House of Commons - Foreign Affairs

Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report

9 Non-proliferation

349. The spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction presents a particular challenge in the context of the war against terrorism. The problem, however, extends beyond concerns about terrorism, to include rogue states such as North Korea and networks such as that managed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's 'Father of the Islamic Bomb', which supplied technologies and materials on a nuclear black market.

350. The US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined the threat. It stated:

The probability of a terrorist organisation using a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon, or high-yield explosives, has increased significantly during the past decade…The threat of terrorists acquiring and using WMD is a clear and present danger.[452]

351. An effective non-proliferation strategy is crucial both to prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks, and to limit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. The UN Secretary General's High Level Panel examined the problem of proliferation of WMD, concluding that:

The first layer of an effective strategy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons should feature global instruments that reduce the demand for them. The second layer should contain global instruments that operate on the supply side—to limit the capacity of both States and non-State actors to acquire weapons and the materials needed to build them. The third layer must consist of Security Council enforcement activity underpinned by credible, shared information and analysis. The fourth layer must comprise national and international civilian and public health defence.[453]

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

352. The chief safeguard against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Currently the NPT permits the possession of nuclear weapons by the US, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China—the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—and forbids others from joining the nuclear club. In exchange, the NWS will reduce their arsenals towards eventual disarmament under Article VI of the NPT. However, the NPT enshrines states' rights to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy programme. Currently, 188 states are members of the NPT, although three states with nuclear weapons—India, Pakistan and Israel—remain outside the Treaty regime.

353. A review conference in May 2005 will tackle existing concerns about the NPT. Non-proliferation measures are high on the agenda, and include proposals limiting the production of weapons usable material, developing nuclear energy systems that do not generate weapons grade material, and promoting multinational approaches to disposal of material. Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors compliance with the NPT. Its powers under the NPT remain limited and so initiatives under the guidance of the US and other prominent states have established an Additional Protocol on Safeguards which strengthens inspection rights of the IAEA.

354. Many commentators agree that expansion of the Additional Protocol would benefit the NPT regime. Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the IAEA, advocated making the Additional Protocol the norm for verifying compliance, and called on the UN Security Council to act in the event of withdrawal from the NPT.[454] He also believes that the international community must:

put a five-year hold on additional facilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. There is no compelling reason to build more of these facilities; the nuclear industry has more than enough capacity to fuel its power plants and research centres. To make this holding period acceptable for everyone, commit the countries that already have the facilities to guarantee an economic supply of nuclear fuel for bona fide uses.[455]

355. The US also has concerns about states' obligations to the NPT. John Bolton, the former Undersecretary for Arms Control at the US State Department, told the 2004 NPT Preparatory Committee: "There is a crisis of NPT compliance, and the challenge before us is to devise ways to ensure full compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation objectives. Without such compliance by all members, confidence in the security benefits derived by the NPT will erode."[456]

356. The United Kingdom supports tougher verification. The Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Denis Macshane, MP, told the House on 26 January 2005: "[At the NPT Review Conference] we will stress the need for a stronger and more effective counter-proliferation regime and the central role of the NPT as its cornerstone. We will emphasise the importance of compliance with the treaty and will promote the adoption of safeguards."[457] David Broucher, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the NPT Preparatory Committee 2004, also said:

The United Kingdom strongly supports the principle that States Party should have access to the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as described in Article VI of the NPT. But the right to enjoy such benefits should be conditional on compliance with Articles I-III…States party that have failed to comply with their safeguards obligations lose the confidence of the international community. We should consider whether such states should not lose the right to a nuclear fuel cycle, particularly the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which are of such proliferation sensitivity.[458]

357. Differing visions of the NPT regime threaten the May Conference, however. While the NWS contend that control of the nuclear fuel cycle is essential to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have demanded disarmament in line with Article VI of the Treaty, since the NNWS feel that a two tier international system is emerging, of nuclear haves and have nots.[459] Mr ElBaradei has also pointed to the necessity of disarmament by the NWS, under measures such as the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the US and the Russian Federation.[460]

