Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We
recommend that in its response to this Report the Government make
a statement of how it ensures that it pursues its various foreign
policy priorities in ways which take into account their inter-connectedness,
and how it factors into that process the primacy of the need to
counter the threats from international terrorism and arms proliferation.
(Paragraph 6)
The ongoing threat from terrorism
2. We
conclude that al Qaeda continues to pose a serious threat to the
United Kingdom and its interests. Indeed, this threat may have
grown more difficult to tackle in the years since 11 September
2001 owing to the fragmentation of groups and individuals associated
with al Qaeda. This was shown once again by the recent suicide
car bomb attack on a theatre packed with Westerners for a performance
of Shakespeare's 'Twelfth Night' in Doha, Qatar, where there had
been no such attacks previously. We further conclude that Iraq
is providing a dangerous training ground for terrorists similar
to that previously provided by Afghanistan. We further conclude
that states such as Iran and Syria are not taking sufficient steps
to prevent terrorism either in neighbouring Iraq or in Israel
and the Palestinian Territories. We recommend that the Government
continue to make it clear to these states that they must end all
support and assistance for terrorist groups and take meaningful
steps to stop their territory from being used by terrorists. (Paragraph
27)
The multilateral framework
3. We
conclude that the work of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)
remains vital. We are therefore dismayed that the lack of a secretariat
has impeded its efforts. We recommend that the Government take
action as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to ensure
that all states meet their reporting obligations to the CTC. We
also recommend that the Government seek to enhance the effectiveness
of the CTC, by ensuring it is provided with the requisite resources
and powers and to encourage greater co-ordination between what
are a series of ad hoc committees set up by separate UN Resolutions.
(Paragraph 33)
4. We welcome the
adoption of UNSCR 1540, although we stress that the Resolution
must work alongside the existing multilateral regimes tackling
non-proliferation. We recommend that in its response to this Report
the Government outline what it is doing to ensure that the work
of the 1540 Committee is co-ordinated with that of other non-proliferation
and counter-terrorism bodies. We also recommend that the Government
be prepared to assist states to compile reports on their non-proliferation
controls and to identify shortcomings. (Paragraph 39)
5. We conclude that
the possible involvement of British nationals or entities in the
UN's Oil for Food scandal remains a concern but that the Government
is right to withhold judgement until it is in possession of all
the facts. However, we recommend swift action if any United Kingdom
nationals or entities are implicated in the affair. (Paragraph
43)
6. We conclude that
the EU anti-terrorism measures hold promise, but have made slow
progress. We recommend that the Government push for greater co-ordination
at the EU level, and that it set out in its response to this Report
what it is doing to improve counter-terrorism co-ordination with
its EU partners. (Paragraph 48)
Human rights and the war against terrorism
7. We
conclude that, now that the British nationals have been released
from detention at Guantánamo Bay, the Government need no
longer keep its diplomacy quiet in the interests of increasing
leverage over individual cases. We recommend that the Government
make strong public representations to the US administration about
the lack of due process and oppressive conditions in Guantánamo
Bay and other detention facilities controlled by the US in foreign
countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. We further recommend
that, during the United Kingdom Presidency of the EU, the Government
raise the situation at these facilities in the UN Commission for
Human Rights. (Paragraph 61)
8. We conclude that
US personnel appear to have committed grave violations of human
rights of persons held in detention in various facilities in Iraq,
Guantánamo Bay and Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government
make it clear to the US administration, both in public and in
private, that such treatment of detainees is unacceptable. (Paragraph
69)
9. We agree with the
recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee that
the British authorities should seek agreement with allies on the
methods and standards for the detention, interviewing or interrogation
of people detained in future operations. (Paragraph 72)
10. We conclude that
some British personnel have committed grave violations of human
rights of persons held in detention facilities in Iraq, which
are unacceptable. We recommend that all further allegations of
mistreatment of detainees by British troops in Iraq, Afghanistan
or elsewhere be investigated thoroughly and transparently. We
conclude that it is essential that wherever there are overseas
detention facilities, those responsible for detainees must have
adequate training. We recommend that the Government review its
training of and guidance to agency personnel, officers, NCOs and
other ranks on the treatment of detainees to ensure that there
is no ambiguity on what is permissible. (Paragraph 76)
11. We conclude that
the arguments for evaluating information which purports to give
details of, for example, an impending terrorist attack, whatever
its provenance, are compelling. We further conclude, however,
that to operate a general policy of use of information extracted
under torture would be to condone and even to encourage torture
by repressive states. (Paragraph 85)
12. We find it surprising
and unsettling that the Government has twice failed to answer
our specific question on whether or not the United Kingdom receives
or acts upon information extracted under torture by a third country.
We recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report,
give a clear answer to the question, without repeating information
already received twice by this Committee. (Paragraph 86)
13. We recommend that
the Government set out, in its response to this Report, a full
and clear explanation of how its policy on the use of evidence
gained under torture is consistent with the United Kingdom's international
commitments as set out in the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which states,
at Article 15, that "Each State Party shall ensure that any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement
was made". (Paragraph 87)
14. We conclude that
the Government has failed to deal with questions about extraordinary
rendition with the transparency and accountability required on
so serious an issue. If the Government believes that extraordinary
rendition is a valid tool in the war against terrorism, it should
say so openly and transparently, so that it may be held accountable.
We recommend that the Government end its policy of obfuscation
and that it give straight answers to the Committee's questions
of 25 February. (Paragraph 98)
Iraq
15. We
conclude that although many parts of Iraq are secure, much of
the country continues to be wracked by violence. This has devastating
consequences for the Iraqi population and imperils the country's
political transition; it also hinders the reconstruction process
which is key to improving the quality of the lives of Iraqis and
drying up the 'recruitment pool' for insurgents. Foreign terrorists
have certainly played a leading and deadly role in the insurgency.
However, the evidence points to the greater part of the violence
stemming from Iraqi groups and individuals, some motivated by
religious extremism and others who have been dispossessed by policies
adopted by the Coalition since the war, such as de-Ba'athification
and the disbanding of the Iraqi security forces. Excessive use
by the US forces of overwhelming firepower has also been counterproductive,
provoking antagonism towards the Coalition among ordinary Iraqis.
We conclude that it should not have been beyond the planning capabilities
of the Coalition to anticipate the consequences of these various
policies. (Paragraph 109)
16. We conclude that
to date the counter-insurgency strategy has not succeeded. This
may reflect an overriding focus on a military approach to the
detriment of political engagement. This has been exacerbated by
the slow progress of reconstruction efforts. We recommend that
the Government encourage the Iraqi Government and Coalition forces
to follow a more rounded counter-insurgency strategy where possible.
(Paragraph 113)
17. We conclude that
while negotiations with al Qaeda and foreign fighters are out
of the question, it might be possible to address some of the Iraqi
insurgents' grievances through political negotiations. We recommend
that the Government be prepared to support any such efforts by
the new Iraqi Government. (Paragraph 117)
18. We conclude that
the slow pace of reconstruction and the failure significantly
to improve the quality of life for many Iraqis may have played
a role in fuelling the insurgency by providing a pool of willing
recruits. We further conclude that it is essential that greater
progress is made towards improving basic services in Iraq and
increasing employment opportunities so that Iraqis may see a material
improvement in the quality of their lives. We recommend that the
Government step up its efforts in support of the reconstruction
process and examine how to increase the impact of reconstruction
efforts. (Paragraph 122)
19. We conclude that
progress has been made towards building up the new Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) and that they played a crucial role in providing
security for the Iraqi elections. Indeed, we commend the immense
bravery of members of the ISF, who operate under the most dangerous
of circumstances. However, the ISF remain too few in number and
are insufficiently trained to be able to take over from the Multi-National
Force. We conclude that the reliance on Shia and Kurdish communities
to build up the ISF risks sowing the seeds of future ethnic and
sectarian conflict. We recommend that the United Kingdom and its
international partners redouble their efforts to build up the
ISF. We further recommend that the United Kingdom work to prevent
the ISF from becoming associated with particular ethnic or sectarian
groups and ensure that it reflects the whole of Iraqi society
so that it can act as a force for national unity. (Paragraph 129)
20. We conclude that
Iraq's neighbours continue to have a role to play in assisting
the political transition in Iraq and improving the security situation.
