Written evidence submitted by the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, President's Office
Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from M Ergun
Further to your e-mail of 7 October 2004 and
the forthcoming FAC visit to Cyprus I am enclosing two papers
which you may present to Members of the FAC before they visit
the island between 9-11 November 2004.
One of the papers is prepared by the TRNC President
Rauf R Denktash and is a short analysis of the Cyprus question
and why it has not been solved for the last 40 years. As you will
see from the analysis the reason is that for Greek Cypriots the
problem was solved when they were treated as the legitimate government
following the hi-jacking of the title of the partnership Republic
of Cyprus in 1963 in contravention of the rule of law of 1960,
of which Great Britain is one of the Guarantors. Ever since, the
Greek Cypriot side has been using this title at the expense of
the equal Turkish Cypriot partner and will continue to do so unless
they are told that they are only the government of Greek Cypriots;
that the 1960 partnership Republic is now defunct; and that they
cannot in law or in fact represent Turkish Cypriots.
The second paper is prepared by me and outlines
the root causes of the Cyprus question, the validity of Greek
Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan, and the way forward for
I thank you for your assistance and remain at
your disposal if you require any further information.
M Ergun Olgun
12 October 2004
THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
WHAT IT ISHOW CAN IT BE SOLVED?
Rauf R Denktash
The Cyprus issue has been on the agenda of the
UN Security Council for 41 years. Since 1968 the two sides have
been negotiating, on and off, in order to reach an agreed settlement
but no settlement has been achieved. Turkish Cypriot call for
the diagnosis of the problem has fallen on deaf ears and the Greek
Cypriot side has been allowed to get away with all that it has
done in Cyprus under the hi-jacked title of "the Government
Consequently for over four decades the Turkish
Cypriots awaited a just and viable solution which would put an
end to their unjust isolation and inhuman embargoes on their economic,
social, cultural and political life and looked forward to the
day their ex-partners would finally realize that the island of
Cyprus was the common home of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike
who should share and have an equal say over its destiny.
Well aware of the fact that a peaceful future
for the younger generations could not be held prisoner to the
tragic experiences of the past, the Turkish Cypriots have never
lost their will or determination for a sound solution which would
ensure that history would not repeat itself. It was in this spirit
that the Turkish Cypriot side has always participated in UN sponsored
negotiations aimed at the establishment of a new partnership based
on the sovereign equality of the two ex-partners. What was foreseen,
and ostensibly agreed, by both parties with the full support of
the UN Secretary General and the Security Council was a bi-zonal,
bi-communal settlement, the ground for which was well prepared
with the voluntary exchange of population in 1975, but this was
never achieved because of the preference by the Greek Cypriot
side to keep and maintain the hi-jacked title of the government
The EU situation was made much worse for the
TRNC by the attitude and acts of the EU. It ignored the legal
rights of Turkish Cypriots in the Partnership Republic of 1960
and shut its eyes to the glaring fact that Greek Cypriot leaders
had destroyed that partnership in order to annex Cyprus to Greece.
In complete defiance of the rule of law and the democratic rights
of Turkish Cypriots, it accepted Greek Cypriots' application for
EU membership as an application by "Cyprus". The EU
was also present at the final stage of the UN negotiations in
Switzerland. The EU "commitment" with regard to a comprehensive
settlement was agreed upon between the parties and the EU Commission.
The European Unionwhich has always refused to treat Turkish
Cypriots as an equal party and has defied all the rules of law,
has treated the Greek Cypriot side as "the legitimate Government
of Cyprus". The EU has repeatedly expressed its strong preference
for the accession of a reunited Cyprus, has given its support
to the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General, and has
made specific commitments to encourage and promote such an outcome.
The Turkish Cypriot point that EU should hold its hand until a
final settlement of the problem was ignored. Repeated statements
to the effect that Cyprus would be accepted as an EU member, whether
there was an agreement or not, fed the intransigence of the Greek
The determination of the international community
for a solution yielded its result and the last four and a half
years' efforts of the UN produced the Annan Plan which was submitted
to the approval of the two sides by separate referenda, leaving
no room for any political or tactical maneuvers. But nevertheless
Greek Cypriot leader Mr Papadopoulos was able to deceive the world
that he was a "YES" voter until the very end when he
persuaded 76% of the Greek Cypriot voters to come out with a crushing
"NO" vote, he preferred the hijacked title of the Government
of Cyprus to a fine and just settlement.
The first phase of negotiations was conducted
on the Island, where only small progress was achieved. The second
and third phases were conducted respectively in New York and Bürgenstock,
Switzerland. During the final round, on 31 March 2004, the UN
Secretary-General finalized the plan on the comprehensive settlement
of the Cyprus problem to be submitted on each side for approval
at separate and simultaneous referenda, in close consultation
with the two parties in Cyprus and with Greece and Turkey. The
four-power conference agreed to be held as the third round could
not take place because of the refusal of the Greek side to sit
around a table in terms of equality with the Turkish Cypriot side!
Thus a plan on which there had been no agreement by the two sides
was decided to be put to the separate votes of the two sides and
presumably leave them to fight about it later!
At the end of the Cyprus talks in Bürgenstock
on 31 March 2004, the UN Secretary-General submitted the final
version of the Annan Plan to the approval of the two parties with
the historic remarks: "The choice is not between a settlement
plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In reality,
at this stage, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement.
There have been too many missed opportunities in the past. For
the sake of all of you and your people, I urge you not to make
the same mistake again."
Even the UN Secretary-General failed to understand
that the so-called "lost opportunities", as far as the
Greek Cypriot leaders were concerned, were not "lost"
at all; always they insisted on keeping and maintaining the hijacked
title of "the Government of Cyprus", rather than share
power permanently with Turkish Cypriot ex-partners. In other words,
they saw no reason to change their century old policy of converting
Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot Republic as long as the world at large
continued to treat them as "the legitimate Government of
Separate simultaneous referenda were held on
24 April 2004 in the TRNC and in the Greek Cypriot administration.
The plan was approved in the Turkish Cypriot referendum by 65%
of the votes whereas 76% of the Greek Cypriot people overwhelmingly
rejected the plan as called for by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr
Tassos Papadopoulos. In an address on 7 April 2004, he demanded,
and got a "resounding no" to the Annan Plan from the
Greek Cypriots. His public statement left no room for doubt that
the Greek Cypriot side would not accept any solution which fell
short of fully endorsing for good their title of "the Government
of Cyprus" which they had hijacked in 1963.
Mr Glafkos Clerides (one of the architects of
the Akritas Plan together with Mr Papadopoulos) has clearly stated
their true vision on this point:
Greek Cypriot preoccupation
"Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation
was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected
Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat
any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept, which
in their opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two
communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle
and for the principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing
and even, if need be, to fight, rather than compromise.
The same principle is still in conflict, even
today, though a federal solution has been acceptedand though
a federation is nothing more than a constitutional partnership
of the component states, provinces or cantons which make up the
(Mr Glafkos Clerides MY DEPOSITION, Vol 3, p
All through my talks with all the Greek Cypriot
leaders from 1968 to this day, I have found no evidence, no indication,
no sign that they have moved an inch from this original "national
objective". In presenting their case to the world they falsely
claim that "the problem started in 1974 with the arrival
of Turkey; that it is a question of occupation and the return
of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes". This is proof
enough of their attitude towards their fellow-men, the Turkish
Cypriots, who were almost wiped off the map of Cyprus during the
1963-74 period! The Greek Cypriot leader the so-called "President
of Cyprus" (!) Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, publicly stated that
"not one Turkish Cypriot was killed during 1963-74"!
The damning reply given to him by Loucas G Charalambous, a Greek
Cypriot journalist in the Greek Cypriot Sunday Mail of 12 September
2004 is worth recording here:
Does the President suffer memory loss?
