Written evidence submitted by National
The National Unity Party is the largest single
Party in the Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,
holding 19 of the 50 seats.
The Select Committee will have received a large
amount of detailed evidence in the course of the Inquiry. The
purpose of this submission is to summarise what we consider to
be the most important points.
The most important point in our view is that
the Committee should not consider itself bound by any pre-existing
policies, statements, resolutions or positions, but should examine
the Cyprus question ab initio. It should in particular be willing
to challenge the Executive branch of government in Britain, and
to challenge the EU, the United Nations, and any other institution
whose policy is or might be wrong.
It is necessary to be quite clear that Cyprus
is not and never has been since independence a single body politic
with a majority and a minority. There are more Greek Cypriots
than Turkish Cypriots but they were both recognised from the very
beginning of the Republic of Cyprus in 1980, by its Constitution
and founding Treaties as being two separate peoples, each with
its own basic rights and obligations.
This fundamental reality in Cyprus has since
been recognised by successive Secretaries-General of the United
Nations, and most recently in the Annan Plan of March 2004
in which it was expressly acknowledged that the relationship between
the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots is not one of majority
and minority but of political equality where neither side may
claim authority or jurisdiction over the other"
Cyprus has never been part of Greece, and is
250 miles from the nearest Greek island. Turkey is only 40 miles
This is not a theoretical question. It is of
the utmost importance because the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot
Administration as if it were the Government of Cyprus has shut
the Turkish Cypriots out of all formal channels of international
communication so that only the Greek Cypriot side of the story
has been heard. It has enabled the Greek Cypriots to keep the
Turkish Cypriots under a crippling embargo for forty yearn without
any authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The British Government accepted that "Cyprus
Government" could mean only a government which acts with
the concurrence of its Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members."
There has been no concurrence since 1963, when the institutions
of the Republic were destroyed by force of Greek Cypriot arms.
In 1963 the Greek Cypriots refused to accept
the decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus
in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, and their armed attack upon
the Turkish Cypriots began. They argued that the 1960 Constitution
was unworkable, but that did not of course justify their resort
to violence. In any event Glafcos Clerides, later to be the Greek
Cypriot President, confirms in his memoirs
that unworkability could not be established.
We will not examine in detail here the massacres
of Turkish Cypriots which took place at Christmas 1963 and in
1964, as they are so well documented in the newspaper reports
at the time
and there are many survivors still alive and willing to testify.
Suffice it to say here that Sir Alec Douglas-Home recorded
his opinion that if the Greek Cypriots could not treat the Turkish
Cypriots as human beings they were inviting the invasion and partition
of the island.
Likewise, the American Under-Secretary of State,
George Ball, said in his own memoirs,
that the central interest of the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios,
"was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his
Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots.
Prof Michael Moran, of Sussex University, made
the following diagnosis of Greek Cypriot attitudes:
"It was because they were under a kind of ideological spell,
a collective mental condition similar to what Marxists used to
call "false-consciousness" that the Greek Cypriots could
embark upon their particular course of action in December 1963
with all the zeal and confidence they did.
Brainwashed through at least a hundred years
of school-teaching and sermonising into a set of beliefs pathologically
at odds with any plausible account of historical and political
realities; lacking contact with a counterbalancing tradition of
rational criticism; for the most part incapable of ironic scepticism
towards theological obfuscationthe Greek Cypriot leaders
were effectively de-sensitised to the equally important rights
of the Turkish Cypriots. In this way they were able to treat their
Turkish compatriots with such consistent and irrational abuse,
hardly noticing that this was in fact what they were doing."
The Greek Cypriot author, Antonis Angastinlyotis
made a documentary film in September 2004 called "The Voice
of Blood" about the events of 1963/64 which the Select Committee
should certainly see. He cannot get it broadcast in South Cyprus
or Greece, and he is now being persecuted. We would suggest that
the Committee asks to see him whilst in South Cyprus, but in all
probability some excuse will be made by the Greek Cypriot Administration
to prevent such a meeting.
We think it very important that the Committee
do not accept the Greek Cypriot claim that both sides were to
blame for the violence, and that the Turkish Cypriots simply withdrew
from their positions in the Republic. There was in fact a systematic
attempt by the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership
to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their basic rights, and in
many cases of their lives as well.
The Select Committee itself said in its 1987
report on Cyprus
"There is little doubt that much of the violence which the
Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or partial destruction
of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a quarter
of the total Turkish Cypriot population, was either directly inspired
by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership".
