Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report


6 The Maghreb

Introduction

A strategically important region

173. The Committee decided to examine the Maghreb[239] in the context of its inquiry into foreign policy aspects of the war against terrorism for two principal reasons. Firstly, this energy-rich region lies on the southern border of the Mediterranean, linking Europe with both Africa and the Arab and Islamic worlds. The United Kingdom has a clear strategic interest in the region. Secondly, the countries of the Maghreb have considerable experience of terrorism. Algeria has suffered from domestic terrorism for years, with much of the 1990s blighted by a bloody struggle between the security forces and Islamists; in May 2003, Morocco was rocked by co-ordinated attacks in Casablanca; and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has both financed international terrorism in the past and faced violent Islamist opposition, including a number of assassination bids that have been linked with al Qaeda. There are documented links between the domestic terrorism in these countries and the al Qaeda 'franchise',[240] notably through the 'Afghan connection'. Members of the North African diaspora have also played a role in terrorist networks in Europe and elsewhere.[241] These factors make the Maghreb experience of interest in any consideration of international terrorism. They also mean that it is critical that the United Kingdom work closely with the region in its efforts to tackle the threat posed by international terrorism.

174. The region is also significant in terms of reform. Algeria, Morocco and Libya are each at different stages in the process of political liberalisation and the pursuit of human rights. Given the correlation drawn between repression and terrorism and the emphasis on the importance of reform in the Arab and Islamic world, these countries' varying experiences offer valuable lessons.

175. Finally, the Libyan case is of significance in relation to proliferation. Libya's decision to relinquish its WMD programmes in 2003 demonstrates that diplomacy can resolve the problem of proliferation when there is political will on all sides.

176. As part of this inquiry, the Committee heard oral evidence from Dr Hugh Roberts, North Africa Project Director at the International Crisis Group and a long-standing expert on Algeria; Professor George Joffé of the Centre of International Studies, Cambridge University, an established authority on Morocco; and Oliver Miles CMG, Chairman of MEC International, Deputy Chairman of the Libyan British Business Council, former Ambassador to Libya and one of the foremost experts on Libya in the United Kingdom. In early February, we were able to visit the region for talks with high-level political and security figures as well as representatives of civil society. We also held discussions with senior figures in London as well as at the United Nations in New York and in Washington DC.

177. In our consideration of the Maghreb, we have focussed on Algeria, Morocco and Libya. Each of these three countries has its own experience of terrorism as well as a distinct political system. However, they share some common themes, some of which are considered below. The particular experiences of the three countries are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.


International counter-terrorism co-operation

178. There is a clear case for close counter-terrorism co-operation with the countries of the Maghreb. However, in the past, the region has not been a priority for the United Kingdom, which has tended to look further afield to countries with which it has historical ties. As a result, relations are at an early stage and there is a need to enhance the level of security co-operation. The Committee heard from Professor Joffé that this reflects a degree of neglect on the part of the FCO:

[T]here is not a general interest in North Africa generally or in Morocco. We have other areas which seem to us to be more important, they are much larger trade partners of course, so you can understand that sense of immediacy, but it is missing out on an area of potential importance and an area with which we are connected by the Barcelona Process, by the nature of the migrant communities in Britain and by the nature of the migrant communities in Europe. It is also a question of what you do with restricted resources. The Foreign Office has limited resources, it has to choose where it is going to make its focus and it has not chosen North Africa in particular or Morocco for that purpose yet.[242]

179. In both Algeria and Morocco we were told that there is a need for greater co-operation on security. The presence in the United Kingdom of Algerian nationals involved in terrorism highlights the need for bilateral security co-operation. Algerians were reported to be involved in the 2003 ricin plot in London and in a counter-terrorism operation in Manchester that led to the death of a police officer in 2003. In 1995, the French authorities cracked down on Algerian cells in France. This followed a number of bombings in the French Metro, carried out by Algerians, that killed eight people and injured well over 100. A number of Algerian extremists subsequently sought refuge in the United Kingdom.[243] Algeria has worked especially closely with the US: during our visit to Algeria, the level of security co-operation between Algeria and the United Kingdom was compared unfavourably with that between Algeria and the US. While in Morocco, we heard about the strong national consensus among political and religious circles about the need to counter terrorism. There is also a strong commitment to international co-operation in this area. We heard that there is a good level of security co-operation between Morocco and the United Kingdom, but that, as with all things, there is scope for improvement. By way of contrast, all parties concerned appear to be satisfied with the level of security co-operation with Libya.

180. One area of difficulty is extradition. The United Kingdom's refusal to extradite suspects to the countries of the Maghreb is a source of great frustration there. During our visit to the region, we heard some annoyance at the fact that while steps are being taken to tackle terrorism in Algeria, Morocco and Libya, individuals are free to operate from London. This was reiterated to us in London by Dr Roberts: "[I]n Algiers there has been festering resentment over the question of Britain providing some sort of a haven for elements which are involved in movements causing them headaches."[244] Although these comments relate to Algeria, we heard similar sentiments in each of the three countries. In Morocco, we heard about the case of Mohammed al-Guerbouzi. The Moroccan authorities allege that Mr al-Guerbouzi, now a British citizen, is linked with the Casablanca bombings in May 2003 and want to extradite him to face charges in Morocco.[245]

181. The difficulty for the United Kingdom relates to the human rights situation in these countries and commitments in line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite a moratorium on its implementation, Algeria retains the death penalty. Thus, there are clearly strong grounds for concern over extradition to Algeria. Nevertheless, there appears to have been a failure on the part of the Government to discuss the issue with its Maghreb partners more fully.[246] France has an informal arrangement with Algeria whereby a small number of extraditions take place with Algerian assurances that the death penalty will not be applied. The issue was among those discussed during Baroness Symons' recent visit to Algeria. The FCO wrote to us about this issue: "We have had discussions with a number of countries at both Ministerial and official level. The negotiations are inevitably complex, but are now moving into a more detailed phase."[247]

182. We conclude that the Maghreb is of strategic importance to the United Kingdom and that Algeria, Morocco and Libya are of great significance to the international war against terrorism. To date, the region has not been a priority for the United Kingdom; as a consequence, bilateral security relations are at an early stage and require some improvement. We further conclude that the security relationship is hindered by difficulties over the issue of extradition. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what steps it plans to take to enhance its security relationship with each of Algeria, Morocco and Libya, as well as the current status of extradition arrangements with these countries.

183. There are also difficulties over the low level of regional security co-operation. In each of the three countries we visited we heard about concerns over the situation in the Sahel, the area to the south of the Maghreb. Some parts of this area are remote and are not under government control, raising concerns over terrorism and related activities. These concerns are heightened by the flow of migrants from these states to the Maghreb and from there to Europe. Given the likely involvement of criminal gangs in unregulated migration, there are concerns over linkages with terrorism. For example, the EU Commission's National Indicative Programme for Algeria notes that the country has problems controlling cross-border crime, which is rising with the increase in movement of goods and individuals.[248] Regional co-operation in this area is hindered by the poor state of relations between Algeria and Morocco, in large part owing to the ongoing conflict over the Western Sahara,[249] and the inactivity of the Arab Maghreb Union. We were able to visit the African Centre for Research and Studies on Terrorism while we were in Algiers. This is an African Union initiative. However, the work of this centre is at an early stage.

184. The US is working with Algeria on the Pan-Sahel Initiative, which involves efforts to develop the security capacities of Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania.[250] The International Crisis Group has argued that there is a need to develop effective co-ordination with the Maghreb and Sahel in order to tackle links between smuggling and al Qaeda-linked activity in the central Sahara.[251] Dr Roberts also told the Committee that this is one area that could benefit from European engagement: "I personally think that the EU has an interest and could play a role in complementing US assistance in that area. That would be something in which the Algerians would be quite interested, should the EU wake up to that possibility."[252]

185. We conclude that there are genuine concerns over the situation in parts of the Sahel, areas of which could be used for terrorist or criminal activities. We further conclude that regional co-operation is inadequate to address this problem. We recommend that the Government work with its EU and international partners to enhance co-operation between regional states and offer assistance with capacity building where appropriate.

The Western Sahara

186. The ongoing conflict over the Western Sahara (referred to as the Moroccan Sahara in Morocco) is key to the poor state of regional relations and co-operation. The Western Sahara has been a disputed territory since Spain withdrew from it in 1976. Initially both Morocco and Mauritania staked a claim to the area, but in 1979 Mauritania renounced its territorial claims. Morocco occupies the territory apart from an eastern strip controlled by the Polisario Front, which leads the independence movement for the Western Sahara with Algerian support. The United Kingdom, in common with most other countries, regards the sovereignty of Western Sahara as undetermined pending UN efforts to find a solution.[253]

187. James Baker, the UN Secretary-General's Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara and former US Secretary of State, produced a peace plan for the territory. The plan provided for a period of autonomy followed by a referendum on the territory's final status.[254] Polisario accepted the Plan, but Morocco rejected it. Following James Baker's resignation in June 2004, the UN Secretary-General appointed Alvaro de Soto as Special Representative for Western Sahara. He has been unable to break the impasse.[255]

188. Both sides have imperfect records on human rights. There have been dramatic improvements in Moroccan-controlled areas of Western Sahara, but some Saharawis are denied equality of opportunity and have limits on their right to free expression and freedom of movement. Although hundreds have been repatriated in recent years, Polisario continue to hold 412 Moroccan POWs, in breach of the Geneva Convention, and do not allow free access by international observers to the camps they control. The International Committee of the Red Cross visit these prisoners regularly.[256]

189. In its evidence to the Committee, the Western Sahara Campaign emphasised the importance of a resolution to this conflict to both domestic Moroccan stability and regional relations:

In settling the Western Sahara issue Morocco will also be able to redirect badly needed domestic finances to addressing poverty and unemployment. The people who carried out the Moroccan terrorist attacks referred to above mainly came from the slums of Casablanca. Today radical Islam has become a powerful political force in Morocco, capitalising on the state's failure to provide effective public services (the literacy rate is barely 50%) and the massive gap between rich and poor to win over the younger generation. The new King's attempts at modernisation have yet to make any significant inroads on this, or on the widespread and high-level corruption in the Moroccan state, which continue to undermine the legitimacy of the Moroccan government in the eyes of its own population.[257]

190. The organisation also argues that a resolution is important to the international war against terrorism:

The Western Sahara Campaign UK further believes that a legitimate Saharawi State will provide an additional balance of power and democratic government to the western reaches of the Sahara. An area defined by porous borders, lack of governance and lawlessness, identified by the US Administration in 2004 as a potential new front for the proliferation of Al Qaeda terrorist training camps. The Leadership of the Polisario have also pledged to foster good relations with Morocco if the Saharawi vote for independence; or to respect the result of a free and fair referendum should the Saharawi vote for integration with Morocco.[258]

191. During our visit to the region we heard about the effect of the conflict on regional relations, notably those between Morocco and Algeria. Algeria opposes Morocco's claim to the territory and supports and shelters Polisario. Both countries have accused each other of harbouring dissident terrorists. The border between the two countries has been closed since 1994. Rivalry between Morocco and Algeria has hindered efforts at regional political and economic integration. Poor relations are also hampering counter-terrorism co-operation across the region as well as in the Sahel.[259]

192. Dr Roberts told us about the reasons for the impasse in attempts to reach a resolution to the conflict:

My view of this is that it is quite impossible for the Moroccan Government to withdraw on the substance of its claim to the Western Sahara. The internal political costs would be enormous; it would quite possibly destabilise it. Therefore, it has no reason to take any chances in moving significantly. On the Algerian side, the Algerians also have little incentive. The status quo is something that does not cause them any major burden. It has a potential dividend for both sides in that, of course, it is an opportunity to bang the nationalist drum when you need to do so as a distraction from other problems.[260]

193. During our visit to Morocco we heard that sovereignty over the Western Sahara is a 'red line' for Rabat: Morocco will not cede sovereignty over the territory but would consider giving it a substantial degree of autonomy. For their part, our Algerian interlocutors gave their support to the Baker plan and insisted that the UN is the correct vehicle through which to reach a resolution of the conflict.