By Loucas G Charalambous
The interviews given by President Papadopoulos
have developed into a unique form of self-flagellation, to such
a degree that we should be asking what is actually happening.
His responses in the interview to the publisher of the United
Arab Emirates-based English language newspaper Khaleej Times,
Mohammed Galadari, were bizarre and raised several questions.
Here is an excerpt:
Galadari: Turkish Cypriots said that after independence
and before the Turkish troops came, within 11 years, lots of massacres
occurred. When the Turkish troops came, they saved them from further
violence, and if they hadn't come, all of them might have been
Papadopoulos: They say that and claim that the
Turkish troops protected them.
Galadari: The Turkish Cypriots say that Mr Papadopoulos
is a hardliner.
Papadopoulos: From the beginning, they were planning
for a separation. But, in fact, the Turkish Cypriots were the
ones who committed massacres and in 1963 we asked to increase
the police patrols, but they refused. From 1963 to 1974, how many
Turkish Cypriots were killed? The answer is none.
We should resist the temptation to laugh at
this response by the President. The situation might be more serious
than what it seems and it would be wrong to laugh at it. I did
not have time to read my archives so as to give you a relatively
accurate number of Turkish Cypriots (or of Greek Cypriots) who
were killed between 1963 and 1974. I will just remind you that
during this period, there were bloody clashes in Masoura-Tylliria,
in Lefka-Ambelikou, in Trypimeni, in Arsos, in Mari and in Kophinou-Ayios
In Kophinou alone, UNFICYP had counted 22 corpses
of Turkish Cypriots by 10am on 15 November, as was reported by
Brigadier Michael Harbottle in his book, The Impartial Soldier.
If my memory serves me well, the total number of Turkish Cypriots
killed during this period, either in clashes with the National
Guard or in isolated incidents, exceeded 600.
I do not think there is anyone who would consider
it wrong to describe the President's claim that no Turkish Cypriots
were killed as a blatant lie. Which leads me to deduce one of
two things: either our President is a liar or he is suffering
from an illness that causes memory loss. Both theories can be
supported by a host of contradictory statements made by Papadopoulos
during his presidency. I will cite the most recent example. In
an interview published in Phileleftheros on 31 July, he served
another blatant lie, denying lie had ever said on 15 July 2003,
that acceptance of the Annan plan "constitutes acceptance
of the fait accompli of the invasion and occupation".
It certainly does not fall within the remit
of this column to investigate and find out what is wrong with
the President. It is our right and duty, however, to note the
problem and call and invite people who, because of their public
position, are burdened with the responsibility of dealing with
the situation, to show an interest. House President Christofias,
for instance, has no excuse for passively watching what is going
Because, whatever the problem is, Papadopoulos
is the President of the Republic and the problem has an effect
on all of us, irrespective of whether we belong to his circle
of supporters or, as in the case of this writer, to the camp of
his critics. In the event that the President is facing a serious
memory loss problem, there is no shame in the people being informed
At least we, his opponents, would be much less
critical of him if we knew that he said these things, not because
he underestimates our intelligence or likes to lie, but because
he has some problem. After all, we are all people and any one
of us could be affected by such a problem at some point.
It is true that the Annan Plan did not satisfy
all the demands and needs of the Turkish Cypriot people. A very
long list of why the plan should have been rejected exists in
the minds of each and every Turkish Cypriot, let alone among the
leadership. However, having paid a dear price for protecting their
vested rights and vital interests, the Turkish Cypriot people
are well aware of the fact that a durable solution also has its
price and requires a good deal of compromise.
But the results of the referendum have clearly
demonstrated, once again, that the island has two owners, two
politically independent and equal peoples each with the separate
right of self-determination, and that it is the Turkish Cypriot
side which sincerely wants a settlement of the Cyprus issue based
on the principles of partnership, bi-zonality and the political
equality of the two peoples. Both sides need to accept the right
of self-determination, and the fact that one has no right to represent
the other, let alone be the government of the other, as confirmed
by separate referenda.
Why There Is a Cyprus Problem
Such a strong "no" on the Greek Cypriot
side, proved, beyond any doubt, that neither the Greek Cypriot
people, nor their political leaders, nor the church, will ever
be ready to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish
Cypriots on the basis of sovereign equality of both peoples. They
prefer instead to continue to enjoy the benefits of the title
of the "Republic of Cyprus" which they usurped through
force of arms and terrorism in December 1963.
Over the years, the Greek Cypriots have based
their arguments on the false allegation that the Turkish Cypriots
revolted against the government in 1963. Consequently the Greek
Cypriots hastened to declare the Constitution "dead and buried",
thus abrogating all the Constitutional and human rights of the
Turkish Cypriots, merely offering their co-partners minority rights
in a Greek Cypriot Republic. They trampled on, and "amended"
those parts of the Constitution which suited their criminal interests
relying on the irrelevant principle of the "doctrine of necessity".
Constitutionally they had no warrant to amend the constitution
in the absence of Turkish Cypriot members in the parliament. After
the unsuccessful coup by Makarios against the partnership state,
the Vice-President, the Turkish Cypriot ministers, and the members
of parliament were prevented from attending their duties. Later,
the Turkish Cypriot members of parliament were told (in 1965)
that they could return only if they agreed to electoral legislation
that would have turned them into a minority.
The false allegation by the Greek Cypriot leaders
that "Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government organs"
can only fool those who have no idea of the bloody events which
unfolded upon Turkish Cypriots in Christmas 1963 and thereafter.
(Please see appendix 2, Foreign Press Extracts.) The following
passage from the report of the UN Secretary-General shows the
stance of the usurpers of power:
"Mr Clerides also stated that the constitutional
provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President
and the Vice-President were no longer applicable. He subsequently
stated that in his opinion the Turkish Cypriot members had no
legal standing any more in the House."
(Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/6569,
29 July 1965)
However, the "doctrine of necessity"
cannot in law be relied upon to justify "the laws" of
a "government" which had itself dismantled the Constitution,
violated international agreements, and wrecked the bi-communal
constitution, as a result of which an exclusively Greek Cypriot
administration came into being. In 1964, in order to stop the
violence, the UN Security Council was under pressure to introduce
a UN force. To do so it treated the Greek Cypriot Government as
if it was the constitutional government of Cyprus. This was a
tragic error. Other states followed the UN in recognizing this
illegitimate and illegal government. The human and political rights
of the Turkish Cypriots, recognized in the 1960 treaties, have
been ignored by the international community and must be restored
if justice is to be done. International treatment of the Greek
Cypriot administration as the legitimate Government of Cyprus
for 40 years in complete disregard of facts and the rule of law
is the only reason why a settlement has eluded Cyprus.
The Turkish Cypriot side defied the brute force
employed against them. Though confined in several enclaves, after
having lost 103 villages, the Turkish Cypriots organized themselves
around the Vice-President of Cyprus as an administrative body.
As stated by Mr Clerides in his memoirs (My Deposition, volume
3, pages 236-237) this Administration acquired the status of a
mini-state as time went by, while the Greek Cypriot side showed
no interest in, or intention of, re-establishing a new partnership.
Here is Mr Clerides again:
Greek Cypriot Aim
(a) Creation and development of the constitutional
The constitutional crisis of the year 1963 disrupted
the constitutional order, the continuity, and the partnership
status of the two communities, which was created by the Zurich
Because of the disruption of constitutional order
a peculiar situation was created, by virtue of which the state
authority, on the one hand, became under the absolute control
of the Greeks, and though the Government was recognised internationally,
yet internally Turkish enclaves were created within the territory
of the Republic in which at first, an elementary organisation
for the purpose of governing the Turkish Cypriots was established,
the main characteristic of which was the confusion of military
and political powers and functions, and the prevailing of military
After the crisis of 1967 (Kophinou Crisis) the
above disruption of constitutional order became more clear and
showed tendencies of permanency. Thus in December 1967, the elementary
military-political organisation of the Turks in the enclaves developed
into a "Temporary Administration" on the basis of a
charter, and at the same time the political and military authorities
In the years that followed a steady, stage by
stage development is noted in the Turkish Administration, with
the separation in its legislative, executive and judicial powers.