The Committee continued
"The effect of the crisis of December 1963 was to deliver
control of the formal organs of Government into the hands of the
Greek Cypriots alone.
And at para. 30 "Equally damaging from
the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they considered to
be their effective exclusion from representation at and participation
in, the international fora where their case could have been deployed.
The acceptance at this time by the United Nations and most other
international organisations of the legality of what had become
an exclusively Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole Government
of the Republic of Cyprus is the source of continuing intense
bitterness amongst Turkish Cypriot leaders. "An official
Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene
virtually disappeared overnight."
The Greek Cypriots have sought to rely on necessityfor
if the Turkish Cypriots withdrew, what option did the Greek Cypriots
have but to govern alone? Such a doctrine has no application here,
for the Greek Cypriots expelled the Turkish Cypriots and created
the necessity themselves. The reverse however is true, that the
Turkish Cypriots having been expelled, had of necessity to establish
their own State, and it was quite wrong for Britain and the UN
to refuse to accept it in 1983.
The Select Committee reported unanimously in
that, "Although the Cyprus Government now claims to have
been seeking to "operate the 1960 Constitution modified to
the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation"
this claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events
of December 1963 the Makarios Government continued to advocate
the cause of ENOSIS [annexation to Greece] and actively pursued
the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to
facilitate this ultimate objective. In February 1966 Makarios
declared that the  Agreements had been abrogated and buried".
The Committee continued: "Moreover in June
1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature unanimously passed a resolution
in favour of ENOSIS, in blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties
Further, the Select Committee found
that "When in July 1965 the Turkish Cypriot members of the
House of Representatives sought to resume their seats they were
told that they could do so only if they accepted the legislative
changes to the operation of the Constitution enacted in their
absence". There can therefore be no substance in the claim
of necessity after July 1965, even if there had been any before.
Moreover, despite the serious risks and huge disadvantages which
the Annan Plan contained, the Turkish Cypriot people voted to
accept it, having been led to believe that it would create a new
partnership of political equalsbut the Greek Cypriots rejected
Although the UK Government deals with the Greek
Cypriot Administration on a day to day basis as if they were the
lawful Government of Cyprus, it does not formally recognise them
as such, for on 25 April 1980 the Secretary of State for Foreign
& Commonwealth Affairs made the following statement:
"We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and
practice concerning the recognition of Governments. This has included
a comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On
the basis of this review we have decided that we shall no longer
accord recognition to Governments. The British Government recognises
States in accordance with common international doctrine."
There is no UN Resolution which confers upon
the Greek Cypriot Administration the status of the Government
of Cyprus. Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 are concerned
with States not Governments, and they say nothing about who is
the government of Cyprus.
Having expelled the Turkish Cypriots from their
positions in the Republic by force, the Greek Cypriot "rump"
of the bi-communal Government set itself up as the Government
of Cyprus. It is difficult to imagine a more profound betrayal
of the Turkish Cypriots and a more serious breach of all the values
for which Britain stands, than this conduct of the Greek Cypriots,
and the acceptance which Britain and other members of the international
community have accorded since then to the Greek Cypriot Administration.
A very serious injustice has been done to the
Turkish Cypriots, which must be remedied without further delay.
The Select Committee should in our view recommend that the UK
Government and the EU should in future deal with the Greek Cypriot
Administration for what it isnamely the Greek Cypriot Government
of Southern Cyprus, with no jurisdiction over Northern Cyprus
nor the people who live there.
The Committee should in our view also find that
the Turkish Cypriots had every right to establish their own State,
and that the British Government should deal with their elected
representatives and officials in all respects.
There is no reason why the international community
should not accept the separation of peoples in Cyprus as they
have done in the former Yugoslavia or East Timor.
The Committee should not accept the Greek Cypriot
claim that Northern Cyprus is a part of the EU which is occupied
by the Turkish Army.
In view of the massacres of Turkish Cypriots
which occurred in 1963-64, 1967, and 1974 and the systematic attempt
to deprive us of all our basic rights during that period, we submit
that Turkey was fully justified in landing troops in 1974, and
should indeed have acted earlier. They had at least as much humanitarian
justification as NATO had in the former Yugoslavia.
It will be remembered that the massacres which
took place in and after March 1964 took place despite the presence
in Cyprus of UN and British troops.
