Examination of Witnesses (Questions 160-179)
16 NOVEMBER 2004
MR DENIS
MACSHANE
MP AND MR
DOMINICK CHILCOTT
Q160 Chairman: That was before.
Mr MacShane: It existed before.
It is now, as it were, under a formal regulation.
Q161 Chairman: Anything tangible?
Mr MacShane: That is the only
tangible result that I can put to you.
Q162 Chairman: But that existed before.
Mr MacShane: There was not a regulation
before. There was certainly, after the barriers were removed in
2003, passage across the border, but I was very much struck when
I was there—and I do not know if colleagues who were there
will confirm this—that in fact this is still a very divided
island with two communities having very little cross-Green Line
contact.
Q163 Sir John Stanley: On the mechanics
of trying to get process towards settlement of the Cyprus issue,
is the Government's view that this is now essentially within the
European countries a matter for the EU and an EU responsibility
and that the British Government's input should be through the
EU or is the British Government's view that there is also some
room for a bilateral contribution by the British Government directly
with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus?
Mr MacShane: Let me stress, Chairman
and Sir John, that, to the contrary, it is firmly our view and
I think the European Union's view, that we should not seek to
usurp or replace United Nations and in particular the role of
the United Nations Secretary-General as the broker of the settlement.
It has been a sensible tradition on the part of the EU not to
step in and seek to resolve either, I put it as it were between
inverted commas, "internal or bilateral disputes". What
the EU does is support, as it did, it offered as part of the Annan
Plan and you will have seen the annex stipulating that Turkish
would be an official language which the united Cyprus enjoyed
and lots of other advantages which would have accrued had the
vote been "yes". We tried to provide a positive context
for the settlement. Britain has some expertise and history on
Cyprus on so a lot of my time is explaining the problems of Cyprus
to colleagues in other governments of whom it is not part of their
political furniture, as I think it is for everybody in this room.
We also obviously provide a huge incentive to Turkey by saying
yes to the accession talks beginning 17 December for Turkey to
look to see what contribution it can make, but I do stress this
is an international problem brought about as a result of the events
of 1974 which are under the aegis of the UN, which are subject
to various UN Security Councils, where the hard work lies here
in the Annan plan, and it is definitely not for the EU to replace
the United Nations. Britain is there as one of the guarantor powers;
it is there because of our incredible affinity of friendship with
both communities of Cyprus, the very large Greek and Turkish Cypriot
diasporas in our own country, but again and again we have said
we are there to help, to encourage, to provide technical diplomatic
toolkits, those that can be used, but we are not in a position
to impose, cajole or oblige a solution to be found if principally
the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots are not willing to agree
to a UN proposals.
Q164 Sir John Stanley: So the short answer
to my question as to whether there is a bilateral role that the
British government sees for the United Kingdom in this is "no",
is that right?
Mr MacShane: There is no direct
unilateral bilateral role in the sense that it is an exclusive
property of the United Kingdom. I followed the Cyprus question
closely as an MP and PPS before becoming a minister, and there
are many, many colleagues who visit there regularly who have a
lot of detailed knowledge and I have listened to all the Cypriot
debates in my ten years as an MP, and I have never felt that Britain
by herself was to produce a kind of Harry Potter solution and
solve the Cypriot conundrum. As I said to President Papadopoulos
and to Mr Talat and their colleagues, "You are the cleverest
people in Cyprus, you can do it by yourselves if you are willing
to break out of old entrenched positions".
Q165 Mr Maples: Do you think in retrospect
it is a pity that we let Cyprus into the European Union without
resolving this problem first?
Mr MacShane: I do not think that
we could be where we are today on Turkey had we, as it were, sought
to recuse the right of Cyprus to join the European Union. In other
words, there was, as I understand it, well before my ministerial
time, a quid pro quo that if Turkey was to be allowed to
become a candidate member or seek to move to the point of becoming
a candidate member, then Cyprus would be allowed to join.
Q166 Mr Maples: We understand the history
but, given where we are now, it surely is a complete and I would
suggest to you unacceptable anomaly in anything other than the
very short term that we should have a situation where part of
the European Union is occupied by foreign troops, is fenced off
where free trade is denied and where its neighbour is pursuing
a sort of beggar-my-neighbour towards it. We have to resolve it.
Surely it is not acceptable within the European Union that this
situation continues for very much longer?
Mr MacShane: That is precisely
why beginning accession talks with Turkey, which I hope will be
the European Union Council's decision next month, does allow a
new opening, because I think I in earlier evidence, Mr Chairman,
stressed the point that it will be an anomaly of increasing magnitude
that Turkey is seeking to negotiate with a union of 25 Member
States, one of which it does not recognise, for example, and it
would be an increasing anomaly that Turkey is seeking to negotiate
with 25 Member States on the territory of which as recognised
by the UN it stations two divisions.
