V, would have given
the Turkish Cypriots real and considerable benefits governmentally,
politically, internationally, economically, security-wise etc,
from the very first day of the Foundation Agreement coming into
operation, ie 24 hours after the referendum. Nevertheless, at
the same time, 24 hours after the referendum, the Republic of
Cyprus would have ceased to exist. In contrast, the two benefits
for Greek Cypriots, namely territorial adjustments and reductions
in the size of the Turkish Army in Cyprus, would not begin immediately,
and would have taken a number of years to be phased in. In this
way, the implementation of the Plan, especially those provisions
of crucial interest to the Greek Cypriots, would have been contingent
to Turkey's good will, which, for the last 30 years, at least,
is far from forthcoming even in embryonic form. When for the last
thirty years, due to lack of good will on the part of the Turkish
side, no progress whatsoever has been achieved in relatively simple
issues of profound humanitarian nature such as the investigation
of the fate of the missing persons, it would be very imprudent
to rely on Turkey's good will for the full, prompt and proper
implementation of a Plan, purporting to provide a comprehensive
solution to the Cyprus problem. The full implementation of the
Plan, would be implemented in phases over a period spanning 21
years after the referendum, whilst, in the meantime, the State—the
Republic of Cyprus—would have ceased to exist, whilst its
substitute—the "new state of affairs"—would
not have fully come into being.
Greek Cypriots failed to understand why, despite
their numerous protestations, Turkish settlers, were to be given
citizenship of Cyprus or a permanent right of residence leading
to citizenship. All provisions regarding citizenship were drafted
to obscure the fact that the issue is "Turkish settlers".
As a matter of fact, Mr Pfirter, legal adviser to Mr De Soto,
and one of the drafters of Annan Plan, told Bogazici University,
in Istanbul, on 17 July 2003 that "the Plan does not foresee
that anybody will be forced to leave"—his speech having
outlined provisions indicating that 70,000 Turks could remain
in Cyprus. On 15 March 2004, the Turkish Cypriot side, under Ambassador
Ziyal's guidance, asked for a list of "50,000 persons in
addition to their spouses and children" to be granted UCR
citizenship. Since some 18,000 settlers, married to Turkish Cypriots,
were entitled to citizenship under another provision, Turkey was
in effect asking for 68,000 settler families to be granted citizenship.
On the basis of two persons per family (2 x 50,000) plus the 18,000
spouses of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey was therefore admitting to
the presence of at least 118,000 Turkish settlers. The Plan as
"finalized" provided for: a list of 45,000 persons;
the spouses of Cypriots (18,000 plus); and, furthermore, an additional
20,000 Turks as permanent residents, who would be entitled in
four years to UCR citizenship, thus providing for some 83,000
Turks to remain. In addition, 18,000 Turkish University staff
and students would remain as residents, while, under the Turkish
immigration quota, another 10,000 Turks could settle (in fact
remain in Cyprus). Thus, under the 2004 version of the Plan, 111,000
Turkish settlers were either entitled to UCR citizenship or to
residence. Accordingly, Mr Pfirter's 17 July 2003 statement that
nobody would be forced by the Plan to leave remained accurate.
It suffices to remind that the Republic of Turkey, in violation
of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the Treaty of Establishment, illegally implanted
these settlers in Cyprus.
Moreover, people did not understand why all
Turkish settlers, who constitute a majority of persons on the
"electoral rolls of the TRNC", have been permitted to
vote in the referendum, in spite of the principle, laid dawn by
the International Court of Justice, "requiring the free and
genuine expression of the will of the people concerned" as
well as, the precedent applied in East Timor. The issue is really
about Turkish settlers voting. The UN was given an Opinion by
18 of the world's leading jurists on the unlawfulness of letting
settlers vote. The Greek Cypriot side had raised this issue continuously.
