House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report

8 Afghanistan

320. In our Report of July 2004, we discussed the political process in Afghanistan, and particularly the preparations for the country's first presidential and parliamentary elections since the fall of the Taliban.[398] We noted that both elections were supposed to be held in June 2004, but that the timetable had slipped. On 9 July 2004, the Afghan-UN Joint Electoral Management Body had announced that the presidential poll would go ahead in October and that parliamentary elections would take place in April 2005.[399] We welcomed the fact that the presidential elections were proceeding; however, we also warned that it was important for the success of democracy in Afghanistan that the parliamentary elections should take place as soon as possible thereafter.[400] At the same time, we noted that the parliamentary election process would inevitably be more complicated than the presidential elections.[401]

321. In its response, published in September 2004, the Government welcomed the then imminent presidential elections, and pledged its support for the parliamentary elections in Spring 2005.[402] The presidential elections went ahead in October as planned, and were won convincingly by Hamid Karzai. Many observers and commentators were surprised how little violence there was during the elections, and by the high turnout among registered voters, including women. Speaking in the House on 29 November, the Secretary of State for Defence said that "It is important that lessons are learned from the recent presidential elections and applied in the parliamentary elections, which certainly present some further and more difficult challenges."[403]

322. The international community is actively involved in programmes to assist the electoral and post-electoral processes. For example, the parliamentary building which the bicameral legislature will use once it has been elected is being refurbished, and France has taken the lead—with British support—on an international scheme to establish a parliamentary service, the Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature project (SEAL).[404]

323. We understand that the estimated cost of holding the parliamentary and district elections will be almost US$130 million.[405] No pledges of funds have yet been sought, but following the positive experience of the presidential elections we have no reason to suppose that funding will be difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, the delay in the election date appears to be attributable mainly to a failure to make the necessary arrangements for conducting the poll. It was 19 January before the Afghan government appointed the nine-member Independent Election Commission which will supervise both the parliamentary and the district council elections, and it has yet to delineate the constituency boundaries.[406] President Karzai's administration also faces a continuing, if improving, security problem and the likelihood that campaigning and voting alike will be disrupted by the Taliban and by other armed factions.

324. On 24 February 2005, the United Nations' chief spokesman in Afghanistan, Manoel de Almeida e Silva, responding to a question at a press briefing, observed that the deadline for holding the elections during the Afghan month of Saur, which ends on 21 May, had passed.[407] Mr de Almeida e Silva noted that the decision on when to hold the elections rested with the Afghan government, which duly announced on 17 March that for "technical reasons" the elections would be delayed until September 2005, which means they will take place fifteen months later than originally planned.[408]

325. We welcome the success of the presidential elections. However, the fifteen month delay in holding Afghanistan's first free parliamentary elections is disappointing, and was not unforeseen. As far back as November 2004, the International Crisis Group was calling on President Karzai to "pick up the pace" of electoral preparations.[409] We do not underestimate the difficulties faced by President Karzai and his government, but we are concerned that a lengthy postponement of elections may damage the credibility of Afghanistan's emerging democracy. We recommend that the Government encourage the Afghan authorities to proceed with parliamentary and district elections as planned in September, and that it offer substantial assistance to ensure that those elections are a success for the people of Afghanistan.

The commanders: a continuing challenge

326. We also commented in our last Report on the role in Afghan society of the 'warlords', military commanders who exercise effective control in many of its regions, levying their own taxes and imposing their own interpretation of justice.[410] The Government agreed with our assessment of the role of commanders, adding that although some were beginning to engage in the political process, others had "retained a military capacity as insurance against an uncertain political future."[411]

327. The International Crisis Group has alleged that:

The central government and its international supporters have, to some extent, been complicit in the maintenance of power by militia commanders. The US-led Coalition has relied on militia commanders in its military operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban, empowering its local allies militarily and economically and helping them to resist central government control. For its part, that central government has, in a limited number of cases, backed military actions against high profile regional strongmen, notably former Herat governor Ismail Khan. These have earned the plaudits of much of the international community but have obscured the government's continued accommodation with mid- and lower-level commanders, often with the acquiescence of external donors.[412]

