Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, President's Office

Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from M Ergu­n Olgun, Under-Secretary

  Further to your e-mail of 7 October 2004 and the forthcoming FAC visit to Cyprus I am enclosing two papers which you may present to Members of the FAC before they visit the island between 9-11 November 2004.

  One of the papers is prepared by the TRNC President Rauf R Denktash and is a short analysis of the Cyprus question and why it has not been solved for the last 40 years. As you will see from the analysis the reason is that for Greek Cypriots the problem was solved when they were treated as the legitimate government following the hi-jacking of the title of the partnership Republic of Cyprus in 1963 in contravention of the rule of law of 1960, of which Great Britain is one of the Guarantors. Ever since, the Greek Cypriot side has been using this title at the expense of the equal Turkish Cypriot partner and will continue to do so unless they are told that they are only the government of Greek Cypriots; that the 1960 partnership Republic is now defunct; and that they cannot in law or in fact represent Turkish Cypriots.

  The second paper is prepared by me and outlines the root causes of the Cyprus question, the validity of Greek Cypriot objections to the Annan Plan, and the way forward for settlement.

  I thank you for your assistance and remain at your disposal if you require any further information.

M Ergu­n Olgun


12 October 2004



  Rauf R Denktash

  The Cyprus issue has been on the agenda of the UN Security Council for 41 years. Since 1968 the two sides have been negotiating, on and off, in order to reach an agreed settlement but no settlement has been achieved. Turkish Cypriot call for the diagnosis of the problem has fallen on deaf ears and the Greek Cypriot side has been allowed to get away with all that it has done in Cyprus under the hi-jacked title of "the Government of Cyprus".

  Consequently for over four decades the Turkish Cypriots awaited a just and viable solution which would put an end to their unjust isolation and inhuman embargoes on their economic, social, cultural and political life and looked forward to the day their ex-partners would finally realize that the island of Cyprus was the common home of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike who should share and have an equal say over its destiny.

  Well aware of the fact that a peaceful future for the younger generations could not be held prisoner to the tragic experiences of the past, the Turkish Cypriots have never lost their will or determination for a sound solution which would ensure that history would not repeat itself. It was in this spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side has always participated in UN sponsored negotiations aimed at the establishment of a new partnership based on the sovereign equality of the two ex-partners. What was foreseen, and ostensibly agreed, by both parties with the full support of the UN Secretary General and the Security Council was a bi-zonal, bi-communal settlement, the ground for which was well prepared with the voluntary exchange of population in 1975, but this was never achieved because of the preference by the Greek Cypriot side to keep and maintain the hi-jacked title of the government of Cyprus!

  The EU situation was made much worse for the TRNC by the attitude and acts of the EU. It ignored the legal rights of Turkish Cypriots in the Partnership Republic of 1960 and shut its eyes to the glaring fact that Greek Cypriot leaders had destroyed that partnership in order to annex Cyprus to Greece. In complete defiance of the rule of law and the democratic rights of Turkish Cypriots, it accepted Greek Cypriots' application for EU membership as an application by "Cyprus". The EU was also present at the final stage of the UN negotiations in Switzerland. The EU "commitment" with regard to a comprehensive settlement was agreed upon between the parties and the EU Commission. The European Union—which has always refused to treat Turkish Cypriots as an equal party and has defied all the rules of law, has treated the Greek Cypriot side as "the legitimate Government of Cyprus". The EU has repeatedly expressed its strong preference for the accession of a reunited Cyprus, has given its support to the good offices mission of the UN Secretary-General, and has made specific commitments to encourage and promote such an outcome. The Turkish Cypriot point that EU should hold its hand until a final settlement of the problem was ignored. Repeated statements to the effect that Cyprus would be accepted as an EU member, whether there was an agreement or not, fed the intransigence of the Greek Cypriot side.


  The determination of the international community for a solution yielded its result and the last four and a half years' efforts of the UN produced the Annan Plan which was submitted to the approval of the two sides by separate referenda, leaving no room for any political or tactical maneuvers. But nevertheless Greek Cypriot leader Mr Papadopoulos was able to deceive the world that he was a "YES" voter until the very end when he persuaded 76% of the Greek Cypriot voters to come out with a crushing "NO" vote, he preferred the hijacked title of the Government of Cyprus to a fine and just settlement.

  The first phase of negotiations was conducted on the Island, where only small progress was achieved. The second and third phases were conducted respectively in New York and Bürgenstock, Switzerland. During the final round, on 31 March 2004, the UN Secretary-General finalized the plan on the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to be submitted on each side for approval at separate and simultaneous referenda, in close consultation with the two parties in Cyprus and with Greece and Turkey. The four-power conference agreed to be held as the third round could not take place because of the refusal of the Greek side to sit around a table in terms of equality with the Turkish Cypriot side! Thus a plan on which there had been no agreement by the two sides was decided to be put to the separate votes of the two sides and presumably leave them to fight about it later!

  At the end of the Cyprus talks in Bürgenstock on 31 March 2004, the UN Secretary-General submitted the final version of the Annan Plan to the approval of the two parties with the historic remarks: "The choice is not between a settlement plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In reality, at this stage, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement. There have been too many missed opportunities in the past. For the sake of all of you and your people, I urge you not to make the same mistake again."

  Even the UN Secretary-General failed to understand that the so-called "lost opportunities", as far as the Greek Cypriot leaders were concerned, were not "lost" at all; always they insisted on keeping and maintaining the hijacked title of "the Government of Cyprus", rather than share power permanently with Turkish Cypriot ex-partners. In other words, they saw no reason to change their century old policy of converting Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot Republic as long as the world at large continued to treat them as "the legitimate Government of Cyprus".


  Separate simultaneous referenda were held on 24 April 2004 in the TRNC and in the Greek Cypriot administration. The plan was approved in the Turkish Cypriot referendum by 65% of the votes whereas 76% of the Greek Cypriot people overwhelmingly rejected the plan as called for by the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos. In an address on 7 April 2004, he demanded, and got a "resounding no" to the Annan Plan from the Greek Cypriots. His public statement left no room for doubt that the Greek Cypriot side would not accept any solution which fell short of fully endorsing for good their title of "the Government of Cyprus" which they had hijacked in 1963.

  Mr Glafkos Clerides (one of the architects of the Akritas Plan together with Mr Papadopoulos) has clearly stated their true vision on this point:

    Greek Cypriot preoccupation

    "Just as the Greek Cypriot preoccupation was that Cyprus should be a Greek Cypriot state, with a protected Turkish Cypriot minority, the Turkish preoccupation was to defeat any such effort and to maintain the partnership concept, which in their opinion the Zurich Agreement created between the two communities. The conflict, therefore, was a conflict of principle and for the principle both sides were prepared to go on arguing and even, if need be, to fight, rather than compromise.

    The same principle is still in conflict, even today, though a federal solution has been accepted—and though a federation is nothing more than a constitutional partnership of the component states, provinces or cantons which make up the federation."

  (Mr Glafkos Clerides MY DEPOSITION, Vol 3, p 105)

  All through my talks with all the Greek Cypriot leaders from 1968 to this day, I have found no evidence, no indication, no sign that they have moved an inch from this original "national objective". In presenting their case to the world they falsely claim that "the problem started in 1974 with the arrival of Turkey; that it is a question of occupation and the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes". This is proof enough of their attitude towards their fellow-men, the Turkish Cypriots, who were almost wiped off the map of Cyprus during the 1963-74 period! The Greek Cypriot leader the so-called "President of Cyprus" (!) Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, publicly stated that "not one Turkish Cypriot was killed during 1963-74"! The damning reply given to him by Loucas G Charalambous, a Greek Cypriot journalist in the Greek Cypriot Sunday Mail of 12 September 2004 is worth recording here:

Does the President suffer memory loss?


By Loucas G Charalambous

  The interviews given by President Papadopoulos have developed into a unique form of self-flagellation, to such a degree that we should be asking what is actually happening. His responses in the interview to the publisher of the United Arab Emirates-based English language newspaper Khaleej Times, Mohammed Galadari, were bizarre and raised several questions.

