Further written evidence submitted by
Professor Clement Dodd
CYPRUS UPDATE:
TURKEY'S
EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS
AND CYPRUS
The referenda on the UN Plan on the 24 April
2004 resulted in its rejection by the South. Subsequently, little
of note immediately occurred on the island, though it became easier
for goods to cross the Green Line, and all EU citizens could cross
from one side to the other regardless of which port, or airport,
they had used. More Turkish Cypriots, and Turks, began to work
in the South, in the building and other industries, but there
was also a large demand for labour in the North, where the building
boom really got under way, mainly supplying holiday, or permanent,
homes for foreigners, chiefly British, often built on former Greek
Cypriot land. The property regime in the UN Plan, should it be
revived, would not prevent this development, while the demise
of the Plan seemed to promise even greater freedom in the use
of former Greek Cypriot property. With this capital inflow, with
EU grants for public works, with an increase in numbers of foreign
tourists, and with the money earned in the South, the Turkish
Cypriots began to look and feel richer.
In politics the popularity of the Prime Minister,
Mehmet Ali Talat, and his coalition government with the small
Democratic Party under Serdar Denktash the President's son. was
maintained for a while. Having said "yes" in the referendum
the Turkish Cypriots found that, for the first time, they were
popular in the world. It helped Talat that the EU Council of Ministers
made a statement (on 26 April 2004) that envisaged opening up
trade directly with the North. This reflected the view that the
Turkish Cypriots should no longer suffer under embargoes. The
EU also proposed a grant of 259 Million euros for the North and
began to seek ways, still continuing, to put into effect its desire
to free trade, including tourism, through the Turkish Cypriot
ports and airport. In a visit to Cyprus in October, the British
Minister for Europe, Mr Denis MacShane, said, "We are committed
to ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, to reducing the
economic gap between the two communities . . . We believe this
to be a key element of keeping alive the prospect of reunification".
That Talat's government now no longer insisted
on recognition for the TRNC was welcomed by the international
community, but criticised by the Turkish Cypriot political opposition
as the greatest of errors. That, in the face of Greek Cypriot
opposition, nothing has as yet been achieved to free commerce
has affected Talat's popularity, though his now increasingly expressed
disillusion with the Greek Cypriots is to some degree helping
him to sustain support. A pre-election poll in late December 2004
showed that 31% of the public would vote for Talat's party, with
only 15% for Eroglu's National Unity Party, but 15% were undecided.
On 20 October 2004 defections from the coalition
parties finally forced the government to resign. Neither Talat,
nor Eroglu, was able to form a new coalition. New parliamentary
elections are forecast for February 2005. There will be a new
presidential election in April 2005, in which President Denktash
has stated he will not be a candidate.
In the South a good deal of attention was paid
by the Government to justifying its rejection of the referendum,
This was accompanied by determination to explore all legal means
through the EU to prevent the opening up of Turkish Cypriot ports
and the airport. In addition, the Greek Cypriot Government claimed
the right to participate in the disbursement of the EU funds to
be made available to the North, There were also accusations in
the South that US aid had been used to influence Greek Cypriots
to approve of the UN Plan. This, and a warning to the Greek Cypriots
by the previous American Cyprus envoy, Thomas Weston, not to veto,
on 17 December, Turkey's application for EU accession negotiations
has soured relations with the United States,
The Greek Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos,
declared that his government would only make its decision about
a veto at the last minute. In connection with the rejection of
the UN Plan he demanded, inter alia, that Turkish troops should
immediately withdraw from Cyprus. Much more seriously, the Greek
Cypriot Government began to insist that Turkey had to recognise
it as the "Government of the Republic of Cyprus". This
highlighted a major problem for Ankara. In many quarters in the
EU it is maintained that Turkey cannot hope to become a member
of the EU if it does not sometime recognise the Greek Cypriot
Government as the rightful Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
Turkey has already recognised the state established as the "Republic
of Cyprus": it did so in 1960, when the international treaties
were signed that established the new republic. The Greek Cypriot
Government cannot legitimately claim to be the government of the
Republic of Cyprus as established if only because its government
does not include Turkish Cypriots, as required in the 1960 Constitution.
Greek Cypriot insistence on the sine qua non
of the recognition of their government by Turkey has roused the
Turkish Cypriots to a realisation of the dangers they face. Talat
recently declared that the Greek Cypriots want Turkey to agree
"that the north of Cyprus is, in fact, a local administration
of Turkey". More important, on 2 December 2004, the Turkish
Cypriot parties in parliament unanimously agreed as follows: "The
TRNC parliament believes that it is vital to underline that it
is not the Greek Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus (which
exists in defiance of the 1960 partnership agreement) that is
to be recognised, but a new joint polity in which the Turkish
Cypriot people takes its place as a political equal."