358. At present, the US presents a serious obstacle to progress on disarmament since the US delegation to the NPT Preparatory Committees has refused to agree an agenda for the May 2005 Review Conference that makes reference to the 13 Practical Steps agreed at the Review Conference in 2000. These steps are to:

ratify the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT);
launch a nuclear test ban moratorium;
adopt a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT);
promote an ad hoc body in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to end deadlock;
apply the principle of irreversibility to arms cuts;
eliminate nuclear arsenals;
render START II and START III transparent and tackle the militarisation of space;
establish a trilateral initiative between the Russian Federation, the US, and the IAEA;
take steps towards disarmament, such as reductions of non-strategic weapons;
implement measures to control fissile materials;
reduce military spending;
issue regular reports on disarmament; and
develop verification measures.[461]

359. Criticising the US position on disarmament, former President Jimmy Carter said: "The United States claims to be upholding Article VI but yet asserts a security strategy of testing and developing new weapons—Star Wars and the earth penetrating 'bunker buster'—and has threatened first use, even against non-nuclear states, in case of 'surprising military developments' and 'unexpected contingencies'."[462]The NNWS are determined to use the 13 steps as a practical basis for negotiation. Without an agreed agenda, the likelihood of success at the May conference is slim unless a creative chairman can push through a series of stand alone resolutions; unfortunately, the Brazilian chairman may not take such a creative line given Brasilia's recent disputes with IAEA.[463]

360. Unlike the US, the United Kingdom has a good record on disarmament. Baroness Symons told the House on 2 February 2005:

The United Kingdom is committed to all its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including under Article VI, and has a good record on disarmament. For example, we have reduced the total explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War and in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review we announced that only one Trident submarine would be on deterrent patrol at any one time. That submarine would normally be on several days notice to fire with its missiles de-targeted.[464]

361. The United Kingdom has also dismantled its Chevaline (Polaris) warheads, withdrawn the RAF's WE177 nuclear bomb and terminated the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles undertaken with US weapons, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.[465] In addition, the United Kingdom supports a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).[466] Given this record, the United Kingdom is a credible interlocutor on arms reduction, and could play a key role in maintaining the NPT regime by encouraging Washington to compromise.

362. We conclude that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an essential element of the international security framework, and that its survival is crucial to limit the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. We also conclude that the risk of proliferation makes efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and curtail the spread of nuclear fuel generating facilities most important. While the United Kingdom has a good record on disarmament and has already reduced its own nuclear weapons to "a minimum deterrent,"[467] other nuclear weapons states do not, and if they do not offer concessions on disarmament in exchange for a more effective system of counter-proliferation in May the NPT regime may suffer. The United Kingdom is well placed to pursue these issues with the US and we recommend that the Government encourage Washington to take steps on disarmament which move towards the 13 Practical Steps.

States of concern

Iran

363. Iran is a signatory of the NPT and has three main nuclear sites, although other locations may play a role in its nuclear programme. Its Arak facility is a heavy water plant which produces substantial quantities of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), ostensibly for Iran's chemical and medical sectors, although the amounts of HEU far exceed the demands of these two sectors. The Natanz underground facility is a pilot uranium fuel enrichment plant. The Bushehr plant is a light water reactor and functions in concert with Russian support. Moscow supplies and removes the plutonium nuclear fuel and in our Report last July we criticised Russian aid for Iran's nuclear programme.[468] Russia has responded to international criticism by introducing a clause into an agreement with Tehran in February 2005 which states that spent fuel rods from the Bushehr plant be returned to Russia, but opposition to the deal is still strong in the US.[469] The resources devoted to these facilities do not match their electricity generating potential, which implies that Iran is seeking to establish nuclear capability for other reasons, such as WMD.[470]

364. Iran's logic for developing a nuclear deterrent revolves around its isolation and the growing number of US clients in its neighbourhood. US troops are in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey is a member of NATO and Pakistan is a close ally of the US in the war against terrorism. Iran's designation as part of the 'axis of evil' and Washington's long standing hostility to the Islamist regime provide serious cause for concern in Tehran. The experience of the Iran-Iraq war also profoundly affected Iran's attitude towards chemical weapons. Much of the drive for a Iranian weapon, however, is political, partly driven by the reactionary clerical regime and partly reflective of longstanding national pride—"a yearning to restore their great power status".[471]

365. Dr Ali Ansari, a leading Iran expert from the University of St Andrews, commented on the Iranian nuclear programme. He said: "There are two catalysts when we talk about the search for nuclear technology…and certainly one was the nuclearisation of South Asia…[The second] is the argument that the Americans are not going to attack nuclear powers."[472]