  Here is an excerpt:

    Galadari: Turkish Cypriots said that after independence and before the Turkish troops came, within 11 years, lots of massacres occurred. When the Turkish troops came, they saved them from further violence, and if they hadn't come, all of them might have been killed?

    Papadopoulos: They say that and claim that the Turkish troops protected them.

    Galadari: The Turkish Cypriots say that Mr Papadopoulos is a hardliner.

    Papadopoulos: From the beginning, they were planning for a separation. But, in fact, the Turkish Cypriots were the ones who committed massacres and in 1963 we asked to increase the police patrols, but they refused. From 1963 to 1974, how many Turkish Cypriots were killed? The answer is none.

  We should resist the temptation to laugh at this response by the President. The situation might be more serious than what it seems and it would be wrong to laugh at it. I did not have time to read my archives so as to give you a relatively accurate number of Turkish Cypriots (or of Greek Cypriots) who were killed between 1963 and 1974. I will just remind you that during this period, there were bloody clashes in Masoura-Tylliria, in Lefka-Ambelikou, in Trypimeni, in Arsos, in Mari and in Kophinou-Ayios Theodoros.

  In Kophinou alone, UNFICYP had counted 22 corpses of Turkish Cypriots by 10am on 15 November, as was reported by Brigadier Michael Harbottle in his book, The Impartial Soldier. If my memory serves me well, the total number of Turkish Cypriots killed during this period, either in clashes with the National Guard or in isolated incidents, exceeded 600.

  I do not think there is anyone who would consider it wrong to describe the President's claim that no Turkish Cypriots were killed as a blatant lie. Which leads me to deduce one of two things: either our President is a liar or he is suffering from an illness that causes memory loss. Both theories can be supported by a host of contradictory statements made by Papadopoulos during his presidency. I will cite the most recent example. In an interview published in Phileleftheros on 31 July, he served another blatant lie, denying lie had ever said on 15 July 2003, that acceptance of the Annan plan "constitutes acceptance of the fait accompli of the invasion and occupation".

  It certainly does not fall within the remit of this column to investigate and find out what is wrong with the President. It is our right and duty, however, to note the problem and call and invite people who, because of their public position, are burdened with the responsibility of dealing with the situation, to show an interest. House President Christofias, for instance, has no excuse for passively watching what is going on.

  Because, whatever the problem is, Papadopoulos is the President of the Republic and the problem has an effect on all of us, irrespective of whether we belong to his circle of supporters or, as in the case of this writer, to the camp of his critics. In the event that the President is facing a serious memory loss problem, there is no shame in the people being informed about it.

  At least we, his opponents, would be much less critical of him if we knew that he said these things, not because he underestimates our intelligence or likes to lie, but because he has some problem. After all, we are all people and any one of us could be affected by such a problem at some point.

  It is true that the Annan Plan did not satisfy all the demands and needs of the Turkish Cypriot people. A very long list of why the plan should have been rejected exists in the minds of each and every Turkish Cypriot, let alone among the leadership. However, having paid a dear price for protecting their vested rights and vital interests, the Turkish Cypriot people are well aware of the fact that a durable solution also has its price and requires a good deal of compromise.

  But the results of the referendum have clearly demonstrated, once again, that the island has two owners, two politically independent and equal peoples each with the separate right of self-determination, and that it is the Turkish Cypriot side which sincerely wants a settlement of the Cyprus issue based on the principles of partnership, bi-zonality and the political equality of the two peoples. Both sides need to accept the right of self-determination, and the fact that one has no right to represent the other, let alone be the government of the other, as confirmed by separate referenda.

Why There Is a Cyprus Problem

  Such a strong "no" on the Greek Cypriot side, proved, beyond any doubt, that neither the Greek Cypriot people, nor their political leaders, nor the church, will ever be ready to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of sovereign equality of both peoples. They prefer instead to continue to enjoy the benefits of the title of the "Republic of Cyprus" which they usurped through force of arms and terrorism in December 1963.

  Over the years, the Greek Cypriots have based their arguments on the false allegation that the Turkish Cypriots revolted against the government in 1963. Consequently the Greek Cypriots hastened to declare the Constitution "dead and buried", thus abrogating all the Constitutional and human rights of the Turkish Cypriots, merely offering their co-partners minority rights in a Greek Cypriot Republic. They trampled on, and "amended" those parts of the Constitution which suited their criminal interests relying on the irrelevant principle of the "doctrine of necessity". Constitutionally they had no warrant to amend the constitution in the absence of Turkish Cypriot members in the parliament. After the unsuccessful coup by Makarios against the partnership state, the Vice-President, the Turkish Cypriot ministers, and the members of parliament were prevented from attending their duties. Later, the Turkish Cypriot members of parliament were told (in 1965) that they could return only if they agreed to electoral legislation that would have turned them into a minority.

  The false allegation by the Greek Cypriot leaders that "Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the government organs" can only fool those who have no idea of the bloody events which unfolded upon Turkish Cypriots in Christmas 1963 and thereafter. (Please see appendix 2, Foreign Press Extracts.) The following passage from the report of the UN Secretary-General shows the stance of the usurpers of power:

    "Mr Clerides also stated that the constitutional provisions concerning promulgation of the laws by the President and the Vice-President were no longer applicable. He subsequently stated that in his opinion the Turkish Cypriot members had no legal standing any more in the House."

  (Report of the UN Secretary-General, S/6569, 29 July 1965)

  However, the "doctrine of necessity" cannot in law be relied upon to justify "the laws" of a "government" which had itself dismantled the Constitution, violated international agreements, and wrecked the bi-communal constitution, as a result of which an exclusively Greek Cypriot administration came into being. In 1964, in order to stop the violence, the UN Security Council was under pressure to introduce a UN force. To do so it treated the Greek Cypriot Government as if it was the constitutional government of Cyprus. This was a tragic error. Other states followed the UN in recognizing this illegitimate and illegal government. The human and political rights of the Turkish Cypriots, recognized in the 1960 treaties, have been ignored by the international community and must be restored if justice is to be done. International treatment of the Greek Cypriot administration as the legitimate Government of Cyprus for 40 years in complete disregard of facts and the rule of law is the only reason why a settlement has eluded Cyprus.

  The Turkish Cypriot side defied the brute force employed against them. Though confined in several enclaves, after having lost 103 villages, the Turkish Cypriots organized themselves around the Vice-President of Cyprus as an administrative body. As stated by Mr Clerides in his memoirs (My Deposition, volume 3, pages 236-237) this Administration acquired the status of a mini-state as time went by, while the Greek Cypriot side showed no interest in, or intention of, re-establishing a new partnership. Here is Mr Clerides again:

Greek Cypriot Aim

    (a)  Creation and development of the constitutional problem.

    The constitutional crisis of the year 1963 disrupted the constitutional order, the continuity, and the partnership status of the two communities, which was created by the Zurich Agreements.

    Because of the disruption of constitutional order a peculiar situation was created, by virtue of which the state authority, on the one hand, became under the absolute control of the Greeks, and though the Government was recognised internationally, yet internally Turkish enclaves were created within the territory of the Republic in which at first, an elementary organisation for the purpose of governing the Turkish Cypriots was established, the main characteristic of which was the confusion of military and political powers and functions, and the prevailing of military power.

    After the crisis of 1967 (Kophinou Crisis) the above disruption of constitutional order became more clear and showed tendencies of permanency. Thus in December 1967, the elementary military-political organisation of the Turks in the enclaves developed into a "Temporary Administration" on the basis of a charter, and at the same time the political and military authorities were separated.

    In the years that followed a steady, stage by stage development is noted in the Turkish Administration, with the separation in its legislative, executive and judicial powers. An administrative organisation is created, as well as police force and an army. The increase of the financial resources of the Turkish Cypriots through economic aid from Turkey permitted the functioning of their administration on a more permanent basis, a fact which they made clear, by renaming their "Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration" to "Turkish Cypriot Administration". Thus there exist today in Cyprus two poles of power on a separate geographical basis ie the Government of the Cyprus Republic, controlling the largest section of the territory of the state and internationally recognised, and the Turkish Cypriot Administration, which controls a very limited area and is not internationally recognised, but has already taken almost all the characteristics of a small state.

