Written evidence submitted by Lobby for
Cyprus
INTRODUCTION
1. Lobby for Cyprus ("Lobby")
welcomes the opportunity to make this submission to the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the House of Commons ("the FAC")
and would further welcome the opportunity to be heard at any oral
evidence sessions.
2. Lobby is the voice of Greek Cypriot refugees
in the United Kingdom ("UK") and is well known to decision
makers in London and Brussels. It is a non-party political organisation
drawing its membership from the refugee municipality and village
associations based in the UK. In addition Lobby has hundreds of
individual members. Amongst the refugee associations are those
of Akanthou, Ayios Amvrosios, Famagusta, Lapithos and Karavas,
Leonarisso, Mandres, Rizokarpasso, Ayia Triada, Eftakomi, Lefkoniko
and many more.
3. Lobby also has close links with the academic
community both in the UK and Cyprus and has organised many conferences
and seminars on the Cyprus issue during the last 10 years. One
such conference, on the Annan Plan, took place in London on 18
March 2004 and the discussions were printed in a book entitled
"the case against the Annan Plan." Copies of this book
have already been sent at the request of the Chairman of the FAC
to its members. For further details relating to the Annan Plan,
please refer to this book.
4. Individual members of Lobby have also
been involved in bringing legal proceedings against the government
of the Republic of Turkey before the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") and Lobby worked with the legal team of Titina
Loizidou in bringing, and winning, these significant proceedings.
5. More information about Lobby can be downloaded
from its web site at www.lobbyforcyprus.org
The Three R's
6. Lobby was set up to campaign for the
restoration of the basic human rights of its members and in direct
response to a forerunner of the Annan Plan, the 1992 Ghali Set
of Ideas. Since 1992 it has argued against any solution to the
Cyprus issue based on apartheid and ethnic separation whether
this is characterised as a federation, confederation or even a
partition.
7. Early in its campaigning, Lobby adopted
the objective of seeking the re-unification of Cyprus and the
restoration of the human rights of its members. The cornerstones
of this campaign strategy are the now well-known "three R's".
These are the:—
— Removal of all occupying Turkish
troops from Cyprus
— Repatriation (humanely but compulsorily)
of all Turkish colonists
— Return of all refugees to their homes
without restriction or pre-condition.
8. Lobby's demands as will be explained
later in this submission, are all based on sound legal principles
and fully reflect the basic human rights of our members. Lobby
seeks nothing more, and nothing less than that.
9. Over the years the logic of these arguments
has come to be recognised. It will not have escaped the notice
of the FAC that all three of the 3R's are to some extent contained
within the final version of the Annan Plan. Regrettably these
basic human rights were very heavily qualified and watered down
rendering the rights conferred almost meaningless. This resulted
in Lobby firmly opposing the Annan Plan.
10. Lobby and its members wish to make it
clear that they earnestly wish to see Cyprus re-united. However
it was felt that the Annan Plan was far more likely to cement
the partition of the island along ethnic lines rather than re-unify
it, and that it had been deliberately drafted to achieve this.
76% of Greek Cypriot voters agreed with Lobby's analysis.
Rejection of the Annan Plan
11. Since 1992 a series of attempts to produce
a solution to the Cyprus issue on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal
federation have been put forward. The Annan Plan was simply the
most recent version. However, crucially, on this occasion the
United Nations ("UN") arrogated to itself the right
to produce the final version of the Plan and this was then to
be submitted to separate and simultaneous referenda in both the
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
12. As the FAC knows in these referenda
Turkish Cypriots voted in support of the Annan Plan, whilst Greek
Cypriots voted heavily against it. During the negotiations on
the Annan Plan and in the run up to the referenda Lobby undertook
a leading role in co-ordinating the Greek Cypriot refugee opposition
to the Annan Plan, in the UK. Representatives from Lobby also
visited Cyprus to support the campaign against the Plan, there.
Yet it must not be forgotten that it is primarily the Greek Cypriot
refugees, that stand to gain the most from the re-unification
of the island and they fervently desire a just solution to the
division of Cyprus. Clearly therefore, their decision to reject
the Annan Plan must have come as a surprise to some and the reasons
for this overwhelming rejection need to be explained.