An administrative organisation is created, as well as police force
and an army. The increase of the financial resources of the Turkish
Cypriots through economic aid from Turkey permitted the functioning
of their administration on a more permanent basis, a fact which
they made clear, by renaming their "Temporary Turkish Cypriot
Administration" to "Turkish Cypriot Administration".
Thus there exist today in Cyprus two poles of power on a separate
geographical basis ie the Government of the Cyprus Republic, controlling
the largest section of the territory of the state and internationally
recognised, and the Turkish Cypriot Administration, which controls
a very limited area and is not internationally recognised, but
has already taken almost all the characteristics of a small state.
From the above the conclusion can be drawn that
our top priority and target must be the dissolution of the Turkish
enclaves for the sake of securing the unity of the island.
Here of course Mr Clerides forgets why and how
"the Cyprus Problem" was created by his side under the
leadership of Archbishop Makarios; how he himself took part in
the notorious Akritas Plan, and was well aware that there was
no "rebellion by the Turkish Cypriots against the government
of Cyprus" (as they advocated and propagated for years).
The Greek Cypriot side knew that an unsuccessful coup had been
waged against the partnership state by Makarios, but they offered
no redress, no apology, no confession of the crimes committed,
no compensation for the destruction of 103 villages and 107 mosquesthe
vision of a Hellenist union with Greece was enough to justify
these crimes against humanity!
At last a courageous Greek Cypriot journalist
has this to say on these events:
The Coup of 1974 (Against Makarios) is a
Consequence of the Akritas Plan
"The Democrats (Disi Party) avoid mentioning
that the first coup was planned and implemented according to the
notorious Akritas Plan. The Akritas Plan which was published on
21 April 1966 and the first coup, which was implemented in accordance
with this plan, was prepared by Makarios III. In the preparation
of this conspiratorial coup Makarios was assisted by his collaborators.
The objective of this conspiracy was to destroy the constitutional
order by the use of force. I must admit that had I been, at the
time, one of the proponents of the Akritas Plan, I would still
have criticized it: When coups are successful, they become a "Revolution";
it is when they are unsuccessful that they are branded as coups.
Had the coup planned in conformity with the Akritas Plan been
successful we would be exalting it today. The Akritas Plan was
not simply a failure, it also led the way to partition.
But whilst everybody is talking freely about
the coup of 1974, no one dares speak about the coup which was
a consequence of the Akritas Plan. Any one daring to do so runs
the risk of being muffled. However in self criticism of ourselves,
we have to accept that the Akritas Plan not only did open the
way to partition of the island but it also caused the collapse
of the (1960) Republic of Cyprus. Refraining from self criticism
will not enable us to save ourselves. Furthermore we shall not
be able to avoid de-facto partition. Let us not forget that even
the Financial Times is currently describing partition as "probably
the best solution".
Alekos Constantinides, Alithia (Greek Cypriot
Organ of the Democratic Rally Party (DISY)
The Easy and the Difficult Condemnations
The Pros and Cons
As I wrote yesterday it is quite easy for one
to condemn the crimes committed by others and in so doing one
does not usually run the risk of being victimized. Thus, for years
now we have all been condemning in the comfort of our house the
barbarities of others . . . and (in spite of the condemnations)
the crimes and barbarities continue.
From the moment we are not prepared to condemn
the crimes and barbarities committed by ourselves, or by those
with whom we have identified ourselves, in my opinion, a condemnation
has no practical significance. But one does not require special
courage to condemn the crimes of others. But to condemn one's
own crime one has to have a lot of courage.
The clamour after the massacre at Mai Lai during
the Vietnam War had practical result because it was emanating
from the Americans themselves, because they were condemning a
crime of their own making; and because of this Mai Lai forced
many Americans to abandon their apathy and to ask their government
to put an end to the war in Vietnam.
The condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
and the massacre in Kerala does not certainly require any courage
on our part. It would, however have special significance if "Haravgi"(1)
would condemn these crimes. But if an AKEL(2) member were to condemn
these Soviet crimes in his own name that would be a courageous
On this occasion the stand of Andrei Zacharoff
was indeed courageous, who by condemning the invasion of Afghanistan,
a crime of the making of his own country, knew full well that
he would have to face the consequences.
As it is well known due to the condemnation
of the invasion of Afghanistan Zacharoff was banished to Gorki.
When in 1964 and later on, after the eruption
of intercommunal disturbances, when massacres took place in Ayios
Vasilios and elsewhere, there was no word of condemnation heard
from amongst our community. No one of us, not excluding myself,
had the courage and did not feel the necessity to condemn those
crimes committed by ourselves. Up to the present time no one on
our side has condemned those massacres. And I surmise at times
if we had the courage then to condemn those crimes, probably the
development of events in Cyprus would have been difficult . .
. . . . and so on . . . .
Alekos Constantinides, "Simerini"
(Greek Cypriot Daily), 22 September 1982
(1) "HARAVGI": A left wing Greek
(2) AKEL: Political organization of left
wing Greek Cypriots
The April 2004 referenda have shown which side
is for a solution that encompasses reunification and peace and
which side is not. The Greek Cypriot people can no longer use
the doctrine of necessity against the Turkish Cypriots since it
was the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek Cypriot people
which blocked a comprehensive settlement on the island, thus preventing
a return to "normal conditions".
It is the view of the Turkish Cypriots that
the international world should no longer tolerate the use of the
title of the "Government of Cyprus" by the Greek Cypriot
side. It is this tolerance which encourages Greek Cypriot side
to continue on its illegal path rather then settle the problem.
Throughout the period of negotiations of the
Annan Plan and all its predecessors, and for a period of more
than 40 years, the Turkish Cypriots have been subjected to physical
and economic deprivation and debilitating uncertainty and it is
time to put an end to this.
The Turkish Cypriot "YES" and Greek
Cypriot "NO" votes in the referenda, as stated in the
plan, have resulted in the Foundation Agreement not entering into
force, and thus the Annan Plan has become "null and void"!
The Turkish Cypriot people, who had been offered
the paradise of EU membership, plus recognition of their state,
had their final word by saying "yes" to the Annan Plan.
Having been completed as a process, the Annan Plan is no longer
subject to further negotiation or any amendment. For this reason,
any initiative by the Greek Cypriot side, or any other third party,
to make amendments to the Annan Plan is not acceptable to Turkish
The question now is will the world close its
eyes to stark reality and allow the Greek Cypriots, who opted
for no solution, to continue pretending that they represent the
whole island? Will they honour the Turkish Cypriots' vested right
to speak and act for themselves through their separate political
will, which they used to further the unification of the island?
For the EU to contend that the Turkish Cypriots can neither speak
for themselves, nor represent North Cyprus would be a further
disregard of the democratic principles that one cannot be represented
by any body or institution in whose election one had no say. In
the case of Cyprus, the Republic that the Greek Cypriot side pretends
to represent had two co-founder partners, who elected their representatives
separately. That is an additional reason for denying treating
the Greek Cypriot Administration as the legitimate Government
of Cyprus with authority to speak for the Turkish Cypriots and
for the whole island!
In his clear statement of 24 April 2004, The
UN Secretary-General applauded the Turkish Cypriots' approval
of the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it
entailed for many of them. The Secretary-General regretted that
"the Turkish Cypriots will not equally enjoy the benefits
of EU membership as of 1 May 2004", but he hoped that "ways
will be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves
through no fault of their own."