366. Iran's nuclear programme has come under investigation by the IAEA which has long doubted Tehran's sincerity towards its NPT obligations. In September 2003, the IAEA gave Iran an ultimatum to open its nuclear programme to investigation or face referral to the UN Security Council. Tehran complied and in October 2003 agreed to sign the Additional Protocol on Safeguards as part of a deal with France, Germany and the United Kingdom—the EU3. A subsequent IAEA report found no evidence of a nuclear weapons programme, although it raised doubts about "breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguard Agreement."[473] In our Report on Iran we welcomed the October 2003 agreement.[474]

367. However, Iran's compliance with the IAEA inspection regime stalled after the triumph of conservative forces in the deeply flawed February 2004 elections. In June 2004, the IAEA criticised Iran for failing to fulfil its obligations. Another initiative by the EU3 sought to bring Tehran back to the negotiating table by offering economic incentives in the form of a Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) for compliance with the IAEA, and a new deal emerged in November 2004. Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and the EU's External Relations Council Conclusions on 24 November welcomed the suspension of enrichment processes and reaffirmed that negotiations for a TCA would resume after IAEA verification.[475]

368. We asked Dr Ansari for his view of the EU3's agreement. He said: "I think this is commendable, but we are really back to where we were last year after having gone through a year of renegotiating, a lot of hair pulling and a lot of frustration. Now broadly speaking the EU, particularly the EU3, have got the position right."[476]He went on to say that one "of the flaws in the thinking in the EU3 last year was that in not actually protesting enough at what happened in the parliamentary elections."[477] He added that other problems included the incoherence of EU foreign policy formation, Iran's determination to play a game of brinksmanship as well as its longstanding suspicion of the West.[478]

369. The US's previous unwillingness to engage with Iran made the EU3's task more complex, since the chief incentives for Iran—security guarantees from Washington which would alleviate Tehran's concerns about encirclement—cannot come onto the table. Dr Ansari told us: "One of the things we have to bear in mind is that the United States has no relations with Iran, they have no man on the spot."[479] He went on to describe how some elements in Washington wanted the EU3 deal to fail, and how others want it to succeed but have prepared for failure. "I was very struck for instance when hardly had the ink dried on this latest agreement than Colin Powell had announced that he had evidence that Iran was converting long-range missiles for nuclear warheads and it turned out this was based on a single source of evidence."[480]

370. Dr Stefan Halper, from the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, however, had a more positive view of both the EU3 initiative and Washington's position. He told us that:

the British, French and German initiative in concert with the IAEA has brought a great deal of progress on Iran and it seems to have created a kind of informal model which is very interesting because the elements of that model with reference to Iran are not unlike what we see in North Korea. There is a trade component, a financial component, then a movement away from enrichment towards light water nuclear systems, and the US is in the background with the threat of force if progress is not made.[481]

371. However, recent comments from the White House have implied willingness to offer incentives to Iran for compliance with the IAEA.[482] On 12 March, Washington announced that it would not block Iran's application to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and would lift its objections to Tehran obtaining parts for commercial aircraft.[483]

372. Condoleezza Rice has also added that the "question [of a military strike against Iran] is simply not on the agenda at this time," while the Foreign Secretary made clear that the United Kingdom has no plans for military action on Iran. He told the House on 9 November 2004: "I could envisage no circumstances in which military action [against Iran] would be justified."[484] It is likely that a referral to the UN Security Council would be vetoed, while a military strike on dispersed nuclear facilities could undermine US objectives in neighbouring Iraq.

373. We welcome the November 2004 agreement between the EU3 and Iran, and recommend that the Government continue its support for and commitment to diplomatic means to end the Iranian nuclear weapons programme. We also conclude that success will be difficult without US involvement, and we therefore welcome Washington's support for the EU3 and its offer of economic incentives for compliance to Tehran. However, if Iran continues to evade its obligations, the Government should consider referring the issue to the UN Security Council.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