13. Greek Cypriots believe that the overriding
philosophy behind the drafting and the reason for imposing the
fifth and final version of the Annan Plan in this way arose from
the wishes of the United States ("US") and the UK to
facilitate Turkey's entry into the European Union ("EU").
In doing so it was necessary to solve the Cyprus issue once and
for all but a way had to be found to secure domestic Turkish support
for this. US and UK objectives were therefore focussed on appeasing
Turkey and in ensuring that any solution achieved most of the
objectives demanded by Turkey's negotiators, even if in doing
so the basic tenets of human rights and international law were
trampled upon. A positive vote by Turkish Cypriots with the encouragement
of Turkey would obviously improve Turkey's international standing
at a time when it is desperate to achieve international credibility
as a suitable member of the EU. Of course in December 2004 the
EU will decide whether accession discussions should begin with
Turkey at all.
14. In pandering in this way to Turkey those
pushing for the Annan Plan as the preferred solution to the Cyprus
issue chose to trample upon the fundamental human rights of Greek
Cypriots, human rights, which have been vindicated before the
ECHR time and time again. They also completely disregarded the
fact that an EU candidate country, Turkey, had been in illegal
occupation of 37% of the territory of a country about to join
the EU. As will be made clear later the legal basis for Turkey's
invasion in 1974 was very spurious and there is absolutely no
justification for the ethnic cleansing carried out in 1974 nor
the subsequent campaigns of cultural destruction, ethnic re-engineering
and continuing occupation of the north of Cyprus ("the Occupied
Area"), all of which have been well documented by the UN,
EU and the Council of Europe.
15. Those pushing for acceptance of the
Annan Plan chose to turn a blind eye to the continuing levels
of bitterness and pain still felt by Greek Cypriots regarding
the events of 1974. They failed to understand that any agreement
by Greek Cypriots to compromise their human rights within the
give and take of a negotiation could only go so far. Quite simply
those seeking Greek Cypriot complicity in the Annan Plan completely
miscalculated (not for the first time) and assumed incorrectly
that Greek Cypriots would be prepared to sign anything. Greek
Cypriots have however learnt the lessons of the 1960 settlement
and also the 1959 Zurich/London agreements, upon which it was
based. They understood that a bad solution would be far worse
than no solution at all.
16. Lobby has repeatedly pointed out to
the UK Government directly and also via its previous special representative
on Cyprus, Lord Hannay, that there were basic fundamental deficiencies
in the philosophy and drafting of the Annan Plan. Had these warnings
been heeded the rejection by the Greek Cypriot voters on April
24, 2004 could have been avoided. Unfortunately the UK Government
pursued a policy of hearing only that which it wanted to hear
and in the circumstances the results in the referenda are hardly
surprising.
17. There are many deficiencies with the
Annan Plan. There are set out below just a few of the more serious
ones:
— The Turkish Cypriot minority of 18%
of the population was to be allowed to retain 30% of the territory
of the island. Only seven% of territory was to be returned to
the Greek Cypriots thus apparently legitimising the occupation
of the remaining 30% of the island and rewarding the military
invasion and ethnic cleansing committed by Turkey in 1974.
— Fundamental freedoms of movement,
residence and ownership were to be denied. This was notwithstanding
Cyprus' status as an EU member state and that these are fundamental
freedoms of the EU. As a consequence of these restrictions Greek
Cypriots were denied owning property in the Occupied Area or living
within certain ethnically pure zones of their own country. By
contrast all other EU citizens would have these freedoms in the
Occupied Area. Such discrimination on grounds of race would effectively
have created a legalised apartheid system and the UK Government,
as a representative of a multi-cultural society in the UK, should
be ashamed to support apartheid within another EU member state.
— The fundamental human rights of the
Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their stolen homes were to
be abrogated forever. More than 100,000 refugees would not have
been allowed to return to their homes. Those allowed to return
would have been subjected to severe restrictions, controls and
lengthy timescales—in some cases up to 19 years, which would
make their return as troublesome as possible. Furthermore their
return would be largely dependant on the staged withdrawal of
Turkish occupying forces, with no guarantee that these forces
would ever leave. Given Turkey's appalling record in adhering
to its treaty obligations it is hardly surprising that Greek Cypriots
felt the need for further re-assurance.