In addition, both Britain and Turkey were bound
by Art 4 of the 1980 Treaty of Guarantee to guarantee the state
of affairs established by the basic articles of the Cyprus Constitution.
This at the very least obliged them to secure to the Turkish Cypriots
the right to remain alive and to live without fear of persecution,
as the political equals of the Greek Cypriots. Britain took no
effective action, despite having been requested by Turkey to take
joint action; so Turkey had to act alone.
The leader of the Greek Cypriot militia in 1974,
one Nicos Sampson, said in 1981
"Had Turkey not intervened I would not only have proclaimed
ENOSISI would have annihilated the Turks of Cyprus."
We have no doubt that he meant what he said, and we have no confidence
that the UN troops could or would have stopped him. Since 1974
Turkish soldiers have remained in Cyprus at the request of the
Turkish Cypriot people as our only effective guarantee that there
would be no more massacres.
The Labour Peer, Lord Willis, who took a particular
interest in Cyprus, said
"Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the
Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit has done just that. In the
12 years since, there have been no killings and no massacres"
In view of what had happened, it was impossible
to reinstate the status quo, but Turkey has since that time worked
hard to secure an agreement between the Turkish Cypriots and the
Greek Cypriots. In March 1988 the Turkish Cypriots accepted the
UN Plan, and most recently accepted the Annan Plan in 2004. The
Greek Cypriots, while appearing to negotiate in good faith have
consistently rejected a settlement.
If the Greek Cypriots had accepted the Annan
Plan, there would have been a phased withdrawal of Turkish troops,
down to a level of 850 men in the North, with 900 Greek troops
in the South, with the likelihood that in time even these would
go. These were merely token force levels, which had been agreed
by all parties at the time of independence. The Greek Cypriots
have no justification for thinking that Turkey would not honour
its commitment to withdraw, because Turkey knows perfectly well
that any such failure would place in serious jeopardy Turkey's
own accession to the European Union.
The UN has never accused Turkey of invading
or occupying Cyprus, and it is in our view quite wrong to regard
Turkish soldiers as an occupying force.
Further, there have been many thousands of Greek
troops in the South for many years, even before 1974, and nobody
has called them an army of occupation.
International interference in the airs of Cyprus
cannot be justified by claiming that the present situation is
a threat to the peace. Greece and Turkey now have a much more
mature relationship, and we think that any talk of war between
them is fanciful. The presence of Turkish soldiers in the North
has meant that there has been no violence in Cyprus for thirty
years, except for isolated border incidents provoked from the
South. However, if the present situation were to change by the
withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the Greek Cypriots had the upper
hand again, we would fear a renewal of violence.
The Plan was internationally recommended as
being a fair solution, and it would be quits wrong to expect the
Turkish Cypriots to make any further concessions. In any event
the Secretary-General was right after the Greek Cypriot rejection
declare us Plan null and void.
The National Unity Party did not support the
Plan, and we do not accept it as a continuing basis for discussion.
We believe that the Turkish Cypriot people took very serious risks
when they voted in April 2004 to accept it. We believe that most
people who voted "yes" did so under a form of duress,
because they saw no future for themselves if the unjust isolation
of their State, and the crippling embargo on their trade and communications
Large amounts of foreign money were poured into
the "yes" camp, and foreign representatives interfered
directly in the campaign. Turkish Cypriots were assured that they
were not voting to abandon their State, nor Turkey's military
guarantee. They were promised that if they voted yes, the way
to Europe would be open to them, and the embargo would be lifted.
This was a cruel deception.
The Turkish Cypriot "yes" vote has
been misinterpreted, and even the UN Secretary-General has claimed
that it indicated that the Turkish Cypriot People do not want
statehood and that they are not interested in the recognition
of their sovereignty and self-determination. Nothing could be
further from the truth.
The Annan Plan contained serious risks and disadvantages
for Turkish Cypriots, for the following reasons:
A. Property Issues
For thirty years Greek Cypriots have been living
in Turkish Cypriot homes in the South and vice-versa. We think
it is inhuman to evict from their homes families who have been
settled for a long period. Until recently Greek Cypriots used
to think only in terms of Turkish Cypriots being evicted so that
Greek Cypriots could return to the North,
but on 24 September 2004 a Turkish Cypriot, Arif Mustafa, won
the right in a Greek Cypriot court to evict the Greek Cypriot
occupants of his house in the South.