374. The nuclear crisis in North Korea first came to a head in 1994, although an agreement resolved the crisis by offering fuel oil supplies from the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) and support for a light water reactor project to Pyongyang, in exchange for DPRK stepping down its nuclear programme. The "Agreed Framework" functioned until the discovery of a secret programme to develop highly enriched uranium by the US brought it to a close in October 2002. The North Koreans subsequently restarted activity at their Yongbyon nuclear facility and removed 8000 spent plutonium fuel rods from storage pools, possibly for conversion into nuclear weapons. Pyongyang also appears to have had ties to AQ Khan's nuclear network, which may have sold centrifuge technology to DPRK, and may have supplied uranium hexaflouride gas to Libya.[485]

375. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. At present, the DPRK has probably produced enough weapons grade plutonium for several bombs, but has limited uranium enrichment capabilities. Its missile capabilities are quite extensive, and certainly present a threat to Japan's security. However, the major risk is Pyongyang's willingness to sell its knowledge, given the desperate state of North Korea's economy.[486]

376. Negotiations on North Korea's nuclear programme have taken place in a six party forum, which includes China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia and the US, although since June 2004 talks have stalled. Indeed, North Korea announced on 9 February 2005 that it possessed nuclear weapons and was unwilling to consider steps towards disarmament. The DPRK government issued a statement saying that it would "increase its nuclear arsenal to defend the ideas, system, freedom and democracy that were chosen by the North Korean people," adding that DPRK required a nuclear deterrent because of the hostile policy of the US.[487] The International Crisis Group contends that North Korea is most interested in the survival of its regime, which wants a guarantee that the US will not attack it and in reliable sources of energy for its crippled economy.[488]

377. The US is quick to dispel the prospects of military action against North Korea. Responding to the DPRK's withdrawal from the six-party talks, Condoleezza Rice said on 10 February 2005: "The North Koreans have no reason to believe that anyone wants to attack them. The president of the United States said in South Korea, that the United States has no intention to attack North Korea. They've been told they can have multilateral security assurances if they will make the important decision to give up their nuclear weapons program."[489] At present, the US's chief concerns are to see verification of DPRK's nuclear programme, and to prevent the proliferation of WMD materials and know how.

378. The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Bill Rammell, MP, travelled to the DPRK in September 2004, becoming the first Minister from the United Kingdom to visit Pyongyang. In a statement issued on 16 September 2004, he said: "I stressed to Foreign Minister Paek and Chief Negotiator Kim Gye Gwan the importance which the UK and the international community attach to the continuation of the Six Party Talks…I also impressed the need for the DPRK to admit its Uranium Enrichment Programme, and encouraged the regime to look to the example of Libya."[490]

379. We conclude that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to play a major role in the proliferation of nuclear materials, knowledge and missile delivery systems, and that its reintegration into the NPT and international verification regimes is a matter of urgency. We recommend that the Government continue to engage the DPRK on non-proliferation issues, and urge full support for the six-party talks. We also recommend that the United Kingdom urge its EU partners to bring pressure to bear on the DPRK in concert with concerned parties such as China, Japan and the US.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

380. The CWC entered into force in 1997, and is the most comprehensive attempt to ban chemical weapons (CW) to date; 164 states are currently participants. The CWC bans the development, stockpiling or retention of CW; use or transfer of CW; assisting other states in CW development; and the use of riot control as "methods of warfare". States parties have to declare their CW inventories and any chemicals which have dual use roles, and also have a responsibility to destroy their stockpiles; 1% within three years, 20% within 5 years, 45% with seven years, and 100% within ten years.[491]

381. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verifies the implementation of the CWC, although the existing regime is currently under some pressure. The OPCW wrote in their submission to our inquiry:

Seven years after the entry into force of the CWC, there remain significant deficiencies in the level of national implementation by its States Parties. Many of them have encountered difficulties in adopting and applying all measures necessary to fully implement the requirements of the CWC, in particular in such key areas as penalising violations and non-compliance, enacting transfer controls for relevant chemicals, or identification of declarable facilities in their industries. The underlying causes range from insufficient awareness and political support to weak public administration and lack of resources. This weakens the strength of the global ban on chemical weapons and could have the potential of undermining the OPCW's verification system and the other measures aimed at CW non-proliferation.[492]

382. Some regions present particular concerns about CW proliferation; one is the Middle East. We heard informally that Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria are reluctant to join the CWC because of the Israel-Palestine conflict, although Libya's decision to sign the CWC is a positive sign. Another region of concern is East Asia, since neither the DPRK nor Taiwan co-operate with the OPCW. However, UNSCR 1540 made explicit reference to CW,[493] calling on states to "promote the universal adoption and, where necessary full implementation of multilateral treaties to which they are parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of…chemical weapons," before invoking states to "renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of…the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons…as an important means of pursuing and achieving their common objectives in the area of non-proliferation and of promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes."[494] These demands should strengthen the OPCW verification regime.