— Property issues were to be administered
in a manner that was utterly at odds with the existing decisions
of the ECHR. For example, cases brought by Greek Cypriots against
Turkey and pending before the ECHR were to be struck out and the
new United Cyprus Republic would instead become the responsible
State party. This created the ludicrous situation that the Greek
Cypriot tax-payers in Cyprus would therefore be forced to compensate
themselves for Turkey's human rights violations! The ECHR has
found Turkey guilty of numerous breaches of human rights in several
cases and has specifically declared that the Greek Cypriots remain
the only legitimate owners of their title deeds to properties
in the north (Loizidou v Turkey (1998)). This attempt to disregard
and ignore the clear case law of the ECHR represents a massive
embarrassment to those representatives of the British Government
involved in lobbying for the Annan Plan.
— The Greek Cypriot National Guard
was to be disbanded but 6,000 Turkish troops were to be permitted
to remain on the island until at least 2011, and 3,000 were to
remain until 2018 or Turkey's accession to the EU. This in itself
was an infringement of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus
and a major security concern. As is well known Turkey possesses
one of the best equipped armies in the world, although it has
usually been deployed against ethnic minorities within its own
borders or the comparatively tiny Greek Cypriot population in
Cyprus. Cyprus would have become the only country in the EU with
foreign non-EU troops on her soil with a right to intervene in
her affairs. In addition the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance
1960, permitting a Turkish military presence on Cyprus, would
continue indefinitely. As it is, Turkey is now in the invidious
position of seeking membership of the EU whilst simultaneously
being in illegal occupation of 37% of the territory of an existing
EU member state! In 1974, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus,
the then Foreign Secretary Jim Callaghan stated that "Cyprus
is for the moment the prisoner of Turkey but one day Turkey will
become the prisoner of Cyprus". His words may yet prove prophetic.
— The vast majority of the 120,000
Turkish colonists (illegal settlers) sent to Cyprus to engineer
a change in the ethnic balance on the island would remain. There
are already serious tensions between them and the indigenous Turkish
Cypriots on the island and it is hard to see how if they are unable
to co-exist harmoniously with Turkish Cypriots, they will be able
to do so with Greek Cypriots.
— The proposed constitution created
a very loose confederation in the guise of power sharing in the
form of a federation. The sovereignty of the government of the
Republic of Cyprus would be further eroded both by allowing foreign
intervention in its affairs by Turkey (the former invading and
occupying power) and by providing for mandatory places on the
Supreme Court and in the Central Bank for non-Cypriots. What other
EU member state would accept such provisions? As UK citizens the
members of Lobby are sure that Parliament would never sanction
foreign representation in the highest court of the land for example.
— Notwithstanding the continued occupation
of Cyprus by Turkey during the last 30 years and the human rights
abuses committed by Turkey against Greek Cypriots, Cyprus would
have been obliged to support Turkey's accession to the EU. This
represents a fetter on the power of a sovereign state to decide
for itself how it wishes to exercise its authority. No other EU
member state would accept being told that it had to support Turkey's
accession. Why should Cyprus be any different?
— Cyprus would have had to agree to
a protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (which Turkey used
as a pretext for its invasion and occupation of 1974) by which
Turkey would be granted "enhanced" (as stated by the
US Ambassador in Nicosia) rights of military intervention in the
affairs of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee was already an anathema
to Greek Cypriots; under the Annan Plan it was strengthened, something
hardly likely to win support amongst Greek Cypriots.
18. United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan stated in a television address to all Cypriots on 21 April
2004 that "there was no magic way of accommodating the maximum
demands of one side while accommodating the maximum demands of
the other." We agree with this view but by accommodating
the near maximum demands of Turkey the resulting rejection by
the Greek Cypriots should have been expected and anticipated.
19. Had the Annan plan been approved then
this would have created a very dangerous precedent in international
law; a new sovereign state would have been created as a result
of an unlawful invasion and subsequent campaign of ethnic cleansing.
20. Accordingly the rejection of the Annan
Plan was a positive step for supporters of human rights worldwide
and sent the message that ethnic cleansing cannot be legitimised.
Greek Cypriots have been villified for their refusal to accept
the Annan Plan. In the circumstances it would have been national
suicide to do anything else and they should be applauded for having
the courage to take a principled line.
