Further written evidence from the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus, President's Office
CYPRUS: OBJECTIVE REALITIES, VALIDITY OF
GREEK CYPRIOT OBJECTIONS TO THE ANNAN PLAN AND THE WAY FORWARD
UNDERLYING CAUSES
OF THE
CYPRUS QUESTION
Turks and Turkish Cypriots have not yet realized
the critical significance of public relations and propaganda.
Greek Cypriots and Greeks, on the other hand, are experts in the
use of propaganda and lobbying. Although propaganda and lobbying
are legitimate, cheating is, to say the least, unethical.
Unfortunately, even the European Union has allowed
itself to be misled by the "unethical" propaganda machine
of the Greek Cypriot side.
Addressing the European Parliament on 21 April
2004, EU Enlargement Commissioner Gunter Verheugen, for
example, recalled that in 1999 the then Greek Cypriot government
had promised to do everything possible to secure a settlement
in return for which the EU would not make a Cyprus solution a
prerequisite for accession. An angry and disappointed Mr Verheugen
stated to the European Parliament that:
"What Mr Papadopoulos said after the negotiations
in Switzerland is the rejection of that notion and I must draw
the conclusion from his words that the government of the Republic
of Cyprus opposes the international settlement and proposes the
rejection of the Plan. I am going to be very undiplomatic now.
I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government"
It is unfortunately a fact that in conflict
situations the near-irresistible temptation is to focus on surface
symptoms, to simplify the task and to search for the fastest way
out. In resolving conflict, however, we need to shift the focus
beyond the surface approach of treating symptoms to a deeper level
where the addressing of the underlying causes of the conflict
is possible. Short-term pain relief should not be confused with
long-term cure.
Coming back to the Cyprus question, we need
to go beyond the easily available propaganda material and dig
out underlying objective facts and causes. The Cyprus conflict
is not, for example, the result " . . . of a military invasion
and continued occupation of part of the territory of a sovereign
state" as the Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos chose
to present it in his 23 September 2004 statement at the General
Debate of the 59th Session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations. Neither did the conflict start because the Turkish Cypriot
people, an equal partner of the 1960 partnership Republic of Cyprus,
agitated to secede from that Republic.
If "occupation" is the root cause
of the Cyprus issue, this is in fact the 41-year-old continued
occupation of the seat of government of the once bi-communal partnership
Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot partner since 1963. It
is because of this occupation and the resultant conflict between
the two equal partners that we have had UN peace-keeping forces
in the island since 1964. The selective ignoring by Mr Papadopoulos
of the period from 1963 to 1974, together with the reasons for
the intervention of Turkey on 20 July 1974, cannot, of course,
be attributed to amnesia. The withholding and even denial of certain
"selected" facts is rather a devious attempt to obscure
the underlying cause of the Cyprus issue in full knowledge of
the dictum that cure is directly linked to cause. In other words,
the Greek Cypriot side is attempting a cure for Cyprus that will
not be based on their hijacking of the 1960 partnership Republic.
Returning back to the Greek Cypriot claim that
the Cyprus conflict is the result of a military invasion and continued
occupation, there is no resolution of the United Nations Security
Council which describes the legitimate and justified intervention
of Turkey in 1974 as "aggression", "invasion"
or "occupation". In fact, in a dramatic statement before
the Security Council on 19 July 1974, Archbishop Makarios, the
Greek Cypriot President at the time, openly accused Greece, not
Turkey, of invading and occupying Cyprus on 15 July 1974. It was
this invasion and occupation in order to realize immediate Enosis
(union of Cyprus with Greece) and the violation of the state of
affairs established by the 1960 Constitution and Treaties that
led to the intervention of Turkey in accordance with its rights
and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
On the claim that it was the Turkish Cypriot
side which agitated to secede from the partnership Republic, Archbishop
Makarios, the then Greek Cypriot President of the 1960 partnership
Republic, is on record for repeatedly confessing that the Greek
Cypriot struggle and aspiration in Cyprus was the realization
of Enosis. In a statement to The Times on 9 April 1963,
eight months before the hijacking of the partnership State, he
said, for example, that:
"The union of Cyprus with Greece is an aspiration
always cherished within the hearts of all Greek Cypriots. It is
impossible to put an end to this aspiration by establishing a
Republic."
When the Security Council resolved to send peacekeeping
troops to the Island, the mandate of these troops (UNFICYP) as
stipulated in resolution 186 (1964) was to prevent a recurrence
of the fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and restoration
of law and order and a return to normal conditions.
Immediately following the endorsement of this
resolution in the Security Council, the Turkish Cypriot side applied
to the UN Secretary-General to use his best efforts to restore
law and order and help return to normal conditions by upholding
the 1960 constitutional order. The then Secretary-General turned
this request down and replied to the Turkish Cypriot side that
this was not the intention of the Security Council in adopting
resolution 186[69]
The admittance in resolution 186 that normal
conditions did not exist and the refusal to restore the constitutional
order in Cyprus are proof that the 1960 partnership institutions
were incapable of functioning as set out in the 1960 Constitution
thus making that Republic legally void as of December 1963[70]
In yet another attempt, the Turkish Cypriot
Parliamentarians who requested the help of the UN Peacekeeping
Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to return to the partnership Parliament
in July 1965 were told by the then Greek Cypriot President of
the House of Representatives Glafkos Clerides that they could
only do so provided they recognized the Greek Cypriot Government
as the Cyprus Government, that they accepted all the laws enacted
by the House of Representatives in their absence, and agreed to
abolish Article 78 of the Constitution concerning separate majorities[71]
When the Turkish Cypriot Parliamentarians refused to accept these
humiliating conditions, they were instantly blamed by the Greek
Cypriot side with withdrawing from the legitimate government.
Turkish Cypriot political leaders of the time have repeatedly
said that it was this final betrayal that triggered the chain
of events, which led to the division of the Island and the emergence
of two separate Governments.