Greek Cypriots are now saying
that it is not right to remove a refugee from the home he has
been living in. We agree. The Annan Plan was fundamentally flawed
in this respect. It would have required the eviction of between
70,000 and 100,000 people in the North. There are in addition
Greek Cypriots living in houses on Turkish Cypriot land in the
South. Any settlement in Cyprus should not require these people,
nor their counterparts in the North, to vacate their homes. Justice
can and must be done by formal exchange of properties and equalisation
Former Greek Cypriot Attorney-General Markides
"People must realise that property rights are not absolute
rights. All rights can be restricted or taken away on certain
conditions. This is how roads, schools and hospitals are built.
Sometimes we as heeding towards trouble because we as so absolute
in this country. There we no absolute rights"
The Annan Plan would have taken away from Turkish
Cypriots the effective guarantee of the Turkish army on the ground
in Cyprus. It would have left them reliant upon international
guarantees which have failed them in the past, and upon the goodwill
of the Greek Cypriots, which the referendum result has shown to
Turkish Cypriots are only too well aware of
the massacre of the Moslem people of Srebrenica whilst under international
C. Poutical Organisation
The Annan Plan would have created a "Common
State" legislature, the lower House of which would have been
dominated by the Greek Cypriots. In the upper House it would not
have been difficult for the Greek Cypriots to force through legislation
with far-reaching consequences if they could secure the support,
or the absence, of a very small number of Turkish Cypriot Senators.
Similarly in the Council the Greek Cypriots would have had four
voting seats and the Turkish Cypriots two. If the Greek Cypriots
could secure the temporary support of one of these Turkish Cypriot
Councillors they could have passed whatever they wanted. Reluctant
acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of this political structure could
easily have led to a repeat of the crisis of 1963.
In 1974 the Turkish Cypriot economy was in a
desperate state, and we invited many people from Turkey to come
and help us rebuild it As the economy has grown we have invited
many more to help us sustain it. Many of these people have been
settled in Northern Cyprus for many years, many have married Turkish
Cypriots and their children, and in some cases grandchildren,
were born here.
Britain would not expel its immigrants, and
should not expect us to do so.
The Greek Cypriots have invited many thousands
of Greeks and other nationalities to live in the South and we
make no complaint about that.
Greek Cypriots considered "attempts to
change the demographic structure of the island" acceptable
when they were killing Turkish Cypriots and forcing us to emigrate.
They wish to preserve the numerical disparity in the hope that
one day they can use their superior numbers again to rule the
We invite the members of the Select Committee
to ask themselves what the Turkish Cypriots have done to deserve
crippling restrictions on our trade and communications for forty
On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General
"The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish
Cypriot communities, which in some instances has been so severe
as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government
of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure."
The Greek Cypriot newspaper "Alithia"
wrote on 17th July 1994:
"We [the Greek Cypriots] caused the Turkish
invasion by exerting pressure on the Turkish Cypriots before 1974.
After 1974 we decided to exert more pressure. We imposed on them
an economic embargo. We entertained the hope that the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus would collapse. The consequence of
this has been the deepening of the gap between the two communities,
and we have forced the Turkish Cypriots closer to Turkey."
The Select Committee itself made the following
recommendation in its 1987 Report
"The Greek Cypriot Government's policy
of seeking to impose an embargo on much of the Turkish Cypriots'
trade and communications with the outside world cannot contribute
to a settlement."
We agree. Even if a settlement had been forced
by duress it would not have been a basis for harmony and progress,
but a recipe for further strife in Cyprus.
EU Commissioner Verheugen
said "Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this
[Greek Cypriot referendum] result. We now have to end the isolation
of the North."
The Council of Ministers of the EU said
"The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation
of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification
of Cyprus by encouraging their economic development."
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
that "The Turkish Cypriots' international isolation must
cease." The resolution continued
"The United Nations should consider whether the resolutions
on which the sanctions are based are still justified." The
Assembly is presumably referring here to resolutions 541 and 550
which call for non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, but they do not authorise any sanctions. This can only
be done under Chapter VII of the Charter.
The UN Secretary-General said
"The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring
and isolating them." He said further
that the elimination of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots
would be consistent with Security Council Resolutions 541 and
In 1987 the Select Committee recommended
to the Greek Cypriot Administration that:
(i) Normal postal and telephone services
should be restored between north and south Cyprus and between
north Cyprus and the outside world.
(ii) International commercial air services
should be permitted to the North.