383. The OPCW also raised concerns about its two year action plan, adopted in October 2003, which includes "the establishment of National Authorities, the enactment of implementing legislation including penal legislation, the adoption of administrative measures and regulations needed to implement the different aspects of the CWC."[495] Other developments took place at the Conference of States Parties in December 2004, the CWC's highest body, where member states agreed to grant extensions of the intermediate deadlines for CW destruction to Libya and Albania, reaffirmed the goals of the Action Plans and agreed a budget for 2005.[496] We met the Director General of the OPCW, Mr Rogelio Pfirter, last year.

384. To date, the United Kingdom has fulfilled its obligations to the CWC. Six inspections of British facilities—at Porton Down and a former chemical weapons facility at Rhydymwyn in Wales—took place in 2003, and the Government has also contributed support for administrative, export control, financial, industrial, scientific and verification activities to the OPCW.[497]

385. We conclude that the United Kingdom's continued support for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is essential, and we recommend that the Government continue to proceed with its chemical weapons disarmament programme, in compliance with all terms of the CWC. We also recommend that the Government offer support to states which lack capacity in the implementation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Action Plan, and that it set out in its response to this Report how it is doing so.

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

386. The BWC lacks an effective monitoring or verification mechanism, although Article VI does permit members to bring states in violation to the UN Security Council. An ad hoc group of states went through a series of meetings from 1995 to consider the introduction of verification measures, but their draft inspection protocol for a verification mechanism failed in summer 2001. The group's efforts have since come to an end.

387. The principle difficulties in 2001 were that the Russian Federation wanted to ensure that certain areas were protected from compliance and verification in opposition to demands for transparency from Western Europe, US, Australia and Japan. Additionally, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states, such as China, India, Pakistan, and Iran, wanted to use Article X to dismantle the Australia Group, which harmonises export controls on dual use materials. However, the prime cause of failure was the US's unwillingness to accept a verification regime because of concerns about its impact on industry.[498]

388. States parties subsequently agreed to establish twice yearly meetings to discuss and promote common understanding on topics related to the BWC, but the only mechanism for investigating biological weapons use or development is the UN Secretary General's investigation mechanism. The last BWC meeting, in December 2004, proposed measures to improve communication and disease surveillance, the legal framework for biological weapons management, and tinkered with the guidelines for the UN Secretary General's investigation mechanism.[499]

389. We addressed the question of the Biological Weapons Convention in our Report on the Biological Weapons Green Paper in 2003.[500] Commenting on the chances of securing a verification mechanism for the BWC, the Government stated in its response to our Report:

There was a widespread view amongst delegations at the 24^th [Ad Hoc Group] session that, without US participation, it was not worth pursuing a Protocol…It is the Government's view that , in order to achieve a broad based agreement on such a Protocol, US support remains critical...A Protocol with a narrowly based membership would risk inducing a false sense of security and leave the more immediate proliferation threats entirely to one side, since there would be little political pressure on states of concern to join a coalition of the virtuous.[501]

Notwithstanding the political situation, severe concerns remain about the lack of verification for biological weapons.

390. The BWC is moving forward in certain areas, however. The FCO said: "In 2005 there will be discussion, and we hope adoption, of a Code of Conduct for scientists working in this area. The United Kingdom has been nominated as Chair of the Meetings in 2005 and therefore preparations for this have already begun."[502] The implementation of an effective code of conduct for scientists will be a most welcome development.

391. We conclude that the lack of a verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention is an extremely serious gap in the international non-proliferation regime, and we recommend that the Government work to garner support for a verification regime, particularly from the US. However, a "coalition of the virtuous" may be better than nothing. We also recommend that in its response to this Report the Government outline the most important developments relating to the BWC, in areas such as the implementation of a code of conduct for biological weapons scientists.