In spite of all these facts, the Greek Cypriot
side has been successfully hiding behind what is called the "state
of necessity"[72]
argument and facade since December 1963. Putting aside the role
of the Greek Cypriot side in creating the abnormal situation of
1963, the Greek Cypriot refusal to go into a new partnership with
Turkish Cypriots and their preference in the 24 April 2004 referendum
to maintain "abnormal conditions" unquestionably deprives
them from using the "state of necessity" argument[73]
any longer, together with the argument that the so-called "Republic
of Cyprus" is the legal government of the whole island.
DISTORTION OF
FACTS
Greek Cypriot politicians and officials frequently
resort to the tactic of distorting facts in order to make more
effective and to dramatize their unethical propaganda attempt.
I will give three examples of such distortions.
a. In his letter to the UN Secretary-General
of 7 June 2004, Tassos Papadopoulos claimed that there are "119,000
. . . illegally implanted Turkish settlers" in North Cyprus.
Putting aside the discussion about the unacceptable nature of
the choice of the word "settlers", Mr Papadopoulos argued
later on in the same letter that the final version of the UN Plan
would have allowed for the entirety of the "settlers"
to remain in Cyprus. This amounts to a gross distortion of the
facts in the Plan which limited to 45,000 those who could acquire
Cypriot citizenship from each side other than those persons who
held Cypriot citizenship on 31 December 1963, their descendants
and the spouses of such descendants.
b. In his interview with the Dubai based
Khaleej Times on 4 September 2004 Mr Papadopoulos openly
claimed in response to a question that no Turkish Cypriots were
killed between 1963 and 1974. The comment of Loucas G. Charalambous,
a prominent Greek Cypriot journalist to this lie was "Does
the President suffer memory loss?". In his opinion column
in the Greek Cypriot English language daily Cyprus Mail of
12 September 2004, Mr Charalambous wrote:
"We should resist the temptation to laugh
at this response by the President. I will just remind you that
during this period (1963-19 74), there were bloody clashes in
Mansoura-Tylliria, in Leka-Ambelikou, in Trypimeni, in Arsos,
in Man, and in Kophinou-Ayios Theodoros.
In Kophinou alone, UNFICYP had counted 22 corpses
of Turkish Cypriots by 10 am on 15 November (1967) as was reported
by Brigadier Michael Harbottle in his book The Impartial Soldier
I do not think there is anyone who would consider it wrong to
describe the President's claim that no Turkish Cypriots were killed
as a blatant lie."
c. Tassos Papadopoulos wrote to the UN Secretary-General
on 7 June 2004 that he once more wanted to "emphatically
reiterate" the commitment of the Greek Cypriot people, as
well as himself, . . . . to the solution of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation". He repeated this commitment in his statement
to the General Debate of the 59th Session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations on 23 September 2004. But in the same statement
Mr Papadopoulos also repeated that the resolution of the land
and property issues had to respect the right of return of refugees.
Similarly, in his letter of 7 June 2004 to the UN Secretary-General,
Mr Papadopoulos insisted that . . . the Plan includes a number
of pre-conditions for reinstatement of properties, which limits
substantially the exercise of the right of Greek Cypriots to reinstatement".
Mr Papadopoulos's insistence on the right of
return and the reinstatement of properties makes mockery out of
the principle of bi-zonality, which is an established pillar for
settlement in Cyprus, and which Mr Papadopoulos says he is committed
to respect. Obviously, Mr Papadopoulos cannot support both bi-zonality
and full respect of the right of return of refugees. If he really
supports bi-zonality he has to put aside pretences and must start
preparing his people to accept restrictions on the right to return
in order to facilitate bi-zonality.
GREEK CYPRIOT
OBJECTIONS TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
PLAN: ARE
THEY REAL
OR MERELY
EXCUSES
A. The functionality argument
In his letter of 7 June 2004 to the UN Secretary-General,
MrPapadopoulos stressed that functionality covers all the areas
of the operation of the state including federal legislation and
its practical application, the Central Bank, fiscal and monetary
policy, the curtailing of the various transitional periods, the
administrative structure and functioning of the federal government,
the decision-making process at all levels, and the territorial
aspect. Mr Papadopoulos described the objective of functionality
as ensuring the viability and smooth operation of the solution.
But, functionality, viability and smooth functioning
vary depending on the agreed model of governance. The modalities
for smooth functioning and decision-making, for example, vary
in the case of a unitary state as compared to the case of a bicommunal
partnership/federal state. In the case of the latter, in order
to respect and cater for the interests and political equality
of the partners, representation and decision-making arrangements
cannot allow for one of the parties to dominate or subordinate
the other if what is required is the smooth functioning and viability
of the partnership.
No doubt all the requirements for a smooth functioning
partnership cannot be legislated and invariably require the building-up
of a partnership culture and mutual trust. Partnerships also require
strong common interests and interdependence, which, together,
will act to hold the partnership together. With the asymmetry
that has been allowed to grow in the political and economic powers
of the two parties in Cyprus since 1963, coupled with the continuing
Greek/Greek Cypriot obsession that Cyprus is part of the Hellenic
world and the insistence to patch the Turkish Cypriot people into
the Greek Cypriot usurped "Republic of Cyprus", I do
not think that the essentials are currently in place for a viable,
smooth functioning and sustainable partnership. There is no doubt
that under the functionality argument Greek Cypriot political
leaders are trying to introduce majoritarian decision-making and
governance arrangements instead of exploring alternative partnership
consensus-building mechanisms.
In fact, such mechanisms were explored in the
course of the Technical Committee meetings on cooperation agreements
and the federal laws. On the subject of the Cooperation Agreement
on European Union Relations, which aimed at regulating policy
formulation, decision-making, representation and legal actions
concerning European Union Relations which fall exclusively or
predominantly into an area of competence of the constituent states,
the formula included in the UN Secretary-General's Plan foresaw
the establishment of a coordination group composed of four representatives,
two hailing from each constituent state. The group would try to
reach decisions by consensus. If consensus could not be achieved,
decisions would be reached by special majority which would include
at least one member hailing from each constituent state. Unfortunately,
even this arrangement, which applied to functions that fall exclusively
or predominantly into an area of competence of the constituent
states on which they could not be overruled, was not acceptable
to Mr Papadopoulos.