194. We conclude that the ongoing conflict over the Western Sahara is harmful both to Morocco's international relations and reputation and to efforts to enhance regional co-operation. We recommend that the Government work through the EU and the UN to achieve a permanent resolution of the conflict.

Religious teaching

195. The war against terrorism is being fought on numerous fronts. During our many informal conversations we have heard about the need to confront the religious ideology utilised by terrorists. For some time, the Moroccan authorities have been seeking to bring mosques and religious teaching under government control, despite strong opposition. In the past, mosques were self-regulating, but the Moroccan Government has taken steps to address this, putting all mosques under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs in the early 1980s. The Ministry has instituted a formal programme of training for imams, and introduced a number of female 'religious advisers'; sermons that advocate breaking the law are banned; imams are only allowed to preach on religious issues. This is an area of concern in a number of countries, including the United Kingdom, where the preaching of figures such as Sheikh Abu Hamza has highlighted the need for regulation.[261] We heard about this from Jane Corbin, an expert on al Qaeda and global terrorism with Panorama:

There are initiatives, like, for example, the attempt to regulate the kind of religious teachers that come to Britain and teach in mosques, to encourage a more home-grown, moderate form of Islam than the importation of mullahs who follow a more extreme Wahabist creed of Islam, though that seems quite a long-term view, but it is important.[262]

196. While we were in Libya, we also heard about concerns over the aggressive influence of Wahabism throughout the Islamic and Western world, but especially on those undertaking the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. We were told about the need to counter this ideology with another from within Islam. However, this is an initiative that must come from within the Islamic world, albeit with assistance from the international community.

197. We conclude that there is a need to address the religious ideologies abused and misrepresented by terrorist groups. However, we also conclude that this is a task for the Arab and Islamic world. We recommend that the Government provide assistance in this area when it is requested but otherwise refrain from interference. We further recommend that the Government consider the lessons of Moroccan efforts to regulate its mosques and religious teaching with a view to ending the negative effects of extreme Islamic teaching in the United Kingdom.

EU policy towards the region

198. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) sets the framework for relations between the EU and the countries of the southern Mediterranean. The Barcelona Declaration has three main objectives: the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue; the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area; and rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.

199. The Partnership comprises bilateral activities, primarily Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements which the EU negotiates with its Mediterranean Partners individually, as well as a regional dimension. Association Agreements are negotiated with the individual countries of the Partnership. However, they all emphasise the observance of human rights, democratic principles and economic freedom; the need to strengthen political stability and regional economic development by encouraging regional co-operation; and the need to open a regular political dialogue in bilateral and international contexts. The MEDA programme is the main financial instrument for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The other important source of funding is the European Investment Bank.[263]

200. Since 2004 the Mediterranean Partners are also included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The aim of the policy is to offer states neighbouring the EU an alternative to membership that will help them become more stable, secure and prosperous.[264] In December 2004, the EU proposed an Action Plan for Morocco as part of the first state of development of the programme. Nevertheless, the ENP is at an early stage, and it is unclear how it will develop. From 2007, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) will replace the MEDA programme.[265]

201. Algeria, Morocco and Libya are at differing stages in their relationships with the EU. Morocco has progressed the furthest; the EU-Morocco Association Agreement was signed on 26 February 1996 and entered into force on 1 March 2000. The EU and Algeria initialled an Association Agreement in December 2001; Algeria has yet to ratify the deal. Libya is the only country around the Mediterranean that has no formal relations with the EU, although it has had observer status to the Barcelona Process since 1999.[266]

202. Both Morocco and Algeria have expressed frustration with the EU's policy towards the region, while Libya has shown little interest in joining the Partnership, preferring to develop bilateral relations.[267]

203. The Moroccan case provides a good example of the difficulties of EU policy. Morocco has been the leading recipient among the Mediterranean partners in terms of total funds received from the MEDA programme. Since the signing of Morocco's Association Agreement, financial co-operation has prioritised supporting the transition towards a market economy and the integration into the Euro-Mediterranean economic area, the development of the private sector and the 'reinforcement of the socio-economic equilibrium'.[268]

204. However, there are questions about whether the economic restructuring programmes applied to Morocco have been appropriate. While we were in Morocco we heard about the significant efforts Morocco has taken to reform the country and its commitment to economic liberalisation, and the seriousness with which the country is pursuing reform. However, we also heard frustration over the level of EU engagement and assistance with the transition process. Most notably, there is concern in Rabat over the cost of lowering of tariff barriers, which has not been offset by either unpopular indirect taxation measures or EU assistance. As Professor Joffé told us:

[B]y and large the economic restructuring programmes which have been proposed have not succeeded in their objective. That objective was really very simple: it was simply to provide employment through economic development. That was the crucial consideration. By and large, despite very great efforts at economic restructuring, none of the countries concerned, and particularly not Morocco, have succeeded in overcoming that particular problem. One of the reasons for this is that they do not have the kind of comparative advantage which would attract foreign capital in the way say, for example, you will find in South East Asia. That is a major problem. Another reason has been that in many cases legislation has not been appropriate to attract foreign capital. The third reason is that no questions have ever really been asked as to whether the methods by which economic restructuring was supposed to occur and produce the desired outcomes were appropriate or not. To a very large extent the evidence seems to be that they were not really very appropriate.[269]

205. During our visit to the region, we heard concerns in both Morocco and Algeria over the direction of EU policy. In particular, Algeria would like more help on the economy; increased human exchanges and more forceful EU engagement. For its part, Morocco would like to be given a special status, somewhere below EU membership, but more than an Association Agreement. Both countries would like significant reform of the Barcelona Process to lead to greater input by Maghreb countries into the decision-making process and expressed the hope that the United Kingdom will push such reform during its Presidency of the EU later this year.

206. The New Neighbourhood Policy appears to offer an enhanced relationship with the EU short of membership. However, it is unclear how the policy will work in practice and whether it will offer the incentives that the neighbouring countries want.[270]

207. We conclude that there is a need for reform of the EU's policy towards the Maghreb. This includes a need for an overhaul of the Barcelona Process as well as careful consideration of the European Neighbourhood Policy in order to ensure that it fully engages the region. We further conclude that the United Kingdom's Presidency of the EU later this year offers a valuable opportunity to drive forward reform of the Barcelona Process on the occasion of its tenth anniversary. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report its position towards reform of the Barcelona Process and what its plans to do to facilitate reform during its Presidency of the EU. We further recommend that the Government set out its understanding of the role of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the EU's relations with the Maghreb and how this policy might be developed to achieve a more satisfactory level of engagement with this important region.

Migration

208. Migration is a major concern for the countries of the Maghreb and Europe. This relates both to migration by people from the Maghreb to Europe and the use of the region as a transit point for migrants travelling onto Europe from elsewhere in Africa. Aside from concerns over the unregulated movement of people, there are humanitarian concerns. The UN estimates that 5,000 illegal migrants have drowned trying to cross the Mediterranean in the last decade.[271] Many migrants who survive the journey reach Italy. Over the past three years, at least 50,000 mainly sub-Saharan migrants have entered Italy aboard overcrowded fishing boats. In September 2004 alone, Italian coastguards apprehended 650 would-be migrants in two boats near the island of Lampedusa.[272]

209. While we were in Libya we heard that there were an estimated 1 million people planning to go to Europe. Between August 2003 and January 2005, Italy sent back 6,587 people to Libya; a larger number reached Italy. Given the size of the flows, there is concern over the involvement of criminal gangs: there are indications of co-ordination between Italy and Libya with regard to the timing of boat departures to coincide with spare capacity at reception centres.

210. Following the lifting of the EU arms embargo against Libya in 2004, Italy and Libya reached an agreement on co-operation in this area. This is largely in the area of training and assistance with equipment to tackle the problem. However, there have also been reports that this co-operation might lead to the creation of holding camps for illegal migrants passing through North Africa bound for Europe. Given the poor treatment of refugees in Libya this raises serious concerns.[273]

211. During its visit to Libya the Committee heard about the need for both greater Libyan co-ordination on this issue and fuller EU engagement. Bilateral work between Libya and Italy is at times hindered by difficulties emerging from the historical relationship between the two countries. Moreover, given the criminal underpinnings of migration as well as the risk that money from this trade in people could be used to finance terrorism, there is a clear international interest. The European Commission conducted an exploratory mission on migration to Libya in May 2003 and a technical follow up mission was conducted at the end of 2004.[274] However, EU engagement on the issue to date has been limited.

212. We conclude that migration from the Maghreb to Europe is a serious problem. Not only does the unregulated movement of people sometimes end in tragedy, but it also involves criminal networks that prey on desperate people and could feed into terrorist funding. We further conclude that this is a European concern and not just an issue for the countries that border the Mediterranean. We recommend that during its forthcoming Presidency of the EU the Government work to encourage greater EU engagement on migration from the Maghreb. We also recommend that the Government work with the countries of the Maghreb to identify the linkages between commercial and human flows that facilitate contraband activity that in turn fuels terrorist groups. We further recommend that the Government set out its position on establishing holding camps for migrants in North Africa.

Algeria

Bilateral relations

British representation

213. Since the height of the violence in Algeria in the mid-1990s, when the British presence was reduced to an absolute minimum, the United Kingdom's representation in Algiers has increased. However, it remains small, limiting the work that the Embassy is able to do and putting undue pressure on personnel. At present, the maximum number of British staff in Algeria is six, including an Archivist and Entry Clearance Officer. This compares unfavourably with the presence of other countries such as France, Italy, Germany and the US. The pressure of heavy work loads resulting from low staffing levels is exacerbated by restrictions on freedom of movement owing to remaining security concerns. During our visit we heard that personnel are effectively under house arrest. This clearly has an effect on staff morale and high turnover has been a problem.