Mr Annan's disappointment was also reflected
in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, dated
2 June 2004, where he stated "the rejection of such a plan
by the Greek electorate is a major setback. What was rejected
was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint."
He further stated that "if the Greek Cypriots
are ready to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots
in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs
to be demonstrated, not just by word, but by action."
In paragraph 89 of his Report Mr Annan emphasized
that "in the aftermath of the vote, the situation of the
Turkish Cypriots calls for the attention of the international
community as a whole, including the Security Council."
Following the referendum on 24 April 2004, the
Cyprus issue has taken a new turn and a new state of affairs has
The fact is that the Turkish Cypriots have certainly
done their part and it is simply not fair to penalize them any
longer, is also clearly reflected by the UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan on 28 April 2004 where he stated: "I salute the
Turkish Cypriots for their courageous vote in favour of the proposals.
We must all do our best to see that they are not penalized for
the way the vote went in the other part of the island."
The UN Secretary General similarly praised the
Government of Turkey, which enabled this new effort, for demonstrating
its readiness and determination to abide by its commitments under
the plan and fully implement a settlement. In Paragraph 78 of
his report he stated: "I appreciated the strong support of
the Turkish Government, from the top down, for my efforts."
Since the EU confirmed at the Helsinki European
council in 1999 that a settlement to the Cyprus issue was not
a pre-condition for accession, the Cyprus issue should not be
put as an obstacle in front of Turkey in her bid for EU accession;
members of the EU have a responsibility to make sure that Turkey's
EU membership is not held hostage by the Greek Cypriot side.
The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Mr Gunther
Verheugen, on 25 April 2004, stated that "what we will seriously
consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of
the Turkish Cypriots." Mr Verheugen further stressed that
"Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this result
. . . now we have to end the isolation of the North. The Commission
is ready to take various measures for that aim."
It is vital to note that similar statements
to that effect have also been made by the US Secretary of State,
Mr Colin Powell, and the Prime Minister of the UK, Mr Tony Blair.
Mr Tony Blair during his visit to Turkey on
18 May 2004 stated that "I think it is important, as I indicated
to the Prime Minister, that we end the isolation of Northern Cyprus
. . . We made it clear we must act now to end the isolation of
Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes in respect to
trade, in respect to air travel . . . There was a very clear commitment
given to people if they supported the Annan Plan. They have supported
it and we must see that commitments through."
The British Foreign Secretary Mr Jack Straw
stated during his meeting with the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister
Mr Mehmet Ali Talat on 1 July 2004 that he welcomed Talat's commitment
to the goal of reunification which was affirmed "so unequivocally"
by the Turkish Cypriots' embrace of the Annan Plan in the April
He also expressed the hope that further steps
would be taken by both communities on the island to promote reconciliation,
and pledged London's support for EU policies geared towards ending
the Turkish Cypriots' economic isolation.
Nothing has happened so far! The Greek Cypriots'
leaders, under the cloak of "the Government of Cyprus",
are doing their utmost to stall any aid or attempt to remove the
embargoes by the European Union.
The Turkish Cypriot people only ask for their
decades old unfair punishment to come to an end. The time has
come for the international community, in general, and the UK,
in particular, as one of the Guarantor Powers, to take measures
to redress the unjust situation arising from the fact that the
Greek Cypriot side which rejected the UN plan has become a member
of the EU under a false title, while the Turkish Cypriot side,
which approved the plan, not only has remained outside the EU
but continues to be subjected to illegal restrictions and embargoes.
It is high time that the inhuman embargoes imposed
upon the Turkish Cypriot people are lifted outright and the undeniable
fact is acknowledged that the so-called "Government of the
Republic of Cyprus" does not, represent and has no right
to, represent the Turkish Cypriot people.
The UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan's call
to the member states, in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices
in Cyprus, dated 2 June 2004, is timely and important to declare
that "the Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for
pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of
the Council can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate
both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary
restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the
Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development." What "the
rationale for pressuring and isolating Turkish Cypriots"
is, or ever was, no one has come forward to say.
The Greek Cypriot side, which astonishingly
managed to convince the world of its political will for a solution
and portrayed the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as intransigent
throughout the long process of negotiations, has in fact impeded
a solution. This is because being treated as "the Government
of Cyprus" for them is the solution! No one tries to understand
this odd phenomenon!
Nevertheless, the EU has accepted the Greek
Cypriot side as a full member of the Union as representing the
whole island and has, so far, failed to take any concrete steps
to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side.
The Turkish Cypriot people expect that the international
community, in general, and the EU, in particular, will respond
to the call of the UN Secretary General to lift the senseless
restrictions and to promote relations in all fields, in particular
in transport, trade, tourism, culture, information, investment
and sports' contacts.
It is an undisputable fact that after the referendum
the parameters have changed. Therefore, if the international community
truly desires to see a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, it
has to re-diagnose the root cause of the Cyprus issue and to adopt
a fresh approach that takes into account the realities in the
An inter-ethnic struggle has ended in separation.
This separation began in 1963 when Turkish Cypriots had to abandon
103 villages and take refuge in enclaves. In 1975, in the Third
Vienna Talks, these enclaves, by agreement of the two sides, were
consolidated in two areas, the North Zone and South Zone. It was
further agreed that the future should be settled in a new partnership
(bi-zonal, bi-communal federation). All the talks to that end
brought no result because the Greek Cypriot leaders would, and
will, not concede that they have no legal or moral right to claim
to constitute the Government of the whole island; and that Turkish
Cypriots are not and will never be their minority. Unless the
family of nations, and especially the EU takes this up with them,
why should any one expect a solution of a problem which, from
the Greek Cypriot point of view was solved the moment they were
treated as "the legitimate Government of Cyprus"? "Legitimacy"
bestowed upon the Greek Cypriot side does not arise from the law
of the land; it is a title hijacked by destroying all the legitimate
legal foundations on which the partnership Republic of Cyprus
Does the international community not have the
obligation to re-examine the facts. Will it do so?
As one of the Guarantor Powers, the UK should
not hesitate to be among those taking the lead in the international
efforts directed towards putting an end to the unjust circumstances
in which the Turkish Cypriot people have been living for 40 years
through no fault of their own.
The Cyprus problem has to be diagnosed by impartial
people. The settlement has to take into account the factual results
of this 40 years' old conflict. Property problems have to be settled
through exchange and compensation. The tragic events of the period
1963-74 have to be accounted for, and redress made to the Turkish
Cypriots whose self-rule now in its 41st year should be recognized
for what it is: the TRNC equal in every respect with the Greek
Cypriot administration in the south!
Good neighbourliness can only arise through
fair, just and equal treatment of both sides. Confidence can only
grow if both sides feel secure in their present status. The claim
of one to be the Government of the other has proved to be the
impediment to any solution for the last four decades!
Appendix 1Akritas Plan
Appendix 2Extracts from the Foreign Press
The Akritas Organisation
On 19 February 1959, the Zurich and London Agreements
were signed and the road to the Republic of Cyprus was opened.
On 16 August 1960 this new Republic was established. The Greek
Cypriot Leader Makarios was elected President and the Turkish
Cypriot Leader Dr Fazil Küçük was elected Vice-President.
According to the Constitution seven Greeks and
three Turks would be Ministers. As one of the Greek Ministers
Makarios chose Polykarpos Yeorgadjis and he became Minister of
Interior. He was the EOKA Area chief for Nicosia. Makarios also
directed Yeorgadjis to form a secret para-military organisation.
The code name "Akritas" was chosen and Yeorgadjis became
"Chief Akritas". For this Organisation he picked ex-EOKA
men loyal to Makarios and Enosis. All party leaders were authorized
to form their own militia and they all did. Thus Makarios through
his Minister of Interior had became the Commander-in-Chief of
a secret army with the aim of destroying "the shackles"
on Enosis which the 1960 Agreement had outlawed.