In an article published in the 29 August 2004
issue of the Sunday Mail, Greek Cypriot political analyst Nicos
A Pittas pointed out that:
"On our side, the hard line successors to
Makarios, who of course are more Catholic than the Pope, pay lip
service to federalism but in reality insist on a government structure
that is essentially unitary and gives control to the majority
Greek Cypriot community in the event of a deadlock. It is exactly
the same issue that brought down the Zurich and London Agreements
in 1963 and which continues today under its contemporary guise
. . . It is not the flaws of the Annan Plan that are the problem.
It is the leadership of our governing coalition that is collectively
responsible for the continuation of the Cyprus stalemate . . .
If our leaders were truly committed to a federal settlement any
practical problems could be surmounted through negotiations after
the establishment of the United Cyprus Republic . . . That in
fact is the nature and essence of federalism: that it needs to
be constantly nurtured and renewed in each generation by the communities
that comprise the federation.
The reality is that no solution or constitution
will be perfect".
B. Security Needs of the Greek Cypriot Side:
Although Cyprus has never been under Greek rule,
Greeks and Greek Cypriots historically (even mythologically) count
Cyprus as an integral part of the Hellenic world. It is this belief
that has led to the violent collapse of the 1960 partnership state.
Because this historic belief is institutionalized in Greek culture
(myths, the Church, schools) it is hard to ignore it. Over a period
of ten years between 1963-1974 no amount of diplomacy succeeded
to change this belief and to halt the forceful marginalization
of Turkish Cypriots and their deprival from their constitutional
and treaty rights. Turkey was forced into intervening in Cyprus
in 1974 in order to fulfill an obligation under the 1960 Treaty
of Guarantee because the state of affairs created by the 1960
Constitution was continuously violated. In spite of the security
protection provided to Turkish Cypriots by the presence of the
Turkish army, which has been the sole deterrent for the reoccurrence
of violence on the island since 1974, the violation of the 1960
state of affairs is continuing and has over the years led to a
chain of events and the emergence of new conditions which have
found expression in guideline agreements (1977 and 1979) between
the two sides (bi-zonality, bi-communality, federalism). But because
the Greek Cypriot side is still obsessed with Hellenism and wishes
to maintain the political and economic advantages it has unjustly
acquired since 1963, there is no eagerness on their side to step
down from their advantageous position and share power with their
equal ex-partner in the context of a new comprehensive partnership
settlement package.
In spite of the fact that the Turkish army continues
to be the one and only security cover for Turkish Cypriots, and,
the fact that the Secretary-General's Plan required the substantial
reduction of these forces over the initial but very critical seven
year period (allowing for both Turkish and Greek contingents not
to exceed 6,000 all ranks until 2011), to be followed by a further
reduction to a symbolic 650 by the European Union accession of
Turkey, or following 2018 (whichever is sooner), both Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriot majority (through the referenda of 24 April
2004) supported the Secretary-General's Plan. The Plan even contained
a provision which provided for a three-yearly review after 2018
with the objective of total withdrawal (Article 8,l,b iii of the
Foundation Agreement).
All these did not suffice to satisfy Mr Papadopoulos,
who, in his all or nothing approach, wrote to the UN Secretary-General
on 7 June 2004 that Greek Cypriot concerns regarding "the
crucial issue of security, were to a great extent, ignored".
He pointed out in the letter that they . . . still have serious
security concerns as a result of the presence of Turkish occupation
troops and Turkish overall behaviour". Mr Papadopoulos claimed
that the Plan meant that Turkish troops would remain on the island
indefinitely.
The underlying logic and calculation behind
this "all or nothing" stance of Mr Papadopoulos can
be traced to his pre-referenda address of 7 April 2004, in which
he also called upon the Greek Cypriot people to give a resounding
"no" reply to the UN Secretary-General's Plan:
"What will be the consequences if the people
vote no at the referendum? If the sovereign people with their
vote reject the Plan, within a week the Republic of Cyprus will
become a full and equal EU member. We will achieve a strategic
goal that we have jointly set to upgrade and politically armor
the Republic of Cyprus . . . The view that this will be the last
initiative for a Cyprus solution constitutes dogmatism and indicates
ignorance of the rule of international policy . . .On the contrary,
I am saying that the pressure for a solution will be bigger .
. . Turkey's accession course will also continue, thus Ankara
will be under continuous evaluation for the adoption and implementation
of the acquis communautaire, and Cyprus will be one on of the
evaluators."
The position of Mr Papadopoulos is therefore
that they are so strongly positioned vis-a-vis the Turkish Cypriot
side and Turkey that they can afford to completely ignore the
legitimate concerns and interests of Turkish Cypriots (including
security), as well as the 1960 Treaty rights of Turkey (while
the Treaty rights of Britain remain intact). They also conclude
on the basis of their calculation that time is working in their
favour, therefore, they can afford to wait indefinitely until
"total victory" is secured.
This line of thinking, coupled with the vision
and obsession of a Hellenic Cyprus, does not leave much room for
give-and-take, compromise and a sustainable win-win settlement,
or stability, in Cyprus. We need to understand that there cannot
be a fair and sustainable settlement in Cyprus that would be based
on the political equality of the two sides so long as the Greek
Cypriot side is allowed to unilaterally realize all its objectives
and so long as the Turkish Cypriot side is made to be seen to
be subordinate to Greek Cypriot authority.
In any case, on the subject of security, we
must not allow the Greek Cypriot side to forget that it is the
refusal of the UN Secretary-General's Plan by them that has prevented
settlement in Cyprus thus halting the kick-starting of the process
of demilitarization on the terms of the Plan. Mr Papadopoulos
should not now be allowed to complain about the presence of Turkish
troops on the island.