214. During our visit we heard that a number of new positions will be filled in the coming year, including a Defence Attaché, a Commercial Secretary and an Overseas Security Manager. Nevertheless, the new staffing level will remain low by international standards and will fail to address the problem adequately. This is a clear indication of the failure by the Government to appreciate the changes that have occurred in Algeria and to position the United Kingdom to take advantage of opportunities there.

215. There are also difficulties with the estate in Algeria. The Embassy in Algiers was closed in early 2004 owing to security concerns and operations were moved to the Hilton Hotel as a temporary measure (although parts of the old Embassy continue to be used). Not only are there no secure communications facilities at the Hilton, but the hotel is situated a long way from the centre of the city and the Algerian ministries. This makes it very difficult for staff to engage as they should with their Algerian counterparts and reduces the visibility of the already small British presence in the country. The Committee heard during its visit that the current arrangement with the Hilton also prevents the Embassy from offering visa services. One solution to the problem of Embassy accommodation being considered is to construct a new Embassy in the garden of the Ambassador's residence.

216. We commend the decision to expand the Embassy in Algiers. However, we conclude that even the new level of staffing will be inadequate either to relieve the unacceptable level of pressure on staff or to carry out the work required of a British Embassy in a country as strategically important as Algeria. We recommend that the Government reassess staffing levels in Algiers with a view to a further expansion and keep the Committee informed of its plans. We further conclude that the current working arrangements at the Hilton Hotel and the old Embassy building hinder the work of the Embassy. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report its plans for a new Embassy, including a timescale and cost-benefit analysis.

Engaging Algeria

217. The continued low-level presence of the United Kingdom in Algiers sends a message about the lack of importance London attaches to Algeria. During our visit we frequently heard that the United Kingdom's Embassy does not function normally or fully. This was clearly a source of concern and was considered symptomatic of a general lack of interest on the part of the United Kingdom to engage more fully with Algeria. We heard time and time again of the Algerian desire for enhanced bilateral ties with the United Kingdom.

218. One issue of concern is the lack of a visa service in Algiers for ordinary Algerians, who have to travel to Tunis for this service. Another highly symbolic issue for Algerians we spoke to was the failure of the British Council to reopen in Algiers following its closure in 1994 on security grounds. Again this compares unfavourably with the position taken by other nations: France, Italy and Spain all have cultural missions in Algeria. Dr Hugh Roberts told us that he was "mystified by the refusal of the British Council to go back to Algeria."[275] He cast doubt on the argument that the security situation prevents the return of the British Council: "I find it impossible to take that pretext seriously. Other countries are active in the cultural sphere."[276] During our visit to Algeria we heard that there is great enthusiasm among Algerians to learn English and this was confirmed to us in London:

One should not under-estimate the fact that the Algerians have been convinced for years that they need mastery of the English language… The Algerians know they have to have English and they are going to the Americans rather than to the British in order to make their entrée into the English speaking world, which seems to be another opportunity we are missing.[277]

219. During its visit, the Committee heard much discussion about whether or not Algeria is a French preserve, and about the impact that 'misperceptions' of Algeria may be having on British business as well as other circles. A number of trade missions are planned for 2005 and Baroness Symons, Minister of State for the Middle East, visited Algeria in January. Nevertheless, the point was made that what is needed is a strong political message that Algeria is open and safe for business. However, messages sent by the United Kingdom tend to be confusing and even contradictory:

[T]here seems to be an element of irresolution in our diplomatic approach, because particularly recent ambassadors have taken a higher profile in Algiers, have given interviews, have articulated a British interest in improving, upgrading and so on relations and yet there has not been follow-through. Interviews of this kind might then be followed by a decision to make it harder for Algerians to go to the consulate over visa applications, things of this kind. It is as though there is no coherence in the British approach to and relating to the Algerians. As a result I think the Algerians feel very, very strongly that this is not a relationship in which they can have any confidence.[278]

220. The inescapable conclusion appears to be that relations with Algeria have not been a priority for the United Kingdom:

[H]ad developing British-Algerian relations been a priority for the Foreign Office, it could and would have done other things. My assumption is that the reason why it has not done very much over the last decade or more is because it has attached a very low level of priority to the Algerian relationship. I think that it has allowed a lot of potential opportunities to go begging as a result.[279]

221. During its visit to the region, the Committee was made aware of the impact this has had at Government and Parliamentary levels. Dr Roberts also told us about the impact this has had on the Algerian population. "I am simply conscious of the degree of resentment that existed at the Algerian end about this. Reading the Algerian press regularly, one very frequently came across quite bitter diatribes about British policy."[280] The lack of interest in Algeria on the part of the Government is clearly at variance with efforts to engage the Arab world more closely through public diplomacy.

222. We conclude that Algeria is by no means a French preserve. Indeed, at both the political and popular levels, there is a strong desire in Algeria for stronger relations with the United Kingdom. However, to date the United Kingdom has put insufficient effort into engaging Algeria and is on the verge of missing an important opportunity there. We recommend that the Government reconsider its approach to Algeria with a view to fostering relations by means of bilateral engagement and exchange. We further recommend that the British Council reconsider its position towards Algeria with a view to re-opening an office there.

Algeria and the war against terrorism

Domestic terrorism

223. In 1992, the Algerian army intervened to prevent the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from winning a majority in the National Assembly. President Chadli Bendjedid was forced to resign, the elections were annulled, a state of emergency was declared and the FIS was banned. The move prompted a long and bloody battle between armed Islamists and the security forces.[281]

224. Since 1992, over 100,000 people and possibly as many as 150,000 have died in a series of bombings, assassinations and indiscriminate massacres of civilians. In the worst days, whole villages were slaughtered, their inhabitants' throats brutally cut. The security forces blamed the Islamists for the violence. However, there were suspicions of complicity in some cases on the part of the authorities, as well as frequent reports of human rights abuses by the security forces, including summary executions and torture.

225. In 1999, following his election as President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika introduced a Law on Civil Concord offering a qualified amnesty. The following year an 'amnesty-pardon' was offered to a number of groups.[282] The level of violence in Algeria is now much reduced. Dr Roberts, who has visited the country regularly over the last thirty years, told the Committee that the atmosphere is now much more relaxed in Algiers.[283] During our visit, we were able to walk through some of the main streets of Algiers and indeed witnessed the normality of a busy and thriving city. We also heard considerable frustration from Algerians over the failure of the international community and especially the United Kingdom to appreciate the changed situation in the country.

226. Nevertheless, three terrorist groups remain active in Algeria: the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC); a rump of the Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group, GIA); and the Houmat Al-Da'wa al-Salafiyya (Guardians of the Salafi Call, or mission, HDS).[284] These groups continue to operate in remote and impenetrable areas such as the mountains and forests of Algeria with the result that "there are parts of the country that remain dangerous, there are parts of the country that are certainly dangerous to travel through at night."[285]

227. During our visit we heard that from a total of 10-12,000 terrorists at the height of the violence, there are now 500-700 active terrorists. There are frequent reports of the capture and killing of members of the remaining groups. Algerian spokespersons were keen to reassure us that Algeria is at the final stages of routing out the terrorist problem and that the population's rejection of violence has forced the terrorists to leave the cities and operate in remote, inaccessible areas.

228. As well as pursuing a brutal military counter-insurgency campaign against the armed movements, the Algerian Government has sought to negotiate with the less extreme elements.[286] A new general amnesty is being considered. Initial plans to extend the 2000 amnesty-pardon were highly controversial and failed to make progress. However, President Bouteflika's re-election in 2004 appears to have brought new vigour to the idea:

His re-election with a convincing majority in April 2004 seems to have unblocked the situation. Not only has [Chief of Staff] Lt General Lamari been pushed into retirement, but Bouteflika has been able to mobilize popular support for the idea of a broader amnesty in the name of "national reconciliation". Moves to translate this into reality are now under way, although there may well still be pitfalls to negotiate.[287]

During our visit we heard optimism over the prospects for such an amnesty and the impact it could have on the domestic situation, although there remain uncertainties over its timing and precisely who might take it up.

Links with al Qaeda

229. Dr Roberts told us about the links between Algerian terrorist groups and al Qaeda:

The GIA, as its core, was set up by people who were veterans of the Afghan war and therefore had links, before engaging in armed activity in Algeria, links to the people around Bin Laden. A key personality involved in setting up the GIA was very close to Ayaman al-Zawahri, Bin Laden's principal lieutenant, the leader of the Egyptian Jihad group.[288]

We heard during our visit that around 3,000 Algerians fought in Afghanistan, some 800 returning to set up terrorist groups. The vast majority of terrorist activity in Algeria has been conducted by Algerians; there have been very few foreign nationals involved in terrorism there. Despite these connections, Dr Roberts is cautious over the significance of links with al Qaeda:

Ideologically, the GSPC and HDS share the doctrine of Al-Zawahiri concerning the issue of takfir (denouncing only the state, not the society, as impious). But these groups are primarily rooted in the Algerian national context, and their jihad has been and remains the internal jihad against the Algerian state, not the global jihad proclaimed by Al-Qaeda. The position appeared to change when the GSPC's founder, Hassan Hattab, was replaced by Nabil Sahraoui in September 2003, since Sahraoui very emphatically proclaimed his allegiance to Bin Laden. This did not subsequently translate into any significant change in the nature of the GSPC's activities, however, although it certainly tended to block all possibility of a negotiated end to its campaign. The killing of Sahraoui and three of his lieutenants in an ambush in June 2004 may, however, have unblocked the position once more.[289]

230. We conclude that great progress has been made towards ending the threat of terrorism in Algeria. Nevertheless, a number of terrorist groups remain active, posing a threat to Algerians and foreigners alike. We further conclude that the evidence points to links between these groups and al Qaeda, most notably through the 'Afghan connection', making events in Algeria an international concern.