Legal relations with the Occupied Area of Cyprus
21. Lobby believes that it would assist
the FAC to be reminded of the legal basis upon which the Republic
of Cyprus was established. Article 1 of the Treaty of Establishment
1960 provided that "The territory of the Republic of Cyprus
shall comprise the Island of Cyprus together with the islands
lying off its coast, with the exception of the two areas . . .
which shall remain under the sovereignty of the UK."
22. A number of important provisions were
also contained within Articles I and II of the Treaty of Guarantee.
23. Article I provides that "The Republic
of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence,
territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its
Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in
part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever.
It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote,
directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition
of the Island."
24. Article II provides that "Greece,
Turkey and the UK, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic
of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise
and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security
of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established
by the Basic Articles of its Constitution".
25. It further provides that "Greece,
Turkey and the UK likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns
them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly,
either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the
Island."
26. In Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee
it is stated that "In the event of a breach of the provisions
of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to
consult together with respect to the representations or measures
necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far
as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of
the three Guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action
with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created
by the present Treaty."
27. Notwithstanding the provisions of the
Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter, the latter of which prohibits the threat or
use of force by states in the conduct of their international relations,
Turkey invaded the northern areas of the Republic in 1974 and,
since then, has subjected them to military occupation, cultural
destruction and ethnic re-engineering.
28. By invading the Republic, Turkey not
only violated the principles upon which the UN was founded and
the Republic was established, Turkey also violated the international
laws of armed conflict as Turkish forces targeted civilians by,
inter alia, bombing residential homes, schools and hospitals.
Turkish military forces ruthlessly ethnically cleansed the northern
areas of the Republic, which in common with the Republic as a
whole, had been populated by a Greek Cypriot majority and a Turkish
Cypriot minority.
29. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots
living in the southern areas of the Republic moved to the areas
under Turkish military occupation either directly or, with the
consent of the then UK government, via the UK Sovereign Base Areas.
Contrary to the impression of many people in the UK, and possibly
to the members of the FAC, Turkish Cypriots did not constitute
a majority in the northern areas of the Republic until 1974, Greeks
Cypriots did. Nor did Turkish Cypriots lawfully own a majority
of the properties in the Occupied Area prior to 1974; Greeks Cypriots
did and under the case law of the ECHR this remains the case.
30. Accordingly, the Republic has been partitioned
on a de facto basis and along ethnic lines since 1974 and the
guarantor powers, including the UK, have self-evidently failed
to honour their obligations under the Treaty of Guarantee to "recognise
and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security
of the Republic of Cyprus".
31. In 1983, the leadership of the Turkish
Cypriot community, following the strategy previously adopted in
1965 by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia, purportedly made
a "unilateral declaration of independence". The Turkish
Cypriot UDI suffered the same fate as that of Southern Rhodesia
and was denounced as illegal. The so-called "Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus" remains an illegal regime and has become
a haven for fugitives from justice and other criminals because
of its pariah status.
32. In response to this declaration, two
UN Resolutions were passed, UN Resolutions 541 and 550 respectively,
which deplored the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot authorities
and called for the withdrawal of the UDI. The UN also called upon
all states "to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus" and
called upon all States "not to recognise any Cypriot State
other than the Republic of Cyprus." The status quo remains
unchanged.
33. Turkey is still in illegal occupation
of northern Cyprus and 40,000 Turkish troops are stationed on
the island. The ECHR in the decision of Loizidou v Turkey [1996]
23 EHRR 513 confirmed that Turkey was in "effective control"
of the northern part of the island as its troops were in occupation.
It also confirmed that there was a continuing breach of the human
right to peaceful enjoyment of one's property under Article 1
of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
ECHR has recently confirmed this decision in Cyprus v Turkey [2001]
1 BHRC 45 and in Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and another
v Turkey [2003] ECHR 16163/90. The continued denial of access
to property was a continuing violation" by virtue of the
fact that Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus
were being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of
their property as well as any compensation for the interference
with their property rights."
34. Additionally, in the recent decision
of Demades v Turkey [2003] ECHR 16219/90, the ECHR held that there
was a continuing violation of right to respect for one's home
under Article 8 of the Convention by way of "the complete
denial of the right of Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to respect
for their homes in northern Cyprus since1974, . . . as . . . displaced
persons they were unable to apply to the authorities to reoccupy
their homes which they had left behind." The position has
not changed.