C. The Question of "Turkish Mainland
Settlers"
This issue has at least three very important
dimensions—political, economic and humanitarian.
On the political front, by using the politically
loaded word "settler" regarding Turkish mainlanders
residing and working in North Cyprus and by challenging the capacity
of Turkish Cypriot authorities to grant "citizenship",
the Greek Cypriot side is, on the one hand, trying to register
the claim that it is only their authorities who can grant citizenship,
and on the other, that "Turks" are not welcome in Cyprus.
In essence, through this position, the Greek
Cypriot side is trying to establish the point that even in the
absence of a settlement and partnership institutions Greek Cypriot
authorities are solely and "divinely" authorized, on
behalf of both sides, to issue "firmans" on the citizenship
issue. In doing so, they of course feel entitled to make as many
Greeks, Russians, Pontian Greeks etc "citizens of Cyprus"
without asking Turkish Cypriots, and, as such, do not consider
these deeds as acts that disturb the demographic balance on the
island.
On the economic front, because Turkish Cypriots
are the undesirable other (challenge to the Hellenic character
of Cyprus, uninvited guests, even "sub-humans") and
must be "hurt" further with embargoes and isolation
so that they will eventually succumb to Greek Cypriot wishes,
they must not have a vibrant economy. Turkish workers and manpower
significantly contribute to the economy of North Cyprus, therefore,
every argument and tool must be used to make their stay in Cyprus
"illegitimate". While the very vibrant construction
sector in North Cyprus is totally dependent on Turkish construction
workers, the agricultural and tourism sectors depend largely on
human recourses from Turkey. The Turkish Cypriot economy would
collapse completely without the Turkish workforce, the presence
of which has now become an integral part of its economic infrastructure.
Per capita income in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is
now calculated to have reached 7,500 US Dollars—a rise of
approximately 50% over a period of two years.
Unfortunately, the current Greek Cypriot leadership
is guided by the type of archaic reasoning and logic outlined
above instead of looking upon the island as a regional, European
and a global opportunity for the two partners and co-owners, where
each side would use its assets, roots and influence in both the
West and the East to maximize returns for the whole of Cyprus
thus making the island a "partnership of civilizations"
model for the rest of the world.
Nicos A Pittas, a Greek Cypriot political analyst
writing for the Cyprus Mail, had the following comments in his
article of 29 August 2004 regarding settlers:
"He (Mit Papadopoulos) also wails that the
Annan Plan allows some settlers, a lot of settlers, maybe even
all the settlers to stay. So What? If Cyprus needs something almost
as much as water, it is cheap labour. . . We already import tens
of thousands of foreign workers from all over the world to do
our dirty work, so what is so awful if some of them are Turks?
In any case given that we are now in the EU and someday probably
so will Turkey with resulting mobility rights throughout the EU
including Cyprus, what is so catastrophic with permitting 50,000
Turks, most of whom have lived on Cyprus for most of their lives,
to stay?
Currently, Greek Cypriot authorities are using
all of their powers and influence in the EU to undermine an EU
Commission proposal for direct trade between North Cyprus and
the EU in yet another attempt to subordinate the Turkish Cypriot
side and its economy to Greek Cypriot rule.
On the humanitarian front, the attitude and
position of the Greek Cypriot side regarding the citizens of an
EU candidate country, which they humiliatingly describe as "Turkish
mainland settlers", is discriminatory and de-humanizing to
say the least.
In a study released in late 2003, the British
Helsinki Human Rights Group criticized the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe for stating in a report that it published
on 24 June 2003 that settlers in Northern Cyprus are coming from
Anatolia "one of the least developed regions of Turkey"
whose "customs and traditions differ significantly from those
present in Cyprus". The British Helsinki Human Rights Group
study pointed out that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe Report "expresses the kind of racist sentiments
supposedly deplored by the Council of Europe"[74]
D. The Claim that the UN Secretary-General's
Plan Was "Not the Product of Negotiation Nor Did It Constitute
an Agreed Solution Between The Parties"
The question that needs to be answered here
is whether the UN provided the necessary frame-work where ample
opportunity was given for negotiation and agreement to take place,
or whether the Greek Cypriot side preferred to be seen to be negotiating—while
putting all the blame on the Turkish Cypriot side—in order
to prevent the realization of a partnership settlement based on
the principles of bizonality and political equality. A study of
the developments between late 2003 and 24 April 2004 reveal without
doubt that the Greek Cypriot side in fact refrained from negotiation
with the objective of preventing the realization of a partnership
settlement and that they are now merely inventing excuses to cover
up their hidden agenda.
In December 2003, Tassos Papadopoulos sent a
letter to the UN SecretaryGeneral calling for the resumption of
substantive negotiations on the basis of his Plan. When the Secretary-General
met Mr Papadopoulos in Brussels on 29 January 2004, Mr Papadopoulos
reiterated his call, stressing categorically, that he sought a
solution before 1 May 2004. He reassured the Secretary-General
that he did not seek "40 or 50" changes to the Plan,
and that all the changes he would seek would be within the parameters
of the Plan[75]
After getting similar signs from the Turkish
Cypriot side, Turkey and Greece, the UN Secretary-General invited
the parties to New York on 4 February 2004 to begin negotiations
on 10 February 2004. Following intensive negotiations, the two
sides reached agreement on 13 February 2004 on a three-phase process
leading to separate simultaneous referenda on a finalized Plan
before 1 May 2004. The three-phases were:
Phase I: The parties would seek to agree on
changes and to complete the Plan in all respects by 22 March 2004
in Cyprus.
Phase II: In the absence of an agreement in
Phase I, the Secretary-General would convene a meeting of the
two sides—with the participation of Turkey and Greece, in
order for them to lend their collaboration in a concentrated effort
to agree on a finalized text to be submitted to referenda on the
basis of the Secretary-General's Plan.