We recommend that the Government continue to work with regional
states including Syria and Iran to encourage them to play a more
co-operative role. (Paragraph 133)
21. We conclude that
despite efforts to internationalise the Multi-National Force and
contributions by around 30 nations, the US and United Kingdom
have carried the major burden of the operation in Iraq. This burden
will increase with the withdrawal by a number of states of their
forces over the coming months. We conclude that despite steps
towards increased involvement by the EU and NATO in Iraq, including
with regard to training the Iraqi Security Forces, this assistance
remains limited. We recommend that the United Kingdom and its
international allies work to reduce the presence and visibility
of its forces where possible. We further recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report what plans it has to hand
over to the Iraqi Security Forces. (Paragraph 143)
22. We conclude that
Iraq's elections were a great achievement and could mark a milestone
in the country's transition to a fully independent and free nation.
We commend the dedication and bravery of the Iraqi people in casting
their votes in the face of the most brutal intimidation. We further
commend the role of the UN in supporting this process, which once
again demonstrates the importance of UN engagement in processes
of political transition. (Paragraph 149)
23. We conclude that
it is essential that the international community, and especially
the US and United Kingdom, refrain from interfering in Iraqi politics
and decision making. Nevertheless, there is an important role
for the international community in Iraq. We recommend that the
Government do all it can to facilitate the UN's role in Iraq,
both in terms of providing security assistance in Iraq and through
support in the Security Council. We further recommend that the
Government consider the case for a UN Special Rapporteur to Kirkuk.
(Paragraph 168)
24. We recommend that
the Government provide an update in its response to this Report
on the current status of the United Kingdom's diplomatic presence
in Iraq and on the security provisions for the safety of personnel.
We conclude that the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's Embassy
and Consulates-General is hindered by the limits on movement imposed
by security considerations, but that the safety of personnel is
paramount. There are also issues of continuity given the short
postings of many of those in Iraq. We recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking
to enhance the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's diplomatic
presence in Iraq and to ensure continuity of policy and approach.
(Paragraph 172)
The Maghreb
25. We
conclude that the Maghreb is of strategic importance to the United
Kingdom and that Algeria, Morocco and Libya are of great significance
to the international war against terrorism. To date, the region
has not been a priority for the United Kingdom; as a consequence,
bilateral security relations are at an early stage and require
some improvement. We further conclude that the security relationship
is hindered by difficulties over the issue of extradition. We
recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report what steps it plans to take to enhance its security relationship
with each of Algeria, Morocco and Libya, as well as the current
status of extradition arrangements with these countries. (Paragraph
182)
26. We conclude that
there are genuine concerns over the situation in parts of the
Sahel, areas of which could be used for terrorist or criminal
activities. We further conclude that regional co-operation is
inadequate to address this problem. We recommend that the Government
work with its EU and international partners to enhance co-operation
between regional states and offer assistance with capacity building
where appropriate. (Paragraph 185)
27. We conclude that
the ongoing conflict over the Western Sahara is harmful both to
Morocco's international relations and reputation and to efforts
to enhance regional co-operation. We recommend that the Government
work through the EU and the UN to achieve a permanent resolution
of the conflict. (Paragraph 194)
28. We conclude that
there is a need to address the religious ideologies abused and
misrepresented by terrorist groups. However, we also conclude
that this is a task for the Arab and Islamic world. We recommend
that the Government provide assistance in this area when it is
requested but otherwise refrain from interference. We further
recommend that the Government consider the lessons of Moroccan
efforts to regulate its mosques and religious teaching with a
view to ending the negative effects of extreme Islamic teaching
in the United Kingdom. (Paragraph 197)
29. We conclude that
there is a need for reform of the EU's policy towards the Maghreb.
This includes a need for an overhaul of the Barcelona Process
as well as careful consideration of the European Neighbourhood
Policy in order to ensure that it fully engages the region. We
further conclude that the United Kingdom's Presidency of the EU
later this year offers a valuable opportunity to drive forward
reform of the Barcelona Process on the occasion of its tenth anniversary.