328. President Karzai has continued to face problems in dealing with the commanders. At times, he has displayed resolve in facing down a commander who has challenged the authority of the central government, as in September 2004, when he dismissed Ismail Khan, and in December, when Defence Minister Mohammed Fahim and Minister for Public Works Gul Agha Sherzai were removed from the cabinet. The delicate balancing act which the President has to maintain was, however, made all too evident when he appointed Ismail Khan as Minister of Water and Energy[413] and—in a worrying development—gave the highly controversial Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostum a senior staff position in the Afghan National Army.[414]

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militias (DDR)

329. In our Report of last July, we also drew attention to the lack of progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of the commanders' militias.[415] We concluded then that achievement of DDR was the "most urgent and pressing need for Afghanistan" and called for more resources to be devoted to it.[416] In its response, the Government agreed with our conclusion, and suggested that "The period between the presidential and parliamentary elections must be used to make rapid advances."[417] The FCO quoted an estimate by the UN which put the number of militia men under arms in the Summer of 2004 at about 60,000. On 24 February, a UN spokesman claimed that 41,000 militia men had handed in their arms, and that the handing over of heavy weapons and seizure of ammunition had "picked up considerably."[418] However, the same spokesman also reported that progress on DDR had been slow in the Kabul region, with the commanders of one division refusing to comply with orders to disarm. There have also been reports that some militias are being reconstituted as private security forces, which although armed are technically civilian and therefore fall outside the DDR provisions.[419]

330. We asked the FCO to comment on progress on removing the militias from political life in Afghanistan and on disarming them. They told us that over 42,000 personnel have now passed through the DDR process and that "the Afghan government has taken strong legal and constitutional measures to prevent militia infiltration of the electoral process."[420]

331. We conclude that progress to date on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of militia forces is encouraging, but limited and that the scale of the task remaining is significant. We recommend that the Government urge all involved in the DDR process to renew their efforts to achieve as much as possible before parliamentary and district elections take place. However, we do not believe that lack of progress on DDR should be accepted as a reason for further delaying those elections.

Countering the drugs threat

332. One of the illegal activities in which commanders are heavily engaged is opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. This is not a problem only for Afghanistan but one with the most serious consequences for British and European society. In our Report of last July we noted that about 95 percent of heroin in the United Kingdom originates from Afghanistan and that the United Kingdom is in the lead on an ambitious programme to reduce cultivation of the opium poppy by 75 percent by 2008 and to eradicate it completely by 2013. We concluded that "Without greater security in Afghanistan, without a successful programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and for as long as the commanders or 'warlords' retain their effective autonomy from central government, the war on drugs cannot be won."[421] We called on the Government to explain how, against a picture of rising production, it would achieve its goal of eliminating the problem by 2013.[422] In a detailed response, the Government set out what it was doing as the lead co-ordinating nation for the UN's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan and stressed that it was "still in the early stages" of a 10-year plan.[423]

333. International agencies have continued to express deep concern about the extent of Afghanistan's production of opium and the effects which this is having both on Afghanistan and in the countries to which the drug is supplied. In its annual report for 2004, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), which is independent of the UN and of national governments, warned that trafficking and use not only of opium and heroin but of cannabis and psychotropic drugs and precursors are "threatening the stability" of Afghanistan. The Chairman of the INCB called on the government of President Karzai to tackle this, stating in his foreword to the annual report that "it is the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan to live up to its commitments under the international drug control treaties and to ensure that its people are protected from the scourge of drugs."[424]

334. Although there is some evidence of progress in recent months, this has been achieved against a background of an increasing challenge. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report on drugs in Afghanistan published in November 2004 showed that cultivation reached record levels in 2004, although the increase in production was lower.[425] A few days later, the FCO made a statement on its counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan, in which it recognised that "we must and will do more in the coming year" to tackle opium production.[426] In response to a parliamentary question on 22 February 2005, FCO Minister Bill Rammell announced the launch of a new Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan, anticipated a reduction in planting of the opium poppy in Afghanistan and reported that the United Kingdom has increased its budget for this programme in the current year to US$100 million.[427]

335. On 10 March, Mr Rammell described the Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan as "an important opportunity" and set out a series of measures which are being implemented in 2005 in an effort to eradicate as much as possible of this year's crop, as well as an increase in support for alternative livelihood schemes for farmers to US$125 million in 2005-06.[428] A number of law enforcement measures and economic incentives are described in the Minister's statement as the "eight pillars" of the 2005 counter narcotics plan:

building institutions
information campaign
alternative livelihoods
interdiction and law enforcement
criminal justice
eradication
demand reduction and treatment of addicts
regional cooperation.

