Written evidence submitted by the Deputy
Prime Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus
On behalf of Deputy Prime Ministry and Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
I have the honour to convey the attached Memorandum on the Cyprus
issue in the hope of assisting the Committee in its inquiry into
the UK policy towards Cyprus.
MEMORANDUM ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE
1. The Cyprus issue has been on the agenda
of the UN Security Council for over 40 years, and since 1968 the
two sides have been negotiating, on and off, in order to reach
a settlement. Consequently for over four decades the Turkish Cypriots
awaited a just and viable solution which would put an end to their
unjust and inhuman isolation on their economic, social, cultural
and political life and looked forward to the day their ex-partners
would finally realize that the island of Cyprus was the common
home of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike who should share
and have an equal say over its destiny.
2. Well aware of the fact that a peaceful
future for the younger generations could not be held prisoner
to the tragic experiences of the past, the Turkish Cypriots never
lost their will or determination for a durable solution which
would ensure that history would not repeat itself. It was upon
the initiative of the Turkish side that the UN Secretary-General
invited parties to New York on 10 February 2004 to resume the
negotiations on the basis of a draft comprehensive settlement
plan, and that an agreement could be reached on 13 February to
resume negotiations to achieve a comprehensive settlement through
separate and simultaneous referenda before 1 May 2004. It was
in the same spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side participated
at the UN sponsored negotiations aimed at the establishment of
a new partnership based on the sovereign equality of the two ex-partners.
3. The determination of the international
community for a solution yielded its result and the last four
and a half years efforts' of the parties under the auspices of
the UN, produced the "Annan Plan", which was submitted
to the approval of the two sides by separate referenda, leaving
no room for any political or tactical maneuvers.
4. The first phase of negotiations between
the parties leading to the Annan Plan was conducted on the Island,
where only small progress achieved, due to the Greek Cypriot attitude.
The second and third phases were conducted in Bürgenstock,
Switzerland. During the final round, on 31 March 2004, the UN
Secretary-General, in accordance with the agreed procedure, finalized
the plan on the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem
in close consultation with the two parties in Cyprus and with
Greece and Turkey.
5. The EU Commission was also present at
the final stage of negotiations in Switzerland and the EU commitment
with regard to comprehensive settlement were agreed upon between
the parties and the EU Commission. The European Union had repeatedly
expressed its strong preference for the accession of a reunited
Cyprus and its support to the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General
and had made specific commitments to encourage and promote such
an outcome.
6. At the closing of the Cyprus talks in
Bürgenstock on 31 March 2004, the UN Secretary-General submitted
the final version of the Annan Plan to the approval of the two
parties with these remarks: "The choice is not between a
settlement plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In
reality, at this stage, the choice is between this settlement
and no settlement. There have been too many missed opportunities
in the past. For the sake of all of you and your people, I urge
you not to make the same mistake again."
7. Separate simultaneous referenda were
held on 24 April 2004 in the island. The plan was approved in
the Turkish Cypriot referendum by 65% of the votes, whereas 76%
of the Greek Cypriot people overwhelmingly rejected the plan as
called for by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos,
in an address on 7 April 2004, where he demanded a "resounding
no" to the Annan Plan from the Greek Cypriots. The rejectionist
approach by the G/C leadership caused wide-spread reaction from
the international community, including the UN Secretary-General
and EU officials. The tactics used by the Greek Cypriot regime
to solicit a "No" vote were also critized as they amounted
to undemocratic methods.
8. The Greek Cypriot leadership launched
a campaign following the referenda in order to explain why the
Greek Cypriots voted against the Plan. The rationale and arguments
used in that explanation were regarded as being baseless by the
international community. In fact the UN Secretary General Mr Annan,
in his letter of 15 June 2004, addressed to Greek Cypriot leader,
took a different view from the latter and emphasized that he did
not share the Greek Cypriot leader's characterization of the conduct
of the effort by the UN.
9. Following the referendum on 24 April
2004, the Cyprus issue has taken a new turn and a new state of
affairs has emerged.
10. It is true that the Annan Plan did not
satisfy all the demands and needs of the Turkish Cypriot people.
A very long list of why the plan should have been rejected exists
in the minds of each and every Turkish Cypriot, let alone the
leadership. However, having paid a dear price for protecting their
vested rights and vital interests, the Turkish Cypriot people
are well aware of the fact that a durable solution also has its
price and requires a good deal of compromise. Moreover, the Plan
was considered to be carefully balanced, and a product of a compromise.
11. The results of the referendum have clearly
demonstrated, once again, that the island has two owners and it
is the Turkish Cypriot side which sincerely wants a settlement
of the Cyprus issue based on the principles of partnership, bi-zonality
and the political equality of the two peoples. These are the main
parameters for a solution of the Cyprus issue, reaffirmed by various
Security Council resolutions and developed over the years through
the decades-long negotiation process, under the auspices of the
UN.
12. The separate simultaneous referenda
also confirmed the fact that there exist two separate peoples
on the island, neither of which represents the other. Consequently
it would be an untenable claim that there is a single authority
to represent the whole island, disregarding the reality that any
solution in Cyprus requires the consent of both sides and both
peoples.