Most notably, President Clerides raised it on 24 July 2000 at
Geneva, when Mr de Soto gave his Preliminary Thoughts on a Plan
for Cyprus. President Clerides also raised it many times thereafter,
as did President Papadopoulos in letters of 28 February 2003,
and 22 March and 25 March 2004. However, when the issue was yet
again raised by President Papadopoulos, as the referendum approached,
the UN Secretariat briefed diplomats that, by raising "settlers
issues", the Greek Cypriot side was attempting to torpedo
the talks. The Secretary General did not take up the President's
request to discuss at Bürgenstock modalities easily and quickly
to settle the issue through a review of the "voters list",
which denotes the place of origin of each voter. He merely stated
that raising the issue was a major addition to the Plan which
was before the Parties and that it undermined a fundamental parameter
of his Plan. The irony is that Mr De Soto, before (but also after)
he was assigned in Cyprus, is the representative of the Secretary-General
in Western Sahara, where, as representative of the United Nations,
actively promotes the view that "according to international
law and the International Court of Justice rulings `settlers'
should NOT be entitled to vote" (!).
Greek Cypriots did not consent to a Plan that
would have established a complicated and dysfunctional state,
through the possibility of continuous deadlocks on clearly political
issues unsuitable for judicial arbitration. This could, with a
high degree of certainty, lead to paralysis. And paralysis, would
inevitably lead to "dialysis" (dissolution of the State).
Functionality covers all the areas of the operation of the state
and the Greek Cypriot concern for functionality was reflected
in all of the Greek Cypriot proposals (oral and written) during
the process covering, inter alia, federal legislation and its
practical application, the Central Bank, fiscal and monetary policy,
the curtailing of the various transitional periods, ensuring conformity
with EU obligations, the administrative structure and function
of the federal government, the decision-making process at all
levels, the territorial aspect and the issue of the missing persons.
All of the Greek Cypriot suggestions concerning functionality
are fully documented, have been within the parameters of the Plan
and did not affect in any way the rights afforded by the Plan
to the Turkish Cypriots. Does one need much argumentation to accept
that no country in the world (far less a small country) can survive
without a unified monetary policy? Yet, the Annan Plan does not
provide for one -unified- monetary policy, in the case of Cyprus.
Can the Greek Cypriot constituent state apply an "austerity"
monetary and financial policy, and, at the same time, the Turkish
Cypriot constituent state an "expansionist policy",
by borrowing, and, in addition, such borrowing being guaranteed
by the Federal Government, the resources of which, as to 90%,
would come from Greek Cypriots?
Another significant aspect of the Plan is a
misleading impression of improving functionality and of indicating
that the Plan represented a solid and workable economic basis
for reunification of Cyprus. It is not explained, however, that
important recommendations by the Technical Committee on Economic
and Financial Aspects of Implementation, (which had only been
appointed at Greek Cypriot insistence and included experts from
the IMF and the World Bank), had either been changed or not included
in the final, fifth Annan Plan and the accompanying Laws. Indicatively,
the "Record of Recommendations of the Technical Committee
on Economic and Financial Aspects of implementation," submitted
by the UN on 25 March 2004 to the two sides, had noted that "the
Cyprus Pound mentioned in the Plan is the current Cyprus pound".
This note was not included in the accompanying Central Bank Law
attached to the fifth Annan Plan. Furthermore, the Committee had
recommended that in the future Monetary Policy Committee (ensuring
currency stability) the Greek Cypriot side should have a majority
of members, but the final version of the Plan, provided for equal
representation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and that
no decision could be taken, unless in the majority vote there
was at least one vote from each community. Moreover, the Committee
had recommended that the branch of the Central Bank in the Turkish
Cypriot constituent state should be closed one year after the
entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, subject to the possibility
of a contrary recommendation from a working group including IMF
and EU experts. Yet the Plan left open the possibilities of maintaining
the branch in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state and of widening
its responsibilities. Such a development could seriously undermine
the effective exercise of monetary policy. Even more seriously,
the Committee had recommended that "An advisory Council should
be created to serve as the main coordinating vehicle between the
federal and constituent states to define a joint fiscal policy
stance and contain and manage new borrowing by an Internal Stability
Pact within the Macroeconomic Stability Council". There were
detailed provisions on the functions of this Macroeconomic Stability
Council and on the borrowing limits of all levels of Government,
but the Plan and the accompanying Laws only referred to the possibility
of setting up an MSC with an advisory role by a later federal
Law. (All federal laws can only be approved by separate majorities
of the two communities' deputies.) Yet again the Committee tackled
the issues of prevention of harmful tax competition and taxation
of commuters, whereas the fifth Plan and Laws were silent. Finally,
the Committee had defined federal economic policy, whereas the
Plan did not touch upon this major issue. All these Committee
recommendations were agreed to by the Committee's members, including
the Turkish Cypriot experts, but Annex II, while it indicates
that implementation of the Committee's recommendations would ensure
a workable economic basis for a reunified Cyprus, is silent as
to the departures from these recommendations in the Plan.
Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan, certain provisions
of which are clear violations or long-term suspensions of the
enjoyment of fundamental rights. These provisions institutionalize
a divisive structure in the political sphere, on questions of
residency, in the exercise of the right to property and even the
right to conduct business. It should not be forgotten that a substantial
number of those voting were refugees, 70% of which voted "no",
and who for more than thirty years have been deprived of their
human rights, particularly their right to return and to property,
due to the presence of 35,000 troops and 119,000 illegally implanted
Turkish settlers.
Greek Cypriots disapproved a plan that denied
to the majority of refugees the right of return to their homes
in safety. Moreover, the proposed complex mechanism, relevant
to the exercise of the property rights of refugees, with the numerous
conditions attached to reinstatement of property, failed to convince
that it would effectively function. In addition, the scheme for
compensation was fraught with ambiguities that raised serious
concerns about its future economic viability. It has been said
that 120,000 displaced Greek Cypriots would be returning under
Greek Cypriot administration. This is most definitely not so.
Based on the 1973 Census of population, 85,000-90,000 displaced
persons would be the maximum number able to return to these areas.
They were not a majority of the refugees. It is curious, to say
the least, why the number of displaced persons who potentially
may return by extrapolating the population to its present levels
including the descendants of many who have left Cyprus, has been
exaggerated. The UN negotiating team knows well the true facts.
At the same time, it is mentioned, elsewhere, that "over
time 100,000 Greek Cypriots would be able to take up permanent
residence in the Turkish Cypriot State". Again, the figures
are grossly exaggerated and no time frame is given. The actual
potential numbers are as follows: between 2010-2013 12,000-13,900
persons were eligible to resettle; between 2014 and 2018 the cumulative
number would have increased to 26,700-31,500; and between 2018-2023
the maximum cumulative number could have become 44,000 to 51,000.
Greek Cypriots rejected a Plan imposing on them
the liability to pay the large claims for loss of use of properties
in the Turkish occupied area. Greek Cypriots simply refused to
assume the cost of the fait accompli created by the 30-year occupation
of their land. In addition, the Greek Cypriot leader, who would
assume the role of the co-president of the Federal State, was
obliged to write to the European Court of Human Rights, asking
the Court to reject pending cases and discourage new applications
to the Court by Cypriot citizens (!).
Greek Cypriots rejected a Plan, which provides
that Cyprus shall not put its ports or airports at the disposal
of the European Union, in the context of the European Security
and Defence Policy, without the consent of Greece and Turkey.
Acceptance of such provisions would deprive Cyprus of enjoying
sovereign rights stemming from its membership in the European
Union.
Some foreign diplomats and observers argue that
Annan Plan V provided for the "re-unification" of Cyprus,
and, therefore, the Greek Cypriots voting at about 76% its rejection,
voted against the "reunification" of Cyprus.
On the contrary, the Plan unfortunately stipulated
"bizonality" in the sense of creating permanent ethnic
and legal separation and effectively brought the whole of Cyprus
into Turkey's sphere of influence. The "separatist"
provisions of the Plan, perpetuating and institutionalising the
separation, are rather more important than the unifying provisions,
and, in fact, without amendment, they perpetuate the separation.
