Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
19 OCTOBER 2004
DR CHRISTOPHER
BREWIN AND
DR PHILIPPOS
SAVVIDES
Q1 Chairman: Gentlemen, could I welcome
you to the Committee. We have before us today, Dr Christopher
Brewin, who is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Keele
University, and we have Dr Philippos Savvides, Research Fellow
at the Athens-based think-tank ELIAMEP, whom we had the privilege
of meeting when we were in Athens. Let us move straight into the
problems of Cyprus and the negotiations leading to the Annan Plan
which appeared at one stage to be on the brink of success. Many
thought this was by far the best hope of uniting the islands since
the invasion in 1974, but alas, it has come to nothing. What is
your interpretation of that, gentlemen?
The Committee suspended from 2.35pm to 2.43
pm for a division in the House I began by saying that
the Annan Plan failed; it may historically be seen as the best
chance to date for uniting the island, long hoped for, and clearly
caused immense disappointment to both the United Nations and the
European Union. Is it your view, gentlemen, that in fact both
sides were negotiating in good faith?
Dr Savvides: First of all, I should
like to thank the Committee for the invitation to be here with
you. I do think we have to divide the negotiation process because
it took four years before we ended up with the last version of
the Annan Plan. I can say with certainty that, from a Greek Cypriot
point of view, the Clerides government was very sincere and ready
to go forward with a solution based on the product that the negotiations
would have created. I am not sure about the Turkish Cypriot leadership
at the time because, if you remember, we had a different government
in Turkey and a different negotiator which was Mr Denktash. I
think that it is very difficult to see at which point each side
was very faithful in the process, but I do think that, at the
end of the day, the mechanisms of the process did not allow both
the sides to sit down and work for a solution; in other words,
the pressure was enormous and I think that was a good thing. The
method used was good in order to sit the sides down and work for
a solution.
Q2 Chairman: But there had been 30 years
since the invasion. Are you saying that more time would have allowed
. . .?
Dr Savvides: No, I am not saying
that, in fact I am saying that it is precisely because a deadline
was set by the United Nations and it was forced that a comprehensive
plan was created. In other words, I am not one of those who think
that endless negotiations can work; that was the mistake of the
previous efforts that they were open-ended.
Q3 Chairman: Are you hinting that there
was a reversal of roles with the Papadopoulos government and Mr
Talat after what had gone before?
Dr Savvides: I think that Mr Papadopoulos
was, from the very beginning, very sceptical about the Annan Plan
and he made his views very public during the campaign as well.
He was very sceptical and I think that indeed he wanted many more
changes in the last version than the Clerides government might
have wanted. I think the difference in the Turkish Cypriot community
came from the change of government in Turkey. I think the Erdogan
government was the single most important change that allowed the
process to move forward. After all, Turkey was the one that suggested
that such problems were resolved in 1974 and thank heaven we had
Mr Erdogan coming to power and changing the position of the Turkish
government.
Dr Brewin: I want to the see the
Annan Plan resuscitated; I hope this Committee meeting is a sign
of that, as I hope is Ambassador Prendergast's visit to Turkey,
because the essence of this, as last time in 1959, is if Greece
and Turkey can agree, a lot can be done in Cyprus. The fact that
at Burgenstock, Greece and Turkey did not have much influence
on the negotiations was rather sad, because if two regional powers
can agree and if they can respond to this notion in the European
Union of making peace in the Eastern Mediterranean as important
as peace in Eastern Europe or peace between France and Germany,
then we are making progress. I agree with Philippos about the
importance of the Greek-Cypriot election. The important thing
about Mr Clerides' view was that he saw the Annan Plan as a basis
for agreement whereas, for Mr Papadopoulos, it was a basis for
negotiations which is not nearly the same thing. I also think
the role of AKEL was very important, because they were after power
and patriotism and obviously on both sides of the Cyprus divide
it is nationalism that leads to people being elected out of a
sense of security and a sense of injustice perpetrated by the
other side. This makes it very difficult at the community level
to have negotiations in what you call good faith without outside
influence.
Q4 Mr Maples: We are interested in how
to take this forward, but I think it is going to help us enormously
to have an understanding of what went wrong this time round. I
wonder whether I could just take both of you a little further.