35. At the present time the EU has approved
funding for Turkish Cypriots. There is the very real risk that
any EU funding given to the Occupied Area will be used to enhance
stolen properties in the hope that if a plan similar to Annan
is implemented, the current occupiers will be allowed to keep
the properties because they have enhanced them substantially.
Given that the Republic of Cyprus is the only legitimate government
of the island, Lobby submits that any EU funding should be channelled
through that government which is the only legally recognised government
of Cyprus. We urge the FAC to recommend to the UK government to
act consistently with international law and ensures that trade
with Turkish Cypriots and funding be channelled through the Republic
of Cyprus official authorities.
36. Additionally, decisions of the European
Court of Justice, such as R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food, ex parte S.P.Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others [1994]
ECR I-3087, clearly provide that it is illegal to export goods
from the occupied area to Member States without the appropriate
certificates issued by the Republic of Cyprus rather than certificates
issued by the Turkish community in the Occupied Area. Any policy
promoting such export by the Occupied Area would be contrary to
EU law.
37. The northern part of the island is still
illegally occupied territory, which is not recognised by any country
other than Turkey. This position has not changed despite Greek
Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan. The international community,
including the EU, should continue to strive for a workable fair
and just settlement, which complies with EU law, international
law and UN Security Council resolutions.
38. In our view therefore there should be
no further support given by the UK government to the illegal regime
in the Occupied Area. Indeed the UK government should do more
to respect the clear legal position under international law. For
example, legal action should be taken against companies seeking
to sell Greek Cypriot owned properties to gullible UK based citizens,
who are in current danger of being sued for trespass by the legitimate
owners or of losing what they consider as their properties in
the event a solution. Parliament would not be doing its job in
acting in the best interests of the public in the UK if it continues
to allow the flagrant advertising for sale and the actual sale
by UK based companies of stolen Greek Cypriot property to UK citizens.
The UK government should also take a firmer line with Turkey and
even at this late stage try to uphold its treaty obligations to
the people of Cyprus.
What type of solution would be in UK's interests
39. As a UK based organisation and with
a membership consisting of UK citizens, Lobby believes it is well
placed to offer guidance to the FAC on what the UK government
should look for in any Cyprus settlement and what would be in
the interests of the UK population. Mistakes have been made in
the past, by all sides, but there is an opportunity now to look
afresh at what factors should underpin a Cyprus settlement. Lobby
looks favourably upon this review by the FAC and believes that
the findings of the FAC could enable the UK government to finally
work towards an ethical foreign policy on Cyprus based on respect
for international law and human rights. This is regrettably something,
which successive UK governments have lamentably failed to do since
1974.
40. To begin with it is critical to British
interests that any solution in Cyprus complies fully with existing
international law. This means that the territorial integrity of
the Republic must be respected and no steps taken now or as part
of any settlement to compromise this by directly or indirectly
recognising the pseudo "state" created as a result of
military invasion and ethnic cleansing. To do so would set a very
unhappy precedent in international law. One wonders whether such
a state of affairs would have been permitted in the Balkans or
elsewhere in the Middle East. If Greek Cypriot confidence in the
UK as an honest broker in any negotiations is to be revived then
it will be necessary to respect the legal rights of all concerned.
41. It would also not be in UK interests
for there to be a settlement which remained open to perpetual
legal challenge. Certainty is critical if any Cyprus settlement
is to have a realistic chance of success. However, this can only
happen if existing fundamental human and legal rights are respected,
retained and enforced. So for example Greek Cypriot property ownership
in the Occupied Area must be recognised and a clear statement
made by the Foreign Office about land ownership in the Occupied
Area. One of the main defects in the Annan Plan was the compulsory
requirement that in areas not subject to territorial adjustment
most Greek Cypriots would be forced into accepting compensation
or property exchanges. Any solution in the future must start off
with the premise that the pre-1974 property ownership should be
respected. Should Greek or Turkish Cypriots then wish to sell
or lease their property so be it. But to force upon them property
exchanges or compensation without any choice in the matter will
lead to continual litigation before courts in Cyprus, the UK and
in Europe.