Chief Akritas (Yeorgadjis) set to work in earnest.
The President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides,
the Minister of Labour Tassos Papadopoulos and Yeorgadjis were
the masterminds of this Organisation. Most top ranking Greek Cypriot
officials of the Government were its members and supporters. According
to Mr Glafkos Clerides, the Organisation started with 500 members
all well armed ex-EOKA fighters. Towards the end of 1963 this
number rose to 1,800. The arms for this Organisation came from
the arms depot of the Cyprus Army and the Police and Gendarmerie
Forces, the Greek Cypriot members of which were now working with
the Organisation under the same leader, the Minister of Interior
Mr Yeorgadjis. With the addition of Greek Contingent and its armoury
and the arrival of 20,000 troops from Greece, Turkish Cypriots
faced a formidable force. Arms came from Greece and Egypt and
some was bought from Czechoslovakia and other neighbouring countries.
Most of the arms were under the direct control of Makarios. The
training of the members was undertaken by the Greek Mainland Regiment
in Cyprus. The leadership was trained in Greece as from the signing
of the London Agreement in 1959. EOKA had cast off its uniform
and was ostensibly converted into a non-combatant organisation
called EDMA whose first task was to give scholarships in Greece,
to young EDMA members in military training and education. The
Akritas organisation started planning a different future for Cyprus.
Apart from military plans a general plan for the extermination
of Turkish Cypriots was prepared. This top secret plan, with the
name of `Akritas Plan', was first published in the Greek Cypriot
newspaper Patris on 21 April 1967, three years after it had been
fully and mercilessly implemented and at a time when all Greek
Cypriot leaders believed that what they had achieved in Cyprus
was irreversible. Indeed Makarios was jubilant in announcing that
Cyprus was now Greece . . . The House of Representatives now composed
of 100% Greek Cypriots, had already passed a resolution on Enosis.
Nothing else could be the "national aim".
Although both Yeorgadjis and Makarios are dead,
this same plan, with certain improvisations, is still being implemented
by the Greek Cypriot Leadership.
The Akritas Plan
The recent public statements of the Archbishop
have prescribed the course which our national issue will follow
in the immediate future. As we have stressed in the past, national
struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is
it always possible to fix definite time limits for the achievement
of the various stages of their development. Our national cause
must always be judged in the light of the conditions and developments
of the moment; the measures which will be taken, the tactics and
the time of implementing each measure is determined by the conditions
existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The
entire effort is trying and must pass through various stages,
because the factors which influence the final result are many
and varied. It must be understood by everyone that each measure
taken is the result of continuous studies and, in the meantime,
forms the basis for future measures. It must be recognized that
the measures which are prescribed now constitute only the first
step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national
objective, to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of
self-determination of the people.
Since the purpose remains unalterable, what
remains to be examined is the subject of tactics. This must necessarily
be separated as internal and external (international), since in
each case both the handling and the presentation of our cause
will be different.
A. EXTERNAL TACTICS (INTERNATIONAL)
During the recent stages of our national struggle
the Cyprus problem has been presented to world public opinion
and diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right
of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. In the exercise
of this right, the subject of the Turkish minority was introduced
under the well-known conditions and with the argument of violent
intercommunal clashes, it had been tried to make it accepted that
co-existence of the two communities under a united administration
was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem
was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which
was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between
the contending parties.
(a) Consequently, our first target has been
to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem
has not really been solved and the solution requires revision.
(b) First objective was our endeavour to
be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression
(i) the solution given is neither satisfactory
(ii) the agreement reached was not the result
of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting
(iii) the revision of the agreements constitutes
a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the
Greeks to repudiate their signature;
(iv) the co-existence of the two communities
is possible; and
(v) the strong element on which foreign states
ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turks.
(c) All the above which required very difficult
effort, have been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the
diplomatic representatives are already convinced that the solution
given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under
pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed
under various threats. The fact that the solution has not been
ratified by the people, is a significant argument in this connection,
because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people
to give its official approval to the agreement by a plebiscite
or otherwise, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have
definitely approved. Generally, it has been established that the
administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the
Greeks and that the Turks were confined to a negative role and
acted as a brake.
(d) Second objective. The first stage having
been completed, we must programme the second stage of our activities
and objectives on the international field. In general terms, these
objectives can be outlined as follows:
(i) The efforts of the Greeks are to remove
unreasonable and unfair provisions of the administration and not
to oppress the Turks.
(ii) The removal of these factors of the
administration must take place today because tomorrow will be
(iii) The removal of these provisions of
the administration, although it is reasonable and necessary, is
not possible because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks
and therefore, since it is not possible by agreement with the
Turks, unilateral action is justified.
(iv) The issue of revision is an internal
affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of intervention,
by force or otherwise, to anyone.
(v) The proposed amendments are reasonable,
just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.
(e) It has been generally proven that today
the international climate is against every type of oppression
and especially the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already
succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus
with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it
is judged that we have greater possibilities of succeeding in
our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour
if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a
demand for exercising the right of self-determination, rather
than as a demand for Enosis. However, in order to secure the right
to exercise complete and free self-determination, first of all,
we must get rid of all those provisions of the Constitution and
of the Agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance etc)
which obstruct the free and unfettered expression and implementation
of the wishes of our people and which may open the way to dangers
of external intervention. It is exactly for this reason that the
first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which
was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the
When this is achieved no power, legal or moral,
can stop us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising
the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.
From the above, the conclusion can be drawn
that for the success of our plan a chain of actions and developments
is needed, each of which is a necessity and a must, otherwise,
future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically
unattainable, while at the same time we will expose the people
and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken
can be classified under the following headings:
(a) Amendment of the negative elements of
the Agreements and parallel abandonment in practice of the Treaties
of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the
need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is
generally accepted internationally and is considered justified
(we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time
external intervention to prevent us amending them is held unjustified
(b) After the above actions, the Treaty of
Guarantee (the right of intervention) becomes legally and substantially
(c) Once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions
(of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance) regarding the exercise
of the right of self-determination, the people will be free to
give expression to and implement their desire.
(d) Legal confrontation by the forces of
State (police and even friendly military forces) of every internal
or external intervention because then we shall be completely independent.
Therefore the actions from (a) to (d) are absolutely
necessary and must be carried out in the above order and in time.
It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have
any possibility of success internationally in our above actions,
we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of
the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance,
if it is accepted that the above four stages are the necessary
course, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments (stage (a))
if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the
amendment of the negative aspects by arguing that this is necessary
for the functioning of the State and the Agreements.
The above relate to targets, aims and tactics
in the international field. And now on the internal front:
B. INTERNAL FRONT
The internal actions are judged by the interpretations
that will be given to them internationally and by the effects
that our actions will have on our national cause.
1. The only danger which could be described
as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention.
Not so much because of material damage, nor because of the danger
itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to
deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the
possible political consequences. If intervention is threatened
or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would
be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of
weight both internationally and in the United Nations. From the
history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a
single case of intervention, even when legally unjustified, has
either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting
the attacker without serious concessions detrimental to the victim.
Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was
condemned by almost all nations and on which Soviet intervention
was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received (kept) the port
of Eilat on the Red Sea as a concession. Naturally, much more
serious dangers exist for Cyprus.
But if we consider and justify our actions under
(a) above well, on the one hand the intervention will not be justified
and, on the other, we will have every support from the beginning,
since by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place
before consultations between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain,
Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage of consultations (before
intervention) that we need international support. We shall have
it if the amendments proposed by us appear reasonable and justifiable.
Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention
by the choice of the amendments we would propose in the first
Tactics: Reasonable Constitutional amendments
after efforts for common understanding with the Turks are exhausted.
Since common agreement is impossible we shall try to justify unilateral
action. At this stage the provisions in (ii) and (iii) of page
21 are applicable in parallel.
