Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence

Written evidence submitted by National Unity Party

  The National Unity Party is the largest single Party in the Parliament of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, holding 19 of the 50 seats.

  The Select Committee will have received a large amount of detailed evidence in the course of the Inquiry. The purpose of this submission is to summarise what we consider to be the most important points.

  The most important point in our view is that the Committee should not consider itself bound by any pre-existing policies, statements, resolutions or positions, but should examine the Cyprus question ab initio. It should in particular be willing to challenge the Executive branch of government in Britain, and to challenge the EU, the United Nations, and any other institution whose policy is or might be wrong.

  It is necessary to be quite clear that Cyprus is not and never has been since independence a single body politic with a majority and a minority. There are more Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots but they were both recognised from the very beginning of the Republic of Cyprus in 1980, by its Constitution and founding Treaties as being two separate peoples, each with its own basic rights and obligations.

  This fundamental reality in Cyprus has since been recognised by successive Secretaries-General of the United Nations, and most recently in the Annan Plan of March 2004[158] in which it was expressly acknowledged that the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots is not one of majority and minority but of political equality where neither side may claim authority or jurisdiction over the other"

  Cyprus has never been part of Greece, and is 250 miles from the nearest Greek island. Turkey is only 40 miles away.


  This is not a theoretical question. It is of the utmost importance because the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot Administration as if it were the Government of Cyprus has shut the Turkish Cypriots out of all formal channels of international communication so that only the Greek Cypriot side of the story has been heard. It has enabled the Greek Cypriots to keep the Turkish Cypriots under a crippling embargo for forty yearn without any authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

  The British Government accepted that "Cyprus Government" could mean only a government which acts with the concurrence of its Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members."[159] There has been no concurrence since 1963, when the institutions of the Republic were destroyed by force of Greek Cypriot arms.

  In 1963 the Greek Cypriots refused to accept the decision of the Supreme Court of Cyprus[160] in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, and their armed attack upon the Turkish Cypriots began. They argued that the 1960 Constitution was unworkable, but that did not of course justify their resort to violence. In any event Glafcos Clerides, later to be the Greek Cypriot President, confirms in his memoirs[161] that unworkability could not be established.

  We will not examine in detail here the massacres of Turkish Cypriots which took place at Christmas 1963 and in 1964, as they are so well documented in the newspaper reports at the time[162] and there are many survivors still alive and willing to testify. Suffice it to say here that Sir Alec Douglas-Home recorded[163] his opinion that if the Greek Cypriots could not treat the Turkish Cypriots as human beings they were inviting the invasion and partition of the island.

  Likewise, the American Under-Secretary of State, George Ball, said in his own memoirs[164], that the central interest of the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, "was to block off Turkish intervention so that he and his Greek Cypriots could go on happily massacring Turkish Cypriots.

  Prof Michael Moran, of Sussex University, made the following diagnosis of Greek Cypriot attitudes[165]: "It was because they were under a kind of ideological spell, a collective mental condition similar to what Marxists used to call "false-consciousness" that the Greek Cypriots could embark upon their particular course of action in December 1963 with all the zeal and confidence they did.

  Brainwashed through at least a hundred years of school-teaching and sermonising into a set of beliefs pathologically at odds with any plausible account of historical and political realities; lacking contact with a counterbalancing tradition of rational criticism; for the most part incapable of ironic scepticism towards theological obfuscation—the Greek Cypriot leaders were effectively de-sensitised to the equally important rights of the Turkish Cypriots. In this way they were able to treat their Turkish compatriots with such consistent and irrational abuse, hardly noticing that this was in fact what they were doing."

  The Greek Cypriot author, Antonis Angastinlyotis made a documentary film in September 2004 called "The Voice of Blood" about the events of 1963/64 which the Select Committee should certainly see. He cannot get it broadcast in South Cyprus or Greece, and he is now being persecuted. We would suggest that the Committee asks to see him whilst in South Cyprus, but in all probability some excuse will be made by the Greek Cypriot Administration to prevent such a meeting.

  We think it very important that the Committee do not accept the Greek Cypriot claim that both sides were to blame for the violence, and that the Turkish Cypriots simply withdrew from their positions in the Republic. There was in fact a systematic attempt by the Greek Cypriot political and religious leadership to deprive the Turkish Cypriots of their basic rights, and in many cases of their lives as well.