42. There must also be full respect for
the freedoms of movement and ownership within the island. It is
a legal nonsense for the United Kingdom to canvass hard for a
solution that so severely curtails these freedoms within another
member state. The UK Government must respect the fundamental rights
of the EU of which it is a member. If the Republic of Cyprus is
fit enough to join the EU it deserves the full benefits. Once
again any solution lacking these freedoms will be continually
legally challenged bringing uncertainty and chaos to the viability
of any settlement.
43. The procedural steps taken to put the
Annan Plan before the respective electorates were wholly inadequate.
It is perhaps not known in the UK that the full version of the
documents upon which the Greek Cypriots were expected to vote
was not made available on the UN website until a few minutes before
midnight on 23/24 April, a mere seven hours before the polls opened.
The period between the Greek Cypriots being told in the broadest
outline what was contained within the final authenticated version
of the Annan Plan and the date of the simultaneous referenda was
a little over three weeks. The UK government thought this was
an acceptable timetable for the Greek Cypriots to consider an
extremely complex series of documents having the effect of legitimising
the events of 1974 and also dissolving the Republic of Cyprus
and putting a new state in its place. One wonders however whether
the UK electorate would find such deadlines acceptable on the
question of a referendum on the Euro, an issue of far less significance
in the day to day lives of the people in the UK than the Annan
Plan was to Greek Cypriots. It has to be in line with international
law and comply with the United Nations previous resolutions on
Cyprus, be properly negotiated and sufficient time allowed for
due consideration by the voters.
44. One of the tragic consequences of the
Turkish invasion was the ethnic re-engineering carried out by
Turkey and the consequent change in the demographic structure
of the Cypriot communities. Some 130,000 colonists have been sent
to Cyprus from Turkey and other countries since 1974 to take over
ownership of Greek Cypriot properties. This massive colonisation
was well documented in the Cuco report of 1992 commissioned by
the Council of Europe (DOC 6589). In paragraph 115 of his report
the author of the report, Rapporteur Cuco, states the following.
"All the foregoing leads me to the conclusion that the presence
and naturalisation of the settlers indubitably constitutes a further
barrier to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cypriot conflict.
The more settlers there are, the more difficult it will be to
find a solution that is acceptable to both communities and the
settlers themselves." Lobby has always taken issue with terming
these persons, who in the UK would clearly be considered illegal
immigrants, as "settlers." These individuals are not
settlers in the traditional sense of the word. They were deliberately
and cynically despatched to Cyprus by Turkey to change the demographic
composition of the island.
45. Under the provisions of the Annan Plan
all of these colonists were to be given Cypriot citizenship enabling
them to travel and work throughout the EU. What is more, under
the Annan Plan the Turkish regional authorities in Cyprus would
have been able to determine, who in the future would be granted
Cypriot citizenship within the new state of the United Cyprus
Republic. At a time when immigration into the UK is a major political
issue the risk of uncontrolled and unfettered immigration has
the capacity to present serious security and social concerns,
especially since all the colonists come from Muslim countries.
Indeed there have been sustained reports over many years that
terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Chechen separatists have
used the Occupied Area as a training base. It cannot be in the
interests of the UK to open up its borders to the colonists living
in the Occupied Area. Accordingly, the UK government should support
a settlement, which ensures that the colonists are removed, humanely
from Cyprus.
46. There is a further reason why it is
in the interests of the UK for the colonists to be repatriated
in any settlement in Cyprus. This is the financial cost to the
UK taxpayer. The cost of compensating Greek Cypriot refugees for
not returning to their properties will be borne by international
community funding, in which the UK will be a major contributor.
The Greek Cypriots will need to be compensated because the colonists
are living in their homes. Lobby suggests that it would be much
cheaper, and therefore in UK interests, for international funds
to be used to repatriate the colonists to Turkey. There would
then be no need to compensate the Greek Cypriots for loss of ownership
as they can return to their properties. The FAC will recall that
in the Loizidou case the applicant was awarded Cypriot £300,000
(around US $600,000) for loss of USE of her property, not loss
of ownership. One can only speculate on how much it would cost
to compensate her, and the thousands of other Greek Cypriot property
owners, for loss of ownership. Clearly it would have to be in
the order of billions of pounds not thousands.