As to the allegations that the Greek Cypriot side did not submit
serious demands on the territorial aspects, the return of refugees,
on Karpasia, the timetables, etc., the following remarks are made.
Had the Greek Cypriot side, at the first phase of the negotiations,
proposed such changes in the Plan, it would have been accused
that it had moved away from its commitment to submit proposals
on the basis and within the parameters of the Plan. It is really
strange and a paradox that such allegations are made from those
who, at the same time, portrayed the Greek Cypriot side as the
one with the negative attitude.
Throughout the talks, in Nicosia, Mr De Soto
was advising the Greek Cypriot side that Turkey would "soon
surprise you with its proposals on territory and for straightening
the map. So wait, until the submission of Turkey's map before
you raise territorial issues". In the end, at Bürgenstock,
both, first, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, and, later,
Mr De Soto, "regretfully inform you that Turkey will not
be submitting a map"
Indeed, at the final stage of the negotiations,
a number of proposals were submitted by the Greek Cypriot side,
which, however, were not satisfied. The Greek Cypriot side pointed
out that if the UN was to change the basis of representation in
the Senate to a communal basis, reduce the caps on the number
of Greek Cypriots to return under Greek Cypriot administration
then, in lieu, more territory should be allocated to the Greek
Cypriot constituent state (Karpas, Kythrea, Saint Barnabas and
Salamis were proposed). This proposal was submitted also in writing,
both in the Cyprus talks, as well as those in Bürgenstock.
It became apparent that Turkey's insistence
on her positions and the support she received by certain powers
would result in changes to the Plan in her favour and that only
those Greek Cypriot proposals that were not inconsistent with
Turkey's demands, or which would have been accepted by the Turkish
side, could be accepted by the United Nations, or would be included
in the finalised version of the Plan. In the light of these dogmatic
and erroneous views, any different negotiating "tactics"
of "talking tradeoffs" would have barely changed the
end result. The opportunity for an agreed comprehensive settlement
was lost because no negotiations were arranged at Bürgenstock
and because Turkey, with powerful backing was too intransigent
in insisting on her strategic and territorial aims on Cyprus,
while the Secretariat was determined to end the interminable procedures,
mainly by satisfying the demands of Turkey, even if the result
was not a "just solution". For reasons unknown, or on
the basis of incorrect information or assessment of the Cyprus
political scene and the feelings of the Greek Cypriots, the Greek
Cypriot side was wrongly taken for granted and that they would
accept any type of a "solution".
In any event, even if as a result of the envisaged
referendum, the settlement was not approved, (as was the case
on 24 April), a major aim would have been achieved for Turkey's
backers; ie that Turkey was cooperative and desirous of settling
the Cyprus problem, so that her occupation of Cyprus should not
be invoked to deny her application for a commencement date for
EU accession negotiations. In such effort, to bring Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriots on board by satisfying all Turkish demands,
a very important point had been missed. Greek Cypriots also had
a public opinion and they also had to give a "yes".
The Greek Cypriot community is a highly politicised community
(even our football teams are politically branded by people), and
it is, furthermore, a highly literate community, proudly being
amongst the three top countries in the world with the highest
ratio of University degree holders to population. Consequently,
nobody can easily mislead them, primarily on political issues
involving the future of their country. The ordinary Cypriot knew
exactly what he was voting for in the referendum and why he did
so.
The Greek Cypriot side showed its desire for
substantial negotiations and for a functional solution by its
considerable contribution to the work of the Technical Committees.
It was the Greek Cypriot side, which drafted almost in their entirety
the Federal Laws, since the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to
cooperate. Unfortunately, the UN, without any negotiations, adopted
Turkish amendments modifying crucial laws in a way that would
hamper the independent functioning of the UCR, eg Law on the Continental
Shelf, whereby Cyprus could not even explore, let alone exploit,
her continental shelf right along the northern and much of the
eastern coasts until Turkey agreed to a demarcation. The finalisation
of these laws, by the United Nations, was never negotiated, but
these laws were simply delivered, in their final form, in the
last five days of the Bürgenstock meeting.