In his summary to the Security Council of what had happened, the
Secretary General's report, presumably largely written by Mr De
Soto, puts the blame pretty fairly and squarely on the Greek Cypriot
leader, who then fired off a counter blast in somewhat less diplomatic
language saying it was not his fault at all. Can you help us to
evaluate whether Kofi Annan's statement, frankly attributing almost
all of the blame to Greek Cypriot leadership is an accurate summary
of how you think those last few months of the negotiations went,
or is it unfair on Mr Papadopoulos?
Dr Savvides: I was not part of
the negotiations, so I do not know what really went on, but I
am one of those people who think that in general the Secretary
General's reports on Cyprus have been very fair over the years.
I have said publicly and I will repeat it here that if we do not
like a report, that does not mean it is not fair. This is the
first time the Greek Cypriots did not like a report. Therefore,
I presume that a lot of the things that the Secretary General
is saying in his report are correct and, of course, Mr Papadopoulos
has produced his own version of the events and he put it in writing.
The issue is that whether or not there were negotiations in good
faith, we had a product at the end, a comprehensive plan which
was put before the people, and the problem was that there was
not enough preparation for the Greek Cypriots especially and there
was also the cultivation of fear amongst the population on the
Greek Cypriot side that led to the negative results. In other
words, I do not believe that the 76% "no" is solidified
or cemented.
Q5 Mr Maples: Presumably a lot of that
76% was influenced by Mr Papadopoulous calling, immediately the
campaign started, for rejection of the plan.
Dr Savvides: In fact the campaign
for the "no" started even before Mr Papadopoulos was
President; it started from the very first day we had the first
version of the Annan Plan. At that time the "no" campaign
was started by those who did not want a solution based on the
philosophy of this plan. The problem for the people who supported
the "yes" was that they came too late into the game
because at the end of the day they could not support a plan they
had not seen. Also, it is a fact that we had a lot of misinformation
spread around, a lot of misunderstandings and in fact one of the
things that I think that the international community can be criticised
on is that it focused so much on the Turkish Cypriot community
leadership in fact, how to avoid the obstacle named Rauf Denktash,
that it ignored developments within the Greek Cypriot community,
which at the end voted "no". Also, I think a couple
of things could have been looked at, in the sense of the implementation
of the agreement and the security; people felt they were not very
sure that Turkey would implement the agreement and that the security
guarantees given would really help them. I think that is one of
the reasons.
Dr Brewin: I agree with Michael
Attalides that there were so many converging dissatisfactions
about land, power, money, bones, that it will be difficult to
sort them into any one particular change that one can make. In
my own mind, I just take it, in terms of power and principle,
that Mr Papadopoulos has been very consistent since his early
beginnings as a leader of the struggle in wanting a proper sovereign
state with minority rights for Turkish Cypriots, but he has never
taken the view that this should mean that they should have an
equal power in the state, or that it is the responsibility of
the majority community to bring the minority community to look
on the majority as being their protectors. The Turkish Cypriots
look on their protection as coming from Turkey still. My hope
is that this has changed, that the Greek Cypriots are less afraid
of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are now less afraid of Greek
Cyprus. This is the fundamental change. There are other important
changes, but on the point about whether Alvaro De Soto, who put
in all this work and at the last minute, because the Turkey side
was being flexible and answering the questions put to them, and
because there was, if you look at the individual generals and
their attitudes on this, a serious problem in Turkey as well,
as to whether Turkey would eventually go with this kind of settlement,
I think there were changes which offended Greek Cypriot opinion
at a time when they felt that going into Europe would put them
in the driving seat. Then right at the last minute changes in
the Security Council with the Russian veto and all that business,
almost a sort of panic measure, which did not help public opinion
feel that this was creating peace. So there were difficulties
at the last minute, but I have total sympathy: if I had been Mr
Alvaro De Soto, the only thing I would have done would have been
to put in something about football because the thing is too long
and there is nothing about who is going to represent Cyprus at
football and who is going to decide how many Turkish Cypriots,
how many Greek Cypriots there would be, or whether there would
be separate teams as in Britain. This is the crucial thing which
would have made people think that you were thinking humanely,
rather than sort of distantly.