2. It is obvious that for intervention to
be justified, more serious reasons and a more immediate danger
must exist than mere constitutional amendments.
Such reasons could be (a) an immediate declaration
of Enosis before stages (a)-(c), (b) serious inter-communal violence
which would be presented as massacre of the Turks.
Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the
first part and, consequently, only the danger of inter-communal
violence remains to be considered. Since we do not intend, without
provocation, to massacre or attack Turks, the possibility remains
that the Turks, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment
of any article of the constitution, will react instinctively,
creating incidents and clashes or stage spurious killings, atrocities
or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that
the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention
would be imperative, for their protection.
Tactics: Our actions for constitutional amendments
will be open and we will always appear ready for peaceful talks.
Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature. Any
incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in
a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to the
plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.
3. Before the right of unilateral amendments
of the constitution is established and is accepted, decisions
and actions which require positive violent acts from us, such
as the unification of municipalities, must be avoided. Such a
decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring
about the unification and seizure of municipal properties, which
will probably compel the Turks to react forcefully. Therefore
it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance,
the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio, when it is the Turks who
will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure
will not amount to action, but a refusal to act. The same applies
to the issue of the separate majorities with regards to taxation
legislation. These measures have already been studied and a series
of similar measures have been decided for implementation. Once
our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established
de facto by some such actions, then we shall be able to advance
using our judgment and our strength more forcefully.
4. It is, however, naive to believe that
it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of
the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has
been described above, without the Turks attempting to create or
to stage violent clashes. Exactly for this reason, the existence
and strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:
(a) In the event of spontaneous Turkish reactions,
if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk of having
panic created among Greeks, particularly in the towns, and thus
we run the danger of losing substantial vital areas irreparably,
while on the other hand an immediate and timely show of our strength
may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions
to insignificant, isolated acts, and
(b) In the event of a planned or spurious
attack of the Turks, staged or not, it is imperative to overcome
it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed
in gaining command of the situation in one or two days, no outside
intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.
(c) In all the above cases, the forceful
and decisive confrontation of any Turkish effort will greatly
facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments.
It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made,
without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their
reaction will be impossible or seriously harmful for their community,
(d) In the event of the clashes becoming
widespread and general we must be ready to proceed immediately
with the actions described in (a) to (d), including the immediate
declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to
wait nor room for diplomatic action.
5. At all these stages we should not overlook
the factor of propaganda, and to counter the propaganda of those
who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well
as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle
must pass through at least four stages and that we must not reveal
our plans and intentions publicly and prematurely. Complete discretion
and secrecy is more than a national duty. It is a Vital Necessity
for Survival and Success.
This will not deter the reactionaries and the
irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation
of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with fertile
ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the
efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional
amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes
more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing
circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made
in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible
demagogy, street politics or bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism.
Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because
the above task must make substantial progress and yield results
long before the next elections, in the relatively short time in
between we must show self-restraint and remain cool, for obvious
reasons. At the same time, however, we must not only maintain
the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but
increase it. We can only achieve this by the necessary briefing
of our members and through them of our people.
Before everything else we have to expose the
true identities of the reactionaries. They are petty and irresponsible
demagogues and opportunists, as their recent past has shown. They
are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose
our leadership, but at the same time without offering a substantive
and practical solution of their own. In order to promote all our
actions we need a steady and strong government until the last
moment. These are known as verbalists and sloganists, with pretty
words and slogans, but they are unable and unwilling to proceed
to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at
the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse
to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves.
They must, therefore, be alienated and isolated.
In parallel and at the same time, we shall brief
our members about the above plan and intentions, but ONLY VERBALLY.
Our Sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse
and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of
our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others.
NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT
ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO HIGH TREASON. No act can damage our struggle
as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document
or its publication by our opponents.
With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing
and guidance, all our other actions, specially publications in
the press, resolutions etc, must be very restrained and no mention
of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and
gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal
responsibility of the Chief of Sub-headquarters, references in
general terms to the above plan. And this only after the explicit
approval of the Chief of Sub-headquarters who will also control
the text. Even in this case, ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES TO THESE
TEXTS IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION PERMITTED.
Tactics: All the briefing of our people and
of the public BY WORD OF MOUTH. We should make every effort to
appear as moderates in public. Projection of or reference to our
plans in the press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials
and other responsible persons will continue to brief the people
and to raise their morale and fighting spirit, but such briefing
excludes making our plans public knowledge by the press or otherwise.
This document will be destroyed by fire on the
personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, in the presence
of all the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies
in full or in part are prohibited. Members of the staff of the
Regional HQ may have the plan on the personal responsibility of
the Chief of Regional HQ, but may not take it out of the Regional
FOREIGN PRESS ON CYPRUS EXTRACTS
"We went to-night into the sealed-off Turkish
quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered
in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there
and we have seen si'ghts too frightful to be described in print
as horrors so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears
and reduced to an hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more
terrible than tears.
This much we can tell:
In the Kumsal quarter, at No 2 Irfan Bey Sokag,
we made our way into a house whose floors were covered with broken
glass. A child's bicycle lay in a corner.
In the bathroom, looking like a group of waxworks,
ware three dead children piled on top of their murdered mother.
In a room next to it, we glimpsed the body of a woman shot in
This, we were told, was the home of a Turkish
Army Major whose family had been killed by the mob in the first
violence. Today was five days later and still they lay there .
(Extract from a report by Rene MacColl and Daniel
McGeachie, Daily Express, 28 December, 1963).
"What does Archbishop Makarios, President
of the Republic of Cyprus want? He has said it himself: he wants
to repeal the treaty of 1960 according to the terms of which Great
Britain, Greece and Turkey guarantee the independence of Cyprus.
The fact that a few hours later faced with the violent reaction
of Mr Duncan Sandys, he mollified the expression of his thoughts
by granting that a unilateral repeal was not in his mind, does
not in any way change the essence of the problem. All is happening
as if President Makarios had decided, in the words of the editorial
of the London Times, to set fire to the powder barrel on which
Cypriots are seated. . ."
(Extract from a report by Robert de Geynst,
Le Soir (of Brussels) 2 January, 1964)
12 SHOT TURKS
"Silent crowds gathered to-night outside
the Red Crescent hospital in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, as
the bodies of nine Turks found crudely buried outside the village
of Ayios Vassilios, 13 miles away, were brought to the hospital
under an escort of the Parachute Regiment. Three more bodies,
including one of a woman, were discovered nearby but they could
not be moved.
Turks guarded by paratroops are still trying
to locate the bodies of 20 more believed to have been buried on
the same site. All are believed to have been killed during fighting
around the village at Christinas.
It is thought that a family of seven Turks who
disappeared from the village may be buried there. Their house
was found burnt, and grenades had been dropped through the roof.
Shallow graves had apparently been hurriedly scooped by a bulldozer.
The bodies appeared to have been piled in two or three deep. All
had been shot.
One man had his arms still tied behind his legs
in a crouching position and had been shot through the head. A
stomach injury indicated that a grenade may have been thrown into
his lap. . ."
(Extract from a report in Daily Telegraph
14 January 1964.)
"Discussions start in London; in Cyprus,
the terror continues. Right now we are witnessing the exodus of
the Turks from their villages. Thousands of people abandoning
homes, lands, herds; Greek terrorism is relentless. This time,
the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice
to cover up barbaric and ferocious behaviours. At four o'clock
in the afternoon, curfew is imposed on the Turkish villages. Threats,
shootings and attempts of arson start as soon as it becomes dark.
After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither women, nor
children, it is difficult to put up any resistance. British vehicles
are shuttling back and forth between the villages and Turkish
Cypriot "ghettos". In Nicosia, an office for the more
than 5,000 refugees is operating. On the walls of its rooms hang
images depicting Turkish renaissance: a woman draped in a flag,
Kemal Ataturk at the head of his victorious troops; and
the families of peasants are arriving who require lodgings and
(Extract from a report by Giorgio Bocca, Il
Giorno, 14 January 1964.)