A similar procedure was followed in the Treaties
Committee whereby the UN Secretary General accommodated in his
Plan "treaties" that were designed to integrate the
"TRNC" into Turkey and which would have had a similar
effect on the UCR had the Plan been accepted. There were also
interferences with Cyprus's Treaty with Egypt on the delimitation
of the exclusive economic zone. They also excluded from the list
of Treaties binding on the UCR, such an important treaty, like
the Treaty of Montreux, while inserting unacceptable agreements
between Turkey and the "TRNC" on the FIR, coastal security
and Search and Rescue.
The Turkish Cypriot side even sought recognition
of the "TRNC" in devious ways, and demanded massive
EU derogations and rights for all Turkish settlers to remain.
Changes also sought to diminish the UN peace-keeping force's mandate.
Changes sought by the Turkish side subverted not only the procedure
agreed in New York, but also the delicate balances of the Plan
between the respect for the human rights of refugees and the needs
of persons currently using the refugees' houses. Turkish Cypriot
proposals were seeking to legitimise ethnic cleansing and land
confiscation while virtually completely abandoning refugees' rights.
The disappointment of the international community,
for not arriving at a settlement, is fully understandable. The
Republic of Cyprus shares this disappointment. Nevertheless it
should be noted that the international community should aim at
finding and securing viable, just and lasting solutions to international
problems. The efforts for a solution of a complex international
dispute, such as the Cyprus problem, must continue. The solution,
to be viable and to withstand the test of time, must be just and
perceived as such by the people who have to live with it.
The views of friends of Cyprus from abroad that
Annan Plan V is a "unique" plan or that it is a "fairly
balanced Plan" are respected though the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs disagrees with such assessment. The question, the ordinary
person in Cyprus asks, is: "if the foreign politicians claim
the right to pontificate that the Plan `is fair and good for Cyprus',
don't we, the people and the residents of Cyprus, who will eventually
have to live with this for the time to come, have, at least, the
equal right to say that the Plan is not viable and is not good
for the people of Cyprus?"
It was not surprising, therefore, that a Plan,
so imbalanced in favour of Turkey, was not approved by 75.8% of
Greek Cypriots, exercising their legitimate democratic right.
It is, however, emphasized, in the strongest possible terms, that
Greek Cypriots have not rejected the solution of the Cyprus problem;
they have not approved this particular Plan.
C. THE ROLE
OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM
IN FUTURE
NEGOTIATION
Though this particular effort did not succeed
in resolving the Cyprus problem, the Government of the United
Kingdom, and the international community should remain committed
in working for a solution bearing in mind the essence of the Cyprus
problem. This is none other than the illegal invasion and occupation
of part of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and the forceful separation
policies inflicted on the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
by 30 years of Turkish military occupation. After all, the United
Kingdom has long-standing relations with Cyprus, and important
interests with the Republic of Cyprus, and the feelings of the
majority of the people of Cyprus, towards United Kingdom, should
not be ignored or allowed to damage this long-standing relationship.
The Greek Cypriots express their disappointment
at the fact that British Representatives in Switzerland, had distributed,
during the Bürgenstock Meetings, to Foreign Ministries and
the mass media, two inaccurate Memos, entitled (a) "UN Secretary
General's Plan for a Cyprus settlement", and (b) "Cyprus:
Bürgenstock: The Final Day (31 March), Summary", trying
to undermine the positions of the Greek Cypriot side and guide
the international community towards a negative attitude in case
of disapproval of the plan in the referendum. Such actions run
contrary to the provision in the plan that it would be null and
void in case of its rejection.
The Greek Cypriots express their disappointment
at the fact that British policy, following the 24 April 2004 referendum,
has not shown, in practice, respect for the will of the overwhelming
majority of the Greek Cypriots, as expressed during the voting.
There is a feeling that the British policy towards Cyprus, although
in words purports to aim for the reunification, in actual terms
consolidates the division and the alienation of the two communities
bringing feelings of disappointment to the Greek Cypriot community.