Weapons of Mass Destruction produced in the former Soviet Union

392. The G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction seeks to secure and destroy WMD, particularly in the former Soviet Union. The Partnership was launched in June 2002 at the G8 summit at Kananaskis in Canada, when the G8 states pledged 10 plus 10 over 10—US$10 billion from the US and US$10 billion from the other member states over the next ten years to manage Russia's WMD legacy.

393. A joint statement issued by the G8 at Kananaskis stated:

Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to US$20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years.[503]

394. We examined the United Kingdom's contribution to the G8 Global Partnership in our last Report in this inquiry.[504] Current key projects include: a £11 million portfolio of nuclear submarine dismantlement projects; a £15 million spent nuclear fuel storage facility at the Atomflot site in Murmansk, announced in July 2004; a number of projects dealing with secure storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in Andreeva Bay in NW Russia; a £15 million contribution to the Chernobyl Shelter project; £4 million a year for the Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership which supports alternative employment for former nuclear weapons scientists and technicians; and the development of the Schuch'ye Chemical Weapons destruction facility.[505] Seven more donors also entered the partnership at the June 2004 summit at Sea Island: Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand.

395. The 2005 Gleneagles Summit will take the G8 Global Partnership further; for instance, the G8 Global Partnership may disperse funds in Ukraine, marking its first departure outside the Russian Federation.[506] The Second Annual Report 2004 on the G8 Global Partnership by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence also outlined plans to expand to include non-proliferation in states such as Iraq and Libya.[507]

396. David Landsman from the FCO Counterproliferation Department described the United Kingdom's position on the forthcoming summit to the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls on 12 January 2005.

We certainly intend to take forward [the G8 Global Partnership] during our G8 Presidency and we have plans for two specific initiatives, one to address implementation of existing projects to ensure that any obstacles there are addressed, removed and the projects move forward, and we also intend to promote a threat-based assessment of priorities, as it were, for the next generation of projects under the G8 Global Partnership.[508]

397. The 2004 Annual Report described the United Kingdom's priorities for 2005 in greater detail. "We will focus on constraining the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technology, and on combating the threat of bioterrorism. The UK will also take over the chair of the Global Partnership Working Group...We will also concentrate on ironing out any remaining obstacles to progress, so that the pace of implementation can increase."[509]

398. We conclude that the ongoing work under the G8 Global Partnership is of critical importance, and we strongly support the Government's efforts to improve the security of the former Soviet's WMD stockpile and to have it rendered non-harmful. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what its priorities are for the G8 Global Partnership, and what challenges the Government foresees in implementation during its G8 Presidency.

Nuclear weapons

399. The Russian Federation produces an enormous amount of weapons grade plutonium in its civilian reactors, has over 5,000 deployed nuclear warheads, and uses radioactive materials in widely dispersed facilities such as hospitals and lighthouses.[510] The threat of any of this nuclear material or the knowledge within the Russian scientific community becoming available to terrorists is severe.

400. The last year has seen progress on nuclear counter-proliferation changes in the former Soviet Union.

Substantial progress has been made in the UK's project to increase safety and security at the Andreeva Bay site in NW Russia, where some 20,000 spent fuel assemblies (SFAs) are stored. We have completed two submarine dismantlement projects, and are implementing a major project in Murmansk to transfer some 3,500 highly fissile fuel assemblies from the [Spent Nuclear Fuel] transport ship, the Lotta, to a safe and secure facility onshore. Substantial portfolios of projects have also been implemented covering nuclear safety. In 2003-04, the UK spent some £42 million on nuclear legacy activities in the FSU.[511]

The value of these projects is immeasurable, although the scale of the task is huge.

401. Other progress has taken place in implementing a legal framework for the G8 Global Partnership efforts. In our Report last year, we commented on the question of legal liability for future damages under the G8 Global Partnership. The Government said in its response to our Report that it was "seeking to widen the scope of the nuclear agreement to cover nuclear safety and security projects across the whole of the Russian Federation and hope to have this framework in place this autumn."[512]

402. Addressing this concern, the 2004 Annual Report states: "A key area of advance during 2004 has been the development of a nuclear security programme from strategy to the first stages of implementation. In order to provide the essential legal basis for this work, we have negotiated our legal agreement with the Russian Federation to include work on improving the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive materials to prevent theft and sabotage."[513] We welcome this development.