"There are two kinds of assassin. The first,
kills alone. His hands are red, therefore he is easily recognized.
"Beast" they call him and he is led, somewhat rudely,
to the guillotine or to forced labour. The second, remains aloof
and watches people assassinate each other. He touches nothing,
his hands are clean. Let one indignant witness speak of halting
the carnage and white hands will look at him and say, severely,
"Look after your own affairs". And he will put out his
foot to trip him up. Only this second kind of assassination is
worthy of consideration as a fine art.
Monsignor Makarios is a great artist. Each time
that I see him on TV or in a newspaper, I admire his fine hands
made for benediction and for prayer, his handsome looks sheltered
by tabernacle-like eyelids barely allow the penetration of suave
insensibility. Monsignor Makarios belongs more to the "Heavens"
than to the earth, that is clearly visible. That is why he permits
the Greeks to carry on the butchery in Cyprus. NATO wants to stop
the bloodshed? "Halt. I am against it. In the holy name of
our independence". The United Nations, then. "I agree,
but be patient. We have time". Is not one master in his own
home? And it is after all, a few corpses gained.
Mark you, Monsignor Makarios is Greek and Christian.
The Greeks are fighting the Turks, 10 against one. In simple arithmetic,
this must add up to nine corpses of infidelsmen, women,
children, it matters littlefor one chosen of the good cause.
Hence, the holy gaiety, at times irrepressible, of Monsignor.
Last Saturday he was seen receiving journalists and laughing his
head off during a whole minute. That day the corpses of the massacred
Turks were piled up at the other edge of the Island.
Journalists know well the customs. They saluted
Monsignor Makarios according to orthodoxy as "Your Beatitude".
His Beatitude, sanctimoniously, was beaming. Here is a man who
attains Paradise in all sweetness. He will arrive with his hands
pure. And yet all the perfumes of Cyprus. . . yes, yes, all the
perfumes of Cyprus shall never clean those hands".
(Extract (translation) from Le Canard Enchaine,
Paris, 19 February 1964.)
"Day by day and as murder follows murder
detached observers here find it harder and harder to credit the
Government of Cyprus with any real determination to stamp out
violence. If the President really wants peace on earth and to
restore the rule of law he could start by investigating publicly
the circumstances surrounding last Thursday's attack on the Turkish
inhabitants of Limassol. The known facts are that on the Wednesday
the British peace keeping forces were assured by the Greek authorities
that no attack would be made on the Turkish community. Accordingly
the British Army did not patrol the town. At 5.30 the following
morning Greek Cypriot security forces launched what our special
correspondent describes as "a heavy well organized attack
against the Turkish quarter of Limassol." It was carried
out by hundreds of steel helmeted men armed with automatic weapons
and supported by one tank and two armoured bulldozers. If the
Greek Cypriot authorities connived at this formidable attack their
behaviour is inexcusable. If they were ignorant of its coming
they must forfeit their claim to govern and control their own
people, let alone the whole Cypriot community."
(Extract from the Guardian London, 20
". . .The Greek Cypriots must recognise
that self-determination is not an absolute right when it imperils
peace and that the prohibition of Enosis has the same standing
in international law as the prohibition of an Austrian anschluss
(Extract from The New York Times, 20
"There is little doubt in the Administration's
own sympathy as well as that of Congress is with Turkey and that
Mr George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, came away from his recent
visit to Cyprus and Turkey convinced that President Makarios is
deliberately provoking trouble in Cyprus and that the present
crisis is not of Turkish making.
". . .cries of "We want Enosis"
were shouted at a demonstration here this morning. The demonstration
had been carefully organised by the directors of the schools who
come under the jurisdiction of the Greek Communal Chamber.
". . .The Director of the Girls' Gymnasium,
Athanasio Chiotelis, a well-known advocate of Enosis, took microphone
and shouted "Long Live Cyprus, Makarios, Dighenis (Grivas)
and Enosis". Makarios is expected to see Grivas in Athens
soon. It would not be surprising if he acceded to the growing
public demand for the return of the ex-Eoka Leader.
". . .It is now being freely admitted in
Whitehall that the costly and risky British policing action has
had two untoward results. It has given the Greek Cypriots time
to build up their armed strength in order to achieve a solution
of the Cyprus problem in their own interests, and it has heightened
the danger posed to the Turkish minority."
(Extract from the Guardian, London 12
. . .I have seen in a bathtub the bodies of
a mother and of her three young ehilden murdered just because
their father was a Turkish officer. . .
Archbishop Makarios is too much of an ecclesiastic
to express himself so brutally, but it is a fact that he never
undertook to condemn openly the horrible excesses committed by
his partisans, leaving a delirious press the task of pursuing
a campaign against the Turks. . ..
. . .The Turks at least are logical with themselves.
They say, "Life under these conditions is impossible. We
are 120,000 menaced, in the full sense of the word, by extermination.
There is but one solution: the partition of the island in two,
we in the north, the Greeks in the south." The Greeks are
less frank. They deny the evidence. . ..
. . .According to him (Archbishop Makarios)
some changes in the Constitution would be enough. The trouble
is that these "amendments" all tend to deprive the Turks
of their rights and guarantees which had been accorded to them
in 1960. The Turks replied: "This amounts to saying to a
drowning man "Take off your life-saver and everything will
be allright!. . ."
(Extract from a report by Max Clos, Le Figaro
(Paris), 25 to 26 January 1964.)
"If the Turkish Army has not already landed
reinforcements to its Treaty Force in Cyprus, that is simple proof
of the patience of Turkey. Its right to do so cannot be denied.
If international treaties mean anything, Turkey can protect the
Turkish Cypriot minority from further massacre. It is racial discrimination
in its most bestial form. Although there have been efforts to
cloud the issue by suggesting that both Cypriot communities are
to blame, by far the heaviest guilt is that of the Greek Cypriot
force known as Eoka or Edma."
(Extract from Daily Telegraph and Morning
Post (London), 15 February 1964.)
"Archbishop Makarios, robed and bearded
cleric who serves as President of Cyprus, has a Byzantine talent
for equivocation. . .
. . .his government deliberately provoked the
clashes and is bent upon the extermination of Turkish population.
"Some sort of federal system of two separate
communities seems inevitable as the minimum to reassure Turkish
Cypriote who demand outright partition. . ."
(Extract from a report by Robert H Estabrook,
in the Washington Post, 16 February 1964.)
". . .Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent
on a policy of genocide. . ."
(Extract from a report in the Washington
Post, 17 February 1964.)
The address of Archbishop Makarios
The 15 July is an invasion. It is a clear attack
from the outside and a flagrant violation of the independence
and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The invasion is continuing
as long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus.
President of Cyprus Republic to the UN Security
Council on 19 July 1974.
Father Papatsestos (priest of the Greek Orthodox
Cemetery in Nicosia)
It is a rather hard thing to say, it is true
that the Turkish intervention saved us from a merciless internecine
Athens daily Ta Nea on 28 February 1976.
Bulent Ecevit (then Prime Minister of Turkey,
20 July 1974)
In fact it was much more than a coup. It was
the forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of the
Cyprus Republic and of the international agreements on which this
Republic was based.
Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence
and constitutional order of Cyprus.
Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility
by taking this action. The Turkish Government did not resort to
armed action before all the other means were tried, but to no
This is not an invasion, but an act against
This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression.
The operations of peace that started with the
breaking of the day, this morning, will bring an end to the darkest
period in the history of Cyprus.
The UN SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution 353 of 20
Paragraph 5: Calls upon Greece Turkey and the
UK to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration
of peace in the area and constitutional Government in Cyprus.