Phase III: As a final resort, in the event of
a continuing and persistent deadlock, the parties invited the
Secretary-General to use his discretion to finalize the text to
be submitted to referenda on the basis of the Secretary-General's
Plan.
When the negotiations re-convened in Cyprus
on 19 February 2004, Mr Papadopoulos insisted that all federal
laws, constitutional laws and cooperation agreements (all 131
of them) had to be completed by 22 March 2004 for the Plan to
be considered complete. More than 250 Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot technical experts worked day and night to finalize these
legal texts, about 90% of which was finalized by 22 March 2004
with some differences remaining between the parties on the remaining
10%.
In the political negotiations, the Greek Cypriot
side kept producing papers on their demands while the Turkish
Cypriot side was busy trying to produce counter proposals that
would address the interests and needs of both sides. The Secretary-General
wrote in his report of 28 May 2004 to the Security Council that:
" . . . .. The Turkish Cypriot side was
generally prepared to engage on Greek Cypriot proposals and to
discuss matters on a realistic basis, and sought to make counter-offers
and compromise proposals".
Unfortunately, although the Technical Committees
succeeded to achieve much of their task, progress was not possible
at the political level and the Secretary-General had to move to
Phase II of the process.
Accordingly, when on 24 March 2004 the Secretary-General's
Advisor Alvaro de Soto proposed an opening meeting of the two
sides, with Greece and Turkey present in Bürgenstock, Switzerland,
in order to lend their collaboration, the Greek Cypriot side indicated
that it did not wish to meet in this format in spite of the fact
that it had accepted this arrangement in New York on 13 February
2004. This undermined the whole purpose of Phase II of the agreed
plan to move the process forward and no progress was therefore
possible in spite of all the bridging proposals of the Secretary-General
and the efforts of friendly countries.
The Secretary-General was therefore forced into
moving to Phase III of the process and at close to midnight on
31 March 2004 he presented the two sides a finalized Plan, as
per the agreement of 13 February 2004, which included further
improvements beyond those already suggested by him in his bridging
proposals.
On his return to Cyprus, Mr Papadopoulos delivered
an emotional address to Greek Cypriots on 7 April 2004 calling
upon them to give a resounding "no" reply to the Secretary-General's
Plan, while using the state machinery to make sure that the Greek
Cypriot referendum result would be negative.
After confirming categorically to EU officials
and to the Secretary-General in their Brussels meeting on 29 January
2004 that he sought a solution before the accession of "Cyprus"
to the EU (before 1 May 2004), Mr Papadopoulos was bold enough
to call on the Greek Cypriot people to wait till after their membership
of the EU when, he said, they will have more leverage against
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots in realizing their objective of
further upgrading and politically armouring the Greek Cypriot
"Republic of Cyprus". Mr Papadopoulos in fact made several
unofficial attempts both in Cyprus and in Bürgenstock to
delay negotiations and agreement till after 1 May 2004 thus proving
his insincerity about agreement by 1 May
2004.
Following all of these, on 23 September 2004
Mr Papadopoulos had the face to claim at the General Debate of
the 59th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations
that ". . .Despite the hard work invested in the process
by all involved the end product of this effort was judged to be
inadequate and it fell short of minimum expectations for a settlement
for Greek Cypriots . . . Firstly (because) the Annan Plan was
not the product of negotiation nor did it constitute an agreed
solution between the parties".
To sum up, in view of the adverse conditions
surrounding the UN negotiation process, the 24 April 2004 referenda
results were virtually a foregone conclusion. Especially with
the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus by the
EU as the sole interlocutor for "Cyprus" and the removal
of the condition foreseen in the 1992 UN Set of Ideas that EU
membership would follow a settlement between the two sides, there
was no need left for the Greek Cypriot side to reach a partnership
settlement since they could realise all of their objectives, including
EU membership under the claim that they represent the whole island,
unilaterally, while the hands of the Turkish Cypriot side were
tied under embargoes and political isolation. The failure of the
United Nations to prepare the ground for meaningful and fair negotiations
and to level the playing field in a way that would respect the
equal legitimacy of the two sides also contributed to this result.
Partnerships require a "glue" factor to hold the partners
together. Professor Tozun Bahçeli of King's University
College, Canada, pointed out at a conference at the Eastern Mediterranean
University, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 29 April,
2004 that the partnership option was attractive to the Greek Cypriot
side so long as a two state solution was a real possibility.
Under the influence of misinformation and the
push of Greece within the EU, and without regard to the rule of
law and the root causes of the Cyprus conflict, the Turkish side
was effectively treated by the EU as the villain seeking secession
from the legitimate Greek Cypriot Government of Cyprus, while
the Greek Cypriots were treated as the victims. The consequence
of these false perceptions and assumptions immunised the Greek
Cypriot side from suffering any consequences for their intransigence.
If the pursuance of a zero-sum strategy entails no consequences
there is naturally no incentive to settle for less. This point
was confirmed in the emotional pre-referenda address of the Greek
Cypriot Leader Tassos Papadopoulos in which he went as far as
saying that he had been entrusted an internationally recognised
Republic and that he was not going to reduce it to the status
of a community.
THE WAY
FORWARD
New facts and a new state of affairs have emerged
in Cyprus as a result of the referenda of 24 April 2004. The international
community cannot now ignore the changing paradigms in Cyprus,
which call for the development of new policies and strategies
to match the new needs.
Among the elements of the new facts and the
new state of affairs could be listed the following:
— The two peoples of the Island are
qualified to, and are capable of exercising their separate inherent
constitutive powers as we have seen in the recent referenda.
— In exercising their equal constitutive
powers, each party represented itself and no other.