13. Such a strong "no" in the
Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, proved, beyond any doubt,
that the Greek Cypriot side shall not be ready to enter into a
power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots, but instead
continue to enjoy the benefits of the title of the "Republic
of Cyprus" which they had usurped through force of arms in
December 1963. In fact, the UN Secretary-General also underlined
this fact in his report to the Security Council (S/2004/437) with
the following words: "If the Greek Cypriots are ready to
share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal
structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated,
not just by word, but by action" (para 86).
14. The Greek Cypriot side, over the years,
based its arguments on the principle of the doctrine of necessity.
However, the doctrine of necessity could not be relied upon to
justify the laws of a government which had itself dismantled the
Constitution, violated international agreements, and wrecked the
bi-communal set-up, as a result of which an exclusively Greek
Cypriot administration came into being.
15. The April 2004 referenda have shown
which side is for a solution that encompasses reunification and
peace, and which side is not. The Greek Cypriot side can no longer
use the doctrine of necessity against the Turkish Cypriots since
it was the Greek Cypriot leadership and ultimately the Greek Cypriot
people which blocked a comprehensive settlement on the island,
thus returning to "normal conditions". It is pertinent
to recall that the comprehensive settlement plan that was rejected
by the Greek Cypriots, was in fact a product of the Greek Cypriots[64]
16. Since it was approved in the Turkish
Cypriot referendum but not in the Greek Cypriot referendum, the
Foundation Agreement did not enter into force and the Annan Plan
became "null and void" as stipulated by its provisions.
17. The Turkish Cypriot people had their
final word by saying "yes" to the Annan Plan. The Annan
Plan is no longer subject to further negotiation for any amendment.
For this reason, any initiative by the Greek Cypriot side or any
other third party to make amendments to the Annan Plan is not
acceptable on the part of Turkish Cypriots.
18. Throughout the period of negotiation
of the Annan Plan and all its predecessors, and for a period of
more than forty years, the Turkish Cypriots have been subjected
to physical and economic deprivation and debilitating uncertainty
and it is time to put on end to this.
19. The question now is whether the world
shall close a blind eye to the striking reality and allow the
Greek Cypriots who opted for no solution to continue pretending
that they represent the whole island or honour the Turkish Cypriots
with their vested rights to speak and act for themselves through
their separate will which they used towards the unification of
the island.
20. The UN Secretary-General's answer was
amply clear in his statement of 24 April 2004. Applauding the
Turkish Cypriots who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant
sacrifices that it entailed for many of them, the Secretary-General
regretted that "the Turkish Cypriots will not equally enjoy
the benefits of EU membership as of 1 May 2004" but he hoped
that "way will be found to ease the plight in which the people
find themselves through no fault of their own."
21. Mr Annan's disappointment was reflected
in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, dated
2 June 2004, where he stated "the rejection of such a plan
by the Greek Cypriot electorate is a major setback. What was rejected
was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint."
22. The UN Secretary General also praised
the Government of Turkey, which enabled this new effort, for demonstrating
its readiness and determination to abide by its commitments under
the plan and fully implement a settlement. In Paragraph 78 of
his Report he stated: "I appreciated the strong support of
the Turkish Government, from the top down, for my efforts."
23. Besides the UN Secretary General[65],
numerous international organizations, as well as dignitaries applauded
the Turkish Cypriot people's affirmative vote and, in the light
of the understanding that ways and means should be found to end
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, they called for the immediate
restoration of their direct political, economic, trade and cultural
activities internationally without any restriction. The injustice
towards the Turkish Cypriots should now come to an end. The Turkish
Cypriots can no longer be left in the cold[66]
24. The rejection by the Greek Cypriots
of the UN plan was deeply regretted by the international community,
since a unique opportunity has been missed and only the Greek
Cypriot side of the Island was able to join the EU. This caused
an anomaly, since the Turkish Cypriots, who said "yes"
to reunification of the Island and the EU membership stayed outside
the EU, whilst the Greek Cypriot side, which rejected both, joined
the EU.
25. Since the EU confirmed at the Helsinki
European Council in 1999 that a settlement to the Cyprus issue
is not a pre-condition for accession, the Cyprus issue should
not be put as an obstacle in front of Turkey in her bid for EU
accession and members of the EU have a responsibility to make
sure that Turkey's EU membership is not held hostage by the Greek
Cypriot side.
26. The Turkish Cypriot people only ask
for their decades-old unfair punishment to come to an end. The
time has come for the international community, in general, and
the UK, in particular, as one of the guarantor powers, to take
measures to redress the unjust situation arising from the fact
that the Greek Cypriot side which rejected the UN plan has become
a member of the EU, while the Turkish Cypriot side which has approved
the plan not only has remained outside the EU but continues to
be subjected to unfair restrictions and isolation. As the UN Secretary-General
concluded in his report to the Security-Council, elimination of
restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the
Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development would be consistent
with Security Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984).