336. The Minister did not mention in his statement the importance of using mosques to spread the anti-drugs message through Afghanistan, nor did he refer directly to the continuing profiteering of warlord commanders and the need to divert their entrepreneurial energies into less harmful activities, both of which must in our view be essential parts of a successful strategy. The Minister did, however, give some detail on the Central Poppy Eradication Force, which under US leadership is intervening directly on the ground to destroy crops; preliminary results of the eradication campaign are expected shortly. The FCO also told us that, as well as "quick impact" projects, it is working with the Afghan authorities on their longer term strategy, including plans to attract contributions by international donors to the new Counter Narcotics Trust Fund.[429]

337. We welcome the Minister's statement on the Afghanistan counter narcotics strategy and the continuing commitment by the United Kingdom to counter narcotics work in Afghanistan, in close cooperation with the Afghan authorities and with international partners. We support the dual emphasis on immediate action to reduce opium poppy cultivation in 2005 and longer term action to eradicate it completely. We conclude that the United Kingdom's lead role in co-ordinating the UN's counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan is one of the Government's most important responsibilities overseas, not least due to some 95 percent of heroin in the United Kingdom originating from Afghanistan. We recommend that the Government continue to keep Parliament fully informed of progress.

Security

338. Last year, we described military operations in Afghanistan, including the ongoing US-led counter-terrorist operation, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Security in Afghanistan was and is provided by the NATO-commanded International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), although it is progressively being handed over to the Afghan police and Afghan National Army (ANA). In June 2004, the OEF had 20,000 personnel in Afghanistan, ISAF had 6,500 and the ANA's strength was about 10,000.[430] In March 2005, the ANA's trained strength stood at 22,000, supported by 30,000 trained police.[431] Overall, the security situation has improved, but the murder on 7 March of a British national, Steve MacQueen, who was working as an adviser on rural development to the Afghan government, illustrates the continuing threat to foreign nationals in the country.

The International Security Assistance Force

339. We were told when we visited Afghanistan in May 2004 that ISAF was seriously overstretched, mainly because NATO member and partner states were unwilling to contribute sufficient resources to bring the force up to its agreed strength, but also because of limitations placed on the role of their forces by some nations (the so-called 'national caveats').[432] In our Report, we deplored NATO's failure to provide sufficient resources and called on it to deliver on its promises.[433]

340. In its response of September 2004, the Government stated that it had pressed its allies to do more and that it would work with them "to generate the momentum necessary" to fulfil NATO's commitments in Afghanistan "as quickly as possible."[434] These included, most crucially, an expansion of the network of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) under NATO leadership, greater support for DDR and the provision of security for the elections. We asked the FCO to supply further details of the assistance which ISAF required from NATO members but which had not yet been delivered. In November, the FCO replied that "NATO still requires further contributions of personnel, air assets and logistical support to carry out Stage 2 of ISAF expansion and NATO is continuing the force generation process to address these shortfalls. But all support pledged has been delivered."[435] We followed this up and in March 2005 the FCO told us that "NATO's statement of requirements for Stages 1 and 2 [has] now been met."[436]

341. As of 21 February 2005, there were about 8,000 troops in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF, drawn from 36 NATO member and partner states.[437] The largest manpower contributions come from Germany, Canada and Turkey (which currently commands the Force). During the presidential elections of October 2004, additional security was provided and played an important role in ensuring the success of those elections. ISAF has also been training the ANA (which as we note above has reached 22,000 trained personnel)[438] and has played an important part in the DDR process, for example supervising the cantonment of heavy weapons handed over by the militias.[439]

342. The PRTs—one of which, the British-led PRT at Mazar-e Sharif, we visited last year—have achieved a great deal in bringing about a significant measure of security, stability and reconstruction.[440] However, progress has been less swift than had been hoped for. The UN Security Council invited NATO to expand its operations beyond Kabul as long ago as October 2003,[441] but it was not until the Istanbul summit in July 2004 that NATO leaders agreed to take on responsibility for PRT operations in the North of the country and to expand them counter-clockwise into the West and, eventually, into the South and East. As of March 2005, there were 19 PRTs in Afghanistan, the majority of them under US leadership. Following yet another meeting of NATO ministers, at Nice in February, renewed statements were issued to the effect that the establishment of PRTs in the South and West under NATO command would soon be under way,[442] but we find it disappointing that the process is taking so long on the ground despite this high-level support. We therefore asked the FCO for a progress report. They told us that as part of the Stage 2 expansion the US, Italy, Spain and Lithuania will be running PRTs in the West of the country; Canada is expected to run a PRT in the South from August 2005; and the United Kingdom "intends to shift its non-Kabul based military effort from the north to the south over the next 12-18 months."[443]