— The Turkish Cypriot side supported
the Secretary-General's Plan, which foresaw a bi-zonal, bi-national
partnership, by a majority of 6,500, while the Greek Cypriot side
refused the partnership plan by a majority of 7,600. This result
has made the Secretary-General's Plan null and void[76]
— The Greek Cypriot vision of a Greek
Cypriot-dominated Cyprus has not changed. Accordingly, the Greek
Cypriot side is continuing to resort to every means and argument
in order to undermine the principles of bizonality, bi-communality
and political equality that are the agreed pillars of a new partnership
settlement. In this regard, the emotional pre-referenda address
of Tassos Papadopoulos was in essence a challenge against bizonality,
political equality and the "virgin birth" approach under
the guise of "functionality"; and against the Treaties
of Guarantee and of Alliance under the guise of "security".
— The referenda results have shown
without doubt that even after so many years of concentrated effort
by the international community the Greek Cypriot side does not
believe in partnership and does not respect the political equality
of the Turkish Cypriot people. Since an imposed partnership is
not an option, the onus is now on the UN and the international
community to free the Turkish Cypriot side from the yoke of Greek
Cypriots.
— The Greek Cypriot argument based
on the "state of necessity" principle lost whatever
ground it had since it has become obvious that it was, and is,
the Greek Cypriot side that has been contributing to the continuation
of the abnormal situation.
— It has now become obvious that what
was the partnership "Republic of Cyprus" has in fact
turned into the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus in which the
Turkish Cypriot people, as an equal corporate body, is no longer
a partner or a party.
— It became clear that the intransigent
side in Cyprus is not the Turkish Cypriot side and also that the
Greek Cypriot side has no ground to hold the Turkish Cypriot side
hostage under international isolation.
— It became evident that the absence
of a level-playing field, and the one-sided conditionality applied
by the European Union, have contributed to the intransigence of
the Greek Cypriot side and have prevented the reaching of a negotiated
settlement.
— It became visible that the Turkish
Cypriot side has been subjected to injustice and discrimination
since 1963.
— The Turkish Cypriot side and the
international community lost more confidence in the Greek Cypriot
side which failed to keep its promise that it would support the
Secretary-General's Plan for a settlement by 1 May 2004 if its
EU membership process was kept on track.
— It became obvious that it is in fact
the Turkish Cypriot side that is confronted with real security
and political threats and that needs more safeguards and guarantees
against the Greek Cypriot side which is obsessed with the vision
of dominating the island.
— The unilateral EU membership of the
Greek Cypriot side has further strengthened their hand thus contributing
to the asymmetry of power between the two sides and further undermining
the chances of fair negotiation.
These new circumstances and realities can now
frustrate or act as a catalyst for opening the door for a new
analysis and for new strategies/remedies. The international community,
especially the United Nations and leading nations, can capitalise
on this new opportunity to bring stability and sustainable resolution
to Cyprus. No doubt this will require leadership and bold steps,
among which could be the following:
— The international community to change
the game plan and paradigms surrounding the Cyprus issue by levelling
the playing field and empowering the equal status and legitimacy
of the Turkish Cypriot polity. Turkish Cypriots should not be
kept under international isolation for no fault of their own.
There can be no movement on the Cyprus issue without creating
a cost for the Greek Cypriot side.
— The international community to free
the Turkish Cypriot people from subordination to the Greek Cypriot
side by ending all economic, social and political embargoes that
have been unjustly applied on them since 1963. The Turkish Cypriot
side is expecting the international community to fulfil its commitment
following the referenda results of 24 April 2004 that the international
isolation of the Turkish Cypriot side would end and that all restrictions
(embargoes) on North Cyprus would be removed. It is pertinent,
in this regard, to recall some of the remarks made by international
personalities and organizations:
"I applaud the Turkish
Cypriots who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant
sacrifices that it entailed for many of them . . . (I) hope that
ways will be found to ease the plight in which the people find
themselves through no fault of their own." (UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, 24 April 2004.)
"The Turkish Government
displayed great courage. The Turkish Cypriots did, as well, on
voting for it (Secretary-General's Plan). And so, I think there
should be some benefits to the Turkish Cypriots for having voted
`yes' for this Plan." (US Secretary of State Cohn Powell,
interview with the press, 26 April 2004.)
"Turkish Cypriots must
not be punished because of this result . . . Now we have to end
the isolation on the North. The (EU) Commission is ready to take
various measures for that aim." (Gunther Verheugen, EU
Enlargement Commissioner, 26 April 2004.)
"I think it is important,
as I indicated to the Prime Minister, that we end the Isolation
of Northern Cyprus . . . We made it clear we must act now to end
the isolation of Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargoes
in respect to trade, in respect to air travel." (Tony
Blair, Prime Minister of the UK, during his visit to Turkey, 18
May 2004.)
"The International community
and in particular the Council of Europe and the European Union
cannot ignore or betray the expressed desire of the majority of
Turkish Cypriots for greater openness and should take rapid and
appropriate steps to encourage it. The Turkish Cypriots' international
isolation must cease?" (The European Parliamentary Assembly
Resolution no.1376(2004).
"I would hope that the
members of the Council can give a strong lead to all States to
cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate
unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of
isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development
. . ." (The Secretary-General's Report on his Mission
of Good Offices in Cyprus to the Security Council, 28 May 2004,8/2004/437,
p.2).
— The United Nation to revisit the
UN Security Council resolutions regarding Cyprus. This is necessary
in view of the new state of affairs in order to ensure that the
Turkish Cypriots are not subordinate to Greek Cypriots or their
political authority and in order to ensure that they are not left
in international isolation and deprived of their rights due to
the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Secretary-General's partnership
plan.
— European Institutions to look for
ways to empower the Turkish Cypriot Administration as the authority
that exercises effective control over North Cyprus. Protocol No
10 of the 2003 Act of Accession stipulated that the Greek Cypriot
Administration does not exercise effective control over North
Cyprus. In fact the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus,
and the state of affairs created thereof, does not allow either
the Greek Cypriot community/partner or the Turkish Cypriot community/partner
to exercise control or authority over the other, or to represent
the other. Each community/partner elect their own representatives.