Q6 Mr Maples: You say that for all of
his political life Mr Papadopoulos had taken a different view
of what the settlement should be, that it should not a bi-zonal
federation, but that it should be one sovereign state with minority
rights for the Turkish community—I think that is what you
said. If that is so, was Mr Papadopoulos negotiating this agreement
in good faith? Do you think he was in a position where he was
never going to agree to a bi-zonal federation whatever the terms?
Dr Brewin: I do not know the answer
to that, because in my view, instead of a just and lasting peace,
they now talk about viable and functional and negotiated settlements,
all of which are looking for a political solution that will work
from the majority's point of view and the proper functions like
the central bank and shipping and all the things they gave up
to join Europe being done, in their view, properly by themselves.
They are looking, as they always have been, for something much
more like an old-fashioned nation state than is now possible in
a Europe where groups of states are having to deal with groups
and where the Balkans, the Palestinians, the Turkish Cypriots
are part of a completely new way of looking at the way we run
ourselves and where really you do not need so many elected parliamentarians—I
am going to irritate you—because it is European law and
it is the control of the executive and having a small executive,
composed of very few people, who have to get along, which is the
key to these kinds of bi-communal problems, I think. I should
not say so in this august building, but there are an awful lot
of parliamentarians with too little to do in Cyprus.
Q7 Chairman: That is interesting, but
it is a long way from the product, from the plan which was on
the table. Therefore we come back to the question: was the negotiation
in good faith, was there any prospect of that plan being accepted,
was it realistic to imagine that, at a late stage, there would
be further amendments and Annan Six, Seven or whatever? What do
you think Mr Savvides?
Dr Savvides: There are two quick
points. I think it would be a mistake to personalise it on Mr
Papadopoulos because there were other forces around him which
also played both a constructive and a negative role in the process.
I think AKEL was important in the whole process; AKEL is not united
in its position on the "yes" and the "no"
and that is why we now see almost a crisis within AKEL. The party
which had the nationalist camp was the one which promoted the
"yes" very heavily. We have to see it in a bigger picture.
The other thing I wanted to say was that I do think, in response
to your question, that the Annan Plan is realistic, in fact it
is the only realistic option we have: it is either the Annan Plan,
as the Secretary General said, or no plan and therefore partition.
I think increasingly Greek Cypriots who voted "no" are
starting to realise that because they are seeing the implications
of their negative vote last April. Therefore, I do think, as I
said earlier and I want to repeat it, that the 76% is not now
there. I am not saying that the majority of people would now vote
"yes", but what I am saying is that between now and
the next effort, which should not take a long time, though I understand
that it should not be immediate either, a lot of work has to be
done on the ground within the Turkish Cypriot community to decide
whether we really want a solution based on power sharing or not.
Q8 Andrew Mackinlay: I do not know whether
there are any figures available to you folk about the numbers
of people who voted on the Turkish side in the referendum who
were not citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Do you know? Have
you seen anything? The minister refused or was unable to answer
that because the referendum which gave a positive vote on the
North—
Dr Savvides: Are you talking about
the settlers?
Q9 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes. If there is,
I would invite you to send it to me and/or the Committee, because
I would be interested to see that.
Dr Brewin: I am not expert enough
for that, but I do need to point out to you, that there are not
figures either on how many people from Australia or the Pontic
Greeks in the Black Sea areas, who have been given citizenship
by the Republic since 1974, voted.
Q10 Andrew Mackinlay: I am pleased you
raised that.
Dr Brewin: This settler business
has this element of ideology. The important thing is to know how
many of them would have been within the 45,000 who were on the
list for the united states of Cyprus.
Andrew Mackinlay: I have to say I disagree
with you. Generally, I should like to see what figures are available.
If you have got any, I should like to see them, including Australians
and so on. What is a matter of fact is that the Republic of Cyprus
is internationally recognised, is the de jure body, so
it can grant citizenship to whom it likes; that is a matter of
fact. So if a person were an Australian he or she would be entitled
to take part in that referendum. What would be a distorting factor
for me would be whether it was significant that the settlers voted
in the North who do not have citizenship. If there is anything
out there, I should like to see it.
Q11 Chairman: What do we know?
Dr Savvides: Indeed, it is a problem
and I think that was one of the issues that was raised during
the campaign: settlers were voting, settlers who were going to
leave were voting as well, because the list was very blurred.
At the same time, the majority of the settlers voted "yes",
which was interesting.