    From the above the conclusion can be drawn that our top priority and target must be the dissolution of the Turkish enclaves for the sake of securing the unity of the island.

  Here of course Mr Clerides forgets why and how "the Cyprus Problem" was created by his side under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios; how he himself took part in the notorious Akritas Plan, and was well aware that there was no "rebellion by the Turkish Cypriots against the government of Cyprus" (as they advocated and propagated for years). The Greek Cypriot side knew that an unsuccessful coup had been waged against the partnership state by Makarios, but they offered no redress, no apology, no confession of the crimes committed, no compensation for the destruction of 103 villages and 107 mosques—the vision of a Hellenist union with Greece was enough to justify these crimes against humanity!

  At last a courageous Greek Cypriot journalist has this to say on these events:

The Coup of 1974 (Against Makarios) is a Consequence of the Akritas Plan

    "The Democrats (Disi Party) avoid mentioning that the first coup was planned and implemented according to the notorious Akritas Plan. The Akritas Plan which was published on 21 April 1966 and the first coup, which was implemented in accordance with this plan, was prepared by Makarios III. In the preparation of this conspiratorial coup Makarios was assisted by his collaborators. The objective of this conspiracy was to destroy the constitutional order by the use of force. I must admit that had I been, at the time, one of the proponents of the Akritas Plan, I would still have criticized it: When coups are successful, they become a "Revolution"; it is when they are unsuccessful that they are branded as coups. Had the coup planned in conformity with the Akritas Plan been successful we would be exalting it today. The Akritas Plan was not simply a failure, it also led the way to partition.

    But whilst everybody is talking freely about the coup of 1974, no one dares speak about the coup which was a consequence of the Akritas Plan. Any one daring to do so runs the risk of being muffled. However in self criticism of ourselves, we have to accept that the Akritas Plan not only did open the way to partition of the island but it also caused the collapse of the (1960) Republic of Cyprus. Refraining from self criticism will not enable us to save ourselves. Furthermore we shall not be able to avoid de-facto partition. Let us not forget that even the Financial Times is currently describing partition as "probably the best solution".

  Alekos Constantinides, Alithia (Greek Cypriot Daily) 14.12.1985

  Organ of the Democratic Rally Party (DISY)

Civility Begins

The Easy and the Difficult Condemnations of Crimes

The Pros and Cons

  As I wrote yesterday it is quite easy for one to condemn the crimes committed by others and in so doing one does not usually run the risk of being victimized. Thus, for years now we have all been condemning in the comfort of our house the barbarities of others . . . and (in spite of the condemnations) the crimes and barbarities continue.

  From the moment we are not prepared to condemn the crimes and barbarities committed by ourselves, or by those with whom we have identified ourselves, in my opinion, a condemnation has no practical significance. But one does not require special courage to condemn the crimes of others. But to condemn one's own crime one has to have a lot of courage.

  The clamour after the massacre at Mai Lai during the Vietnam War had practical result because it was emanating from the Americans themselves, because they were condemning a crime of their own making; and because of this Mai Lai forced many Americans to abandon their apathy and to ask their government to put an end to the war in Vietnam.

  The condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the massacre in Kerala does not certainly require any courage on our part. It would, however have special significance if "Haravgi"(1) would condemn these crimes. But if an AKEL(2) member were to condemn these Soviet crimes in his own name that would be a courageous act.

  On this occasion the stand of Andrei Zacharoff was indeed courageous, who by condemning the invasion of Afghanistan, a crime of the making of his own country, knew full well that he would have to face the consequences.

  As it is well known due to the condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan Zacharoff was banished to Gorki.

  When in 1964 and later on, after the eruption of intercommunal disturbances, when massacres took place in Ayios Vasilios and elsewhere, there was no word of condemnation heard from amongst our community. No one of us, not excluding myself, had the courage and did not feel the necessity to condemn those crimes committed by ourselves. Up to the present time no one on our side has condemned those massacres. And I surmise at times if we had the courage then to condemn those crimes, probably the development of events in Cyprus would have been difficult . . . . . . and so on . . . .

  Alekos Constantinides, "Simerini" (Greek Cypriot Daily), 22 September 1982

  (1)  "HARAVGI": A left wing Greek Cypriot Daily

  (2)  AKEL: Political organization of left wing Greek Cypriots

  The April 2004 referenda have shown which side is for a solution that encompasses reunification and peace and which side is not. The Greek Cypriot people can no longer use the doctrine of necessity against the Turkish Cypriots since it was the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Greek Cypriot people which blocked a comprehensive settlement on the island, thus preventing a return to "normal conditions".

  It is the view of the Turkish Cypriots that the international world should no longer tolerate the use of the title of the "Government of Cyprus" by the Greek Cypriot side. It is this tolerance which encourages Greek Cypriot side to continue on its illegal path rather then settle the problem.

  Throughout the period of negotiations of the Annan Plan and all its predecessors, and for a period of more than 40 years, the Turkish Cypriots have been subjected to physical and economic deprivation and debilitating uncertainty and it is time to put an end to this.

  The Turkish Cypriot "YES" and Greek Cypriot "NO" votes in the referenda, as stated in the plan, have resulted in the Foundation Agreement not entering into force, and thus the Annan Plan has become "null and void"!

  The Turkish Cypriot people, who had been offered the paradise of EU membership, plus recognition of their state, had their final word by saying "yes" to the Annan Plan. Having been completed as a process, the Annan Plan is no longer subject to further negotiation or any amendment. For this reason, any initiative by the Greek Cypriot side, or any other third party, to make amendments to the Annan Plan is not acceptable to Turkish Cypriots.

  The question now is will the world close its eyes to stark reality and allow the Greek Cypriots, who opted for no solution, to continue pretending that they represent the whole island? Will they honour the Turkish Cypriots' vested right to speak and act for themselves through their separate political will, which they used to further the unification of the island? For the EU to contend that the Turkish Cypriots can neither speak for themselves, nor represent North Cyprus would be a further disregard of the democratic principles that one cannot be represented by any body or institution in whose election one had no say. In the case of Cyprus, the Republic that the Greek Cypriot side pretends to represent had two co-founder partners, who elected their representatives separately. That is an additional reason for denying treating the Greek Cypriot Administration as the legitimate Government of Cyprus with authority to speak for the Turkish Cypriots and for the whole island!

  In his clear statement of 24 April 2004, The UN Secretary-General applauded the Turkish Cypriots' approval of the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it entailed for many of them. The Secretary-General regretted that "the Turkish Cypriots will not equally enjoy the benefits of EU membership as of 1 May 2004", but he hoped that "ways will be found to ease the plight in which the people find themselves through no fault of their own."

  Mr Annan's disappointment was also reflected in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, dated 2 June 2004, where he stated "the rejection of such a plan by the Greek electorate is a major setback. What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint."

  He further stated that "if the Greek Cypriots are ready to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriots in a federal structure based on political equality, this needs to be demonstrated, not just by word, but by action."

  In paragraph 89 of his Report Mr Annan emphasized that "in the aftermath of the vote, the situation of the Turkish Cypriots calls for the attention of the international community as a whole, including the Security Council."


  Following the referendum on 24 April 2004, the Cyprus issue has taken a new turn and a new state of affairs has emerged.

  The fact is that the Turkish Cypriots have certainly done their part and it is simply not fair to penalize them any longer, is also clearly reflected by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 28 April 2004 where he stated: "I salute the Turkish Cypriots for their courageous vote in favour of the proposals. We must all do our best to see that they are not penalized for the way the vote went in the other part of the island."

  The UN Secretary General similarly praised the Government of Turkey, which enabled this new effort, for demonstrating its readiness and determination to abide by its commitments under the plan and fully implement a settlement. In Paragraph 78 of his report he stated: "I appreciated the strong support of the Turkish Government, from the top down, for my efforts."

  Since the EU confirmed at the Helsinki European council in 1999 that a settlement to the Cyprus issue was not a pre-condition for accession, the Cyprus issue should not be put as an obstacle in front of Turkey in her bid for EU accession; members of the EU have a responsibility to make sure that Turkey's EU membership is not held hostage by the Greek Cypriot side.