Q167 Mr Maples: But it is not just the
Turkish involvement in Cyprus, is it, that is an anomaly? The
anomaly is we are a free trade zone. You can go and trade anywhere,
work anywhere, invest your money anywhere, start a business anywhere
except with one little fenced-off piece, and that seems to me
to be, without doubt, an anomaly, and I believe it would have
been better if we had not brought this particular cuckoo into
our nest but having done so and having I think been comprehensively
out-manoeuvred by the Greek Cypriot government we, I suggest to
you, cannot allow this to continue and simply fall into the timetable
of Turkish accession because that may be 15 years. We have to
do something about this before then.
Mr MacShane: I am always a little
bit nervous of signing off on the "something must be done"
argument but you are, I think—
Q168 Mr Maples: I think you are in sympathy.
Mr MacShane: —repeating
with much more vigorous force than the Foreign Office is allowed
to points I was making when I was in Cyprus and I have made today
on Turkish television, and I think I am probably the first minister
so to do, that yes, I think—
Q169 Mr Maples: You see, I would suggest
to you that this Cyprus veto is a paper tiger. We found as one
of the major countries in the European Union that if you are outnumbered
and in a minority of one, as we have been on several occasions
and more so under the previous Conservative government than this
one, even so it is almost impossible to sustain a minority of
one for very long. The pressure is huge; the other things you
are trying to negotiate all get blocked as well. I hope that the
Foreign Office is being much more robust in these negotiations
than you give the impression of. Maybe you want to put a diplomatic
licence on this but I really do hope we are being robust about
this because I think the Greek Cypriots can exercise this veto
once. It is like owning one nuclear weapon and firing it. When
you have done it you have completely wrecked your goodwill, you
have wrecked everybody's trust in you—they cannot do it
any more than they can veto the Turkish application on 17 December.
Now, it may be sensible to wait until 17 December but I hope on
18 December we will pursue a really robust attitude with the Greek
Cypriots and if we cannot get them to agree say, "Okay, we
will have a meeting. You exercise your veto. Go on. You do it.
You show the world that that is your policy to try and ruin the
Northern Cyprus economy", and I would suggest to you we need
more robustness in these negotiations.
Mr MacShane: I hear what you say
and this is on the record and I hope others hear what you say.
I have, though, to make the point that were I to use that language
about Britain, that we cannot use our veto and our veto is a paper
tiger and it is only a one use nuclear weapon—an interesting
concept in itself—I think, if not my ministerial life, the
high reputation I have in our anti European press might go down
very fast indeed—
Q170 Mr Maples: I think you take my point.
Mr MacShane: —but you are
right. I am astonished at the sound of my own diplomatic weasely
voice, but yes, I prefer not to go down the rip roaring road of
upping the ante that you are taking the Committee down, Mr Maples,
but I do assure you that there is very considerable feeling out
in the European Union park, if I can use that expression, that
we need to move forward with Cyprus and many people in other countries
want to do trade with Cyprus—not just Britain; there are
other people who want to open tourism in Northern Cyprus in particular—
Q171 Mr Maples: I am going to interpret
your response as encouraging to the view I have taken, but I want
to pursue my reasoning a little bit further with you, because
I think there is very good evidence that the strategy which Mr
Papadopoulos and his government are pursuing is to hold out, and
the longer they can hold out the more they will wreck the Turkish
Cypriot economy; the more people will leave and the better settlement
they will get. They think if they hold this out for five, seven,
eight years they will get a much better deal than they have under
Annan Five, and we must not allow that to happen because the price
of that is the ruination of the Turkish Cypriot economy. I do
not accept you publicly to accept my analysis of their strategy
is right but the evidence of what I am saying is absolutely overwhelming,
and if we allow them to get away with that the price will be paid
by 200,000 Turkish Cypriots.
Mr MacShane: I am not sure. We
can all suck our thumbs this afternoon and say what will be happening
in two or three or four years' time and we clearly have to go
back two or three or four years' time to President Clerides, and
it was not he who principally was the main barrier to moving to
considering Annan One or Two or Three. The bleak picture you paint,
however, has to take into consideration demographic changes. There
are maybe 200,000 Turkish Cypriot citizens who are eligible for
a Republic of Cyprus passport. They could get that and relocate
tomorrow to anywhere in Europe, to London, to Frankfurt, Paris—
Q172 Mr Maples: Many of them have done
so.