We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this
Report its position towards reform of the Barcelona Process and
what its plans to do to facilitate reform during its Presidency
of the EU. We further recommend that the Government set out its
understanding of the role of the European Neighbourhood Policy
in the EU's relations with the Maghreb and how this policy might
be developed to achieve a more satisfactory level of engagement
with this important region. (Paragraph 207)
30. We conclude that
migration from the Maghreb to Europe is a serious problem. Not
only does the unregulated movement of people sometimes end in
tragedy, but it also involves criminal networks that prey on desperate
people and could feed into terrorist funding. We further conclude
that this is a European concern and not just an issue for the
countries that border the Mediterranean. We recommend that during
its forthcoming Presidency of the EU the Government work to encourage
greater EU engagement on migration from the Maghreb. We also recommend
that the Government work with the countries of the Maghreb to
identify the linkages between commercial and human flows that
facilitate contraband activity that in turn fuels terrorist groups.
We further recommend that the Government set out its position
on establishing holding camps for migrants in North Africa. (Paragraph
212)
31. We commend the
decision to expand the Embassy in Algiers. However, we conclude
that even the new level of staffing will be inadequate either
to relieve the unacceptable level of pressure on staff or to carry
out the work required of a British Embassy in a country as strategically
important as Algeria. We recommend that the Government reassess
staffing levels in Algiers with a view to a further expansion
and keep the Committee informed of its plans. We further conclude
that the current working arrangements at the Hilton Hotel and
the old Embassy building hinder the work of the Embassy. We recommend
that the Government set out in its response to this Report its
plans for a new Embassy, including a timescale and cost-benefit
analysis. (Paragraph 216)
32. We conclude that
Algeria is by no means a French preserve. Indeed, at both the
political and popular levels, there is a strong desire in Algeria
for stronger relations with the United Kingdom. However, to date
the United Kingdom has put insufficient effort into engaging Algeria
and is on the verge of missing an important opportunity there.
We recommend that the Government reconsider its approach to Algeria
with a view to fostering relations by means of bilateral engagement
and exchange. We further recommend that the British Council reconsider
its position towards Algeria with a view to re-opening an office
there. (Paragraph 222)
33. We conclude that
great progress has been made towards ending the threat of terrorism
in Algeria. Nevertheless, a number of terrorist groups remain
active, posing a threat to Algerians and foreigners alike. We
further conclude that the evidence points to links between these
groups and al Qaeda, most notably through the 'Afghan connection',
making events in Algeria an international concern. (Paragraph
230)
34. We conclude that
there are substantial and long-standing links between the terrorists
who remain active in Algeria and the informal economy and crime.
We recommend that the Government work with the Algerian Government
both bilaterally and through the EU to support and where possible
assist the Algerian Government's work to tackle smuggling, money-laundering
and other forms of illicit economic activity linked with terrorism,
including offering training where required to help build Algerian
capacity. We commend initial steps towards bilateral co-operation
on policing and recommend that the Government consider what assistance
it could provide Algeria in this area, especially with regard
to community policing. We further recommend that the Government
consider sending a police attaché to Algiers to facilitate
this co-operation. (Paragraph 236)
35. We conclude that
the re-election of President Bouteflika and withdrawal of the
Algerian army from politics offer an opportunity for progress
towards democratisation in the medium term. We recommend that
the Government work to support this process, providing assistance
with capacity building where appropriate. (Paragraph 240)
36. We conclude that
there remain human rights concerns in Algeria, but that a process
of national reconciliation is under way. Given the atrocities
committed during the country's recent past, it is critically important
that this process should succeed. To this end, we recommend that
the Government provide the fullest assistance to Algeria on human
rights, including assistance in such areas as the judiciary and
through bilateral exchanges. (Paragraph 246)
37. We conclude that
insufficient priority has been attached to an exchange of high-level
visits between the United Kingdom and Morocco. We further conclude
that this is a mistake given Morocco's strategic position on the
southern shore of the Mediterranean, the country's status as a
willing ally in the war against terrorism and the fact that Morocco
represents a genuine success story in the pursuit of reform and
moderation in the Arab world. We recommend that the Government
give a higher priority to high-level exchanges. We further recommend
that the Government keep us informed of its plans in this regard.
We commend the valuable work of the British Council in Morocco.