  The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Mr Gu­nther Verheugen, on 25 April 2004, stated that "what we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots." Mr Verheugen further stressed that "Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this result . . . now we have to end the isolation of the North. The Commission is ready to take various measures for that aim."

  It is vital to note that similar statements to that effect have also been made by the US Secretary of State, Mr Colin Powell, and the Prime Minister of the UK, Mr Tony Blair.

  Mr Tony Blair during his visit to Turkey on 18 May 2004 stated that "I think it is important, as I indicated to the Prime Minister, that we end the isolation of Northern Cyprus . . . We made it clear we must act now to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes in respect to trade, in respect to air travel . . . There was a very clear commitment given to people if they supported the Annan Plan. They have supported it and we must see that commitments through."

  The British Foreign Secretary Mr Jack Straw stated during his meeting with the Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mr Mehmet Ali Talat on 1 July 2004 that he welcomed Talat's commitment to the goal of reunification which was affirmed "so unequivocally" by the Turkish Cypriots' embrace of the Annan Plan in the April 24 referendum.

  He also expressed the hope that further steps would be taken by both communities on the island to promote reconciliation, and pledged London's support for EU policies geared towards ending the Turkish Cypriots' economic isolation.

  Nothing has happened so far! The Greek Cypriots' leaders, under the cloak of "the Government of Cyprus", are doing their utmost to stall any aid or attempt to remove the embargoes by the European Union.

  The Turkish Cypriot people only ask for their decades old unfair punishment to come to an end. The time has come for the international community, in general, and the UK, in particular, as one of the Guarantor Powers, to take measures to redress the unjust situation arising from the fact that the Greek Cypriot side which rejected the UN plan has become a member of the EU under a false title, while the Turkish Cypriot side, which approved the plan, not only has remained outside the EU but continues to be subjected to illegal restrictions and embargoes.

  It is high time that the inhuman embargoes imposed upon the Turkish Cypriot people are lifted outright and the undeniable fact is acknowledged that the so-called "Government of the Republic of Cyprus" does not, represent and has no right to, represent the Turkish Cypriot people.

  The UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan's call to the member states, in his Report on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, dated 2 June 2004, is timely and important to declare that "the Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development." What "the rationale for pressuring and isolating Turkish Cypriots" is, or ever was, no one has come forward to say.

  The Greek Cypriot side, which astonishingly managed to convince the world of its political will for a solution and portrayed the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as intransigent throughout the long process of negotiations, has in fact impeded a solution. This is because being treated as "the Government of Cyprus" for them is the solution! No one tries to understand this odd phenomenon!

  Nevertheless, the EU has accepted the Greek Cypriot side as a full member of the Union as representing the whole island and has, so far, failed to take any concrete steps to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side.

  The Turkish Cypriot people expect that the international community, in general, and the EU, in particular, will respond to the call of the UN Secretary General to lift the senseless restrictions and to promote relations in all fields, in particular in transport, trade, tourism, culture, information, investment and sports' contacts.

  It is an undisputable fact that after the referendum the parameters have changed. Therefore, if the international community truly desires to see a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus, it has to re-diagnose the root cause of the Cyprus issue and to adopt a fresh approach that takes into account the realities in the island.

  An inter-ethnic struggle has ended in separation. This separation began in 1963 when Turkish Cypriots had to abandon 103 villages and take refuge in enclaves. In 1975, in the Third Vienna Talks, these enclaves, by agreement of the two sides, were consolidated in two areas, the North Zone and South Zone. It was further agreed that the future should be settled in a new partnership (bi-zonal, bi-communal federation). All the talks to that end brought no result because the Greek Cypriot leaders would, and will, not concede that they have no legal or moral right to claim to constitute the Government of the whole island; and that Turkish Cypriots are not and will never be their minority. Unless the family of nations, and especially the EU takes this up with them, why should any one expect a solution of a problem which, from the Greek Cypriot point of view was solved the moment they were treated as "the legitimate Government of Cyprus"? "Legitimacy" bestowed upon the Greek Cypriot side does not arise from the law of the land; it is a title hijacked by destroying all the legitimate legal foundations on which the partnership Republic of Cyprus was established.

  Does the international community not have the obligation to re-examine the facts. Will it do so?

  As one of the Guarantor Powers, the UK should not hesitate to be among those taking the lead in the international efforts directed towards putting an end to the unjust circumstances in which the Turkish Cypriot people have been living for 40 years through no fault of their own.

  The Cyprus problem has to be diagnosed by impartial people. The settlement has to take into account the factual results of this 40 years' old conflict. Property problems have to be settled through exchange and compensation. The tragic events of the period 1963-74 have to be accounted for, and redress made to the Turkish Cypriots whose self-rule now in its 41st year should be recognized for what it is: the TRNC equal in every respect with the Greek Cypriot administration in the south!

  Good neighbourliness can only arise through fair, just and equal treatment of both sides. Confidence can only grow if both sides feel secure in their present status. The claim of one to be the Government of the other has proved to be the impediment to any solution for the last four decades!

  Appendix 1—Akritas Plan

  Appendix 2—Extracts from the Foreign Press

Appendix 1

The Akritas Organisation

  On 19 February 1959, the Zurich and London Agreements were signed and the road to the Republic of Cyprus was opened. On 16 August 1960 this new Republic was established. The Greek Cypriot Leader Makarios was elected President and the Turkish Cypriot Leader Dr Fazil Küçük was elected Vice-President.

  According to the Constitution seven Greeks and three Turks would be Ministers. As one of the Greek Ministers Makarios chose Polykarpos Yeorgadjis and he became Minister of Interior. He was the EOKA Area chief for Nicosia. Makarios also directed Yeorgadjis to form a secret para-military organisation. The code name "Akritas" was chosen and Yeorgadjis became "Chief Akritas". For this Organisation he picked ex-EOKA men loyal to Makarios and Enosis. All party leaders were authorized to form their own militia and they all did. Thus Makarios through his Minister of Interior had became the Commander-in-Chief of a secret army with the aim of destroying "the shackles" on Enosis which the 1960 Agreement had outlawed.

  Chief Akritas (Yeorgadjis) set to work in earnest. The President of the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides, the Minister of Labour Tassos Papadopoulos and Yeorgadjis were the masterminds of this Organisation. Most top ranking Greek Cypriot officials of the Government were its members and supporters. According to Mr Glafkos Clerides, the Organisation started with 500 members all well armed ex-EOKA fighters. Towards the end of 1963 this number rose to 1,800. The arms for this Organisation came from the arms depot of the Cyprus Army and the Police and Gendarmerie Forces, the Greek Cypriot members of which were now working with the Organisation under the same leader, the Minister of Interior Mr Yeorgadjis. With the addition of Greek Contingent and its armoury and the arrival of 20,000 troops from Greece, Turkish Cypriots faced a formidable force. Arms came from Greece and Egypt and some was bought from Czechoslovakia and other neighbouring countries. Most of the arms were under the direct control of Makarios. The training of the members was undertaken by the Greek Mainland Regiment in Cyprus. The leadership was trained in Greece as from the signing of the London Agreement in 1959. EOKA had cast off its uniform and was ostensibly converted into a non-combatant organisation called EDMA whose first task was to give scholarships in Greece, to young EDMA members in military training and education. The Akritas organisation started planning a different future for Cyprus. Apart from military plans a general plan for the extermination of Turkish Cypriots was prepared. This top secret plan, with the name of `Akritas Plan', was first published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris on 21 April 1967, three years after it had been fully and mercilessly implemented and at a time when all Greek Cypriot leaders believed that what they had achieved in Cyprus was irreversible. Indeed Makarios was jubilant in announcing that Cyprus was now Greece . . . The House of Representatives now composed of 100% Greek Cypriots, had already passed a resolution on Enosis. Nothing else could be the "national aim".

  Although both Yeorgadjis and Makarios are dead, this same plan, with certain improvisations, is still being implemented by the Greek Cypriot Leadership.