  The Select Committee itself said in its 1987 report on Cyprus[166] "There is little doubt that much of the violence which the Turkish Cypriots claim led to the total or partial destruction of 103 Turkish villages and the displacement of about a quarter of the total Turkish Cypriot population, was either directly inspired by, or certainly connived at, by the Greek Cypriot leadership".

  The Committee continued[167] "The effect of the crisis of December 1963 was to deliver control of the formal organs of Government into the hands of the Greek Cypriots alone.

  And at para. 30 "Equally damaging from the Turkish Cypriot point of view was what they considered to be their effective exclusion from representation at and participation in, the international fora where their case could have been deployed. The acceptance at this time by the United Nations and most other international organisations of the legality of what had become an exclusively Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the source of continuing intense bitterness amongst Turkish Cypriot leaders. "An official Turkish Cypriot presence in the international political scene virtually disappeared overnight."

  The Greek Cypriots have sought to rely on necessity—for if the Turkish Cypriots withdrew, what option did the Greek Cypriots have but to govern alone? Such a doctrine has no application here, for the Greek Cypriots expelled the Turkish Cypriots and created the necessity themselves. The reverse however is true, that the Turkish Cypriots having been expelled, had of necessity to establish their own State, and it was quite wrong for Britain and the UN to refuse to accept it in 1983.

  The Select Committee reported unanimously in 1987[168] that, "Although the Cyprus Government now claims to have been seeking to "operate the 1960 Constitution modified to the extent dictated by the necessities of the situation" this claim ignores the fact that both before and after the events of December 1963 the Makarios Government continued to advocate the cause of ENOSIS [annexation to Greece] and actively pursued the amendment of the Constitution and the related treaties to facilitate this ultimate objective. In February 1966 Makarios declared that the [1960] Agreements had been abrogated and buried".

  The Committee continued: "Moreover in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature unanimously passed a resolution in favour of ENOSIS, in blatant contravention of the 1960 Treaties and Constitution."[169]

  Further, the Select Committee found[170] that "When in July 1965 the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives sought to resume their seats they were told that they could do so only if they accepted the legislative changes to the operation of the Constitution enacted in their absence". There can therefore be no substance in the claim of necessity after July 1965, even if there had been any before. Moreover, despite the serious risks and huge disadvantages which the Annan Plan contained, the Turkish Cypriot people voted to accept it, having been led to believe that it would create a new partnership of political equals—but the Greek Cypriots rejected it.

  Although the UK Government deals with the Greek Cypriot Administration on a day to day basis as if they were the lawful Government of Cyprus, it does not formally recognise them as such, for on 25 April 1980 the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs made the following statement[171]: "We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice concerning the recognition of Governments. This has included a comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis of this review we have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments. The British Government recognises States in accordance with common international doctrine."

  There is no UN Resolution which confers upon the Greek Cypriot Administration the status of the Government of Cyprus. Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 are concerned with States not Governments, and they say nothing about who is the government of Cyprus.

  Having expelled the Turkish Cypriots from their positions in the Republic by force, the Greek Cypriot "rump" of the bi-communal Government set itself up as the Government of Cyprus. It is difficult to imagine a more profound betrayal of the Turkish Cypriots and a more serious breach of all the values for which Britain stands, than this conduct of the Greek Cypriots, and the acceptance which Britain and other members of the international community have accorded since then to the Greek Cypriot Administration.

  A very serious injustice has been done to the Turkish Cypriots, which must be remedied without further delay. The Select Committee should in our view recommend that the UK Government and the EU should in future deal with the Greek Cypriot Administration for what it is—namely the Greek Cypriot Government of Southern Cyprus, with no jurisdiction over Northern Cyprus nor the people who live there.

  The Committee should in our view also find that the Turkish Cypriots had every right to establish their own State, and that the British Government should deal with their elected representatives and officials in all respects.

  There is no reason why the international community should not accept the separation of peoples in Cyprus as they have done in the former Yugoslavia or East Timor.


  The Committee should not accept the Greek Cypriot claim that Northern Cyprus is a part of the EU which is occupied by the Turkish Army.

  In view of the massacres of Turkish Cypriots which occurred in 1963-64, 1967, and 1974 and the systematic attempt to deprive us of all our basic rights during that period, we submit that Turkey was fully justified in landing troops in 1974, and should indeed have acted earlier. They had at least as much humanitarian justification as NATO had in the former Yugoslavia.

  It will be remembered that the massacres which took place in and after March 1964 took place despite the presence in Cyprus of UN and British troops.