— The European Union to take all necessary
steps to put an end to the unjustified embargoes and give effect
to measures to connect the Turkish Cypriot people with the rest
of the World. It must be remembered that part of the restrictions
on Turkish Cypriots were dicated in the decisions of the European
Court of Justice in the Anastasiou cases where the rationale stemmed
from the lack of ability to cooperate with the Authorities in
North Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots must have a closer and direct cooperation
with European Union institutions and must not be deprived of the
advantages conferred by EU Treaties.
— The European Union and the Member
States to establish direct contacts with North Cyprus. Strictly
speaking, under the circumstances described in this paper, the
emergence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been
the result of necessity and, as such, recognition is the right
of the state that emerged, resting on the free and democratic
choice of the Turkish Cypriot people. But, this is not the issue
here. The issue is that the Greek Cypriot side does not have the
right to be the government of the Turkish Cypriots in North Cyprus
and therefore, a formula has to be found to allow for direct contacts
with, and equal opportunities to, the Turkish Cypriot polity,
without subordinating it in any way to the Greek Cypriot polity.
The non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
should not therefore prevent direct contacts with the Turkish
Cypriot side. In fact, in the case of Taiwan, the European Union
had developed modalities through contacts at the "administrative
level" to facilitate trade. Furthermore, the authenticity
of North Cyprus documents could be checked by European Commission
authorities and not by the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Council
Regulation defining the terms under which the provisions of EU
law will apply to the green line between the two sides in Cyprus
is far from meeting the legitimate interests of the Turkish Cypriot
side and the new realities on the island following the referenda
on 24 April 2004. It is imperative that the direct trade and financial
aid Regulations prepared by the EU Commission go through as proposed
by the Commission.
The European Union to provide technical
assistance in upgrading Gazimagosa Port and help in preparing
the ground so that newly furbished Ercan Airport could be opened
for international traffic. All these could be done in full compliance
with the related acquis with the proviso that this will not be
used in any other way than for economic development of North Cyprus.
— The European Union should provide
financial and technical assistance for the development of physical
and social infra-structural projects, including projects in the
electricity sector and a major skills development program to train
qualified personnel for the tourism sector. The EU could also
provide technical assistance to the Turkish Cypriot side in project
preparation, undertaking, feasibility studies and application
for aid from EU structural and regional funds. Turkish Cypriot
citizens and Turkish Cypriot companies registered in North Cyprus
should be able to tender for EU funded projects. Any assistance
coming from the EU or from international funds should not be linked,
directly or indirectly, to the outstanding property issue.
— The European Union to accept Turkish
Cypriot certification to facilitate free movement of peoples and
goods. The assistance of the EU to open direct mail, telephone
and electronic links between North Cyprus and EU as well as the
rest of the World will also provide a major step towards the ending
of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people who have proven
their readiness to be the part of the EU and the World.
— The European Union to open an Office
in North Cyprus to facilitate direct relations. Such an Office
should also provide technical assistance for harmonization with
the acquis. It should also function as a Paying and Audit Agent
to facilitate transfer of EU funds for the economic development
of the Turkish Cypriot people.
The Turkish Cypriot side could itself contribute
to efforts to bring stability and resolution by doing, among other
things, the following:
— Initiate a process, together with
the European Union Commission, to harmonise the Turkish Cypriot
legal, economic and political system with the European Union acquis.
— Reorganise its administrative and
legal infrastructure in order to improve efficiency and compatibility
with EU and international norms.
— Assist in combating illegal immigration,
terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering as well as other
threats to public order and public/international security.
— Create effective domestic remedies
in North Cyprus especially as regards issues relating to property
and public order.
— Look forward to a new cooperative
relationship with the Greek Cypriot side on all issues as two
good neighbours and as the two co-owners of the Island.
— Make sure that the territory under
its control continues not to be used for any subversive or terrorist
activity against the Greek Cypriot side or any other neighbouring
country.
— Work towards a customs union agreement
with the Greek Cypriot side and with Turkey in parallel with its
harmonisation process with the European Union.
— Remain committed to settling the
outstanding property issue in a way that would satisfactorily
compensate legitimate property owners.
CONCLUSION
As also stated by the United Nations Secretary-General
on several occasions, a balanced comprehensive settlement plan
for Cyprus requires visionary and bold political leadership on
both sides of the island, as well as in Turkey and Greece, all
of which have to be in place at the same time and to actively
engage in the resolution process with determination in order to
secure the needed balanced compromises for settlement. They all
have to work hard to convince their respective peoples of the
needed compromises and the benefits of a partnership settlement.
While the political leadership in Turkey, the Turkish Cypriot
side and to some extent Greece demonstrated that they were ready
to grasp the opportunity, the political leadership on the Greek
Cypriot side remained in the grip of selfish ethno-nationalism
in spite of a concentrated effort by the international community,
including some heavy weights like the USA, the EU and Britain.
With his track record as a leading nationalist, I do not think
that the Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos can now change
his vision for a Greek Cypriot dominated Ilellenic Cyprus and
can look upon the Turkish Cypriots as co-owners of the island
and their equal partners in partnership.
The sheer size of the Greek Cypriot "no"
vote raises fundamental questions and has significant implications,
considering that this was the first time that the Greek Cypriot
public was being asked to vote on a bi-communal, bi-zonal partnership
solution of the problem. The referenda results have shown without
doubt that the outstanding majority of Greek Cypriots are calling
into question many fundamental aspects of the Secretary-General's
Plan, a culmination of decades of negotiation, including those
provisions which translated the political equality of the Turkish
Cypriot people into practical terms, bi-zonality, security arrangements
and the virgin birth approach. The "virgin birth" design
of the Plan allowed each side to maintain its position on how
the new state of affairs would come into being since both sides
rejected the sole continuity of the other. In his broadcast speech
on 7 April 2004 before the referenda, Tassos Papadopoulos was
very clear in his challenge to the complete philosophy and fundamental
aspects of the Plan when he said:
"We are asked to dissolve the Republic of
Cyprus, the only security of our people, the only shield and guarantee
of our historic physiognomy—to dissolve our internationally
recognised state entity exactly at the very moment this is reinforced
through our accession to the European Union I have received a
state that was internationally recognised. I will not hand it
over as a community, without the right to speak internationally.