The Akritas Plan




  The recent public statements of the Archbishop have prescribed the course which our national issue will follow in the immediate future. As we have stressed in the past, national struggles are neither judged nor solved from day to day, nor is it always possible to fix definite time limits for the achievement of the various stages of their development. Our national cause must always be judged in the light of the conditions and developments of the moment; the measures which will be taken, the tactics and the time of implementing each measure is determined by the conditions existing at the time, both internationally, and internally. The entire effort is trying and must pass through various stages, because the factors which influence the final result are many and varied. It must be understood by everyone that each measure taken is the result of continuous studies and, in the meantime, forms the basis for future measures. It must be recognized that the measures which are prescribed now constitute only the first step, one simple stage towards the final and unalterable national objective, to the full and unfettered exercise of the right of self-determination of the people.

  Since the purpose remains unalterable, what remains to be examined is the subject of tactics. This must necessarily be separated as internal and external (international), since in each case both the handling and the presentation of our cause will be different.


  During the recent stages of our national struggle the Cyprus problem has been presented to world public opinion and diplomatic circles as a demand for the exercise of the right of self-determination of the people of Cyprus. In the exercise of this right, the subject of the Turkish minority was introduced under the well-known conditions and with the argument of violent intercommunal clashes, it had been tried to make it accepted that co-existence of the two communities under a united administration was impossible. Finally, for many international circles the problem was solved by the London and Zurich Agreements, a solution which was presented as the result of negotiations and agreement between the contending parties.

    (a)  Consequently, our first target has been to cultivate internationally the impression that the Cyprus problem has not really been solved and the solution requires revision.

    (b)  First objective was our endeavour to be vindicated as the Greek majority and to create the impression that:

    (i)  the solution given is neither satisfactory nor fair;

    (ii)  the agreement reached was not the result of a free and voluntary acceptance of a compromise of the conflicting views;

    (iii)  the revision of the agreements constitutes a compelling necessity for survival, and not an effort of the Greeks to repudiate their signature;

    (iv)  the co-existence of the two communities is possible; and

    (v)  the strong element on which foreign states ought to rely is the Greek majority and not the Turks.

    (c)  All the above which required very difficult effort, have been achieved to a satisfactory degree. Most of the diplomatic representatives are already convinced that the solution given was neither fair nor satisfactory, that it was signed under pressure and without real negotiations and that it was imposed under various threats. The fact that the solution has not been ratified by the people, is a significant argument in this connection, because our leadership, acting wisely, avoided calling the people to give its official approval to the agreement by a plebiscite or otherwise, which the people, in the 1959 spirit, would have definitely approved. Generally, it has been established that the administration of Cyprus up to now has been carried out by the Greeks and that the Turks were confined to a negative role and acted as a brake.

    (d)  Second objective. The first stage having been completed, we must programme the second stage of our activities and objectives on the international field. In general terms, these objectives can be outlined as follows:

    (i)  The efforts of the Greeks are to remove unreasonable and unfair provisions of the administration and not to oppress the Turks.

    (ii)  The removal of these factors of the administration must take place today because tomorrow will be too late.

    (iii)  The removal of these provisions of the administration, although it is reasonable and necessary, is not possible because of the unreasonable attitude of the Turks and therefore, since it is not possible by agreement with the Turks, unilateral action is justified.

    (iv)  The issue of revision is an internal affair of the Cypriots and does not give the right of intervention, by force or otherwise, to anyone.

    (v)  The proposed amendments are reasonable, just, and safeguard the reasonable rights of the minority.

    (e)  It has been generally proven that today the international climate is against every type of oppression and especially the oppression of minorities. The Turks have already succeeded in persuading international opinion that union of Cyprus with Greece amounts to an attempt to enslave them. Further, it is judged that we have greater possibilities of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favour if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand for exercising the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for Enosis. However, in order to secure the right to exercise complete and free self-determination, first of all, we must get rid of all those provisions of the Constitution and of the Agreements (Treaty of Guarantee, Treaty of Alliance etc) which obstruct the free and unfettered expression and implementation of the wishes of our people and which may open the way to dangers of external intervention. It is exactly for this reason that the first target of attack has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which was the first that was stated to be no longer recognised by the Greek Cypriots.

    When this is achieved no power, legal or moral, can stop us from deciding our future alone and freely and exercising the right of self-determination by a plebiscite.

  From the above, the conclusion can be drawn that for the success of our plan a chain of actions and developments is needed, each of which is a necessity and a must, otherwise, future actions will remain legally unjustified and politically unattainable, while at the same time we will expose the people and the country to serious consequences. The actions to be taken can be classified under the following headings:

    (a)  Amendment of the negative elements of the Agreements and parallel abandonment in practice of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. This step is necessary because the need for amendments of the negative aspects of the treaties is generally accepted internationally and is considered justified (we can even justify unilateral action), while at the same time external intervention to prevent us amending them is held unjustified and inapplicable.

    (b)  After the above actions, the Treaty of Guarantee (the right of intervention) becomes legally and substantially inapplicable.

    (c)  Once Cyprus is not bound by the restrictions (of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance) regarding the exercise of the right of self-determination, the people will be free to give expression to and implement their desire.

    (d)  Legal confrontation by the forces of State (police and even friendly military forces) of every internal or external intervention because then we shall be completely independent.

  Therefore the actions from (a) to (d) are absolutely necessary and must be carried out in the above order and in time.

  It is therefore obvious that if we hope to have any possibility of success internationally in our above actions, we cannot and must not reveal or declare the various stages of the struggle before the previous one is completed. For instance, if it is accepted that the above four stages are the necessary course, then it is unthinkable to speak of amendments (stage (a)) if stage (d) is revealed. How can it be possible to aim at the amendment of the negative aspects by arguing that this is necessary for the functioning of the State and the Agreements.

  The above relate to targets, aims and tactics in the international field. And now on the internal front:


  The internal actions are judged by the interpretations that will be given to them internationally and by the effects that our actions will have on our national cause.

  1.  The only danger which could be described as insurmountable is the possibility of external intervention. Not so much because of material damage, nor because of the danger itself (which, in the last analysis, it is possible for us to deal with partly or totally by force), but mainly because of the possible political consequences. If intervention is threatened or implemented before stage (c), then such intervention would be legally debatable, if not justified. This fact has a lot of weight both internationally and in the United Nations. From the history of many recent instances we have learnt that in not a single case of intervention, even when legally unjustified, has either the United Nations or any other power succeeded in evicting the attacker without serious concessions detrimental to the victim. Even in the case of the Israeli attack against Suez, which was condemned by almost all nations and on which Soviet intervention was threatened, Israel withdrew, but received (kept) the port of Eilat on the Red Sea as a concession. Naturally, much more serious dangers exist for Cyprus.

  But if we consider and justify our actions under (a) above well, on the one hand the intervention will not be justified and, on the other, we will have every support from the beginning, since by the Treaty of Guarantee, intervention cannot take place before consultations between the Guarantor Powers, that is Britain, Greece and Turkey. It is at this stage of consultations (before intervention) that we need international support. We shall have it if the amendments proposed by us appear reasonable and justifiable.

  Hence, the first objective is to avoid intervention by the choice of the amendments we would propose in the first stage.

  Tactics: Reasonable Constitutional amendments after efforts for common understanding with the Turks are exhausted. Since common agreement is impossible we shall try to justify unilateral action. At this stage the provisions in (ii) and (iii) of page 21 are applicable in parallel.

  2.  It is obvious that for intervention to be justified, more serious reasons and a more immediate danger must exist than mere constitutional amendments.

  Such reasons could be (a) an immediate declaration of Enosis before stages (a)-(c), (b) serious inter-communal violence which would be presented as massacre of the Turks.

  Reason (a) has already been dealt with in the first part and, consequently, only the danger of inter-communal violence remains to be considered. Since we do not intend, without provocation, to massacre or attack Turks, the possibility remains that the Turks, as soon as we proceed to the unilateral amendment of any article of the constitution, will react instinctively, creating incidents and clashes or stage spurious killings, atrocities or bomb attacks on Turks, in order to create the impression that the Greeks have indeed attacked the Turks, in which case intervention would be imperative, for their protection.