The headline of The Economist Editorial
20 July 1974
"CYPRUS: A STATE BUT NOT A NATION"
Die Zeit30 August 1974
The massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta
is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their
Cyprus, A Troubed ISland, p 83
Nicos Sampson the man chosen by the Athens junta
as president, had spoken briefly on the radio, pledging to lead
Cyprus to "National Union and Hellenism"
Cyprus, A Troubed Island, p 84
In the four days that followed the coup, an estimated
2,000 people, known to be ardent supporters of Makarios were killed.
Their names were later added to those killed during the subsequent
Cyprus, A Troubed ISland, p 85
The Greek side could have emerged from the Geneva
talks (July-August 1974) as a partner in a Cypriot federation
but at a price of autonomous Turkish cantons and an agreement
to tolerate a large Turkish military presence on the island.
Archbishop Makarios, in an interview with the
Frankfurter Rundschau reported in the Cyprus Mail. (16
Enosis had always been for the Greek Cypriots
a deeprooted national aspiration. To me independence is a compromise.
In other words, if I had a free choice between Enosis and independence,
I would support Enosis.
Archbishop Makarios, in a letter to the President
of Greece, Gen Phaedon Ghizikis. (2 July 1974)
The Cyprus state could be dissolved only in the
event of Enosis.
Nicos Sampson, reported in the Cyprus Mail.
(17 July 1974)
I was about to proclaim Enosis when I quit
Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given to
the Norwegian newspaper Degbladet. (12 March 1977)
It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been
. . . They say that they intend to maintain Cyprus
as independent and non-aligned and to continue the intercommunal
talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. But at the same time
they talk about the "salvation of the Hellenism of Cyprus",
they refer to the island as a "Hellenic republic", and
they set first among their targets the "restoration of the
spiritual unity of Greek Cyprus".
. . . The Turkish Government, and the Turkish
community in Cyprus, can hardly be expected to ignore this development.
. . . As soon as any threat to the Turkish community
develops, or as soon as any definite step towards Enosis is taken
the Turks are bound to react.
. . . If concerted action proves impossible,
any one of the guarantors has the right to intervene unilaterally.
The Times, 16 July 1974
Ecevit said: "Let no one try to profit from
the chaotic situation in Cyprus to infringe upon the rights of
the Turks. We will never accept a fait accompli. We will let no
one trample the rights of the Turks."
The Times, 16 July 1974
. . . There should be no doubt that this is an
international problem and not an internal one. Under the Treaty
of Guarantee of 1960 the three guarantor powersBritain,
Greece and Turkeyrecognised and guaranteed the "independence,
territorial integrity and security of Cyprus and also the state
of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution".
. . . Each of them reserved the right if "common
or concerted action" should not prove possible to "take
action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs
created by the present treaty".
. . . The Greek government should be told that
unless it withdraws the officers immediately it can not escape
the charge of intervening in Cypriot affairs, and can not expect
that other powers should refrain from exercising their rights
under the treaty.
The Times, 17 July 1974
. . . The Turks regard Monday's coup as a de
facto enosis, as a breach by Greece of the Treaty of Guarantee,
and hence as a threat both on the Turkish community in Cyprus
and to Turkey's own strategic position. If "concerted action""
with Britain proves impossible, the Treaty gives Turkey the right
The Times, 19 July 1974
A PERILOUS BUT
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus is a justified
exercise of national power to defend an interest and fulfil a
. . . The British made it clear that they would
not engage in joint military action, or even verbally support
it. Neither expressions of distaste for Sampson, nor diplomatic
manoeuvring, were for Ankara a big enough commitment on the part
of her two major NATO allies. As days went by, the lesson of history
evidently impressed itself on the Turks: that the illegal Sampson
regime would soon become, de facto legal.
The Sunday Times, 21 July 1974
. . . After landing at RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire,
Mr Derek Reed, aged 31, said he had seen bodies being buried in
a mass grave near Paphos after last Monday's coup.
"People who were told by Makarios to lay
down their guns were shot out of hand by the National Guard",
he said "they were buried in mass graves".
The Times, 22 July 1974
"Cyprus, Christmas day of 1963"
Prof Alexis Heraklides
Ta Nea (Athens), 10 January 2002
Translation of an article by Prof. Alexis Heraklides
(International Relations Faculty of Political Science), which
appeared in the 10 January 2002 issue of the left-leaning and
pro-government Greek newspaper Ta Nea:
During the second round of talks between Denktash
and Clerides, the issue of missing persons was raised. According
to the widespread view in Greece regarding the matter, only missing
persons in Cyprus are Greek Cypriots and Turkey together with
Greek Cypriots are the responsible parties.
But the situation is entirely different. Though
lesser in number, there are Turkish Cypriot missing persons as
well in Cyprus. They are the victims of EOKA-B and the troops
of the Junta in Greece, both of whom have escaped punishment.
Furthermore, some of the Greek Cypriot missing persons have been
killed by their very compatriots. The other responsible party
for the Greek Cypriot missing persons is the invading Turkish
army and not the Turkish Cypriots or Denktash.
If an attempt is made to write a different version
of history based on certain selected memories, inevitably leads
to a picture which is detached from the realities of the past.
This is being done deliberately to "clear" our side
in the face of certain serious allegations. Let us have a brief
look at the Cyprus issue starting from 30 years ago:
December 1963. Three years old bi-communal Republic
of Cyprus no longer exists. The obvious reason for this was a
step taken by Makarios, which is considered as a big mistake.
The basic motive behind Makarios' proposal on 30 November 1963,
consisting of 13 constitutional amendments, was to relegate the
status of the numerically less Turkish Cypriots to minority status
and to surrender their destiny to the mercy of the Greek Cypriots.
Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader of the era,
was so shocked that he made this remark: "Would Enosis be
better under these circumstances!"
The developments, which took place later on,
are tragic and known. There was a bloodbath in incidents that
took place during the months of December 1963 and January 1964.
This led to the division of the Island and the deployment a UN
Peace Force. The Green Line, a creation of that time, is still
present on the Island. There are two different main opinions in
serious history books regarding the bloody incidents of December
1963 and January 1964:
(a) The responsibility for the incidents
rests with both parties;
(b) Greek Cypriots essentially should be
held responsible because they initiated the incidents.
The first opinion is formulated by Greek and
pro-Greek intellectuals. The second one, which is more realistic,
was also adopted by the UN Secretary-General of the time.
If you ask why I have written the above at the
beginning of the new year, the reason is twofold: Firstly, about
three weeks ago I was very disappointed to watch, on a Greek Cypriot
TV channel, a program depicting Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as
solely responsible for the incidents of December 1963. The second
reason is my belief that, if the opinion broadcast by the Greek
Cypriot TV channel is shared by Greek Cypriots in general, then
the Cyprus issue can only be resolved through partition, and not
through EU membership.
I have just finished reading a very interesting
book called The Genocide Files, written by Harry Scott
Gibbons. This book covers the events in Cyprus from December 1963
to the intervention of Turkey in 1974, and if true, paints a very
different picture of events than the one portrayed by the Greek
Cypriot side. If this book is to be believed, and I cannot see
why the author would portray things incorrectly, then there was
most certainly a very grave injustice, amounting to attempted
genocide of the Turkish Cypriot community. My question is, given
that these events would represent a crime against humanity, why
does the TRNC not make more publicity of these events, and bring
their version of the situation to international attention. Surely,
if these facts were made more public, then the international community
would look more closely at the situation instead of simply taking
the Greek Cypriot view of the events leading to Turkey's intervention.
Also, as far as I am led to believe, there is no statute of limitations
on crimes against humanity, so why have the TRNC not tried to
bring the people involved in the attempted genocide to justice?
I await your comments with interest.
E-Mail dated 15 September 2004