343. We welcome progress on the expansion of NATO's ISAF operations in Afghanistan and in particular we acknowledge the considerable achievements of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We recommend that the Government maintain its efforts to impress on its allies the need for them to commit substantial resources to ISAF and the PRTs and that it continue its work to generate the momentum necessary for these to be delivered as quickly as possible.

Merging ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom

344. The work of the US-led military campaign Operation Enduring Freedom has meanwhile continued. On 19 February 2005, Major General Peter Gilchrist, the British deputy commanding officer of Combined Forces Command Afghanistan, gave an upbeat assessment of OEF's operations to the American Forces Press Service. Major General Gilchrist said that in recent months the situation in Afghanistan has "shifted significantly" and that "anti-coalition forces are losing steam."[444] This shift, and the prospect of a reduction in the scale and intensity of operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda in eastern Afghanistan, may be one reason why the United States and France have recently dropped their objections to merging the commands of ISAF and OEF, bringing the latter within NATO for the first time. A unified command—even if, as reported in the press, it is to be double-hatted, with a distinct counter-terrorism function—should enhance the overall efficiency of operations in Afghanistan.[445] The FCO warned us, however, of a "risk that some Allies will view a single mission as a precursor to a US troop withdrawal and resist it."[446] They also suggested that some countries were of the opinion that a fresh UN mandate will be required. From this we infer that the proposed merger is unlikely to take place in the near term, or that in practice a form of closer co-operation which stops short of a formal merger may be adopted.

345. The Government has confirmed that NATO military authorities have been tasked by member governments to develop a plan "to increase synergy and better integrate the two operations."[447] We asked the FCO what is the timetable for this process, but they could not tell us; neither did their response refer in terms to a proposed 'merger'. Press reports, however, have suggested that the ISAF and OEF missions will merge next year and that they will be brought within NATO, initially under British command.[448]

346. We conclude that the proposal for increased synergy between and better integration of NATO's operations in Afghanistan and those of the US-led coalition is a potentially positive move, which if correctly implemented should enhance the effectiveness of security, reconstruction and counter-terrorist activities alike. However, we would not support such a process being used as cover for a significant withdrawal of US forces from the country or for a material reduction in the US commitment, unless there was a corresponding threat reduction. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government set out its thinking on how to achieve the NATO Council's objectives in this area.

The United Kingdom's Special Envoy to Afghanistan

347. In a further development, the Foreign Secretary announced on 24 February that the Prime Minister had appointed Lieutenant General John McColl, who served as the first commander of ISAF in 2002, as his Special Envoy to Afghanistan.[449] General McColl is "highly regarded by President Karzai." His role, which is part-time, will be to "visit Afghanistan 2-3 times a year, engaging with President Karzai and the Afghan authorities across a range of issues vital to the bilateral relationship."[450] We asked the FCO to explain how this role will complement the work of the British Embassy in Kabul, which is responsible for the full range of bilateral relations. The FCO told us that General McColl will "add value to all key areas" of the bilateral relationship and will "trouble-shoot when problems arise."[451]

348. We welcome the appointment of Lieutenant General John McColl as the Prime Minister's Special Envoy to Afghanistan and assurances given by the Government that his role does not cut across that of the Embassy in Kabul. We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government give a progress report on the work of the Envoy to date.

398 HC (2003-04) 441-I, paras 168 to 232 Back

399 "Secretary-General expresses full support for Afghanistan election dates", UN news release, available at www.un.org Back

400 HC (2003-04) 441-I, para 180 Back

401 Ibid., para 173 Back

402 Cm 6340, p19 Back

403 HC Deb, 29 November 2004, col 355 Back

405 Source: UNDP Back

406 Agence France Presse, 20 January 2005, available at www.sabawoon.com Back

407 UNAMA press briefing, 24 February 2005, available at www.unama-afg.org Back

408 BBC News Online, 17 March 2005 Back

409 "Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections", International Crisis Group, 23 November 2004, available at www.icg.org Back

410 HC (2003-04) 441-I, paras 214 to 220 Back