One should bear in mind, that, in absolute numbers,
the "YES" vote of the Greek Cypriots and the "YES"
vote of the Turkish Cypriots, (even including the votes of the
settlers), combined are far less of the "NO" vote of
the Greek Cypriots.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus regrets
the inclusion in the "strategic partnership" document,
signed between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom with Mr
Erdogan, of a paragraph affecting the interests of the Republic
of Cyprus (". . .in order to end the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots following their strong support for the Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus problem proposed by the UN Secretary
General to work within the UN, the EU and bilaterally to promote
greater direct commercial, economic, political and cultural contacts
between the UK, the EU and the Turkish Cypriot side." It
is odd that a partner in the European Union is signing an action
plan (agreed during the British and Turkish Prime Ministers meeting,
in Ankara on 17 May 2004) with an EU candidate Country, to work
together, in relation to a segment of the population, and against
the interests, of a partner in the EU.
Such a policy can affect the United Kingdom's
role in future negotiation, which should aim at making the necessary
changes in the Annan plan, to make it functional and workable
and in line with the EU acquis communautaire.
There is a number of good reasons for which
the United Kingdom's interests can be promoted through good relations
with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
The United Kingdom has a special role in working
for a solution preserving the sovereignty, the territorial integrity
and the unity of the Republic of Cyprus. It should aim at the
economic integration and the rapprochement of the two communities
and should avoid actions that are not in line with this goal.
In this respect, the United Kingdom should encourage both communities
to implement the EU Regulation on the green line (No 866/2004),
which provides for intra island trade and for exports to the EU
through the legal ports and airports of the Country. The Regulation
entered into force on 1 May 2004. Combined with the Commission's
implementing rules adopted on 7 July 2004, it provides the legal
machinery for the crossing of persons and goods across the line.
It should be realised, that the so-called "economic
isolation" of the Turkish Cypriots is, to a great extent,
self-imposed. A great example of this very fact is the introduction
of the Turkish lira as the currency of the illegal secessionist
entity in the occupied areas of Cyprus, basically for political
reasons. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Cyprus
strongly believes that the so-called "direct trade"
is purely a political reward for the Turkish Cypriots, not justified
by economic considerations.
The United Kingdom should not support and promote
proposals for "direct trade" from the northern part
of the island. Such a measure does not serve the aim of the reunification
of Cyprus, or indeed the purpose of the economic development of
the Turkish Cypriot community and the economic integration of
the island. On the contrary, it infringes on Cyprus's sovereignty,
it would help to solidify and deepen the division of the island,
and would give a political message to the Turkish Cypriots that
they do not need to cooperate with the Greek Cypriots. There is
no question whatsoever in international law and practice that
it is the exclusive sovereign right of states to define the points
of entry and exit of both goods and people. This has also been
verified by the Legal Service of the Council during the discussions
on this issue at the COREPER meeting of 22 July. The Council Legal
Service has also affirmed that legal basis proposed by the Commission
for the "direct trade" Regulation (Article 133 of the
Treaty of the EU, which deals with trade with third countries)
is not the appropriate one.
The United Kingdom should also support the proposal
of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, as elaborated in
the letter, by President Papadopoulos to Commissioner Verheugen,
dated 23 August 2004, for the return of Varosha to its lawful
inhabitants and the reopening of Famagusta port under the joint
management of the two communities, with an appointed chairperson
by the European Commission.
The British Government should respect resolutions
of the Security Council on Cyprus and avoid actions to weaken
Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). The fact that the Turkish
Cypriots voted in favour of one of many UN plans does not change
the reality that the northern part of the island is still occupied
and 36,000 Turkish military troops are stationed on the island.
The United Kingdom Government should underline to Turkey that
the presence of Turkish military troops on the territory of an
EU partner is incompatible with the British and European values.