  In addition, both Britain and Turkey were bound by Art 4 of the 1980 Treaty of Guarantee to guarantee the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the Cyprus Constitution. This at the very least obliged them to secure to the Turkish Cypriots the right to remain alive and to live without fear of persecution, as the political equals of the Greek Cypriots. Britain took no effective action, despite having been requested by Turkey to take joint action; so Turkey had to act alone.

  The leader of the Greek Cypriot militia in 1974, one Nicos Sampson, said in 1981[172] "Had Turkey not intervened I would not only have proclaimed ENOSIS—I would have annihilated the Turks of Cyprus." We have no doubt that he meant what he said, and we have no confidence that the UN troops could or would have stopped him. Since 1974 Turkish soldiers have remained in Cyprus at the request of the Turkish Cypriot people as our only effective guarantee that there would be no more massacres.

  The Labour Peer, Lord Willis, who took a particular interest in Cyprus, said[173] "Turkey intervened to protect the lives and property of the Turkish-Cypriots, and to its credit has done just that. In the 12 years since, there have been no killings and no massacres"

  In view of what had happened, it was impossible to reinstate the status quo, but Turkey has since that time worked hard to secure an agreement between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. In March 1988 the Turkish Cypriots accepted the UN Plan, and most recently accepted the Annan Plan in 2004. The Greek Cypriots, while appearing to negotiate in good faith have consistently rejected a settlement.

  If the Greek Cypriots had accepted the Annan Plan, there would have been a phased withdrawal of Turkish troops, down to a level of 850 men in the North, with 900 Greek troops in the South, with the likelihood that in time even these would go. These were merely token force levels, which had been agreed by all parties at the time of independence. The Greek Cypriots have no justification for thinking that Turkey would not honour its commitment to withdraw, because Turkey knows perfectly well that any such failure would place in serious jeopardy Turkey's own accession to the European Union.

  The UN has never accused Turkey of invading or occupying Cyprus, and it is in our view quite wrong to regard Turkish soldiers as an occupying force.

  Further, there have been many thousands of Greek troops in the South for many years, even before 1974, and nobody has called them an army of occupation.


  International interference in the airs of Cyprus cannot be justified by claiming that the present situation is a threat to the peace. Greece and Turkey now have a much more mature relationship, and we think that any talk of war between them is fanciful. The presence of Turkish soldiers in the North has meant that there has been no violence in Cyprus for thirty years, except for isolated border incidents provoked from the South. However, if the present situation were to change by the withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the Greek Cypriots had the upper hand again, we would fear a renewal of violence.


  The Plan was internationally recommended as being a fair solution, and it would be quits wrong to expect the Turkish Cypriots to make any further concessions. In any event the Secretary-General was right after the Greek Cypriot rejection declare us Plan null and void.

  The National Unity Party did not support the Plan, and we do not accept it as a continuing basis for discussion. We believe that the Turkish Cypriot people took very serious risks when they voted in April 2004 to accept it. We believe that most people who voted "yes" did so under a form of duress, because they saw no future for themselves if the unjust isolation of their State, and the crippling embargo on their trade and communications continued.

  Large amounts of foreign money were poured into the "yes" camp, and foreign representatives interfered directly in the campaign. Turkish Cypriots were assured that they were not voting to abandon their State, nor Turkey's military guarantee. They were promised that if they voted yes, the way to Europe would be open to them, and the embargo would be lifted. This was a cruel deception.

  The Turkish Cypriot "yes" vote has been misinterpreted, and even the UN Secretary-General has claimed that it indicated that the Turkish Cypriot People do not want statehood and that they are not interested in the recognition of their sovereignty and self-determination. Nothing could be further from the truth.

  The Annan Plan contained serious risks and disadvantages for Turkish Cypriots, for the following reasons:

A.   Property Issues

  For thirty years Greek Cypriots have been living in Turkish Cypriot homes in the South and vice-versa. We think it is inhuman to evict from their homes families who have been settled for a long period. Until recently Greek Cypriots used to think only in terms of Turkish Cypriots being evicted so that Greek Cypriots could return to the North[174], but on 24 September 2004 a Turkish Cypriot, Arif Mustafa, won the right in a Greek Cypriot court to evict the Greek Cypriot occupants of his house in the South.