Links with the informal economy and crime

231. The International Crisis Group report "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page" notes that there is a substantial and long-established link between the surviving armed movements and the informal economy. A major trait of these groups is their "symbiotic relationship with local 'mafias', groups that take advantage of the state's abdication of its regulatory role in much of the economy to engage in illicit commercial activities, notably smuggling, protection rackets and money-laundering."[290] This is especially true of the GSPC. Dr Roberts told us:

[T]hey are linked to what is locally known as the sand mafia, le mafia du sable, which is an occult network which is engaging in environmental predatory activity in relation to the environment, taking sand out of the river beds and the sea shores. They are also known to be involved in money laundering. In the Tebessa area, they were involved in trafficking of containers and of livestock and in the Sahara, this is the connection with the Sahara, there has been a longstanding trans-Saharan smuggling racket, particularly cigarettes, what the Algerians call the Marlborough Connection.[291]

232. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the informal economy may account for 20% of Algerian GDP.[292] Informal economic activity is reported to be expanding at an "exponential" rate, fuelled by a vast pool of unemployed, poor and excluded.[293] Algeria continues to face serious economic and social problems, including: high unemployment (officially around 30%, but possibly much higher and estimated at around 50% for those under 30); labour unrest; continued weakness in the non-oil economy; and slow progress on economic reform efforts (largely due to opposition by labour unions and the armed forces).[294]

233. In 2001, there were widespread protests after the death of a Berber youth in police custody. This culminated in the march of nearly one million people on Algiers on 14 June. Despite the ethnic dimensions of the protests, they were largely driven by discontent over water shortages, housing shortages and high unemployment.[295] The term 'hogra', which means social and political exclusion, was widely used. More recently there were riots in January protesting against rises in the price of fuel.[296]

234. During our visit we were told about the connection between terrorism and crime and drugs, and in particular the fact that some terrorists finance their activities by extracting protection money from businesses and individuals. We were also told that important work is under way to regulate money laundering and the financing of terrorism. In April 2004, Algeria submitted a supplementary report to the UN's Counter Terrorism Committee.[297] The report outlines the steps Algeria has taken to enhance its anti-terrorism legislation, including a bill on money-laundering and terrorist financing and the establishment of a Financial Information Processing Unit within the Ministry of Finance. However, the report notes that informal transactions are difficult to control and fall "within the competence of the national police and national gendarmerie."[298] Algeria has taken steps to modernise its customs services and police force and is seeking international co-operation in certain areas, including training in how to identify and track concealed financial circuits and funds and assets of suspicious origin; and combating money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, including investigative techniques in these areas.[299]

235. Algeria has a crime problem, especially street crime, in part because for too long the focus of policing has been on countering terrorism. However, Algeria is also under-policed; during our visit we heard that the country is looking to recruit 30-40,000 police in coming years. This is one area where the United Kingdom could provide useful assistance. The Committee heard that efforts are already being made in this area, with the invitation of Colonel Ali Tounsi, Director General of the General Directorate of National Security to London.

236. We conclude that there are substantial and long-standing links between the terrorists who remain active in Algeria and the informal economy and crime. We recommend that the Government work with the Algerian Government both bilaterally and through the EU to support and where possible assist the Algerian Government's work to tackle smuggling, money-laundering and other forms of illicit economic activity linked with terrorism, including offering training where required to help build Algerian capacity. We commend initial steps towards bilateral co-operation on policing and recommend that the Government consider what assistance it could provide Algeria in this area, especially with regard to community policing. We further recommend that the Government consider sending a police attaché to Algiers to facilitate this co-operation.

The political system, human rights and national reconciliation

Role of the military and democratisation

237. Since Algeria's independence in 1962, the military has exercised considerable power behind the scenes. It has openly intervened in politics several times and all post-independence presidents have had either a military background or the full backing of the military. The ruling Front de la Libération Nationale (FLN) has also been dominated by high-ranking officers. Reforms in the late 1980s saw some formalisation of the role of the military, but little diminution of its actual influence.[300]

238. The 2004 presidential election was the first in which the military did not take sides. In contrast with the heavy handed military intervention exercised in previous elections, Chief of Staff General Muhammad Lamari repeatedly declared before the election that the military would accept any candidate, even an Islamist.[301] A number of important steps were taken to improve the democratic process ahead of the election, including amendments to the electoral law to enable members of the armed forces to vote without pressure, facilitate monitoring and provide equal airtime to candidates.[302] While there were doubts about the accuracy of the size of President Bouteflika's victory (the President was re-elected with 83% of the vote), there can be no doubt that he did win re-election.[303]

239. President Bouteflika's renewed mandate reflects a victory of the presidency over the military. Dr Roberts wrote to us that this could represent a step towards a genuine process of democratisation:

The prospect in the medium term is thus one of strong presidential rule, quite possibly displaying a new-found capacity to address and resolve some of Algeria's most pressing problems, but without any immediate progress towards a substantive democratization of Algerian political life. However, should this formula succeed in completely ending the violence and thus the premise of the state of emergency (enacted in February 1992 and renewed every year since then), it could well establish some of the conditions of a subsequent resurgence a few years from now of party politics of the kind that is indispensable to effective democratic government.[304]

240. We conclude that the re-election of President Bouteflika and withdrawal of the Algerian army from politics offer an opportunity for progress towards democratisation in the medium term. We recommend that the Government work to support this process, providing assistance with capacity building where appropriate.

Human rights and national reconciliation

241. There are a number of human rights issues in Algeria. Amnesty International has expressed concerns about the lack of freedom of expression in Algeria:

Over the past year, freedom of expression has been markedly restricted in Algeria. In particular, there has been a steep increase in the number of court cases brought against journalists and newspaper editors in an apparent attempt to silence the privately owned press. Many of these are defamation cases filed against individual journalists who face prison sentences for reporting allegations of corruption or publicly criticizing officials. Under Algerian law, defamation is a criminal offence. Those found guilty of defaming state institutions may face prison terms of up to one year, in addition to fines of up to 250,000 Algerian dinars (approximately US$3,200).[305]

242. Another long-running concern is that of 'disappearances'. During the bitter civil war, several thousand people 'disappeared' in Algeria. The Algerian security forces and their civilian allies are believed to be responsible for the disappearance of more than 7,000 people.[306] In addition, hundreds, possibly thousands of Algerians are believed to have been abducted by armed groups. There is no reliable list of the victims, or estimate of their numbers, although some organisations put the figure at 10,000.[307] Most of these people disappeared between 1993 and 1998; however, there have been isolated reports of disappearances since 1999.[308] Many remain unaccounted for.

243. Since 1998 the families of the disappeared have held regular demonstrations outside state institutions across Algeria to protest against the failure of the authorities to take seriously their concerns. According to Human Rights Watch, the police sporadically harass these relatives.[309] In September 2003, President Bouteflika announced the setting up of a body to investigate disappearances within the framework of the National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which reports to the President. While welcomed, the new body has been criticised by human rights groups for failing to address the problem with sufficient rigour.

244. Given Algeria's bloody past, there is a need for national reconciliation. This is broadly recognised and has been addressed by President Bouteflika:

It was the most important reason why people voted for him last year. I was there at the time and I listened to his speeches and they evoked enthusiasm… It was, amongst other things, saying "We are fed up with all this identity politics, Islamism, Berberism, what have you, we are all Algerians, we are all Muslims.?"... He is now under some pressure to deliver. He has raised expectations. I also think that as president he has an institutional interest in delivering. He does have an interest in the violence ending… There are grounds for giving him at least the benefit of the doubt as to his being in earnest about this and he has made some interesting moves recently, including enlisting Algeria's first president, the very elderly Ahmed Ben Bella in a key prominent role in organising a national commission on a general amnesty.[310]

245. However, there remain concerns about the institutional basis for improved rights in Algeria. Dr Roberts told that at the crux of the problem lies a weak judiciary:

[Y]ou do not have a robustly independent judiciary… Ultimately this is a function of the fact that you have a very, very weak legislature and therefore an unaccountable executive; the judiciary ultimately does come under enormous pressure from the government, from the upper echelons of the executive branch and all of this means that arbitrariness is built into the way things work. Human rights violations are simply the most brutal expression of a general tendency to arbitrariness and it is something that, as at present, a substantially unreformed political system cannot really address except in a superficial way.[311]

246. We conclude that there remain human rights concerns in Algeria, but that a process of national reconciliation is under way. Given the atrocities committed during the country's recent past, it is critically important that this process should succeed. To this end, we recommend that the Government provide the fullest assistance to Algeria on human rights, including assistance in such areas as the judiciary and through bilateral exchanges.

Morocco

Bilateral relations

247. The United Kingdom and Morocco have a good bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, there is scope for improvement. During its visit to Morocco, the Committee heard some frustration over the level of importance attached by the United Kingdom to Morocco. For our Moroccan interlocutors this issue is symbolised by the continued failure to arrange either a state visit to the United Kingdom for King Mohammed VI or visits to Morocco by the Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary (both of whom have been invited to visit the Kingdom). A state visit by King Mohammed had been set up for 2003, but was cancelled owing to the war in Iraq. No new date has been arranged. This compares unfavourably with efforts to invite Jordan's King Abdallah to the United Kingdom (the two kings came to power at around the same time and the differing experiences of the two monarchs will be compared by Rabat).

248. The United Kingdom's trade with Morocco has trebled over the past decade: British exports in 2003 were worth £357 million, while imports from Morocco totalled £456 million. Nevertheless, trade levels remain low.[312] Cultural exchange has been more successful. As we saw for ourselves, the British Council is doing excellent work in Morocco. Professor George Joffé told us:

The British Council has long been active in Morocco and has continued to be active. It is very highly respected, it competes with the American equivalent; it competes too with the French and the Germans. It represents for Moroccans… a mechanism for access to the wider world. English is recognised in Morocco now to be perhaps the most important foreign language. The British Council's language services are very highly respected indeed. They are vastly over-subscribed.[313]

249. However, Professor Joffé had concerns about the level of coverage given to Morocco by the BBC World Service:

[O]ne hears far too little about North Africa in general and Morocco in particular, not just on the World Service main services, but also on the Africa service. If you compare it with, say, French international radio, coverage on North Africa is much better. It is a pity because this is part, in effect, of the European periphery and it is directly connected to interests in this country.[314]

The BBC World Service wrote to us to defend its coverage of the region: "the World Service carries a great deal of coverage about North Africa and it gives it due prominence in the English output. The expertise that resides within the World Service is also available to the rest of the BBC, and it is often utilised."[315]

250. We conclude that insufficient priority has been attached to an exchange of high-level visits between the United Kingdom and Morocco. We further conclude that this is a mistake given Morocco's strategic position on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the country's status as a willing ally in the war against terrorism and the fact that Morocco represents a genuine success story in the pursuit of reform and moderation in the Arab world. We recommend that the Government give a higher priority to high-level exchanges. We further recommend that the Government keep us informed of its plans in this regard. We commend the valuable work of the British Council in Morocco.