(iii) Ships' Masters who use harbours in
the north should not be subjected to threats of legal penalties
in the South.
All of these recommendations have been ignored
by the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Committee should in our
view reinforce these recommendations, and recommend that the UK
Government removes all restrictions forthwith.
The UK Government has acknowledged
that direct flights from EU member states to Ercan Airport in
Northern Cyprus would be in line with the EU policy, encouraged
by the UN Secretary-General, to end the isolation of the Turkish
Cypriots with a view to reuniting the island.
The UK Prime Minister has declared
"We must act now to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus.
That means lifting the embargos on trade and air travel. There
was a very clear commitment given to the people if they supported
the Annan Plan. They have supported it and we must see that commitment
The UK Government has further acknowledged
that direct air links are a matter for bilateral agreements, not
for the EU. Ercan airport has now been fully upgraded to international
standards, and the UK Government has been asked in Parliament
what (if any) legal impediments, in their opinion, prevent them
authorising direct flights. They have given only generalised replies
As the Select Committee's task is to scrutinise
the policies of the Executive, it should in our view demand to
know exactly what provisions of the Chicago Convention or any
other rule of international law are said to constitute an impediment,
and to ask their own legal experts to examine those provisions.
The fact that the UK Government will not be specific suggests
to us that there is no such impediment.
It is a grave disappointment to the Turkish
Cypriots that this embargo is still in place after they voted
to accept the Annan Plan. It is unacceptable that we should have
to export and import via the South, and we invite the Committee
to reflect on why the Turkish Cypriots should be restricted in
this way. There is no reason why phyto-sanitary and other export
certificates should not be given by Turkish Cypriot officials
or EU officials resident in Northern Cyprus and not accredited
to the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Greeks and Greek Cypriots in the EU should not
be allowed to abuse their position by attempting to block the
dismantling of the embargo, as recommended by the UN Secretary-General,
Commissioner Verheugen, the EU Council, Prime Minister Blair,
and the Select Committee itself. The short answer to any abuse
of veto power should be that the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus could be recognised by member-states if the veto is cast.
Turkish Cypriots do not want to base their future
on subsidies from the international communitywe want to
be free to earn our own living in the world without restrictions.
The international community cannot undo the
grief and misery inflicted upon the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek
Cypriots for 40 years, but it can attempt to compensate them for
the damage to their economy during that time, and to enable them
to compensate people who lost their properties. The sum of 259
million Euros does not even approach the sum required for that
purpose, and even that amount has not yet been paid. It is quite
wrong that the Greek Cypriots should have any say over how grants
in aid to the Turkish Cypriots should be spent.
The EU has created a major problem by admitting
"Cyprus" to the Union in advance of a settlement. The
admission of "Cyprus" without the consent of Turkey
was illegal, as it contravened Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of
In addition, Cyprus being the home of the Turkish Cypriots as
well as the Greek Cypriots, it was quite wrong of the EU to admit
Cyprus without the concurrence of the Turkish Cypriots.
The EU must now be very careful not to allow
entrenched Greek Cypriot and Greek interests to cause further
injustice to the Turkish Cypriots; nor to Turkey, who has done
everything required of it. The EU must always remember that the
Greek Cypriot Administration does not represent the Turkish Cypriot
people of the island, and that the Turkish Cypriots are not allowed
to argue their own case in the institutions of the EU, contrary
to the rules of natural justice recognised in all civilised nations.
The role of the Greek Orthodox Church is hardly
ever mentioned in reports on Cyprus, but we know it to have a
very powerful influence upon the Greek Cypriot people. The church
has always maintained, without any just cause, that Cyprus is
a Greek island, and has dedicated itself, as it did in Crete,
to the removal or death of the ethnic Turkish people. It is no
accident that Makarios was a leader of the Greek Orthodox Church.
Theirs is a racist policy, totally unacceptable
in the modern world, and it has directed and informed the policies
of successive Greek Cypriot leaders since 1955 and even before.
It was the driving force behind the tragedy of 1963-64, and it
continues today. In the referendum campaign of 2004 influential
church leaders were telling the people that if they voted for
the Annan Plan they would go to hell when they died.
A VOICE IN
In our view there is no longer any justification,
if ever there was, for preventing the Turkish Cypriots from arguing
their case fully and freely in all the Councils of the world,
and from becoming members of NGO's and sporting organisations.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
"considers it unfair for the Turkish Cypriot community .