  Tactics: Our actions for constitutional amendments will be open and we will always appear ready for peaceful talks. Our actions will not be of a provocative or violent nature. Any incidents that may take place will be met, at the beginning, in a legal fashion by the legal Security Forces, according to the plan. All actions will be clothed in legal form.

  3.  Before the right of unilateral amendments of the constitution is established and is accepted, decisions and actions which require positive violent acts from us, such as the unification of municipalities, must be avoided. Such a decision compels the Government to intervene by force to bring about the unification and seizure of municipal properties, which will probably compel the Turks to react forcefully. Therefore it is easier for us, using legal methods, to amend, for instance, the provision of the 70 to 30 ratio, when it is the Turks who will have to take positive violent action, while for us this procedure will not amount to action, but a refusal to act. The same applies to the issue of the separate majorities with regards to taxation legislation. These measures have already been studied and a series of similar measures have been decided for implementation. Once our right of unilateral amendments to the constitution is established de facto by some such actions, then we shall be able to advance using our judgment and our strength more forcefully.

  4.  It is, however, naive to believe that it is possible to proceed to substantive acts of amendment of the constitution, as a first step of our general plan, as has been described above, without the Turks attempting to create or to stage violent clashes. Exactly for this reason, the existence and strengthening of our Organisation is imperative because:

    (a)  In the event of spontaneous Turkish reactions, if our counter-attacks are not immediate, we run the risk of having panic created among Greeks, particularly in the towns, and thus we run the danger of losing substantial vital areas irreparably, while on the other hand an immediate and timely show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to insignificant, isolated acts, and

    (b)  In the event of a planned or spurious attack of the Turks, staged or not, it is imperative to overcome it by force in the shortest possible time, because if we succeed in gaining command of the situation in one or two days, no outside intervention would be possible, probable or justifiable.

    (c)  In all the above cases, the forceful and decisive confrontation of any Turkish effort will greatly facilitate our subsequent actions for further Constitutional amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be impossible or seriously harmful for their community, and

    (d)  In the event of the clashes becoming widespread and general we must be ready to proceed immediately with the actions described in (a) to (d), including the immediate declaration of Enosis, because then there would be no reason to wait nor room for diplomatic action.

  5.  At all these stages we should not overlook the factor of propaganda, and to counter the propaganda of those who do not know or cannot be expected to know our plans, as well as of the reactionary elements. It has been shown that our struggle must pass through at least four stages and that we must not reveal our plans and intentions publicly and prematurely. Complete discretion and secrecy is more than a national duty. It is a Vital Necessity for Survival and Success.

  This will not deter the reactionaries and the irresponsible demagogues from indulging in an orgy of exploitation of patriotism and provocations. The plan provides them with fertile ground, because it gives them the opportunity to allege that the efforts of the leadership are confined to the objective of constitutional amendments and not to pure national objectives. Our task becomes more difficult because by necessity, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, even the constitutional amendments must be made in stages. However, all this must not draw us into irresponsible demagogy, street politics or bidding higher in the stakes of nationalism. Our acts will be our most truthful defenders. In any event, because the above task must make substantial progress and yield results long before the next elections, in the relatively short time in between we must show self-restraint and remain cool, for obvious reasons. At the same time, however, we must not only maintain the present unity and discipline of the patriotic forces, but increase it. We can only achieve this by the necessary briefing of our members and through them of our people.

  Before everything else we have to expose the true identities of the reactionaries. They are petty and irresponsible demagogues and opportunists, as their recent past has shown. They are negative and aimless reactionaries who fanatically oppose our leadership, but at the same time without offering a substantive and practical solution of their own. In order to promote all our actions we need a steady and strong government until the last moment. These are known as verbalists and sloganists, with pretty words and slogans, but they are unable and unwilling to proceed to concrete acts or to suffer sacrifices. For example, even at the present stage they offer nothing more concrete than recourse to the United Nations, that is, words again without cost to themselves. They must, therefore, be alienated and isolated.

  In parallel and at the same time, we shall brief our members about the above plan and intentions, but ONLY VERBALLY. Our Sub-headquarters must, in gatherings of our members, analyse and explain fully and continuously the above, until each one of our members understands fully and is in a position to brief others. NO WRITTEN REPORT IS PERMITTED. THE LOSS OR LEAKAGE OF ANY DOCUMENT ON THE ABOVE AMOUNTS TO HIGH TREASON. No act can damage our struggle as vitally and decisively as the revealing of the present document or its publication by our opponents.

  With the exception of word-of-mouth briefing and guidance, all our other actions, specially publications in the press, resolutions etc, must be very restrained and no mention of the above should be made. Similarly, in public speeches and gatherings, only responsible persons may make, under the personal responsibility of the Chief of Sub-headquarters, references in general terms to the above plan. And this only after the explicit approval of the Chief of Sub-headquarters who will also control the text. Even in this case, ON NO ACCOUNT ARE REFERENCES TO THESE TEXTS IN THE PRESS OR ANY OTHER PUBLICATION PERMITTED.

  Tactics: All the briefing of our people and of the public BY WORD OF MOUTH. We should make every effort to appear as moderates in public. Projection of or reference to our plans in the press or in writing is strictly prohibited. Officials and other responsible persons will continue to brief the people and to raise their morale and fighting spirit, but such briefing excludes making our plans public knowledge by the press or otherwise.


  This document will be destroyed by fire on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, in the presence of all the General Staff within 10 days from its receipt. Copies in full or in part are prohibited. Members of the staff of the Regional HQ may have the plan on the personal responsibility of the Chief of Regional HQ, but may not take it out of the Regional HQ.

  The Chief





    "We went to-night into the sealed-off Turkish quarter of Nicosia in which 200 to 300 people had been slaughtered in the last five days. We were the first Western reporters there and we have seen si'ghts too frightful to be described in print as horrors so extreme that the people seemed stunned beyond tears and reduced to an hysterical and mirthless giggle that is more terrible than tears.

  This much we can tell:

    In the Kumsal quarter, at No 2 Irfan Bey Sokag, we made our way into a house whose floors were covered with broken glass. A child's bicycle lay in a corner.

    In the bathroom, looking like a group of waxworks, ware three dead children piled on top of their murdered mother. In a room next to it, we glimpsed the body of a woman shot in the head.

  This, we were told, was the home of a Turkish Army Major whose family had been killed by the mob in the first violence. Today was five days later and still they lay there . . .

  (Extract from a report by Rene MacColl and Daniel McGeachie, Daily Express, 28 December, 1963).


    "What does Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus want? He has said it himself: he wants to repeal the treaty of 1960 according to the terms of which Great Britain, Greece and Turkey guarantee the independence of Cyprus. The fact that a few hours later faced with the violent reaction of Mr Duncan Sandys, he mollified the expression of his thoughts by granting that a unilateral repeal was not in his mind, does not in any way change the essence of the problem. All is happening as if President Makarios had decided, in the words of the editorial of the London Times, to set fire to the powder barrel on which Cypriots are seated. . ."

  (Extract from a report by Robert de Geynst, Le Soir (of Brussels) 2 January, 1964)


  "Silent crowds gathered to-night outside the Red Crescent hospital in the Turkish sector of Nicosia, as the bodies of nine Turks found crudely buried outside the village of Ayios Vassilios, 13 miles away, were brought to the hospital under an escort of the Parachute Regiment. Three more bodies, including one of a woman, were discovered nearby but they could not be moved.

  Turks guarded by paratroops are still trying to locate the bodies of 20 more believed to have been buried on the same site. All are believed to have been killed during fighting around the village at Christinas.


  It is thought that a family of seven Turks who disappeared from the village may be buried there. Their house was found burnt, and grenades had been dropped through the roof. Shallow graves had apparently been hurriedly scooped by a bulldozer. The bodies appeared to have been piled in two or three deep. All had been shot.

  One man had his arms still tied behind his legs in a crouching position and had been shot through the head. A stomach injury indicated that a grenade may have been thrown into his lap. . ."

  (Extract from a report in Daily Telegraph 14 January 1964.)