  Greek Cypriots are now saying[175] that it is not right to remove a refugee from the home he has been living in. We agree. The Annan Plan was fundamentally flawed in this respect. It would have required the eviction of between 70,000 and 100,000 people in the North. There are in addition about 40,000[176] Greek Cypriots living in houses on Turkish Cypriot land in the South. Any settlement in Cyprus should not require these people, nor their counterparts in the North, to vacate their homes. Justice can and must be done by formal exchange of properties and equalisation in cash.

  Former Greek Cypriot Attorney-General Markides said[177] "People must realise that property rights are not absolute rights. All rights can be restricted or taken away on certain conditions. This is how roads, schools and hospitals are built. Sometimes we as heeding towards trouble because we as so absolute in this country. There we no absolute rights"


  The Annan Plan would have taken away from Turkish Cypriots the effective guarantee of the Turkish army on the ground in Cyprus. It would have left them reliant upon international guarantees which have failed them in the past, and upon the goodwill of the Greek Cypriots, which the referendum result has shown to be absent

  Turkish Cypriots are only too well aware of the massacre of the Moslem people of Srebrenica whilst under international protection.

C.   Poutical Organisation

  The Annan Plan would have created a "Common State" legislature, the lower House of which would have been dominated by the Greek Cypriots. In the upper House it would not have been difficult for the Greek Cypriots to force through legislation with far-reaching consequences if they could secure the support, or the absence, of a very small number of Turkish Cypriot Senators. Similarly in the Council the Greek Cypriots would have had four voting seats and the Turkish Cypriots two. If the Greek Cypriots could secure the temporary support of one of these Turkish Cypriot Councillors they could have passed whatever they wanted. Reluctant acceptance by the Greek Cypriots of this political structure could easily have led to a repeat of the crisis of 1963.

D.   Mainlanders

  In 1974 the Turkish Cypriot economy was in a desperate state, and we invited many people from Turkey to come and help us rebuild it As the economy has grown we have invited many more to help us sustain it. Many of these people have been settled in Northern Cyprus for many years, many have married Turkish Cypriots and their children, and in some cases grandchildren, were born here.

  Britain would not expel its immigrants, and should not expect us to do so.

  The Greek Cypriots have invited many thousands of Greeks and other nationalities to live in the South and we make no complaint about that.

  Greek Cypriots considered "attempts to change the demographic structure of the island" acceptable when they were killing Turkish Cypriots and forcing us to emigrate. They wish to preserve the numerical disparity in the hope that one day they can use their superior numbers again to rule the Turkish Cypriots.


  We invite the members of the Select Committee to ask themselves what the Turkish Cypriots have done to deserve crippling restrictions on our trade and communications for forty years.

  On 10th September 1964 the UN Secretary-General reported[178] "The economic restrictions being imposed against the Turkish Cypriot communities, which in some instances has been so severe as to amount to veritable siege, indicated that the Government of Cyprus seeks to force a potential solution by economic pressure."

  The Greek Cypriot newspaper "Alithia" wrote on 17th July 1994:

  "We [the Greek Cypriots] caused the Turkish invasion by exerting pressure on the Turkish Cypriots before 1974. After 1974 we decided to exert more pressure. We imposed on them an economic embargo. We entertained the hope that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would collapse. The consequence of this has been the deepening of the gap between the two communities, and we have forced the Turkish Cypriots closer to Turkey."

  The Select Committee itself made the following recommendation in its 1987 Report[179]

  "The Greek Cypriot Government's policy of seeking to impose an embargo on much of the Turkish Cypriots' trade and communications with the outside world cannot contribute to a settlement."

  We agree. Even if a settlement had been forced by duress it would not have been a basis for harmony and progress, but a recipe for further strife in Cyprus.

  EU Commissioner Verheugen[180] said "Turkish Cypriots must not be punished because of this [Greek Cypriot referendum] result. We now have to end the isolation of the North."

  The Council of Ministers of the EU said[181] "The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging their economic development."

  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe resolved[182] that "The Turkish Cypriots' international isolation must cease." The resolution continued[183] "The United Nations should consider whether the resolutions on which the sanctions are based are still justified." The Assembly is presumably referring here to resolutions 541 and 550 which call for non-recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, but they do not authorise any sanctions. This can only be done under Chapter VII of the Charter.

  The UN Secretary-General said[184] "The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them." He said further[185] that the elimination of the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots would be consistent with Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550.

  In 1987 the Select Committee recommended[186] to the Greek Cypriot Administration that:

    (i)  Normal postal and telephone services should be restored between north and south Cyprus and between north Cyprus and the outside world.

    (ii)  International commercial air services should be permitted to the North.