D. SUPPORT FOR
CYPRUS'S
GOVERNMENT POLICY
VIS Á VIS
THE TURKISH
CYPRIOTS
Moreover, the United Kingdom Government should
also express support for the Cyprus Government measures vis-a"-vis
the Turkish Cypriots, which are as follows:
The Greek Cypriots are not turning their backs
to their Turkish Cypriot compatriots. On the contrary, the Greek
Cypriot side are fully determined to work for a solution that
will meet the hopes and expectations of both communities. We want
a common future for all Cypriots within the European Union, without
any third parties dictating that future. On the contrary, it is
the Turkish Cypriots who turn down such measures in pursuit of
purely (not economic) political considerations, in the light of
the prospect of "direct trade", which, in this perspective,
in fact operates as a disincentive towards unification of the
country and its trade.
In this spirit, a package of measures, to the
benefit of the Turkish Cypriots, which have been described as
generous by the international community and have lead to tangible
economic and other benefits to the Turkish Cypriots, is being
implemented by the Republic of Cyprus, since last year.
Following April 16, 2003, and the unfortunate
collapse of the UN talks in the Hague, the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus has elaborated on 30 April 2003, and is now implementing,
a "Set of Measures" in the framework of its "Policy
vis-á -vis the Turkish Cypriots". This package includes
a wide range of political, social, humanitarian, educational,
and economic measures aiming at providing our Turkish Cypriot
compatriots, with the opportunity to acquire, have access to,
and make full use of their rights as citizens of the Republic
of Cyprus, as well as the benefits arising from the accession
of Cyprus to the European Union.
Measures such as lifting of restrictions on
the movement of persons and vehicles from and to the Government
controlled area have proved to be very successful. The response
of the people on both sides of the divide showed the bankruptcy
of the Turkish policy of separation.
Since April 2003, more than four million crossings
have been registered. Since the enactment of the policy of the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus vis-a«-vis the Turkish
Cypriots, more than 10,000 Turkish Cypriots arrive every day,
(a figure representing more than 12% of the population of Turkish
Cypriots living in the occupied areas) in the areas under the
control of the Republic of Cyprus, earning about $150 million
per year. There is equally a significant number of daily visits
of Turkish Cypriots at the competent authorities of the Republic,
whereby they deal with issues such as birth certificates, identity
cards, passports and other administrative matters.
Many thousands of Turkish Cypriots have visited
the medical institutions (of whom a large number receive on a
regular basis specialized treatment at the Cyprus Oncology Centre
and the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics); no comparable
institutions exist in the occupied areas. Compared to April 2003,
the monthly number of Turkish Cypriots treated in these institutions
increased by 506%. The number of Turkish Cypriots visiting the
medical centres in the areas under the control of the Government
is currently to about 1,350 per month.
Moreover, the Government of the Republic of
Cyprus is taking steps for the clearing of minefields and the
destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Cyprus. UNFICYP
has begun setting up the necessary infrastructure for the implementation
of the project. Special training grounds for personnel have been
put into place. The EU is providing Euro 2.5 million, towards
the cost for the demining project in Cyprus; these money are available
as from 1 May 2004.
In addition, the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus has published in the Official Gazette of the Republic
(12 March 2003) the list with the names of the TC whose cases
have been submitted to the Committee on Missing Persons. On 14
June, 2003 the list has been published in most of the Turkish
Cypriots newspapers informing the Turkish Cypriots relatives about
this measure of the Government and inviting the Turkish Cypriots
relatives of missing persons to contact the relevant authorities
in order to attain and give information about the fate of their
loved ones.
The response by the families of missing Turkish
Cypriots has been very encouraging and a number of relatives have
already visited the competent authorities of the Republic, where
they have received all the information about the fate of their
loved ones and have also given blood samples and ante-mortem
data in order to help in the establishment of the identity of
the remains through DNA processes.
Moreover, following the accession of Cyprus
into the EU, the Government, working closely with the European
Union, have achieved a common understanding in order to have products,
produced in the occupied areas, exported, through the legal ports
and airports of the Country. The genuine interest of the Government,
about the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community,
was shown in practice with the announcement and implementation
of a second package of measures, on 26 April 2004.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is
the first to support the economic development of Turkish Cypriots;
an economic development based on the proper criteria that promote
the ultimate aim of facilitating the reunification of our country.