  "Discussions start in London; in Cyprus, the terror continues. Right now we are witnessing the exodus of the Turks from their villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, lands, herds; Greek terrorism is relentless. This time, the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the busts of Plato do not suffice to cover up barbaric and ferocious behaviours. At four o'clock in the afternoon, curfew is imposed on the Turkish villages. Threats, shootings and attempts of arson start as soon as it becomes dark. After the massacre of Christmas that spared neither women, nor children, it is difficult to put up any resistance. British vehicles are shuttling back and forth between the villages and Turkish Cypriot "ghettos". In Nicosia, an office for the more than 5,000 refugees is operating. On the walls of its rooms hang images depicting Turkish renaissance: a woman draped in a flag, Kemal Atatu­rk at the head of his victorious troops; and the families of peasants are arriving who require lodgings and food."

  (Extract from a report by Giorgio Bocca, Il Giorno, 14 January 1964.)


  "There are two kinds of assassin. The first, kills alone. His hands are red, therefore he is easily recognized. "Beast" they call him and he is led, somewhat rudely, to the guillotine or to forced labour. The second, remains aloof and watches people assassinate each other. He touches nothing, his hands are clean. Let one indignant witness speak of halting the carnage and white hands will look at him and say, severely, "Look after your own affairs". And he will put out his foot to trip him up. Only this second kind of assassination is worthy of consideration as a fine art.

  Monsignor Makarios is a great artist. Each time that I see him on TV or in a newspaper, I admire his fine hands made for benediction and for prayer, his handsome looks sheltered by tabernacle-like eyelids barely allow the penetration of suave insensibility. Monsignor Makarios belongs more to the "Heavens" than to the earth, that is clearly visible. That is why he permits the Greeks to carry on the butchery in Cyprus. NATO wants to stop the bloodshed? "Halt. I am against it. In the holy name of our independence". The United Nations, then. "I agree, but be patient. We have time". Is not one master in his own home? And it is after all, a few corpses gained.

  Mark you, Monsignor Makarios is Greek and Christian. The Greeks are fighting the Turks, 10 against one. In simple arithmetic, this must add up to nine corpses of infidels—men, women, children, it matters little—for one chosen of the good cause. Hence, the holy gaiety, at times irrepressible, of Monsignor. Last Saturday he was seen receiving journalists and laughing his head off during a whole minute. That day the corpses of the massacred Turks were piled up at the other edge of the Island.

  Journalists know well the customs. They saluted Monsignor Makarios according to orthodoxy as "Your Beatitude". His Beatitude, sanctimoniously, was beaming. Here is a man who attains Paradise in all sweetness. He will arrive with his hands pure. And yet all the perfumes of Cyprus. . . yes, yes, all the perfumes of Cyprus shall never clean those hands".

  (Extract (translation) from Le Canard Enchaine, Paris, 19 February 1964.)


  "Day by day and as murder follows murder detached observers here find it harder and harder to credit the Government of Cyprus with any real determination to stamp out violence. If the President really wants peace on earth and to restore the rule of law he could start by investigating publicly the circumstances surrounding last Thursday's attack on the Turkish inhabitants of Limassol. The known facts are that on the Wednesday the British peace keeping forces were assured by the Greek authorities that no attack would be made on the Turkish community. Accordingly the British Army did not patrol the town. At 5.30 the following morning Greek Cypriot security forces launched what our special correspondent describes as "a heavy well organized attack against the Turkish quarter of Limassol." It was carried out by hundreds of steel helmeted men armed with automatic weapons and supported by one tank and two armoured bulldozers. If the Greek Cypriot authorities connived at this formidable attack their behaviour is inexcusable. If they were ignorant of its coming they must forfeit their claim to govern and control their own people, let alone the whole Cypriot community."

  (Extract from the Guardian London, 20 February 1964.)


  ". . .The Greek Cypriots must recognise that self-determination is not an absolute right when it imperils peace and that the prohibition of Enosis has the same standing in international law as the prohibition of an Austrian anschluss to Germany."

  (Extract from The New York Times, 20 February 1964.)


  "There is little doubt in the Administration's own sympathy as well as that of Congress is with Turkey and that Mr George Ball, Under-Secretary of State, came away from his recent visit to Cyprus and Turkey convinced that President Makarios is deliberately provoking trouble in Cyprus and that the present crisis is not of Turkish making.

  ". . .cries of "We want Enosis" were shouted at a demonstration here this morning. The demonstration had been carefully organised by the directors of the schools who come under the jurisdiction of the Greek Communal Chamber.

  ". . .The Director of the Girls' Gymnasium, Athanasio Chiotelis, a well-known advocate of Enosis, took microphone and shouted "Long Live Cyprus, Makarios, Dighenis (Grivas) and Enosis". Makarios is expected to see Grivas in Athens soon. It would not be surprising if he acceded to the growing public demand for the return of the ex-Eoka Leader.

  ". . .It is now being freely admitted in Whitehall that the costly and risky British policing action has had two untoward results. It has given the Greek Cypriots time to build up their armed strength in order to achieve a solution of the Cyprus problem in their own interests, and it has heightened the danger posed to the Turkish minority."

  (Extract from the Guardian, London 12 March 1964.)


  . . .I have seen in a bathtub the bodies of a mother and of her three young ehilden murdered just because their father was a Turkish officer. . .

  Archbishop Makarios is too much of an ecclesiastic to express himself so brutally, but it is a fact that he never undertook to condemn openly the horrible excesses committed by his partisans, leaving a delirious press the task of pursuing a campaign against the Turks. . ..

  . . .The Turks at least are logical with themselves. They say, "Life under these conditions is impossible. We are 120,000 menaced, in the full sense of the word, by extermination. There is but one solution: the partition of the island in two, we in the north, the Greeks in the south." The Greeks are less frank. They deny the evidence. . ..

  . . .According to him (Archbishop Makarios) some changes in the Constitution would be enough. The trouble is that these "amendments" all tend to deprive the Turks of their rights and guarantees which had been accorded to them in 1960. The Turks replied: "This amounts to saying to a drowning man "Take off your life-saver and everything will be allright!. . ."

  (Extract from a report by Max Clos, Le Figaro (Paris), 25 to 26 January 1964.)


  "If the Turkish Army has not already landed reinforcements to its Treaty Force in Cyprus, that is simple proof of the patience of Turkey. Its right to do so cannot be denied. If international treaties mean anything, Turkey can protect the Turkish Cypriot minority from further massacre. It is racial discrimination in its most bestial form. Although there have been efforts to cloud the issue by suggesting that both Cypriot communities are to blame, by far the heaviest guilt is that of the Greek Cypriot force known as Eoka or Edma."

  (Extract from Daily Telegraph and Morning Post (London), 15 February 1964.)


  "Archbishop Makarios, robed and bearded cleric who serves as President of Cyprus, has a Byzantine talent for equivocation. . .

  . . .his government deliberately provoked the clashes and is bent upon the extermination of Turkish population. . .."

  "Some sort of federal system of two separate communities seems inevitable as the minimum to reassure Turkish Cypriote who demand outright partition. . ."

  (Extract from a report by Robert H Estabrook, in the Washington Post, 16 February 1964.)


  ". . .Greek Cypriot fanatics appear bent on a policy of genocide. . ."

  (Extract from a report in the Washington Post, 17 February 1964.)

The address of Archbishop Makarios

  The 15 July is an invasion. It is a clear attack from the outside and a flagrant violation of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. The invasion is continuing as long as there are Greek officers in Cyprus.

  President of Cyprus Republic to the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974.

Father Papatsestos (priest of the Greek Orthodox Cemetery in Nicosia)

  It is a rather hard thing to say, it is true that the Turkish intervention saved us from a merciless internecine war.

  Athens daily Ta Nea on 28 February 1976.

Bu­lent Ecevit (then Prime Minister of Turkey, 20 July 1974)

  In fact it was much more than a coup. It was the forceful and flagrant violation of the independence of the Cyprus Republic and of the international agreements on which this Republic was based.

  Turkey is a co-guarantor of the independence and constitutional order of Cyprus.

  Turkey is fulfilling her legal responsibility by taking this action. The Turkish Government did not resort to armed action before all the other means were tried, but to no avail.

  This is not an invasion, but an act against invasion.

  This is not aggression, but an act to end aggression.