(Paragraph 250)
38. We conclude that
Morocco remains vulnerable to the Islamist violence that has affected
other states in the region and that, although the Moroccan authorities
have taken concerted efforts to tackle the problem, there remains
a threat both to Moroccan and to foreign interests. Moreover,
a number of domestic factors that may have contributed to the
violence remain to be addressed and could therefore contribute
to further terrorist violence. These include a large informal
economy, the existence of sprawling slums and the failure to address
the socio-economic needs of the population in the light of falling
living standards. We recommend that the Government, bilaterally
and with its European partners, consider what assistance it can
give Morocco in these areas. (Paragraph 257)
39. We conclude that
Morocco offers a reform success story in the Arab world. Although
there remains work to be done, and not all recent developments
have been positive, the country is pursuing a genuine process
of democratisation and has taken important steps towards improving
the human rights situation. Given the importance placed on democratisation
and respect for human rights in conjunction with the war against
terrorism, we recommend that the Government fully recognise the
achievements made by Morocco in these areas. We further recommend
that the Government work with Morocco to help facilitate further
progress on human rights and that it keep Parliament informed
of its efforts in this area. (Paragraph 267)
40. We commend the
Government's skilled work to restore diplomatic relations with
Libya and welcome the improvement in ties over recent years. We
conclude that there is scope for further improvement in cultural,
business and defence relations and that the good relationship
developed between the two governments and in particular between
Mr Qadhafi and Prime Minister Tony Blair offers an opportunity
for further progress. We recommend that the Government set out
in its response to this Report its plans further to enhance relations
in these areas. (Paragraph 279)
41. We conclude that
current Estate arrangements hinder the work of the United Kingdom's
Embassy in Libya. It would make operational as well as financial
and business sense to procure a site that would accommodate all
Embassy offices. We recommend that the Government set out in its
response to this Report what steps it plans to take to resolve
this issue, including a timeframe for action. (Paragraph 281)
42. We conclude that
Libya is providing important co-operation in the war against terrorism.
We commend the Government for its work to bring Libya back into
the international fold and to facilitate this co-operation. (Paragraph
287)
43. We commend the
role of the United Kingdom in bringing about Libya's renunciation
of WMD programmes. We conclude that great progress can be made
by means of diplomacy to tackle the problem of proliferation when
there is political will on all sides. We commend the co-operation
between Libya, the United Kingdom, the US, the IAEA and the OPCW
in verifying and destroying Libya's WMD programmes. We commend
the decision at the 2004 G8 summit to co-ordinate threat reduction
work with regard to Libya. We recommend that the Government, in
its response to this Report, set out the work it has done to date,
and work it plans to undertake, in this area, including with regard
to redirecting Libyan WMD scientists. (Paragraph 298)
44. We conclude that
there is no early prospect of political reform in Libya. Given
the importance placed on the spread of democracy in eradicating
the root causes of international terrorism, we also conclude that
the situation in Libya offers cause for concern. We commend the
work of the Government to encourage improvements in the human
rights situation, notably in the field of prison reform, but we
are concerned about how the United Kingdom's improved relations
with Libya—an authoritarian state with a very questionable
human rights record—may be viewed elsewhere in the region.
We recommend that the Government continue to make clear to the
Libyan authorities that human rights abuses are wholly unacceptable
and that it work both bilaterally and with its EU and international
allies, especially the US, to demand that the Libyan authorities
cease human rights abuses. We recommend that the Government set
out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking in
this area, including any plans to bring international mediation
to bear in the case of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medical personnel.
(Paragraph 311)
The Middle East Peace Process
45. We
conclude that the London Meeting on support for the Palestinian
Authority was a worthwhile and positive initiative, with some
potentially very useful outcomes. We recommend that the Government
ensure that the momentum generated by the Meeting and by other
events is maintained, so that inevitable setbacks may be overcome.