. . to continue to be denied representation in the European political
debate. Such continued isolation may help strengthen the positions
of those who are opposing a unified Cyprus."
The National Unity Party does not however regard
the compromise solution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly
as satisfactory. The Turkish Cypriot representatives should not
be considered part of the "Cypriot" delegation.
The Select Committee should in our view recommend
that all British Governmental and nongovernmental organisations
should establish normal relations with the Turkish Cypriots.
Knowing Cyprus as we do, we do not think that
the political structures envisaged by the Annan Plan could have
worked even with goodwill and tolerance on both sides. The overwhelming
rejection of the Plan by the Greek Cypriots, and the statements
made by their political and religious leaders during the referendum
campaign have shown what we have always knownthat the Greek
Cypriots do not wish to share power with the Turkish Cypriots.
The Secretary-General was right when he said
that they had not only rejected his Plan but the solution itself.
In our view, the way forward is not to seek
a quick-fix settlement such as the Annan Plan, but rather to pursue
an evolutionary process beginning with a confederation between
two separate recognised States in Cyprus. What would begina
confederation might, if given the opportunity, lead in time to
a loose federation, but if even that is unacceptable or unworkable,
a complete separation.
The two peoples of Cyprus should have the opportunity,
as France and Germany have had, to deal with each other as political
equals, each secure in its own sovereign territory, and to find
a way forward on the basis of mutual respect and common interest
The world should stop tying to persuade one or both of them to
accept the unacceptable.
Party Leader, National Unity Party
158 31 March 2004-Main Article iii. Back
FO telegram 1131 of 12 March 1964. Back
Turkish Communal Chamber v Council of Ministers 5 CLR (1963) 59,
77, 78. Back
"Cyprus-My Deposition"-Alithia publishing company, Nicosia,
Summarised in Appdx 2 to the written evidence of President Denkta?
to the Select Committee. See also "The Death of Friendship"
by nurse Turkan Aziz; and "The Cyprus Question" by Michael
Stephen copies of which have been supplied to the Committee. Back
"The Way The Wind B1ows" Collins 1976, page 242. Back
"The Past has Another Pattem" Norton 1982 at p345. Back
"Sovereignty Divided"-1998 p.12. Back
H.C. no. 23 of 1986-87 7 ' May 1987 page xii para. 27. Back
ibid. para. 28. Back
ibid. page xiii para. 31. Back
ibid. (Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee declares prohibited any
action likely to promote directly or indirectly union with any
other state or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2) of the
Constitution is to similar effect). Back
Ibid. page xiii para.3 1. Back
Hansard Lords) vol. 408 ccl. I 121. See also Hansard (Commons)
vol. 983 WA cols. 277-9 2?11 April 1980 Hansard (Commons) vol.
989 WA col. 723. See also Hansard (Commons) 12 Nov 1967 WA col.
Greek newspaper, Eleftherotipia, 26 February 1981. Back
House of Lords, 17th December 1986. Back
See Loizidou v Turkey. European Court of Human Rights judgement
of 18 December 1996 (merits), Reports of Judgements and Decisions
1996-VI, p. 2223. Back
Cyprus Mail 26 Sept 2004. Back
Cyprus Mail 3 October 2004. Back
UN doc. S/5950. Back
HC 23 of 1986/87 7 May 1987 page xxxiv para. 141. Back
25 Apr 2004. Back
26 April 2004. Back
Res. 136 of 29 April 2004 para. 3. Back
para. 4. Back
Report on Mission of Good Offices 2 June 2004. Back
Report 28 May 2004 S/2004/437 para. 93. Back
Hansard (Lords) 21 Jun 2004 Col. WA 97. Back
Speech in Ankara 18 May 2004. Back
Hansard [Lords] 8 July 2004. Back
See eg. Ibid col. 916. Hansard [Commons] 22 June 2004,
col. 1327W. Back
Written Opinions (ISBN 0-9540675-1-7) of Prof Maurice Mendelson
QC dated 6 June 1997 (UN doe.A/S 1/951-511997/585) 21 July 1997.
l2 September 2001 and 3 March 2002 in which he considers in detail
the arguments to the contrary advanced in joint written Opinions
obtained by the Greek Cypriot Administration from Professors Crawford,
Hafner and Pellet. See also Prof. Peter Peruthaler. University
of Innsbruck. Austria. Paper delivered at seminar in Jerusalem
Res. 1376 of 29 April 2004. Back
Report 2 June 2004. Back