Morocco and the war against terrorism

The Casablanca bombings

251. In the 1990s, Moroccans prided themselves on having escaped the Islamist violence that tore neighbouring Algeria apart. However, this all ended on 16 May 2003, when twelve suicide bombers killed 33 people, in addition to themselves, and wounded another 100 in co-ordinated attacks in Casablanca (five locations were attacked: a hotel, two restaurants, a Jewish civic association and the Jewish cemetery in the old city).[316] The attacks were traced to networks in Fez, Tangier and Casablanca. The involvement of Moroccans in the March 2004 Madrid bombings provided a further shock to the Moroccan system.[317]

252. The Moroccan authorities moved quickly to deal with the terrorist threat following the May attacks, rounding up huge numbers of suspects and implementing new counter-terrorism legislation.[318] However, there is concern over the continuing threat as well as a degree of ongoing violence:

[A]lthough the networks were mopped up very quickly indeed and although a very powerful anti-terrorism law was introduced, bringing back the death penalty, in fact there has continued to be low level violence in Morocco ever since; certainly up until May of last year there was evidence of networks existing in the countryside and indeed of there having been the use of traditional "musem", which is a kind of pilgrimage, to act as cover for training camps that were used. That has all been stopped, but nonetheless the evidence of the networks still persists. We have to assume that there is somewhere there a kernel of violence, but again it is internally directed, it is not connected with the outside world.[319]

Links with al Qaeda

253. In the context of the international war against terrorism, there have been concerns over possible links between Moroccan Islamists and al Qaeda. Although there appear to be some linkages, in large part owing to personal connections deriving from the experience of fighting and training in Afghanistan, our witnesses have emphasised the indigenous nature of the violence in Morocco. They have also highlighted the difference between the attacks in Morocco and the terrorist acts perpetrated by members of the Moroccan diaspora (for example in Madrid). Professor Joffé told us:

There were certainly people involved in them who had been in Afghanistan over the previous 20 years and to that extent you could argue they had links towards al-Qaeda and similar movements… those relations were links in the loosest of senses; they did not imply a commonality of ideology or purpose. Again, the events of May 2003 were fundamentally directed at Morocco at the Moroccan state and at attributes of the Moroccan state. Many of the targets were Jewish, but you have to bear in mind that in Morocco the sultanate has always been seen as the protector of the Jewish community, so there was a clear link between the state and the actual targets. To that extent it was a localised, internal matter.[320]

Links with the informal economy

254. The Islamist networks implicated in the 16 May attacks have links with the informal economy. A thriving informal sector has developed in Morocco (known as 'tijara shunta', or 'suitcase trade'):

[T]here is a vast informal economy. It is the essential component which soaks up surplus labour and guarantees a degree of social peace. It is therefore, although disliked by government, because it cannot be controlled and cannot be taxed, tolerated and to some extent encouraged… The point about that trade is that what it does is build up networks and the networks can communicate inside the country and outside it and as such it becomes a very useful vehicle on which you can piggyback political movements. Therefore it is very often connected, in some way, with movements linked with political violence or political opposition.[321]

Given the thriving drug industry in Morocco, there are also concerns about linkages between drug money and terrorist financing.[322]

255. Professor Joffé told the Committee about other important factors behind the growth of Islamist violence in Morocco such as social and economic deprivation as well as an underlying political sympathy for these movements and their ideology:

If you look at the movements which have been identified in Morocco, they are located in certain quarters of certain towns. They are related often to the presence of charismatic preachers, often people who have been involved in events outside Morocco, but they are then localised and there are linkages between them around the country, between, for example, Casablanca and Fez, Fez and Tangiers, but they are not necessarily the same links as you will find through the informal economy. Having said that, the fact of the informal economy, the implication of social and economic deprivation that it implies, is of crucial importance in explaining why there is, as it were, a background against which terrorism and violence can exist. One needs to bear in mind that none of these movements can survive if there is not a generalised sympathy in some way with their wider objectives and that is certainly true in Morocco.[323]

256. Morocco is facing a number of serious socio-economic problems. During its visit to Morocco the Committee was told about the King's genuine commitment to pursue social and economic development as a way to improve the population's living standards. Social programmes include investment in education, housing and a massive literacy programme. Economic reform is essential, but despite efforts by the government, the majority of the population has seen no improvement in their standard of living. The country's position on the human development index has fallen in recent years, from a ranking of 112 in 2001 to 125 in 2004.[324] Around 49% of the population is illiterate,[325] 15-20% of the population is unemployed (the figure is as estimated to be as high as 50% among graduates) and there is a major housing crisis (this is reflected in the growth of slums outside the major cities, where the rule of government is absent).[326]

257. We conclude that Morocco remains vulnerable to the Islamist violence that has affected other states in the region and that, although the Moroccan authorities have taken concerted efforts to tackle the problem, there remains a threat both to Moroccan and to foreign interests. Moreover, a number of domestic factors that may have contributed to the violence remain to be addressed and could therefore contribute to further terrorist violence. These include a large informal economy, the existence of sprawling slums and the failure to address the socio-economic needs of the population in the light of falling living standards. We recommend that the Government, bilaterally and with its European partners, consider what assistance it can give Morocco in these areas.

Democratisation, human rights and national reconciliation

Political reform

258. Morocco is a reform success story in the Arab world. One of King Mohammed's first moves when he came to power in 1999 was to sack Interior Minister Driss Basri, who had been regarded as the most powerful man in Morocco and was widely hated for his association with the corrupt and abusive political system.[327] Basri's sacking was widely hailed as proof of the new King's commitment to reform. However, as Professor Joffé told us, the process of political reform was already underway by this point:

To understand the political changes in Morocco you need to go back to 1990, which is when King Hassan II made a conscious decision that Morocco had to develop a more constitutionalised form of government and indeed that human rights formed an important part of that agenda. Although the progress during the remainder of his reign was perhaps not as certain or as determined as one might have anticipated or heard there was undoubted improvement. Freedom of the press began to develop and by and large it was possible to express an opinion, except on the monarchy and over the Western Sahara, without threat of any kind.[328]

259. The Moroccan political system is evolving from a strongly centralised monarchy to a bicameral parliamentary system. Parliamentary elections in 2002 and municipal elections in 2003 were largely free, fair, and transparent.[329] During our visit to Morocco we learned that there are 35 women members in the lower house of Parliament, which is equal to around 10% of the total. We heard from our interlocutors that the process of democratisation in Morocco is genuine and has reached the point where it is "irreversible". Nevertheless, political reform has some way to go:

There is a fundamental problem and the problem revolves around the operations of the royal palace. Traditionally in Morocco the royal palace has run a parallel system of government alongside formal government, to which it has been superior. That system has not been dismantled, in other words the king still rules quite directly, he does not simply reign. One of the purposes of the reform should have been to transform his position into a constitutional one of reigning rather than being directly involved in the process of government on a day-to-day basis. That means that there is still an element of arbitrariness inside the political system and the danger there is that at moments of crisis that can always be enlarged.… All in all, even though I do not think Morocco is yet a fully democratic state, I would consider that it is the most advanced state inside the Middle East and North Africa by far in the progress it has made. The evidence seems to be that that progress will continue."[330]

260. During its visit to Morocco, the Committee heard enthusiasm over the possibility of exchanges with the United Kingdom. Professor Joffé told us that such exchanges could play a role in bolstering Morocco's progress towards democratisation:

I think there is a much greater need for cultural and political exchange, that is to say Morocco may well desire to create a democratic political system, it may have put in place the legislation for that purpose, it does not yet necessarily have the habits of mind by which that can be achieved. Local administration for example is often inept, the political parties often do not fully appreciate their responsibilities inside the political system and therefore much greater contact at those sorts of levels will be immensely useful in building an infrastructure which would operate an effective political system.[331]

Human rights and national reconciliation

261. In tandem with reform of the political system, Morocco has gone a long way to improve the human rights situation. In its report "Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads", Human Rights Watch noted:

Morocco has made impressive strides in human rights over the last fifteen years. These advances have included greater respect for basic civil and political rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of association. This period, especially since the accession of King Mohamed VI in 1999, has also witnessed efforts to address issues of impunity for serious and systematic past crimes, including "disappearances" and torture.[332]

262. Notable achievements include: an improvement in the general level of freedom of expression; the release of political prisoners and return of exiles; [333] the adoption of a Family Law in 2004 that gives women rights that are virtually the same as in Europe and including equal divorce rights and the right to be joint head of household; and the establishment of the State Commission on Equity and Reconciliation in early 2004 to document human rights abuses committed in past decades with a view to facilitating a process of national reconciliation.

263. Professor Joffé told us about the work of the Reconciliation Commission:

Not only were those who have been in prison been paid compensation, but at the end of last year the Moroccan Government engaged in a process which in North Africa is completely unique by publicly confronting what had occurred. A series of public investigations was broadcast on radio and television on some of the most notorious abuses of human rights, with those involved actually stating their cases, stating what was done to them and the issue being confronted in public. This was quite remarkable.[334]

264. We met the Chairman of the Commission during our visit to Rabat. In addition to compensation, the Commission is mandated to recommend and assist rehabilitation.[335] The Commission, which will produce a final report later this year, will also make recommendations on reform of the courts, security apparatus and legal framework for human rights.

265. Despite this progress, there remain some areas where human rights could be improved.[336] In particular, there are concerns about the treatment of those arrested in the crackdown that followed the Casablanca attacks. Human Rights Watch note:

Morocco's security forces and judiciary failed to uphold the rights of those arrested in the crackdown on suspected militants that followed the bombings of May 16, 2003. The police carried out massive arrests and home searches without judicial warrants, mostly in poor neighborhoods that are suspected Islamist strongholds… In cases we examined, police held suspected Islamist militants in garde à vue detention beyond the legally permitted limit before bringing them before a judge. The police then falsified the recorded arrest date to make it appear that garde à vue had stayed within the legal bounds.

Many detainees stated that their interrogators subjected them to physical and mental torture and degrading treatment in order to extract a confession or to induce them to sign a statement they had not made. During their garde à vue detention, they had no access to a lawyer and the police did not disclose their whereabouts to relatives. In some cases lawyers were not given adequate time to study and prepare the defense for their clients.[337]

266. The new anti-terrorism legislation is also problematic. The legislation introduces a broader definition of terrorism:

A list of specific acts can be classified as terrorist when they "are deliberately perpetuated by an individual, group or organization, where the main objective is to disrupt public order by intimidation, force, violence, fear or terror." The list of acts includes theft, extortion, and the "promulgation and dissemination of propaganda or advertisement in support of such acts." This definition of terrorism has been applied to convict and imprison journalists who "incite violence.[338]

In November 2003, the UN Committee against Torture expressed concern about Morocco's counter-terror legislation, notably "the considerable extension of the time limit for police custody, the period during which the risk of torture is greatest, both in criminal law and in counter-terrorist legislation."[339]

267. We conclude that Morocco offers a reform success story in the Arab world. Although there remains work to be done, and not all recent developments have been positive, the country is pursuing a genuine process of democratisation and has taken important steps towards improving the human rights situation. Given the importance placed on democratisation and respect for human rights in conjunction with the war against terrorism, we recommend that the Government fully recognise the achievements made by Morocco in these areas. We further recommend that the Government work with Morocco to help facilitate further progress on human rights and that it keep Parliament informed of its efforts in this area.

Libya

Bilateral relations

The resumption of diplomatic relations

268. The United Kingdom broke off diplomatic relations with Libya in 1984 after the murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher. Relations deteriorated further following the seizure of the 'Eksund' in 1987 loaded with arms and explosives for the IRA. In November 1991 the Lord Advocate of Scotland issued an arrest warrant for two Libyan officials in connection with the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988.