We further recommend that the Government continue to work closely
with the United States, with a view to ensuring there is no loss
of interest in or disengagement from the peace process by the
US administration. In particular, we recommend that the Government
bring pressure to bear on the international community fully to
deliver on its promises, on the Palestinian Authority fully to
implement its reforms, and on Israel fully to meet its commitments
under the Road Map. (Paragraph 319)
Afghanistan
46. We
do not underestimate the difficulties faced by President Karzai
and his government, but we are concerned that a lengthy postponement
of elections may damage the credibility of Afghanistan's emerging
democracy. We recommend that the Government encourage the Afghan
authorities to proceed with parliamentary and district elections
as planned in September, and that it offer substantial assistance
to ensure that those elections are a success for the people of
Afghanistan. (Paragraph 325)
47. We
conclude that progress to date on disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration of militia forces is encouraging, but limited
and that the scale of the task remaining is significant. We recommend
that the Government urge all involved in the DDR process to renew
their efforts to achieve as much as possible before parliamentary
and district elections take place. However, we do not believe
that lack of progress on DDR should be accepted as a reason for
further delaying those elections. (Paragraph 331)
48. We welcome the
Minister's statement on the Afghanistan counter narcotics strategy
and the continuing commitment by the United Kingdom to counter
narcotics work in Afghanistan, in close cooperation with the Afghan
authorities and with international partners. We support the dual
emphasis on immediate action to reduce opium poppy cultivation
in 2005 and longer term action to eradicate it completely. We
conclude that the United Kingdom's lead role in co-ordinating
the UN's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan is one of the
Government's most important responsibilities overseas, not least
due to some 95 percent of heroin in the United Kingdom originating
from Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government continue to
keep Parliament fully informed of progress. (Paragraph 337)
49. We welcome progress
on the expansion of NATO's ISAF operations in Afghanistan and
in particular we acknowledge the considerable achievements of
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We recommend that
the Government maintain its efforts to impress on its allies the
need for them to commit substantial resources to ISAF and the
PRTs and that it continue its work to generate the momentum necessary
for these to be delivered as quickly as possible. (Paragraph 343)
50. We conclude that
the proposal for increased synergy between and better integration
of NATO's operations in Afghanistan and those of the US-led coalition
is a potentially positive move, which if correctly implemented
should enhance the effectiveness of security, reconstruction and
counter-terrorist activities alike. However, we would not support
such a process being used as cover for a significant withdrawal
of US forces from the country or for a material reduction in the
US commitment, unless there was a corresponding threat reduction.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
set out its thinking on how to achieve the NATO Council's objectives
in this area. (Paragraph 346)
51. We welcome the
appointment of Lieutenant General John McColl as the Prime Minister's
Special Envoy to Afghanistan and assurances given by the Government
that his role does not cut across that of the Embassy in Kabul.
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
give a progress report on the work of the Envoy to date. (Paragraph
348)
Non-proliferation
52. We
conclude that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an essential
element of the international security framework, and that its
survival is crucial to limit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.
We also conclude that the risk of proliferation makes efforts
to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and
curtail the spread of nuclear fuel generating facilities most
important. While the United Kingdom has a good record on disarmament
and has already reduced its own nuclear weapons to "a minimum
deterrent," other nuclear weapons states do not, and if they
do not offer concessions on disarmament in exchange for a more
effective system of counter-proliferation in May the NPT regime
may suffer. The United Kingdom is well placed to pursue these
issues with the US and we recommend that the Government encourage
Washington to take steps on disarmament which move towards the
13 Practical Steps. (Paragraph 362)
53. We welcome the
November 2004 agreement between the EU3 and Iran, and recommend
that the Government continue its support for and commitment to
diplomatic means to end the Iranian nuclear weapons programme.
We also conclude that success will be difficult without US involvement,
and we therefore welcome Washington's support for the EU3 and
its offer of economic incentives for compliance to Tehran. However,
if Iran continues to evade its obligations, the Government should
consider referring the issue to the UN Security Council. (Paragraph
373)
54. We conclude that
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to
play a major role in the proliferation of nuclear materials, knowledge
and missile delivery systems, and that its reintegration into
the NPT and international verification regimes is a matter of
urgency. We recommend that the Government continue to engage the
DPRK on non-proliferation issues, and urge full support for the
six-party talks. We also recommend that the United Kingdom urge
its EU partners to bring pressure to bear on the DPRK in concert
with concerned parties such as China, Japan and the US. (Paragraph
379)
55. We conclude that
the United Kingdom's continued support for the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) is essential, and we recommend that the Government
continue to proceed with its chemical weapons disarmament programme,
in compliance with all terms of the CWC. We also recommend that
the Government offer support to states which lack capacity in
the implementation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Action Plan, and that it set out in its
response to this Report how it is doing so. (Paragraph 385)
56. We conclude that
the lack of a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons
Convention is an extremely serious gap in the international non-proliferation
regime, and we recommend that the Government work to garner support
for a verification regime, particularly from the US. However,
a "coalition of the virtuous" may be better than nothing.