403. The Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership has also continued its work to train former nuclear weapon scientists and technicians in the closed cities of Sarov, Seversk, Snezhinsk, Ozersk, Zheleznogorsk and Novouralsk; its efforts include offering a grant of £237,712 to Raster Technology, which produces cutting templates for cardboard packaging production, to establish production in Snezhinsk and create jobs for weapons scientists.[514]

404. Last year, we also commented on our concerns that the plutonium disposition programme was proceeding less efficiently than other programmes such as the submarine dismantlement programme in NW Russia.[515]The Government stated that it intended to lobby hard on securing a legal framework for the plutonium disposition programme, but the 2004 Annual Report says that a priority for 2005 is to "reach agreement on the way forward with other G8 countries and finalise the multilateral treaty."[516] While we recognise the complexities of the negotiations, we remain greatly concerned about the slow pace of progress on the implementation of the relevant legal agreements.

405. We conclude that the work carried out under the G8 Global Partnership is a most valuable contribution to nuclear non-proliferation efforts, and we welcome advances in the dismantlement of submarines, in increased security of spent nuclear fuel storage, in implementation of a legal regime for nuclear counter-proliferation efforts, and in the ongoing work of the Closed Nuclear Cities Partnership. However, we remain concerned about the pace of progress on the plutonium disposition programme, and urge the Government to redouble its efforts to secure agreement while holding the G8 Presidency.

Chemical and biological weapons

406. The G8 Global Partnership also tackles the CW legacy in the former Soviet Union. Russia ratified the CWC in 1997, and has declared 40,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, including nerve agent (Sarin, Soman and Vx), which it was due to destroy by 2007. Achieving this deadline is unlikely; Russia has asked for an extension until 2012.[517]

407. In our Report last year we raised concerns about delays in the destruction of chemical weapons.[518] However, Russia has since accelerated its chemical weapons disposal programme, and President Putin has signed the 2005 federal budget which will provide US$400 million for chemical weapons destruction—more than twice the US$183 million in 2004.[519] We welcome this development.

408. The centrepiece of the United Kingdom's contribution to the chemical weapons destruction programme is the Schuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility. The United Kingdom is currently working on the procurement of equipment to build an electricity substation at Schuch'ye, following from the construction of a water supply for the facility which was completed in 2003. The project cost £7.3 million, of which £5 million came from the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is also supporting the construction of a railway to transport the munitions stored at the storage depot 18 kilometres to the destruction facility.[520] However, the decision to concentrate CW destruction at the Shchuch'ye plant has caused frictions with the Russians, since the difficulty of transporting the chemical weapons, the seals of which are in some state of disrepair, means Russia is most unlikely to comply with the CWC 2007 deadline. One solution which Russian officials are currently considering is the construction of destruction facilities at the five sites where Russia stores nerve agent.[521]

409. The G8 Global Partnership does not play a significant role in the counter-proliferation efforts on biological weapons, although the Ministry of Defence has launched a project for the retraining of former biological weapons scientists at a anti-crop institute in southern Georgia, called the Institute of Plant Immunity.[522] Our concerns about the opacity of Moscow's attitude towards its biological weapons capabilities, expressed last year, remain strong.[523]

410. We conclude that the Government's support for the Schuch'ye chemical weapons destruction facility is essential, and we urge the Government to maintain its efforts. We also welcome the Russian Federation's determination to accelerate its chemical weapons destruction. However, we recommend that the Government examine the possibility of supporting other CW destruction facilities in Russia to address Moscow's concerns about transporting deadly stockpiles along rickety railroads. We also remain very concerned that the G8 Global Partnership is not working on biological weapons issues with the Russian Federation.

Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) and the Nunn-Lugar programme

411. US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar established the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme in 1991, which includes the Nunn-Lugar programme. To date, the Nunn-Lugar programme has funded the disassembly of thousands of nuclear warheads and dozens of submarines and has put tonnes of fissile material into safe storage.[524]

412. CTR efforts to expand non-proliferation activities received a boost in 2004 when the US Congress passed legislation permitting the transfer of funds to Albania to support the destruction of its Cold War era chemical weapons stockpiles. Albania is the first country outside the former Soviet Union to receive funds from the CTR programme, and will receive about US$20 million to destroy 16 tonnes of chemical agents over the next two years. Additionally, Senator Lugar is planning to launch proposals in Congress which will remove the caps on spending for nuclear reduction programmes.[525]

413. We conclude that the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) and Nunn-Lugar programmes are positive contributions by the US to non-proliferation efforts. We recommend that the United Kingdom continue to support CTR efforts, for instance by encouraging the US to expand activities as widely as necessary.