269. Diplomatic relations were resumed on 7 July 1999 following an agreement in which Libya accepted 'general responsibility' for the shooting of WPC Fletcher, made an apology and promised to pay compensation to the Fletcher family.[340] Libya also undertook to co-operate with and abide by the findings of the Metropolitan Police investigation into the shooting. The first British Ambassador to Tripoli for 15 years arrived in December 1999. A Libyan Ambassador arrived in London in January 2001.

270. In 1999, Libya handed over two suspects for trial before a Scottish court in the Netherlands for the Lockerbie bombing; UN sanctions and the EU legislation implementing them were immediately suspended. The Lockerbie trial began in May 2000 and in January 2001, one suspect was found guilty. Trilateral talks involving the United Kingdom led to the eventual lifting of UN sanctions against Libya in September 2003.[341] The United Kingdom was also instrumental in bringing about Libya's decision in 2003 to relinquish its WMD programmes.[342]

271. Libyan Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Shalgam's visit to London in February 2004 was the first visit to the United Kingdom by a Libyan Foreign Minister since Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi came to power in 1969. It helped pave the way for Prime Minister Tony Blair's visit to Libya in March 2004, the first by a British Prime Minister since 1943.[343]

272. The United Kingdom's approach towards Libya and the resumption of bilateral relations have been broadly praised. Oliver Miles told the Committee that he was:

very impressed by the finesse shown by our former colleagues in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office… in somehow bridging this gap, finding a way forward… I think the British Government have followed a skilful policy of building up a relationship in these very difficult circumstances.[344]

Enhancing relations

273. Speaking at a press conference in Tripoli after meeting Mr Qadhafi, the Prime Minister said:

From today, in line with the step by step improvement in our relations, the Foreign Secretary and the Libyan Foreign Minister will initiate a new dialogue on regional and security issues. We will deepen educational ties. You may like to know that Libyan students are in fact already the largest contingents in the UK from the Arab world. The British Council have opened a new office in Tripoli, we will renew strong UK-Libya trade ties.[345]

274. During its visit to Libya the Committee heard that in general, Libya views the United Kingdom in a positive light. Anger at the injustices of imperialism remains strong in Libya, and the fact that the United Kingdom did not colonise Libya, and in fact played a role in helping Libya to gain independence is viewed favourably. A good working relationship has also developed between Mr Qadhafi and Tony Blair.

275. We also heard that the British Council will soon open an English language teaching centre in Tripoli. There is great interest in learning English in Libya, and the British Council faces little competition. Libya is also traditionally a strong British market and there is great business interest in Libya. [346] However, Libya is not an easy place to do business: economic reform has been erratic, there are considerable bureaucratic obstacles to overcome as well as a serious lack of transparency.[347] Libya lacks many essential institutions, for example individual taxation systems and property rights.[348] During its visit to Libya, the Committee was told that wages have been frozen since 1982 and it is illegal to employ anyone, although there is an informal exception to this in the oil industry.

276. In June 2002, US-educated economist Shukri Ghanem was appointed prime minister, suggesting that economic reform was on the agenda.[349] The United Kingdom is working to encourage such reform, and in 2004 convened a seminar bringing together Libyan and British economists. The Global Opportunities Fund has provided funding for this work.

277. While businesses of all nationalities face difficulties in Libya, there are areas in which the Government could do more to facilitate access for British firms. Oliver Miles told us about the difficulties of getting visas: "I am afraid we ought to be a bit tougher with them and I think that if senior Libyans had to go through the kind of performance that senior British people have to go through in order to get visas, you would find the system would change more quickly."[350]

278. Speaking at a press conference in Tripoli after his meeting with Mr Qadhafi, the Prime Minister announced that a Defence Co-ordinator for Libya would be appointed[351] and that the United Kingdom would "offer Libya a chance of a new military relationship with the United Kingdom."[352] Nevertheless, there are indications that Libya's expectations may not have been met on this issue. In November 2004, Mr Qadhafi voiced his disappointment that: "Libya had not been properly recompensed. This, he noted, provided little incentive for countries like Iran and North Korea to dismantle their nuclear programs. He said he needed more security guarantees from the United States, Europe and Japan, as well as "civilian-use technology in return for abandoning military technology."[353] During its visit to Libya, the Committee heard that the United Kingdom is prioritising dialogue on the threats facing Libya rather than defence equipment sales. In addition, a number of places at British military training establishments have been offered to Libyan students.

279. We commend the Government's skilled work to restore diplomatic relations with Libya and welcome the improvement in ties over recent years. We conclude that there is scope for further improvement in cultural, business and defence relations and that the good relationship developed between the two governments and in particular between Mr Qadhafi and Prime Minister Tony Blair offers an opportunity for further progress. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report its plans further to enhance relations in these areas.

Estate issues

280. There are currently some difficulties over the United Kingdom's diplomatic Estate in Libya. At present, the Embassy is divided between two sites, with the Chancery based at the Residence and the Management, Consular and Visa sections located in an office block elsewhere. Both sites are leased. There is also the old Embassy; the building is too close to the road to be used under current security provisions, but the site offers substantial grounds that could be used to house a new building. During our visit to Libya, we heard that the current working arrangements are inconvenient and impede the effectiveness of the Post. The Committee understands that the Government has declined an offer to purchase sites owing to financial considerations.

281. We conclude that current Estate arrangements hinder the work of the United Kingdom's Embassy in Libya. It would make operational as well as financial and business sense to procure a site that would accommodate all Embassy offices. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what steps it plans to take to resolve this issue, including a timeframe for action.

Libya and the war against terrorism

282. Speaking after meeting Mr Qadhafi in Tripoli in March 2004, the Prime Minister told a press conference that he was struck by the Libyan leader's recognition of "a common cause, with us, in the fight against al Qaeda extremism and terrorism which threatens not just the western world, but the Arab world also."[354] This is not surprising. As Oliver Miles told us:

"Qadhafi has every interest in trying to uncover and destroy… the Bin Laden franchise, if you like, the people who associate themselves as violent Islamic fundamentalists with Bin Laden. These people have tried to murder Qadhafi in the past. There was an incident in 1998 which was the one which led Qadhafi to put out an arrest warrant for Bin Laden through Interpol and there have been other incidents as well. This has been the most serious internal threat to Qadhafi's regime ever since the beginning of his regime in 1969."[355]

Mr Qadhafi condemned the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and has provided a very close degree of counter-terrorism co-operation to both the United Kingdom and the US. The Committee heard during its visit to Libya that this is the "major success story" of the relationship with Libya.

283. Mr Qadhafi's change in stance towards terrorism appears to have been the result of an evolutionary process of normalisation that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s:

Externally Libya ceased to provide support for terrorism and extremism. Internally, Qadhafi's experiment of closing down the whole of the retail sector of the economy, which had proved a disastrous failure, was abandoned. There may have been three main reasons. First, Libya's revolutionary policies were not delivering results. Second, the bi-polar pattern of international affairs had broken down and the game could no longer be played by the old rules, not that Libya ever joined the Soviet camp, nor did the Soviet Union give Libya much encouragement or support. Third, the concept inherited from the Nasser period that the Arab world was or should be united against imperialism spearheaded by Israel no longer carried conviction.[356]

284. As well as renouncing terrorism, Mr Qadhafi has assumed a role as mediator in international cases of kidnapping: Libyan mediation helped to secure the release of hostages held by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines in September 2000[357] and in October 2004, Mr Qadhafi appealed for the release of British hostage Ken Bigley.[358]

285. Nevertheless, Libya remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Recent allegations of Libyan involvement in a plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah make it unlikely that Libya will be removed from this list in the immediate future.[359] Moreover, Oliver Miles told the Committee that Mr Qadhafi's understanding of the international threat from terrorism may not be the same as that in Washington or London:

He distinguishes very carefully between Islamic fundamentalist violence, which he sees as a threat both to himself and to America and to others on the one hand, and, on the other hand, national liberation movements, resistance to occupation both in Palestine and Iraq, which he would not for a moment associate with terrorism.[360]

286. Furthermore, it is not impossible that Mr Qadhafi could once again change tack. Although the recent rapprochement with the international community is certainly in Libya's interest, and Mr Qadhafi has deliberately sought it, Oliver Miles told us that he "would not necessarily assume that he [Qadhafi] is totally committed for the future. If things went wrong, he could change again."[361] There are also questions about the direction Libya might take post-Qadhafi given the highly personalised nature of the political system and the fact that there is no provision for succession. Libya is a large country, with many remote and inaccessible areas, which could provide a haven for terrorist activity. While domestic opposition of all strains, including Islamist, is firmly controlled, there remains Islamist sympathy and activity. Elisabeth Hughes, a freelance writer on Libya, wrote to us about the continued presence of Islamist opposition there: from time to time, there are demonstrations, particularly in the Benghazi area, where resistance has been loosely linked to the Islamist cause. There is also concern that Libyans returning from abroad could reinvigorate Islamist activity. A number of Libyans fought in Afghanistan and a small number are believed to be active in Iraq.[362]

287. We conclude that Libya is providing important co-operation in the war against terrorism. We commend the Government for its work to bring Libya back into the international fold and to facilitate this co-operation.