. .".
This statement alone reveals the true intentions
of Mr Papadopoulos and his supporters who have commanded the 76%
majority. This fact alone entitles Turkish Cypriots to reconsider
their position about entrusting their fate in Greek Cypriots,
even in the context of a new bi-zonal partnership settlement.
It is therefore time for both Turkish Cypriot authorities and
the international community to start considering and promoting
the "next best alternative" (BATNA)[77]
for the Turkish Cypriot people, bearing in mind that the Turkish
Cypriots cannot give up their distinct identity, political equality,
the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, and the needed bi-zonality
which, together, are essential for their physical, political and
economic survival and security. The existence of a strong Turkish
Cypriot BATNA could also deter the Greek Cypriot side, as also
pointed out by Prof. Tozun Bahçeli, from pursuing zero-sum
strategies and could re-generate mutual interest in partnership
based on real political equality.
I would argue that the main reason for the failure
of the repeated peacemaking initiatives in Cyprus could be traced
to deficiencies in process design. The burden of this shortcoming
cannot wholly be placed on the shoulder of the United Nations
Secretary-General or his staff. Major international players, including
the EU, have contributed to this failure and to the biased circumstances
that conditioned the relations of the international community
with the two sides. The ignoring of the rule of law regarding
Cyprus also contributed to the deficiencies in the process design.
For its part, the EU blatantly failed in benefiting from its catalytic
capacity in Cyprus and accession was realised without a settlement
and under the "time-bomb" claim that the Greek Cypriot
administration represents the whole island. Overall, processes
were initiated at times that did not match with the existence
of a mutually perceived notion of deadlock (mutually hurting stalemate);
enough attention was not paid to the need for a level and fair
playing field (Turkish Cypriots had to negotiate under embargoes
and the claim that the Greek Cypriot authorities represented the
whole of Cyprus); windows of opportunity (like the EU membership
of Cyprus) that could have equally induced the parties for settlement
were mishandled; the root causes of the Cyprus issue were not
adequately analysed and addressed; and so-called "confidence
building measures" were put into practice that amounted to
the dependence, and even subordination of the Turkish Cypriot
side on the Greek Cypriot side (like the EU asking Turkish Cypriots
to export their goods through Greek Cypriot ports) rather than
promoting confidence-building through interdependence—an
essential requirement of partnership.
To re-open the door for settlement, I would
therefore suggest as a starter that the shortcomings that have
undermined the negotiation processes so far be remedied—starting
with the lifting of all embargoes on North Cyprus, and, parallel
to this the political empowerment of the Turkish Cypriot side
as an equal party in Cyprus.
As the UN Secretary-General has pointed out
in his 28 May 2004 Report, the Greek Cypriot leadership is challenging
the fundamental aspects of his bi-communal, bi-zonal partnership
plan and there is no justification under these circumstances for
isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.
The Greek Cypriots must be stopped from holding the Turkish Cypriot
people their political and economic hostage.
Finally, I would argue that we cannot develop
policies and strategies regarding Cyprus in isolation of Turkey
and Greece and the region as a whole. It will not suffice to contain
or seemingly solve the problem of Cyprus without taking into account
the realities of the island and of the volatile region Cyprus
finds itself in between Europe and the Middle East, as well as,
of course, the reality that Greek Cypriots have connections to
Greece and Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. The partnership option
of the two equal peoples still seems the best opportunity for
Cyprus, but for this option to be realised we must make absolutely
sure, in the spirit of partnership and for reasons of balance
and sustainability, that neither side is subordinate to the other
in the setting up of the partnership and in its functioning. The
realisation of this vision will not be possible unless there is
island-wide and international consensus on the magnitude and significance
of what we are trying to achieve. This necessitates an appreciation
of the island-wide, regional and global benefits that partnership
between the two peoples and cultures of the island would bring.
For the island, this would mean peace, security, stability, prosperity
and synergy; at the regional and global level, it would mean the
cooperation and partnership of two civilizations that some people
have recently chosen to condemn to perpetual obscurity through
the dogma called "clash of civilizations". Only an international
community acting in unison has the political force to achieve
this vision. But, in the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot people
must be freed from being the hostages of the Greek Cypriot side
and must be treated, as a polity, at par with the Greek Cypriot
polity. Put differently, the Greek Cypriot side must be prevented
from using its unjustly and illegitimately acquired weight in
Brussels to further hurt its ex-equal partner, the Turkish Cypriot
people, and to settle scores with its neighbour, Turkey.
M Ergun Olgun
4 October 2004
69 Paragraphs 218 and 219 of the UN Secretary-General's
report of 10 September 1964 Back
70
On 4th July 1992, the EC Arbitration Commission found that the
federal institutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) were incapable of functioning as originally designed in
the Yugoslav Constitution and that the SFRY should therefore be
considered to have dissolved and ceased to exist. The Arbitration
Commission also found that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) could not be considered to be the continuity of the SFRY. Back
71
UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council dated 29
July 1965, paragraphs 7-11. Back
72
Chrystomides, Kypros, The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International
Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000). Back
73
Dr. Kudret Ozersay, The Doctrine of State Necessity and the Republic
of Cyprus (unpublished report). Back
74
"Bitter Lemons The Search for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem",
British Helsinki Human Rights Group, www.bhhrg.org, p 18 Back
75
UN Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council dated 28
May 2004, para 8. Back
76
The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 31 March 2004,
Annex IX: Coming. Back
77
Fisher, Roger & William Ury, Getting to Yes, Negotiating an
agreement without giving in (Arrow Business Books, 1996), pp 104-111. Back
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