    (iii)  Ships' Masters who use harbours in the north should not be subjected to threats of legal penalties in the South.

  All of these recommendations have been ignored by the Greek Cypriot Administration. The Committee should in our view reinforce these recommendations, and recommend that the UK Government removes all restrictions forthwith.


  The UK Government has acknowledged[187] that direct flights from EU member states to Ercan Airport in Northern Cyprus would be in line with the EU policy, encouraged by the UN Secretary-General, to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots with a view to reuniting the island.

  The UK Prime Minister has declared[188] "We must act now to end the isolation of Northern Cyprus. That means lifting the embargos on trade and air travel. There was a very clear commitment given to the people if they supported the Annan Plan. They have supported it and we must see that commitment through."

  The UK Government has further acknowledged[189] that direct air links are a matter for bilateral agreements, not for the EU. Ercan airport has now been fully upgraded to international standards, and the UK Government has been asked in Parliament what (if any) legal impediments, in their opinion, prevent them authorising direct flights. They have given only generalised replies[190]

  As the Select Committee's task is to scrutinise the policies of the Executive, it should in our view demand to know exactly what provisions of the Chicago Convention or any other rule of international law are said to constitute an impediment, and to ask their own legal experts to examine those provisions. The fact that the UK Government will not be specific suggests to us that there is no such impediment.


  It is a grave disappointment to the Turkish Cypriots that this embargo is still in place after they voted to accept the Annan Plan. It is unacceptable that we should have to export and import via the South, and we invite the Committee to reflect on why the Turkish Cypriots should be restricted in this way. There is no reason why phyto-sanitary and other export certificates should not be given by Turkish Cypriot officials or EU officials resident in Northern Cyprus and not accredited to the Greek Cypriot Administration.

  Greeks and Greek Cypriots in the EU should not be allowed to abuse their position by attempting to block the dismantling of the embargo, as recommended by the UN Secretary-General, Commissioner Verheugen, the EU Council, Prime Minister Blair, and the Select Committee itself. The short answer to any abuse of veto power should be that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could be recognised by member-states if the veto is cast.


  Turkish Cypriots do not want to base their future on subsidies from the international community—we want to be free to earn our own living in the world without restrictions.

  The international community cannot undo the grief and misery inflicted upon the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots for 40 years, but it can attempt to compensate them for the damage to their economy during that time, and to enable them to compensate people who lost their properties. The sum of 259 million Euros does not even approach the sum required for that purpose, and even that amount has not yet been paid. It is quite wrong that the Greek Cypriots should have any say over how grants in aid to the Turkish Cypriots should be spent.


  The EU has created a major problem by admitting "Cyprus" to the Union in advance of a settlement. The admission of "Cyprus" without the consent of Turkey was illegal, as it contravened Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee[191] In addition, Cyprus being the home of the Turkish Cypriots as well as the Greek Cypriots, it was quite wrong of the EU to admit Cyprus without the concurrence of the Turkish Cypriots.

  The EU must now be very careful not to allow entrenched Greek Cypriot and Greek interests to cause further injustice to the Turkish Cypriots; nor to Turkey, who has done everything required of it. The EU must always remember that the Greek Cypriot Administration does not represent the Turkish Cypriot people of the island, and that the Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to argue their own case in the institutions of the EU, contrary to the rules of natural justice recognised in all civilised nations.


  The role of the Greek Orthodox Church is hardly ever mentioned in reports on Cyprus, but we know it to have a very powerful influence upon the Greek Cypriot people. The church has always maintained, without any just cause, that Cyprus is a Greek island, and has dedicated itself, as it did in Crete, to the removal or death of the ethnic Turkish people. It is no accident that Makarios was a leader of the Greek Orthodox Church.

  Theirs is a racist policy, totally unacceptable in the modern world, and it has directed and informed the policies of successive Greek Cypriot leaders since 1955 and even before. It was the driving force behind the tragedy of 1963-64, and it continues today. In the referendum campaign of 2004 influential church leaders were telling the people that if they voted for the Annan Plan they would go to hell when they died.


  In our view there is no longer any justification, if ever there was, for preventing the Turkish Cypriots from arguing their case fully and freely in all the Councils of the world, and from becoming members of NGO's and sporting organisations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe[192] "considers it unfair for the Turkish Cypriot community . . . to continue to be denied representation in the European political debate. Such continued isolation may help strengthen the positions of those who are opposing a unified Cyprus."