  The operations of peace that started with the breaking of the day, this morning, will bring an end to the darkest period in the history of Cyprus.

  The UN SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution 353 of 20 July 1974.

    Paragraph 5: Calls upon Greece Turkey and the UK to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional Government in Cyprus.

  The headline of The Economist Editorial 20 July 1974


  Die Zeit—30 August 1974

    The massacre of Turks in Paphos and Famagusta is the proof of how justified the Turks were to undertake their second intervention.

  Andrew Borowiec

  Cyprus, A Troubed ISland, p 83

    Nicos Sampson the man chosen by the Athens junta as president, had spoken briefly on the radio, pledging to lead Cyprus to "National Union and Hellenism"

  Andrew Borowiec

  Cyprus, A Troubed Island, p 84

    In the four days that followed the coup, an estimated 2,000 people, known to be ardent supporters of Makarios were killed. Their names were later added to those killed during the subsequent Turkish invasion.

  Andrew Borowiec

  Cyprus, A Troubed ISland, p 85

    The Greek side could have emerged from the Geneva talks (July-August 1974) as a partner in a Cypriot federation but at a price of autonomous Turkish cantons and an agreement to tolerate a large Turkish military presence on the island.

  Archbishop Makarios, in an interview with the Frankfurter Rundschau reported in the Cyprus Mail. (16 May 1974)

    Enosis had always been for the Greek Cypriots a deeprooted national aspiration. To me independence is a compromise. In other words, if I had a free choice between Enosis and independence, I would support Enosis.

  Archbishop Makarios, in a letter to the President of Greece, Gen Phaedon Ghizikis. (2 July 1974)

    The Cyprus state could be dissolved only in the event of Enosis.

  Nicos Sampson, reported in the Cyprus Mail. (17 July 1974)

    I was about to proclaim Enosis when I quit

  Archbishop Makarios, in an interview given to the Norwegian newspaper Degbladet. (12 March 1977)

    It is in the name of Enosis that Cyprus has been destroyed.


    . . . They say that they intend to maintain Cyprus as independent and non-aligned and to continue the intercommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. But at the same time they talk about the "salvation of the Hellenism of Cyprus", they refer to the island as a "Hellenic republic", and they set first among their targets the "restoration of the spiritual unity of Greek Cyprus".

    . . . The Turkish Government, and the Turkish community in Cyprus, can hardly be expected to ignore this development.

    . . . As soon as any threat to the Turkish community develops, or as soon as any definite step towards Enosis is taken the Turks are bound to react.

    . . . If concerted action proves impossible, any one of the guarantors has the right to intervene unilaterally.

  The Times, 16 July 1974


    Ecevit said: "Let no one try to profit from the chaotic situation in Cyprus to infringe upon the rights of the Turks. We will never accept a fait accompli. We will let no one trample the rights of the Turks."

  The Times, 16 July 1974


    . . . There should be no doubt that this is an international problem and not an internal one. Under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 the three guarantor powers—Britain, Greece and Turkey—recognised and guaranteed the "independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus and also the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the constitution".

    . . . Each of them reserved the right if "common or concerted action" should not prove possible to "take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty".

    . . . The Greek government should be told that unless it withdraws the officers immediately it can not escape the charge of intervening in Cypriot affairs, and can not expect that other powers should refrain from exercising their rights under the treaty.

  The Times, 17 July 1974


    . . . The Turks regard Monday's coup as a de facto enosis, as a breach by Greece of the Treaty of Guarantee, and hence as a threat both on the Turkish community in Cyprus and to Turkey's own strategic position. If "concerted action"" with Britain proves impossible, the Treaty gives Turkey the right to intervene.

  The Times, 19 July 1974


    The Turkish invasion of Cyprus is a justified exercise of national power to defend an interest and fulfil a treaty obligation.

    . . . The British made it clear that they would not engage in joint military action, or even verbally support it. Neither expressions of distaste for Sampson, nor diplomatic manoeuvring, were for Ankara a big enough commitment on the part of her two major NATO allies. As days went by, the lesson of history evidently impressed itself on the Turks: that the illegal Sampson regime would soon become, de facto legal.


  The Sunday Times, 21 July 1974


    . . . After landing at RAF Lyneham, Wiltshire, Mr Derek Reed, aged 31, said he had seen bodies being buried in a mass grave near Paphos after last Monday's coup.

    "People who were told by Makarios to lay down their guns were shot out of hand by the National Guard", he said "they were buried in mass graves".

  The Times, 22 July 1974

"Cyprus, Christmas day of 1963"

Prof Alexis Heraklides

Ta Nea (Athens), 10 January 2002

  Translation of an article by Prof. Alexis Heraklides (International Relations Faculty of Political Science), which appeared in the 10 January 2002 issue of the left-leaning and pro-government Greek newspaper Ta Nea:

    During the second round of talks between Denktash and Clerides, the issue of missing persons was raised. According to the widespread view in Greece regarding the matter, only missing persons in Cyprus are Greek Cypriots and Turkey together with Greek Cypriots are the responsible parties.

    But the situation is entirely different. Though lesser in number, there are Turkish Cypriot missing persons as well in Cyprus. They are the victims of EOKA-B and the troops of the Junta in Greece, both of whom have escaped punishment. Furthermore, some of the Greek Cypriot missing persons have been killed by their very compatriots. The other responsible party for the Greek Cypriot missing persons is the invading Turkish army and not the Turkish Cypriots or Denktash.

    If an attempt is made to write a different version of history based on certain selected memories, inevitably leads to a picture which is detached from the realities of the past. This is being done deliberately to "clear" our side in the face of certain serious allegations. Let us have a brief look at the Cyprus issue starting from 30 years ago:

    December 1963. Three years old bi-communal Republic of Cyprus no longer exists. The obvious reason for this was a step taken by Makarios, which is considered as a big mistake. The basic motive behind Makarios' proposal on 30 November 1963, consisting of 13 constitutional amendments, was to relegate the status of the numerically less Turkish Cypriots to minority status and to surrender their destiny to the mercy of the Greek Cypriots. Küçük, the Turkish Cypriot leader of the era, was so shocked that he made this remark: "Would Enosis be better under these circumstances!"

    The developments, which took place later on, are tragic and known. There was a bloodbath in incidents that took place during the months of December 1963 and January 1964. This led to the division of the Island and the deployment a UN Peace Force. The Green Line, a creation of that time, is still present on the Island. There are two different main opinions in serious history books regarding the bloody incidents of December 1963 and January 1964:

    (a)  The responsibility for the incidents rests with both parties;

    (b)  Greek Cypriots essentially should be held responsible because they initiated the incidents.

  The first opinion is formulated by Greek and pro-Greek intellectuals. The second one, which is more realistic, was also adopted by the UN Secretary-General of the time.

  If you ask why I have written the above at the beginning of the new year, the reason is twofold: Firstly, about three weeks ago I was very disappointed to watch, on a Greek Cypriot TV channel, a program depicting Turkey and Turkish Cypriots as solely responsible for the incidents of December 1963. The second reason is my belief that, if the opinion broadcast by the Greek Cypriot TV channel is shared by Greek Cypriots in general, then the Cyprus issue can only be resolved through partition, and not through EU membership.


  I have just finished reading a very interesting book called The Genocide Files, written by Harry Scott Gibbons. This book covers the events in Cyprus from December 1963 to the intervention of Turkey in 1974, and if true, paints a very different picture of events than the one portrayed by the Greek Cypriot side. If this book is to be believed, and I cannot see why the author would portray things incorrectly, then there was most certainly a very grave injustice, amounting to attempted genocide of the Turkish Cypriot community. My question is, given that these events would represent a crime against humanity, why does the TRNC not make more publicity of these events, and bring their version of the situation to international attention. Surely, if these facts were made more public, then the international community would look more closely at the situation instead of simply taking the Greek Cypriot view of the events leading to Turkey's intervention. Also, as far as I am led to believe, there is no statute of limitations on crimes against humanity, so why have the TRNC not tried to bring the people involved in the attempted genocide to justice? I await your comments with interest.

  Best Regards

  E-Mail dated 15 September 2004

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