Libya's weapons of mass destruction

288. In previous Reports in this inquiry we have noted the Libyan decision in 2003 to relinquish its WMD programmes.[363] On 19 December 2003, Mr Qadhafi confirmed that Libya had been seeking to develop WMD and longer range missiles to deliver them. In a statement delivered by Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgam, Libya committed itself to abandon these programmes and limit itself to missiles with a range of no more than 300 kilometres, in compliance with the parameters set by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Shalgam announced that this would be done in a transparent and verifiable manner, and invited immediate international inspection.[364] In addition, he committed Libya to compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (including the Additional Protocol) and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

289. The announcement followed nine months of secret talks with the United Kingdom and the US. As part of these talks, Libya permitted joint US-British teams to visit secretly a number of WMD and missile-related facilities in Libya. There is some disagreement over what prompted Libya's decision as well as over the sincerity of the move. FirstWatch International, a research consultancy that supports non-proliferation efforts, wrote to us about this:

Although the dialog with Libya came directly at the start of the war with Iraq, it would be short-sighted to argue that Libya's disarmament was a consequence of the war. It was most likely the nexus of various problems that Libya's decision-makers faced… Externally, Libya was looking for a way to re-enter the international community in good standing after years of being treated as a rogue nation…. Internally, Col Quaddafi is known to have felt the burden of sanctions on Libya's economy.[365]

290. Both multilateral bodies and national governments have been fulsome in their praise of Libya's co-operation in verifying and dismantling its WMD programmes.[366] In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula A. DeSutter said: "I'm happy to say that so far, Libya's work to implement its December 19 commitments has been outstanding, and every indication so far has been that these commitments are indeed sincere."[367]

291. Nevertheless, as FirstWatch International told us, there remain questions to be answered:

The only possible area where Libya's cooperation may be lacking, at times, is in answering Agency's questions regarding outside suppliers to its nuclear program. In May 2004, the IAEA reported that, "Libyan authorities have 'usually' provided clear answers to Agency questions and have provided some supplementary declarations." However Libyan authorities have not always been able to provide supporting documents to augment their short December 2003 'time line.' According to the Agency report, "Lack of supporting documents limits the Agency's ability to fully confirm the completeness of Libya's declarations in some areas…" In another example, it has been noted that resolving the mystery of the origin of uranium that Libya had obtained from a foreign supplier has been difficult. According to IAEA inspectors, solving the mystery has been complicated by conflicting statements from one Libyan who said the uranium came from North Korea, and another who said the material came from A.Q. Khan.[368]

292. Libya had not acquired a nuclear weapon, but was on the way to developing a capability. It had been actively pursuing nuclear fuel cycle projects, including uranium enrichment.[369] Libya's declared nuclear capability has been dismantled and removed, and Libya has signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In 2004, US and British teams removed uranium hexafluoride, centrifuge equipment and other items including detailed nuclear weapons designs. The materials and items were taken to the US for evaluation, testing and destruction.[370] Around 17 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have also been returned to Russia (which originally supplied it). The US$700,000 fuel-removal was funded by the US Department of Energy under the Tripartite Initiative, a co-operative US-Russia-IAEA programme which addresses safety and proliferation risks.[371] Work is under way to convert the Tajura research reactor to low enriched uranium (LEU) and to develop ways to redirect Libyan WMD and missile scientists, engineers, and technicians to civilian pursuits.[372]

293. Libya has joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and submitted a declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). This declaration included over 3,300 aerial bombs designed to disperse chemical warfare agent, approximately 23 metric tonnes of mustard gas, one inactivated chemical weapons production facility and two chemical weapons storage facilities. No filled munitions were declared.[373]

294. Libya has destroyed all its chemical munitions under international supervision and agreed a timetable for the destruction of its stocks of chemical agent. Deactivation of the chemical weapons production facility has been verified. OPCW inspectors have inventories of all declared chemical weapons and related equipment and have verified that the chemical weapons and equipment have been secured. Under the CWC Libya's chemical weapons and the capacity to produce them must be completely destroyed by 29 April 2007.[374]

295. In October 2004, the OPCW Executive Council approved a recommendation that Libya be allowed to convert a former chemical weapons production facility rather than destroy it. The plan is to use the facility to produce low-cost vaccines and medicines for diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis for Africa.[375]

296. Libya has admitted to previous intentions to acquire capabilities related to biological weapons, but has said that it did not develop biological weapons. No international mechanisms, such as the IAEA or OPCW, exist in the biological weapons field. We discuss this issue in paragraphs 386-391.

297. Libya is not formally a part of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. However, in 2004 the G8 agreed at the Sea Island summit to co-ordinate threat reduction work in Libya, including the retraining of scientists involved in WMD programmes.[376]

298. We commend the role of the United Kingdom in bringing about Libya's renunciation of WMD programmes. We conclude that great progress can be made by means of diplomacy to tackle the problem of proliferation when there is political will on all sides. We commend the co-operation between Libya, the United Kingdom, the US, the IAEA and the OPCW in verifying and destroying Libya's WMD programmes. We commend the decision at the 2004 G8 summit to co-ordinate threat reduction work with regard to Libya. We recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report, set out the work it has done to date, and work it plans to undertake, in this area, including with regard to redirecting Libyan WMD scientists.

Democratisation and human rights

299. Elisabeth Hughes wrote to us explaining the Libyan political system. Mr Qadhafi established the Jamahiriya, or 'state of the masses', after a coup in 1969. This system is based on the political and philosophical thinking of Mr Qadhafi's Green Book, which highlights the need for the state to be representative of the whole of society and to reflect the thinking of the masses. However, the state is effectively run by Mr Qadhafi, whose only formal role is as the 'Leader' or 'Guide' of the revolution.[377]

300. The country is divided into regions (shabiyya). Each region has a Basic People's Committee, through which Libyans in theory influence political decision making (hence the 'state of the masses'). Representatives from these committees make up a General People's Congress (the Libyan equivalent of parliament), which is called to make decisions at the national level. The General People's Committee (cabinet) is elected by the Congress from nominees chosen by Mr Qadhafi, and is responsible for managing the Congress and the day-to-day running of the state.[378]

301. During our visit to Libya we heard great pride in the stability of the Libyan political system. However, there are serious concerns about the lack of political freedom. There is no official opposition in Libya: the Libyan legal system prohibits the formation of associations or political parties outside the existing political system.

Critics of the current system, who wish to voice their political dissent through peaceful means outside the official structures, are heavily sanctioned and even face the death penalty. They are forced to operate in secret… Despite the risks, some Libyans, including lawyers, are calling for legal obstacles to be lifted to enable them to form independent human rights organizations.[379]

The penalty for such activities is often arrest, prolonged incommunicado detention sometimes involving torture, followed by unfair trials and possibly the death penalty.

302. Asked about the United Kingdom's priorities in Libya and the relationship between ridding the country of its WMD programmes and the pursuit of democratisation, the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee on 8 February:

I think you are trying to do both the whole time. Obviously it is important to get co-operation. Even if you have a regime that is not democratic, to get co-operation over WMD is important. That is why it was important to make sure that the Libya programme was shut down… Now, none of that means, however, I think, that ultimately the situation will be stable. I think that one major lesson that we are learning is that wherever there is repression, wherever there are failed states, those are places where terrorism can breed.[380]

During our visit to Libya, we heard that political reform is quite simply not on the official Libyan agenda.

303. More positively, there have been some improvements in the human rights situation. In February 2004, Amnesty International visited Libya for the first time in 15 years. Its subsequent report noted that the authorities have taken some positive steps in recent years, including the decisions in 2001 and 2002 to release hundreds of political prisoners, among them prisoners of conscience detained since 1973, and the passing of a resolution in January 2005 to abolish the People's Court. However, it also outlined its "grave concerns about the human rights situation."[381] These concerns include the plight of political prisoners as well as prisoners of conscience, arbitrary arrest and detention, a seriously flawed judicial system and poor treatment of refugees and migrants. During its visit to Libya, the Committee was deeply troubled by what it heard about continued human rights abuses in Libya.

304. The case of Bulgarian and Palestinian medical workers accused of deliberately infecting children with the HIV virus has received considerable attention. The European Commission wrote to us about the case. In February 1999, five Bulgarian nurses, a Bulgarian doctor and a Palestinian doctor, along with Libyan medical staff, were accused of deliberately infecting around 426 children with HIV/AIDS in a Benghazi hospital. According to the results of a medical investigation, paid for by Libya, the infection was probably accidental and took place before the arrival of the medical staff at the hospital. Nevertheless, in May 2004, the five Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor were condemned to death; the Bulgarian doctor was sentenced to four years imprisonment (he was subsequently released but not permitted to leave Libya). There is strong evidence of the ill-treatment of the medics in detention. All the Libyan staff involved, including those accused of ill-treatment of the detainees, were released. [382]

305. The EU as well as individual member states have sought to win the release of the medical workers. There have also been efforts to ease the situation of the children affected, for example by providing hospital treatment. Nevertheless, the medics remain in prison under sentence of death.

306. The Qadhafi International Foundation for Charity Associations, which is headed by Mr Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam, has an ongoing campaign on human rights. The United Kingdom has been working with the Foundation on prison reform. Two former British prison governors visited Libya in October 2003 to advise on prison conditions and the FCO's Global Opportunities Fund is supporting a project to improve prison management. The Head of the FCO's Human Rights Policy Department visited Libya in July 2004. During his visit the Libyan authorities agreed to further joint work on prison management.[383]

307. The United Kingdom is also active in Libya on the issue of child abduction. There are around 20 long-running child abduction cases in Libya. The FCO has been working with International Social Services to arrange visits to Libya by parents whose children have been abducted there, including providing funding for these visits. The Libyan system makes obtaining visas difficult, and the traditional culture complicates visits for foreign mothers.[384]

International leverage

308. EU Association Agreements include commitments on human rights and democratisation. However, Libya is the only country around the Mediterranean that has no formal relations with the EU. Moreover, while the EU would like to incorporate Libya in its various Mediterranean programmes, Libya appears to be more interested in relations with individual European states.[385] As Oliver Miles told us:

Coming to the question of the European Union and its various institutions, the Barcelona process and so on, my feeling is that they are not really widely understood or appreciated in Libya and that Qadhafi himself probably does not spend very much time worrying about them and does not in a sense know what the fuss is about. I think he probably looks at the relationship which Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt have established with those European institutions and wonders whether there is really very much in it for him. There is a price to pay. If he chooses to join those institutions, he has to accept the acquis which opens a lot of difficult subjects, most obviously… the question of democratic institutions and so on. Does he really want to sign up, as the Tunisians, and the Algerians and the Egyptians have apparently signed up, to a row of undertakings about democratic institutions which he does not believe?[386]

309. By contrast, the promise of improved relations with the US is of great interest to Libya. Elisabeth Hughes wrote to us about the importance that Mr Qadhafi attaches to his international standing:

Perhaps the most important factor influencing policy at the current time is the attempt to normalise relations with the international community. This attempt both improves his standing in Libya, as his one of his favoured portrayals is as an international statesman, and improves the country's standing and opportunities for investment and trade.[387]

Oliver Miles reiterated this, emphasising the importance to Libya of relations with the US:

A major if not the major objective behind the normalisation that I have described has been to re-establish good relations with Washington. Qadhafi, with good reason, has always taken his relationship with Washington very seriously. More generally, Libya is a pro-American country.[388]

310. The US has gone some way to improving relations with Libya, ending the applicability of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act to Libya and lifting economic sanctions, which unblocked frozen Libyan assets. Restrictions on cargo aviation and third-party code-sharing have been lifted, as have restrictions on passenger aviation. However, certain export controls remain in place and Libya remains on the state sponsors of terrorism list. The US opened an Interest Section in Tripoli in February 2004, upgrading it to a Liaison Office in June.[389]

311. We conclude that there is no early prospect of political reform in Libya. Given the importance placed on the spread of democracy in eradicating the root causes of international terrorism, we also conclude that the situation in Libya offers cause for concern. We commend the work of the Government to encourage improvements in the human rights situation, notably in the field of prison reform, but we are concerned about how the United Kingdom's improved relations with Libya—an authoritarian state with a very questionable human rights record—may be viewed elsewhere in the region. We recommend that the Government continue to make clear to the Libyan authorities that human rights abuses are wholly unacceptable and that it work both bilaterally and with its EU and international allies, especially the US, to demand that the Libyan authorities cease human rights abuses. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what steps it is taking in this area, including any plans to bring international mediation to bear in the case of the Bulgarian and Palestinian medical personnel.