Mr MacShane: —and who would
come in and take their place? People from the mainland of Turkey
who then might make a new and different obstacle to what the Republic
of Cyprus government want. So all actions have consequences and—
Q173 Mr Maples: I follow all that. Can
I finish my questioning to you with what I hope is a constructive
suggestion and I think it will flush out whether or not my analysis
of Mr Papadopoulos' strategy is correct or not. This has become
an all or nothing negotiation; either you sign the Annan Plan
or you do not get any of it, but there are huge chunks of Annan
which are agreed by both sides and I would suggest to you that
we ought to be working for, and so ought any other agencies involved
and particularly the European Union, for partial implementations
of the Annan Plan. Now, Mr Hamilton or Mr Pope mentioned Famagusta,
Varosha. That is a self-contained settlement that can pretty easily
be made and it would give Varosha back to the Greek Cypriots,
open up Famagusta to more international trade and be beneficial
to the whole island. If these partial trade-offs are vetoed by
the Republic of Cyprus then it seems to bear out what I am saying
and their logic, if you put this to them, and their argument is,
and both sides say the same thing: if they get part of what they
want without having to agree the whole deal it will weaken the
pressure on them to settle, but it seems to me that if every international
negotiation were conducted on that basis we would never reach
agreement on anything because what you do by moving towards a
settlement is you change the atmosphere on both sides. You change
the environment in which you are negotiating, and I think that
is what the Republic of Cyprus government is missing on this.
I would like suggest to you that moves perhaps initiated by us
through the European Union to have some partial implementation
of little packages of the Annan Plan will go a long way towards
improving the atmosphere in which you might eventually reach a
settlement.
Mr MacShane: I do not disagree.
This was debated in the House in Mr Cox's Adjournment motion a
couple of weeks ago where the points you made were echoed probably
more clumsily and long-windedly in my own speech, but let us not
forget that the principal objections to the Famagusta Varosha
trade is Mr Talat and Northern Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots, because
they say, "We had all of this in the Annan Plan plus a bit
more; the Greek Cypriots have vetoed the Annan Plan; why on earth
should we settle for a lot less?" Now this is a discussion
that you or I have to have then perhaps with Mr Talat if we think
this is the right way to go down. I have said on record talking
about anything before 17 December and I have said to Turkish opposite
numbers, that the sight of a division or so of Turkish troops
getting on to their transports and leaving the island would send
a marvellous symbolic signal around the world that Turkey was
thinking afresh while still maintaining security for the Turkish
Cypriots and security concerns in the region. So those are two
tiny proposals which the British Government will have no problems
with. I think we would prefer a comprehensive settlement but in
essence direct flights to the north are a partial settlement and
that is what the EU is calling for, so I have no problems with
that at all but believe me, I did not feel a great echo when I
put some of these ideas informally in very friendly talks with
both Mr Talat and his colleagues and President Papadopoulos and
his colleagues.
Q174 Mr Maples: If I can just finish
my thoughts, if we all come to the conclusion, which I have, that
this is an intolerable problem to continue in the European Union
for more than a year or two then it does seem to me there are
various lines we can pursue, some of which we have talked about
through trade and opening up ports and they are part, I would
have thought, of partial implementation. I agree, there are lots
of trade-offs unless they happen to be made by both parties, but
I think we ought to be gently and diplomatically banging people's
heads together behind the scenes to see if we cannot get that
process started.
Mr MacShane: I do not bang heads
together—
Q175 Mr Maples: I said "diplomatically".
Mr MacShane: —but I have
said this in public rather than private and earned a reproach
from the senior Turkish diplomatic representative—no names—and
it struck me probably I was just about half doing my job, but
yes, I do want to see movement: I would like it to be on the basis
of Annan Five and a half or Annan Five minus three quarters. Were
that not possible then, if there are partial measures that can
be undertaken, we will press for that very strongly internationally
in the EU context and in all of our bilateral discussions, and
we will continue to press along the lines that you are talking
about, and I am certainly very much looking forward to the Committee's
report and recommendations because I value enormously in the time
I have been a Foreign Office minister all of your investigations—
Q176 Chairman: That is fine but—
Mr MacShane: Sorry, I thought
I was on a winner!
Q177 Chairman: Yes, but we want to know
what it means. You have told Mr Maples that you want to continue
along these lines. What other candidates do you have for partial
implementation of the Annan Plan as confidence-building measures,
which is what Mr Maples is suggesting?
Mr MacShane: This may sound a
silly one but I remember a discussion with Mr Talat on the terrace
here in the summer. It was a question whether Turkish Cypriots
would take part in the Olympic Games. No, he said, because they
could not march under the Republic of Cyprus flag. I said, "Are
you quite sure? I can think of nothing better if there is a great
Turkish Cypriot weight lifter or runner or marathon runner or
whatever than to be up there winning a prize. You will have all
of Turkey and all of Turkish Cyprus cheering for you and actually
all of Cyprus, just as we have the most awful anti Europeans in
our press but they are damned happy—
Q178 Chairman: But, with respect, that
is four years' time?
Mr MacShane: No. In the Ryder
Cup when we beat the Americans as a European team. Mr Talat seemed
to think this was inconceivable. Well, I just thought to myself
then that the problem may be deeper and more entrenched on both
sides than we realise.
Q179 Chairman: Do you have any other
matters which are part of the Annan agreement which could be agreed
as partial implementation within the next year or so?
Mr MacShane: No, because I do
not want to cherry pick. I really think that is not helpful. I
have said to President Papadopoulos and Mr Talat—Mr Talat,
of course, now no longer having the majority in his Assembly—"Can
you not go away and talk yourselves informally, privately between
officials?"
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