We also recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
outline the most important developments relating to the BWC, in
areas such as the implementation of a code of conduct for biological
weapons scientists. (Paragraph 391)
57. We conclude that
the ongoing work under the G8 Global Partnership is of critical
importance, and we strongly support the Government's efforts to
improve the security of the former Soviet's WMD stockpile and
to have it rendered non-harmful. We recommend that the Government
set out in its response to this Report what its priorities are
for the G8 Global Partnership, and what challenges the Government
foresees in implementation during its G8 Presidency. (Paragraph
398)
58. We conclude that
the work carried out under the G8 Global Partnership is a most
valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and
we welcome advances in the dismantlement of submarines, in increased
security of spent nuclear fuel storage, in implementation of a
legal regime for nuclear counter-proliferation efforts, and in
the ongoing work of the Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership. However,
we remain concerned about the pace of progress on the plutonium
disposition programme, and urge the Government to redouble its
efforts to secure agreement while holding the G8 Presidency.
(Paragraph 405)
59. We conclude that
the Government's support for the Schuch'ye chemical weapons destruction
facility is essential, and we urge the Government to maintain
its efforts. We also welcome the Russian Federation's determination
to accelerate its chemical weapons destruction. However, we recommend
that the Government examine the possibility of supporting other
CW destruction facilities in Russia to address Moscow's concerns
about transporting deadly stockpiles along rickety railroads.
We also remain very concerned that the G8 Global Partnership is
not working on biological weapons issues with the Russian Federation.
(Paragraph 410)
60. We conclude that
the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Nunn-Lugar programmes
are positive contributions by the US to non-proliferation efforts.
We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to support CTR efforts,
for instance by encouraging the US to expand activities as widely
as necessary. (Paragraph 413)
61. We conclude that
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee provide
useful forums to discuss export controls, but fear that their
wide membership and unbinding nature leaves controls too loose.
We recommend that the Government work to strengthen the NSG, perhaps
by considering a diplomatic initiative to encourage states not
to permit exports of NSG list materials or goods to states outside
the Additional Protocol on Safeguards. (Paragraph 417)
62. We conclude that
UNSCR 1540 has strengthened the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) by making it more legally binding. We recommend that the
Government set out in its response to this Report what it is doing
to encourage other states, such as China, to conform to MTCR standards.
(Paragraph 420)
63. We conclude that
the United Kingdom's efforts to counter the proliferation of small
arms and light weapons (SALW) are steps in the right direction
but that more needs doing. We urge the Government to continue
its support for regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement by bringing
states which produce SALW into the treaty regimes and by strengthening
the binding elements of regimes tackling the proliferation of
conventional weapons. We also fully endorse the comments made
by the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls, recommending
that trade in MANPADS, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic
light weapons, should be subject to extra-territorial control
if intended for end use by anyone other than a national government.
(Paragraph 426)
64. We welcome the
ongoing development of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and we recommend that the Government set out in its response to
this Report the most important developments which have come out
of the meetings of operational experts and military exercises.
However, we remain concerned about the legality of detentions
of shipping on the high seas, and in particular with draft Article
8 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Marine Navigation. We recommend that the Government
outline how it will ensure the human rights of those on board
any detained vessels, and how it will limit any potentially destabilising
interdictions or detentions, particularly if the Government adheres
to its position of "deemed consent", giving states four
hours to respond to demands to allow boarding. (Paragraph 436)
65. We conclude that
the Container Security Initiative is a sound means to promote
the security of the United States. We recommend that the Government
examine the possibilities of enacting a similar initiative to
secure the ports of the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories.
(Paragraph 439)
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