239   This term refers to north-west Africa, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Back

240   Al Qaeda is discussed more fully in paras 11-22. Back

241   For example, Moroccans were among those responsible for the March 2004 attacks in Madrid. Back

242   Q177 [Joffe] Back

243   "North African Terror in the UK", BBC News Online, 15 January 2003. Back

244   Q 143 Back

245   "The secret war", The Observer, 21 March 2004. Back

246   Q 143 Back

247   Ev 82 Back

248   "Euro-Med Partnership, Algeria National Indicative Programme 2005-2006". Back

249   Relations between Morocco and Algeria are strained by the conflict over the Western Sahara. This issue is discussed in paras 186-94. Back

250   Q 155 Back

251   "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page", International Crisis Group, 30 July, piii. Back

252   Q 156 Back

253   "Morocco Country Profile", FCO, 3 February 2005, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

254   "Baker quits Western Sahara role", BBC News Online, 12 June 2004. Back

255   "UN "standing firm" on W Sahara", BBC News Online, 23 June 2004. Back

256   "The ICRC in Morocco and Western Sahara", International Committee of the Red Cross, available at: www.icrc.org Back

257   Ev 122 Back

258   Ibid. Back

259   This is discussed in more detail in paras 183-85. Back

260   Q 159 Back

261   "Abu Hamza and the mosque", BBC News Online, 28 May 2004. Back

262   Q 57 Back

263   "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process", European Commission External Relations, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

264   "The European Neighbourhood Policy", European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

265   "The European Neighbourhood Policy", European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

266   "The EU"s relations with Libya", European Commission, June 2004, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

267   Libya"s relationship with the EU is discussed in more detail in paras 308-11. Back

268   "The EU"s Relations with Morocco", External Relations Directorate, European Commission, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

269   Q 173 [Joffe] Back

270   "How the EU should help its neighbours", Heather Grabbe, Centre for European Reform, June 2004, available at: www.cer.org.uk Back

271   "Gaddafi joins EU campaign to foil illegal migrants", The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 2004. Back

272   "Perils of Somali migrants in Libya", BBC News Online, 16 September 2004. Back

273   "Gaddafi joins EU campaign to foil illegal migrants", The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 2004; see also "Migrant boats test EU", BBC News Online, 27 August 2004; Libyan human rights are discussed in greater detail in paras 299-311. Back

274   "The EU"s relations with Libya", European Commission, June 2004, available at: http://europa.eu.int Back

275   Q 160 Back

276   Q 161 Back

277   Q 164 Back

278   Q 163 Back

279   Q 162 Back

280   Q 145 Back

281   "Algeria"s decade of bloody conflict", BBC News Online, 11 January 2002; "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page", International Crisis Group, 30 July 2004, p4. Back

282   "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page", International Crisis Group, 30 July 2004, p4. Back

283   Q 138 Back

284   Qq 138-9 Back

285   Qq 139 & 141 Back

286   Ev 41 Back

287   Ev 42 Back

288   Q 146 Back

289   Ev 42 Back

290   "Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turing the Page", International Crisis Group, 30 July 2004, p17. Back

291   Q 142 Back

292   "Algeria Country Analysis", US Energy Information Administration, available at: www.eia.doe.gov Back

293   "Sizing the informal sector in Algeria", The North Africa Journal, 4 August 2004. Back

294   "Algeria Country Analysis", US Energy Information Administration, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov Back

295   "An Algerian Presidential Free-for-All", Middle East Report Online, 6 April 2004, available at: www.merip.org Back

296   "Algeria hit by further gas riots", BBC News Online, 24 January 2005. Back

297   The work of this Committee is discussed in more detail in paras 29-33. Back

298   "Fourth report submitted by Algeria to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001)", S/2004/324, April 2004, available at: www.un.org, p8 Back

299   "Fourth report submitted by Algeria to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001)", S/2004/324, April 2004, available at: www.un.org, p16 Back

300   "An Algerian Presidential Free-for-All", Youcef Bouandel, Middle East Report Online, 6 April 2004. Back

301   "Arab Reform Bulletin", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2004, Volume 2, issue 4. Back

302   Ibid. Back

303   "Observers praise Algerian voting", BBC News Online, 10 April 2004. Back

304   Ev 43 Back

305   "Algeria: Freedom of expression under threat", The Wire, Amnesty International, August 2004 Vol 34 No. 07. Back

306   "Truth and Justice on Hold: The New State Commission on "Disappearances"", Human Rights Watch, December 2003, p3 & 10. Back

307   Ibid., p 11-12 Back

308   Ibid. Back

309   Ibid., p 2 Back

310   Qq 153-54 Back

311   Q 152 Back

312   "Morocco Country Profile", FCO, 3 February 2005, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

313   Q 176  Back

314   Ibid. Back

315   Ev 143 Back

316   "Terror blasts rock Casablanca", BBC News Online, 17 May 2003. Back

317   "Morocco"s shock at Madrid bomb "link"", BBC News Online, 17 March 2004. Back

318   These issues are discussed in more detail in paras 261-67. Back

319   Q 166 [Joffe] Back

320   Ibid. Back

321   Q 168 [Joffe] Back

322   According to a recent report in the North Africa Journal, Cannabis output continues to rise in Morocco, with 75% ending up in Europe. See "Morocco, the World"s Biggest Supplier of Cannabis", The North Africa Journal, 24 November 2004, available at: www.north-africa.com Back

323   Q 168  Back

324   See successive Human Development Reports, available at: http://hdr.undp.org Back

325   See UNDP Human Development Index, available at: http://hdr.undp.org Back

326   "Morocco: 2004 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Morocco", International Monetary Fund, June 2004. Back

327   "The departure of Morocco"s strong man", BBC News Online, 9 November 1999 Back

328   Q 170  Back

329   "Morocco poll retains status quo", BBC News Online, 14 September 2003. Back

330   Q 170 [Joffe] Back

331   Q 178  Back

332   "Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads", Human Rights Watch, October 2004, available at: www.hrw.org Back

333   Q 170 [Joffe] Back

334   Q 170  Back

335   "Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads", Human Rights Watch, October 2004, available at: www.hrw.org Back

336   The Western Sahara is discussed in greater detail in paras 186-94. Back

337   "Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads", Human Rights Watch, October 2004, available at: www.hrw.org Back

338   "Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads", Human Rights Watch, October 2004, available at: www.hrw.org Back

339   Ibid. Back

340   This compensation has been paid. Back

341   "Libya country profile", FCO, 23 November 2004, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

342   The WMD issue is discussed in greater detail in paras 288-98. Back

343   "Libya country profile", FCO, 23 November 2004, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

344   Qq 118 & 131 Back

345   Remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference in Tripoli, 25 March 2004, available at: www.number-10.gov.uk Back

346   "Libya Country Profile", FCO, 23 November 2004, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

347   Ev 33 Back

348   "The Origins and Parameters of Libya"s Recent Actions", Diederik Vandewalle, Arab Reform Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Volume 2, Issue 3, March 2004, available at: www.carnegieendowment.org Back

349   "Beating swords into oil shares", The Economist, 30 December 2003. Back

350   Qq 121-2  Back

351   General Searby has been appointed to this position. Back

352   Remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference in Tripoli, 25 March 2004, available at: www.number-10.gov.uk Back

353   "One Year Later in Libya", Joseph Cirincione, Revati Prasad, 16 December 2004, available at: www.carnegieendowment.org Back

354   Remarks by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Press Conference in Tripoli, 15 March 2004, available at: www.number-10.gov.uk Back

355   Q 131  Back

356   Ev 31 Back

357   "Libya hands over Jolo hostages", BBC News Online, 12 September 2000. Back

358   "Gaddafi asks for Bigley"s release", BBC News Online, 6 October 2004. Back

359   "Libya indignant over Saudi rebuke", BBC News Online, 22 December 2004. Back

360   Q 125  Back

361   Q 124  Back

362   Ev 120 Back

363   HC (2003-04) 441-I, paras 475-479; and HC (2003-04) 81, paras 243-251. Back

364   "Libyan WMD: Tripoli"s statement in full", BBC Online, 20 December 2003. Back

365   Ev 137 Back

366   "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People"s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", GOV/2004/59, Report by the Director General, IAEA, 30 August 2004, derestricted on 18 September 2004, available at: http://www.iaea.org; see also "OPCW Executive Council Approves Recommendation to Allow for Conversion of Former Chemical Weapon Facility in Libya", OPCW press release number 50, 18 October 2004, available at: http://www.opcw.org Back

367   "Testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee", 26 February 2004, available at: http://foreign.senate.gov Back

368   Ev 139 Back

369   "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People"s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", Report by the Director General to the IAEA Board of Governors, 18 September 2004. Back

370   "DOE helps secure Libyan nuclear materials", US DOE This Month, March 2004, available at: www.energy.gov; and "President lauds Oak Ridge role in Libya project", US DOE This Month, July 2004, available at: www.energy.gov Back

371   "Removal of High-Enriched Uranium in Libya Arab Jamahiriya", IAEA staff report, 8 March 2004, available at: www.iaea.org; and "President lauds Oak Ridge role in Libya project", US DOE This Month, July 2004, available at: www.energy.gov Back

372   "Testimony of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, Senate Foreign Relations Committee", 26 February 2004, available at: http://foreign.senate.gov Back

373   "Libya Completes the First Phase of Chemical Weapons Destruction", OPCW press release number 7, 4 March 2004, available at: http://www.opcw.org; and 1. "Libya Accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention", Chemical Disarmament Quarterly, March 2004, available at: www.opcw.org Back

374   "Initial inspection in Libya Completed", OPCW press release number 10, 22 March 2004, available at: www.opcw.org Back

375   "OPCW Executive Council Approves Recommendation to Allow for Conversion of Former Chemical Weapon Facility in Libya", OPCW press release number 50, 18 October 2004, available at: www.opcw.org Back

376   G-8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation, Sea Island, Georgia, 9 June 2004, available at: www.g8usa.gov Back

377   Ev 118 Back

378   Ev 118 Back

379   "Libya: Time to make human rights a reality", Amnesty International Report, MDE 19/002/2004, 27 April 2004, available at: www.amnesty.org Back

380   HC 318-I Q16 Back

381   "Libya: Time to make human rights a reality", Amnesty International Report, MDE 19/002/2004, 27 April 2004, available at: www.amnesty.org Back

382   Ev 127 Back

383   "Human Rights", Foreign & Commonwealth Annual Report 2004, available at: www.fco.gov.uk Back

384   Ibid. Back

385   Ev 31 Back

386   Q 136  Back

387   Ev 119 Back

388   Ev 34 Back

389   "Background note: Libya", US Department of State, December 2004, available at: www.state.gov Back


 
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