Q12 Andrew Mackinlay: Of course they
would do.
Dr Savvides: The point here is
that this is a very difficult number.
Q13 Andrew Mackinlay: I do not want to
labour the point. I was genuinely asking whether there were any
figures. Dr Brewin raised the question quite reasonably that there
might be other people, and I note that, but they are citizens
of the Republic of Cyprus. By all means supply those figures that
are available. I cannot get it from the British Foreign Office,
which makes me think there is a little bit of a smell.
Dr Brewin: I do not think you
will, from either side, about how many recently—
Q14 Andrew Mackinlay: I do not want to
labour the point.
Dr Savvides: The figures are public
so you can get them very easily.
Q15 Andrew Mackinlay: If we go to the
Annan Plan, there is a danger actually of history repeating itself,
particularly as it was under pressure, as both of you have described.
What was not agreed at any stage was this concept of whether or
not it should be a shared state, like Belgium, which has symmetry,
broadly 50/50, or whether or not the Turkish community should
be given protected special minority rights. That was something
which was never really resolved or agreed. I would be correct
on that, would I?
Dr Brewin: Yes. I think the Annan
Plan is extremely clear, and it relates to the previous point.
Under international law, it is wrong to bring in other people,
but to get a compromise on Cyprus, where Turkey has taken this
interest in the Turkish Cypriot community, you have to accept
that the Turkish Cypriots, being afraid as a minority, are going
to have to rule themselves in this geographical sector, against
all European principles of free movement and all the rest of it,
in order to get them to accept a solution that is based on a one-island
basis rather than a sort of Ulster basis next to Turkey. This
is the deal, that the Turkish Cypriots have to rule in their area
at least for the 15 to 20 years of the Annan Plan. That is the
clarity of it and this is very difficult for the Greek Cypriots
to accept. It is a classic dispute and we cannot expect everybody
to like [anything about] this.
Q16 Andrew Mackinlay: It also seemed
to me that the international community, both the Secretary General
of the UN and the EU, were more or less saying that they were
going to arbitrate: the parties had not agreed to the arbitration,
they were going to arbitrate, take it or leave it, and when one
side rejected it, from the Secretary General downwards they said
it was a rotten show. That is what has happened here, is it not?
Dr Brewin: It is not the way I
would put it.
Q17 Andrew Mackinlay: It is not the way
you would put it. The other thing I want to ask is this. When
you come to constitution making, you can either reserve to the
centre the federal power, specific competencies, and say everything
else falls to the constituent states, or the constituent states
can have the specified powers and everything is with the centre.
Presumably that was again one of the problems, was it not?
Dr Brewin: Yes.
Q18 Andrew Mackinlay: Just help us on
how it fell. I think it was specific competencies to the centre,
was it not, and everything else was with the constituent states?
Dr Savvides: It was a loose federation.
Q19 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, but you could
have a loose federation and you would have to dictate—
Dr Savvides: I think the plan
was clear about the executive branch and the legislative branch,
in terms of the powers, in the sense that constituent states had
a lot of the powers, but the important thing to remember with
this particular plan is that the plan would have worked within
the European Union framework. That is the critical difference
from previous efforts, in the sense that a lot of the policies
would have to be made in co-operation with Brussels and the most
important thing also, the most important elements of the constituent
states, education, culture all these things that people are very
sensitive about, were within the constituent states; I think that
is very important. What the federal government had was important
powers to do with the unification of the island, in the sense
of keeping the island unified and keeping the sense that this
was a unified state and not a partitioned state, that was where
the difference lay, in the sense that you had an executive branch
allowed, for example, to have a unified economy. The economy was
[not] one of the problems that the Greek Cypriots raised and there
are changes in the last version of the Annan Plan, because, indeed,
the first version of the plan was creating too many divisions
within the economy and of course you know that if you have no
unified economy, you cannot have a unified state. That was improved
in the last version of the plan. I think it was balanced and I
think the plan was balanced. The problem for the Greek Cypriots
was not the executive and the legislature so much, as it was the
notion that the agreement would be implemented by Turkey and whether
the security guarantees were really enough. There was a lot of
concern about Turkey having troops after the solution and a lot
of concerns about keeping the guarantees of Turkey and I shared
those concerns, but I was hoping that within the European Union
this would have been mitigated.
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