This has been shown in practice by the announcement and implementation
of four packages of measures, of 30 April 2003, 26 April 2004,
16 and 30 July 2004, respectively. These measures have in essence
freed the intra island trade of agricultural and manufactured
goods, minerals, produced in the northern part of Cyprus, as well
as their exports through the legal ports and airports of the Republic
of Cyprus. Unfortunately, due to political considerations, such
far-reaching measures are not being made use of, due to the insistence
of the occupation regime for direct trade through illegal ports
and airports in violation of international law.
Furthermore, a document entitled Code for the
implementation of regulation 866/2004/EC of the Council on a regime
under article 2 of Protocol 10 of the act of accession was produced,
in order to facilitate the free movement of people across the
cease-fire line of the Turkish occupation forces.
However, it is more than evident that Turkey
and the Turkish Cypriot leadership are not genuinely interested
about the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community,
but primarily for the upgrading and ultimate recognition of the
secessionist entity, ie to secure purely political advantages.
Continuing its unremitting efforts for enhancing
cooperation and confidence between the two communities in Cyprus
and developing a sense of security among the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots, the Government proposed, on 16 July 2004, the opening
of eight additional crossing-points along the ceasefire line,
demining (which is already, unilaterally, under way by the Government
for minefields of the National Guard within the buffer-zone) by
both sides of the existing minefields, disengagement of military
forces from the walled part of Nicosia, the wider Dheryneia-Famagusta
and Strovilia areas, as well as restricting military manoeuvres.
On the eight new crossing points proposed, four are of top priority
and provide for the crossing of people, vehicles and goods.
In particular, the Government of the Republic
has submitted a proposal to the UN for the unmanning of and removal
of all weaponry from military positions, on either side, of the
old city of Nicosia within the walls and in the Famagusta—Dheryneia
area. The total area covered by this proposal will be approximately
28 square kilometres.
On 30 July 2004, the Government announced further
supplementary measures in order to facilitate the movement and
transport of Turkish Cypriots and their goods. As such, the Government
decided on the amendment of the relevant legislation, so that
public service vehicles owned by Turkish Cypriots are allowed
to cross the line, loaded with persons or products, as appropriate.
Such vehicles include:
— trucks to transport goods for own
account;
— trucks to transport goods for hire
or payment;
— tourist buses and coaches; and
— taxis owned by Turkish Cypriots.
At the same time, in order to facilitate the
movement of goods produced in the occupied area and the development
of contacts and economic relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots,
the Government introduced a series of measures regarding, among
other:
— the exclusion of the obligation of
Turkish Cypriots to register on the VAT Register, in order to
sell goods or provide services to persons in the areas under the
control of the Government; and
— the imposition of zero VAT on goods
crossing the line.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus strongly
believes that the welfare and prosperity of the people of Cyprus
lie with the economic integration of the two communities and the
unification of the economy of Cyprus.
The United Kingdom Government should not support
proposals, which promote and present a situation of external trade
with a secessionist entity as lawful. Not only all these efforts
fail to respect legality, but, also, more importantly, the end
result is that they violate the very norms from which they try
to derive their legal validity. The outcome is a doubtful attempt
to legalize an illegal situation in a territory of Member-State
of the EU, where the application of the acquis communautaire is
suspended, whilst at the same time creating serious practical
problems.
E. IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE
EU'S RELATIONSHIP
WITH TURKEY
The occupation of the northern part of the island
and the presence of Turkish military troops are incompatible with
international law and the behaviour by a Country aspiring to become
a member of the EU. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that
the withdrawal of Turkish troops, as well as the fulfilment of
its obligations under the Customs Union Agreement concerning Cyprus
and the removal of the vetoes on the participation of Cyprus in
international organisations will facilitate Turkey's accession
prospects. The Government of the United Kingdom should remind
Turkey of those obligations.
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