27. The EU has to play a pivotal role in
bringing-up concrete measures to alleviate the sufferings of the
Turkish Cypriots. However, despite the call made by the Council
of Foreign Ministers on 26 April 2004[67],
and all the promises given to the Turkish Cypriots, this could
not yet been realized. The United Kingdom as one of the guarantors
in Cyprus and a prominent member of the EU has a special responsibility
in to play a leading role completing as soon as possible the package
of measures towards putting an end to the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots.
28. The Greek Cypriot side, which astonishingly
managed to convince the world of its political will for a solution
and portrayed the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as intransigent
through the long process of negotiations, has in fact impeded
a solution. As the Greek Cypriot leader publicly admitted[68],
the Greek Cypriot side's main focus was not to negotiate a solution,
but rather to protect its advantageous position. The Greek Cypriot
side's policy of imposing embargoes on much of the Turkish Cypriot's
trade and communications with the outside world cannot contribute
to a settlement. Therefore there is a need for more imaginative
and constructive policies.
29. Consequently, it is an undisputable
fact that after the referenda the parameters have drastically
changed. Therefore, if the international community truly desires
to see a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, it has to re-diagnose
the Cyprus problem and adopt a fresh approach.
30. As one of the guarantor powers, the
UK should not hesitate to be at the forefront of those taking
the lead in the international efforts directed towards putting
an end to the unjust circumstances in which the Turkish Cypriot
people have been living through no fault of their own. Everything
possible should be done to facilitate contacts between northern
Cyprus and the outside world. Establishing direct flights and
sea links with northern part of Cyprus would be a good start to
ease the plight of the Turkish Cypriots.
31. The United Kingdom should also firmly
oppose the Greek Cypriot claims to be the single authority on
the Island, and reject its attempts to take decision on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot people and to perceive the Turkish Cypriots
as their subordinate minority. Any claim and attempt by either
side to control the whole Island and dominate the other people
in its own exclusive interests would be likely to perpetuate the
conflict.
Deputy Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
13 September 2004
It is vital to note that similar statements to that
effect have also been made by the US Secretary of State, HE Mr
Colin Powell, and the Prime Minister of the UK, HE Mr Tony Blair.
HE Mr Tony Blair during his visit to Turkey on 18
May 2004 stated that "I think it is important, as I indicated
to the Prime Minister, that we end the isolation of Northern Cyprus.
We made it clear we must act now to end the isolation of Northern
Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes in respect to trade,
in respect to air travel. There was a very clear commitment given
to people if they supported the Annan Plan. They have supported
it and we must see that commitments through."
The British Foreign Secretary HE Mr Jack Straw stated
during his meeting with the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister HE
Mr Mehmet Ali Talat on 1 July 2004 that he welcomed Talat's commitment
to the goal of reunification which was affirmed "so unequivocally"
by the Turkish Cypriots' embrace of the Annan Plan in the April
24 referendum.
He also expressed the hope that further steps would
be taken by both communities on the island to promote reconciliation
and pledged London's support for EU policies geared towards ending
the Turkish Cypriots' economic isolation.
"The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed
their clear desire for a future within the EU. The Council is
determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot
Community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging
the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community. The
Council invited the Commission to bring forward comprehensive
proposals to this end, with particular emphasis on the economic
integration of the island. The Council recommended that the 259
million euro already earmarked for the northern part of Cyprus
in the event of a settlement now be used for this purpose."
"If the sovereign people reject the Plan by
their vote, the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal
member of the European Union. We would have achieved the strategic
goal we have jointly set, ie to upgrade and shield politically
the Republic of Cyprus.
The view that this would be the final initiative
for the solution of the Cyprus problem constitutes dogmatism and
ignorance of the rules of international policy.
Turkey's accession course will also continue and
therefore Ankara would continue to be under continuous monitoring
concerning the adoption of the European acquis. International
interest for normalisation and peace in our region will continue
to exist.
Shall we do away with our internationally recognised
state exactly at the very moment it strengthens its political
weight with its accession to the European Union?
I call upon you to reject the Annan Plan. I call
upon you to say a resounding "NO" on 24 April."
64 "Parts of the plan were put together by the
UN. But all of its key concepts emerged out of four years of negotiations
among your leaders. And most of its 9,000 pages were drafted by
hundreds of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots." (Secretary-General's
video message, 21 April 2004). Back
65
The UN Secretary General, HE Mr Kofi Annan's call to the member
states in his report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus,
dated 2 June 2004, to the effect that "the Turkish Cypriot
vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them.
I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong
lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international
bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that
have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding
their development." Back
66
The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Mr Gunter Verhaugen, on 25 April
2004, stated that "what we will seriously consider now is
finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots."
Mr Verheugen further stressed that "Turkish Cypriots must
not be punished because of this result now we have to end the
isolation of the North. The commission is ready to take various
measures for that aim." Back
67
European Council of Foreign Ministers Conclusion Statement of
26 April 2004: Back
68
As explained by Mr Papadopoulos, Greek Cypriot leader, in his
televised address to Greek Cypriot voters before the referenda,
on 7 April 2004: Back
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