47. The FAC may recall that in fact the
final version of the Annan Plan did contain a clause in which
financial inducements would be given to colonists to return (annex
VI Article 5(2)). However this provision only applied to those
"current inhabitants" living in those areas, which were
to be returned to Greek Cypriot administration. Any settlement
must deal with the entire issue of the colonists in a comprehensive
manner. In Lobby's view once this issue is properly addressed
and property ownership returned to the legal owners then much
of the detail of a settlement can be easily dealt with. If the
UK government wants a quick and clean settlement in Cyprus it
must support the repatriation of the illegal immigrants in Cyprus,
the Turkish colonists.
The way forward
48. Lobby has campaigned for the 3R's, as
set out in paragraph 7 above. None of these represent anything
other than the basic human rights of the Greek Cypriots. If the
UK government is to pursue an ethical foreign policy on Cyprus
and meet its legal and moral obligations it should seek a settlement
that respects the right of ownership and return. In addition if
the UK wants to assist Turkey to join the EU then it must make
it clear to her that it must pull its troops out of Cyprus and
cease the occupation of an EU member state. Finally it must send
a decisive signal not only to the people of Cyprus but also to
those in the UK that it will not tolerate colonisation into the
Occupied Area of Cyprus to be used as a stepping stone to illegal
immigration into the UK.
49. The settlement to be pursued should
also not create an apartheid state within the EU. Lobby submits
that the idea of having ethnically pure administrative areas in
Cyprus is past its sell by date. Federation in the guise of apartheid
has no place within the EU. Dangerous precedents would be set
within the EU if this were permitted and it is likely that extreme
nationalist or religious elements would seek to carve up towns
and cities in Europe along ethnic or religious grounds, possibly
demanding separate legislative or judicial authorities in these
areas.
50. Lobby suggests that more effort be made
to create areas of co-operation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.
For example the relaxation on trading is welcome and so is EU
funding for the Turkish Cypriots, so long as it is done through
the appropriate legal channels. The ghost town of Varosha should
be returned now to its legal owners and in return the port of
Famagusta could be used for trading with the EU. Indeed the UK
economy would stand to gain also from the re-opening of Famagusta
since the town will need to be re-developed and UK contractors
should be in a good position to capitalise given the UK's historical
role in Cyprus. As Turkish Cypriots move closer towards reaping
EU benefits they will begin to see the virtue of a strong central
government in which they would be represented. Loose federation
would not provide this. Once confidence has returned between the
two communities it will be easier to see the appropriate constitutional
framework and to secure agreement.
Specific issues raised by the FAC
51. The FAC has raised a number of specific
issues. These have in the main been addressed elsewhere in this
document but for the sake of completeness we address them here
also.
Whether the UK should continue to back the Annan
Plan
Lobby has made it clear that any settlement
must comply with international and human rights law. The Annan
Plan does not do this. Furthermore the UK has a legal obligation
to safeguard the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and constitution
of the Republic of Cyprus. The Annan Plan would dissolve the Republic
and replace it with a loose federation of two autonomous states
with the danger of eventual creation of two independent states.
This would not be in the best interest of the UK and it should
not be supported.
The implications for the EU of the admission
of a divided country
It is not the fault of anyone other than Turkey
that the EU has been forced to admit a divided country. It is
Turkey, which divided the island and has perpetuated the division.
It is Turkey, an EU applicant state, which illegally occupies
an EU member state. It is Turkey, which has continually flouted
EU law and the decisions of the ECHR. Accordingly the continued
occupation of Cyprus should be used as a reason to deny Turkey
admission to the EU, until it removes its army of occupation from
the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
Trade with the Turkish Cypriots should be encouraged
but this must be under the control of the legitimate government
of the Republic of Cyprus.
A divided island certainly does not allow the
fulfilment of the true potential that a united island would have
brought to the European family and it hinders the development
of the whole Eastern Mediterranean region. For this reason a settlement
within the European framework must be sought by the EU. The benefits
of a united and peaceful island would be enormous both to Cyprus
and the EU.