This significant show of unity by all the political
parties was matched by the declaration by the Turkish Foreign
Minister, Abdullah Gul, that there would be no recognition before
a solution. This was followed by a statement by the Prime Minister,
Tayyip Erdogan that the EU could not now use new pressure with
regard to Cyprus. He said that there was no question of Turkey
taking new moves on this issue before 17 December. President Denktashh
declared himself very satisfied with this stance. This rejection
of further pressure was followed by an important meeting of Turkish
and Turkish Cypriot leaders in Ankara on 3 December. Authoritative
sources reported that there was agreement that, for Turkey and
the TRNC, recognition of the "Government of Cyprus"
had to form part of a solution arrived at in the context of the
good offices" mission of the UN Secretary-General.
After a lecture in Turkey at this time by President
Denktashh on the Cyprus issue to an audience containing members
of all political parties, the prolonged standing ovation he received
spoke volumes for the depth of Turkish support for the Turkish
Cypriots. The Government has to take note.
The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
These momentous developments coincided with
an investigation into the Cyprus issue by the House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of the Rt Hon.
Donald Anderson[103]
The Committee's Report is planned to appear in early 2005, so
there will be some time for evaluation of the position after the
17 December decision on Turkey's accession negotiations. The examination
of witnesses and the Committee's visit to Cyprus occurred, however,
before the European Council's decision.
A thoroughgoing analysis of the Committee's
work must, of course, await its Report, but it is interesting
to note the trend of the Committee's deliberations from the questions
put to witnesses. To date, a major concern has been whether the
UN (Annan Plan could be revived, in particular whether the Greek
Cypriots could be brought on board. Greek Cypriot objections to
the Plan therefore were given some prominence, notably on the
scheme of demilitarisation, the place in Cyprus of the Turkish
immigrants (the so-called "settlers"), and the fear
that Turkey would in the end not really allow the UN Plan to be
implemented. Referendum exit polls in the South showed three-quarters
of those voting "no" did so for security reasons, this
apparently indicating that they were afraid Turkey would not implement
the troop reductions in the Plan, and that the maintenance of
the 1960 system of guarantees, with the right, under certain circumstances,
of intervention, would allow Turkey to intervene again[104]
Another important topic in questions posed to
witnesses was the issue of opening up international, particularly
EU, trade for the Turkish Cypriots, with considerable emphasis
on the need for the direct air flights that would be the real
boost for the Turkish Cypriot tourist industry. Greek Cypriot
legal and other objections were explored. There was also a certain
amount of discussion of recent history. the unwisdom, for instance,
of allowing the "Republic of Cyprus" into the EU before
a settlement. By their questions the Committee members showed
that they were well apprised of the situation. Six witnesses were
examined, but the absence of a well-informed Turkish Cypriot witness
was noted with dismay by members of Britain's large Turkish Cypriot
community who attended the hearings[105]
In this brief article only a few major, or striking,
points made by the witnesses can be mentioned. In this regard
it was interesting that Dr Savvides believed that the Greek Cypriot
could be brought back to the Plan. It would have been useful to
have had a Turkish Cypriot view on whether in another vote the
Turkish Cypriots would still be in favour now that the Greek Cypriots
have revealed, as some would say, their true colours. Lord Hannay
was critical of both Denktash and Papadopoulos. In particular,
he claimed that President Denktash was responsible for Turkish
Cypriot rejection of the UN Plan in late 2002 at Copenhagen, and
again in The Hague in March 2003, though, it has to be said, on
both occasions the Greek Cypriots could confidently hide behind
the anticipated Turkish Cypriot rejection. However, more important,
are the reasons for the Turkish Cypriot rejection of the Plan.
Lord Hannay's ad hominem approach is inadequate for an understanding
of the situation. In his Report (1 April 2003) on the failure
of negotiations the UN Secretary-General came close to the realities
of the situation when he wrote:
Mr Denktashh would not accept that the exercise
was the writing of a new constitution for the existing, internationally
recognized and continuing Republic of Cyprus, to transform it
into a bi-cameral, bi-zonal federation, the Turkish Cypriot community
essentially being reintegrated into that state. Mr Clerides would
not accept that the exercise was the founding of a new state by
two pre-existing sovereign states or entities, which devolved
some of their sovereignty to that state , but otherwise retained
sovereignty in their hands (Para. 66).
The Minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, agreed
with the Chairman that the referendums marked the best possibility
of uniting the island since 1974. A major area of questioning
was the possibility of opening up the Turkish Cypriot ports and
airport to direct trade with the EU under EU rules. Mr MacShane
noted that any member state, if it so chose, or any individual
ship owner, could sail into any port in Cyprus, but what Britain
was arguing for was "a new trade regulation that allows the
normal governmental trading rules of the EU to be extended to
the northern part of the island". The problem was that as
an EU member-state Cyprus could veto such a proposal, since unanimity
was required. On the important issue of direct flights to Northern
Cyprus, it was pointed out that under the terms of the Chicago
Convention an airport had to be designated as "an airport
suitable for receiving international flights by the government
of the territory in which the airport is found". On the disbursement
of the 259 million euros promised by the EU to Northern Cyprus,
the Cyprus Government was arguing that it had a particular interest,
and right, in how the grant was to be disbursed, though the British
Government believed it should be directly disbursed in the North.
The assumption that nothing immediate could be done because of
the threat of a Greek Cypriot veto prompted one member of the
Committee to suggest that the Greek Cypriot veto was a "paper
tiger", and that the British Government needed to pursue
a more robust attitude towards the Greek Cypriots. In response
the Minister admitted astonishment "at the sound of my own
diplomatic weasely voice", but preferred not "to go
down the rip-roaring road of upping the ante". One road down
which the Minister did not intend to go was recognition of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
Why, one needs ask, this constant British position
on non-recognition, a position stressed also by the UN Secretary-General
in his, yet to be presented, report on the failure of the UN Plan?
The usual reply is that partition was not allowed by the 1960
treaties, but then, as mentioned above, neither was the rule of
the Greek Cypriots as the Republic of Cyprus without the participation
of the Turkish Cypriots in accordance with the internationally
guaranteed 1960 Constitution. In 1964 the British Government,
in an aide memoire to the UN Secretary-General, made this point:
"H.M.G.'s view is that until such time as
the Constitution of Cyprus and the Agreements are amended through
negotiation and with the consent of all parties, the government
of the Republic of Cyprus, the Guarantor powers and the United
Nations as a whole have no alternative but to conduct their activities
in accordance with the Constitution and with the Agreements"[106]
The Permanent Representative of Turkey wrote
to the UN Security Council underlining this point on 21 December
2000. The real reasons for the "recognition" of the
Greek Cypriot Government as the Government of Cyprus are political,
not legal. Britain did not persist in defending the Constitution
that formed part of the 1960 Treaties because the security of
the British bases, at a time of danger in the Middle East, was
a more serious concern than the status of the Turkish Cypriots.
Also, a great deal of pro-Greek Cypriot pressure was brought to
bear on the UN by the non-aligned states, and by the Soviet Union
and its satellites. In this way the Greek Cypriot Government came
gradually to be treated as the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
The EU followed suit, thus creating the present difficulty for
Turkey over recognition of the Greek Cypriot Government's clearly
illegitimate claim to sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots.
On 17 December 2004 Turkey was given a date
(3 October 2005) for the beginning of EU accession negotiations.
There was no Greek Cypriot veto, and no Turkish recognition of
the Greek Cypriot "Government of Cyprus". Turkey agreed
to sign only a modified protocol extending its customs union with
the EU to the new member states, including Cyprus. There will
be pressure to have the situation clarified by 3 October. The
Greek Cypriots will undoubtedly seek to extract more concessions
from the Turkish Cypriots in any attempt that is made to obtain
a settlement by reviving the UN Plan.
Professor Clement Dodd
Professorial Research Associate,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London
103 The other members of the Committee were Mr David
Chidgey, Mr Fabian Hamilton, Mr Eric Illsley. the Rt Hon Andrew
Mackay, Mr Andrew Mackinlay, Mr John Maples, Mr Bill Olner, Mr
Greg Pope. the Rt Hon Sir John Stanley and Ms Gisela Stuart. Back
104
Information taken from the "Friends of Cyprus Submission
to the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry", September 2004,
published in their Report, No.47, Autumn, 2004, p 8. Back
105
The witnesses examined were Dr Philippos Savvides, a Greek Cypriot
Research Fellow working in Athens, Mr Christopher Brewin, Senior
Lecturer in the University of Keele, Lord Hannay of Chiswick.
formerly British Special Representative for Cyprus, Mr Ozdem Sanberk,
formerly Turkish Ambassador in London, the Rt Hon Denis MacShane,
MP, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (accompanied
by Mr Dominick Chilcott, Director for Europe, F&CO), and Mr
Pierre Mirel, Director-General for Enlargement, European Commission.
Mr Sanberk said that he was not an expert on Northern Cyprus. Back
106
Aide Memoire from the UK Mission to the United Nations, New York,
4 March 1964. Back
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