  The National Unity Party does not however regard the compromise solution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly as satisfactory. The Turkish Cypriot representatives should not be considered part of the "Cypriot" delegation.

  The Select Committee should in our view recommend that all British Governmental and nongovernmental organisations should establish normal relations with the Turkish Cypriots.


  Knowing Cyprus as we do, we do not think that the political structures envisaged by the Annan Plan could have worked even with goodwill and tolerance on both sides. The overwhelming rejection of the Plan by the Greek Cypriots, and the statements made by their political and religious leaders during the referendum campaign have shown what we have always known—that the Greek Cypriots do not wish to share power with the Turkish Cypriots. The Secretary-General was right when he said[193] that they had not only rejected his Plan but the solution itself.

  In our view, the way forward is not to seek a quick-fix settlement such as the Annan Plan, but rather to pursue an evolutionary process beginning with a confederation between two separate recognised States in Cyprus. What would begin—a confederation might, if given the opportunity, lead in time to a loose federation, but if even that is unacceptable or unworkable, a complete separation.

  The two peoples of Cyprus should have the opportunity, as France and Germany have had, to deal with each other as political equals, each secure in its own sovereign territory, and to find a way forward on the basis of mutual respect and common interest The world should stop tying to persuade one or both of them to accept the unacceptable.

Dervis Eroglu

Party Leader, National Unity Party

158   31 March 2004-Main Article iii. Back

159   FO telegram 1131 of 12 March 1964. Back

160   Turkish Communal Chamber v Council of Ministers 5 CLR (1963) 59, 77, 78. Back

161   "Cyprus-My Deposition"-Alithia publishing company, Nicosia, 1989-1991. Back

162   Summarised in Appdx 2 to the written evidence of President Denkta? to the Select Committee. See also "The Death of Friendship" by nurse Turkan Aziz; and "The Cyprus Question" by Michael Stephen copies of which have been supplied to the Committee. Back

163   "The Way The Wind B1ows" Collins 1976, page 242. Back

164   "The Past has Another Pattem" Norton 1982 at p345. Back

165   "Sovereignty Divided"-1998 p.12. Back

166   H.C. no. 23 of 1986-87 7 ' May 1987 page xii para. 27. Back

167   ibid. para. 28. Back

168   ibid. page xiii para. 31. Back

169   ibid. (Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee declares prohibited any action likely to promote directly or indirectly union with any other state or partition of the island, and Art. 185(2) of the Constitution is to similar effect). Back

170   Ibid. page xiii para.3 1. Back

171   Hansard Lords) vol. 408 ccl. I 121. See also Hansard (Commons) vol. 983 WA cols. 277-9 2?11 April 1980 Hansard (Commons) vol. 989 WA col. 723. See also Hansard (Commons) 12 Nov 1967 WA col. 240. Back

172   Greek newspaper, Eleftherotipia, 26 February 1981. Back

173   House of Lords, 17th December 1986. Back

174   See Loizidou v Turkey. European Court of Human Rights judgement of 18 December 1996 (merits), Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2223. Back

175   Cyprus Mail 26 Sept 2004. Back

176   Cyprus Mail 3 October 2004. Back

177   ibid. Back

178   UN doc. S/5950. Back

179   HC 23 of 1986/87 7 May 1987 page xxxiv para. 141. Back

180   25 Apr 2004. Back

181   26 April 2004. Back

182   Res. 136 of 29 April 2004 para. 3. Back

183   para. 4. Back

184   Report on Mission of Good Offices 2 June 2004. Back

185   Report 28 May 2004 S/2004/437 para. 93. Back

186   ibid. Back

187   Hansard (Lords) 21 Jun 2004 Col. WA 97. Back

188   Speech in Ankara 18 May 2004. Back

189   Hansard [Lords] 8 July 2004. Back

190   See eg. Ibid col. 916. Hansard [Commons] 22 June 2004, col. 1327W. Back

191   Written Opinions (ISBN 0-9540675-1-7) of Prof Maurice Mendelson QC dated 6 June 1997 (UN doe.A/S 1/951-511997/585) 21 July 1997. l2 September 2001 and 3 March 2002 in which he considers in detail the arguments to the contrary advanced in joint written Opinions obtained by the Greek Cypriot Administration from Professors Crawford, Hafner and Pellet. See also Prof. Peter Peruthaler. University of Innsbruck. Austria. Paper delivered at seminar in Jerusalem 1998. Back

192   Res. 1376 of 29 April 2004. Back

193   Report 2 June 2004. Back

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