What role the UK should play in the continuing
process of negotiations between the two communities on the island
The Cyprus issue is now a greater concern to
the EU as a whole than the UK since Cyprus is an EU member state
under occupation by an EU applicant country. The UK should therefore
contribute to settling the Cyprus issue within the context of
the EU. It can assist by using its influence over Turkey to seek
compliance with the 3R's.
The UK government should respect the outcome
of the referenda of 24 April 2004 and refrain from apportioning
blame as this would hinder the recommencement of the negotiating
process.
Implications for the Annan Plan's rejection for
the northern part of the island
We cannot comment on this other than to note
that there was a good reason why Turkish Cypriots supported the
Annan Plan; it legitimised the invasion, occupation and ethnic
cleansing carried out by Turkey and gave the Turkish Cypriots
far greater rights than they would have been entitled to under
international law.
Whether the British Government should seek to
alter its relationship with the northern part of the island and
if so how
The least the UK government can do is to avoid
taking any steps that would lend the regime in the north legitimacy.
It should adhere to its pre-election commitment not to recognise
the so called "TRNC", and to facilitate a settlement
in line with international law. It should not seek to open trade
with the north, as this would cement the division of the island.
Implications for the EU's relationship with Turkey
Turkey cannot be considered as a credible EU
applicant state whilst it continues to illegally occupy a part
of the EU and refuses to apply EU fundamental freedoms and rights
both in Cyprus and also within Turkey. The EU should make the
ending of the occupation of Cyprus one of the criteria for Turkish
admission.
In Conclusion
52. The Annan Plan, If implemented would
have had the inescapable and irreversible effect of inter alia:
(a) depriving Cypriot citizens of many rights
under the European convention on Human Rights and, furthermore,
under EU law;
(b) denying the right of return to tens
of thousands of displaced persons ethnically cleansed from the
northern area of Cyprus during the Turkish invasion of 1974;
(c) freezing all applications of Cypriot
citizens to the European Court of Human Rights in respect of the
actions of Turkey in Cyprus since 1974;
(d) precluding Cypriot citizens from bringing
certain cases before the European Court of Human Rights ;
(e) legalizing the presence in the northern
area of Cyprus of tens of thousands of foreign settlers and colonists
planted there by Turkey;
(f) negating the principles of democracy
by giving 18% of the population 50% of the seats in the senate
together with the power to undermine decision-making within the
executive;
(g) permitting foreign interference in the
domestic affairs of Cyprus via the appointment of three non-Cypriot
judges to the Supreme Court who would have held the balance of
power in the event of a deadlock between the three Greek Cypriot
and three Turkish Cypriot judges;
(h) authorising a substantial foreign military
presence on the island which would only be reduced substantially
(but not totally) in the event of the accession of Turkey to the
EU;
(i) enhancing the rights of Turkey in accordance
with the terms of an Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Guarantee
1960 under which the Turkish government asserts a disputed right
of military intervention in Cyprus and;
(j) curtailing the sovereignty of Cyprus
in other ways by placing an obligation on Cyprus to endorse the
application of Turkey to the EU irrespective of whether it improves
its dreadful record on human rights.
From the above its is clear why the Greek Cypriot
people had no option but to reject the fundamentally flawed Annan
Plan. However it must be stressed that the Greek Cypriots did
not vote against a settlement and against the reunification of
their island, which they have dreamed of for 30 years following
the brutal invasion and occupation by Turkey? They voted `no'
because they did not want to endorse the consequences of the Turkish
invasion of 1974. They did not want to give democratic legitimacy
to so many provisions, which were incompatible with the fundamental
principles of democracy, human rights and international law.
The UK and EU should respect the democratic
choice of the Greek Cypriots and intensify efforts to address
the issues that let to such an overwhelming rejection of the Plan.
They should help find a settlement that adheres to international,
human and legal rights, the European aqui communautaire and one
that can be acceptable to any other European citizen. Only then
can a united Cyprus progress and prosper in the EU and in return
for the EU to take full advantage of Cyprus's geographical position,
and expand trading routes, eastwards.
Further Contact
53. Lobby is anxious to assist the FAC and
would welcome the opportunity to supplement this memorandum with
the giving of oral evidence. In the meantime should the FAC have
any questions about anything set out in this memorandum please
contact Nick Kounoupias of Lobby for Cyprus on 07768 201998 or
the Lobby office by email admin@lobbyforcyprus.org
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