The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

414. The Zangger Committee emerged from Article 3, paragraph 2, of the NPT, by which nuclear powers undertake not to export nuclear technologies without the recipient acting under IAEA safeguards. The Zangger Committee essentially comprises a trigger list of goods or technologies of concern, which should harmonise the export controls of nuclear states. Harmonisation of export controls is an important means to strengthen the existing non-proliferation regimes.

415. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a voluntary arrangement which seeks to control the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology. The NSG operates through guidelines on export controls on nuclear and dual use technology and goods. "The NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices which would not hinder international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms."[526]

416. In 2002 the NSG held an extraordinary plenary to take account of the threat of terrorism, and agreed to several comprehensive amendments to its guidelines. At the 2004 plenary, NSG participants agreed to improve the links between the NSG and the IAEA, to expand its outreach work, and introduced a catch all mechanism in the NSG guidelines to provide a national legal basis to control items not on control lists. The NSG also considered the suspension of supply to states under investigation by the IAEA, and admitted China, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta to its ranks.[527]However, firmer measures, such as an obligation in the NSG not to supply nuclear materials to states that have not signed the Additional Protocol, may be necessary to strengthen the NSG, if only at an informal level.

417. We conclude that the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee provide useful forums to discuss export controls, but fear that their wide membership and unbinding nature leaves controls too loose. We recommend that the Government work to strengthen the NSG, perhaps by considering a diplomatic initiative to encourage states not to permit exports of NSG list materials or goods to states outside the Additional Protocol on Safeguards.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

418. Established in 1987, the MTCR has 34 members who restrict their exports of missile technology. The states parties implement export controls on missile technology, according to certain criteria. These are; whether the intended recipient is working towards a WMD program; the purposes of the missiles and space programs; potential contribution to the recipients WMD delivery capacity; and whether a transfer would conflict with any multilateral treaty. The MTCR is voluntary and has no penalties for transfers, although the US identifies any states or entities in breach of the MTCR as proliferators. Israel, Romania and Slovakia have pledged to abide by the MTCR without joining it.

419. The MTCR's October 2004 plenary saw the admission of Bulgaria, welcomed UNSCR 1540 and "called upon all non-MTCR members to apply the MTCR control list and guidelines and underlined the willingness of MTCR members in a position to do so, to assist non-MTCR members in this respect."[528]The MTCR also undertook to carry out an intensive programme of outreach to tackle export controls, transhipment and the MTCR goals, but did not admit China despite Beijing's request for membership.[529] The US's decision to sanction several Chinese companies for their export of missile related technologies to Iran points out China's continued failure to live up to MTCR standards.

420. We conclude that UNSCR 1540 has strengthened the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by making it more legally binding. We recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report what it is doing to encourage other states, such as China, to conform to MTCR standards.

Conventional weapons proliferation

421. In publishing its UK Policy and Strategic Priorities on Small Arms and Lights Weapons (SALW) 2004-2006, the Foreign and Commonwealth set out its strategy on small arms because they "are the weapons of choice for criminals, terrorists and combatants alike. Estimates of the numbers of available weapons vary, but even if all new production were to cease tomorrow, there would still be hundreds of millions of small arms and light weapons in circulation."[530]

422. The United Kingdom deals with SALW proliferation through mechanisms which tackle supply, such as the Transfer Control Initiative, and through international regimes covering the proliferation of conventional weapons such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, which the Quadripartite Committee examined in its Report last July.[531] The WA held its tenth plenary in Vienna in December 2004. The plenary statement made clear the risk of terrorism. "Participating states reaffirmed their intention to intensify efforts to prevent the acquisition of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies by terrorist groups and organisations, as well as viewing them as an integral part of the global fight against terrorism. In this context they also exchanged information on national measures taken in accordance with the 2003 decision to tighten controls on the exports of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and called again on other countries to apply similar principles in order to prevent proliferation of these dangerous weapons."[532] The EU Code of Conduct on export controls also provides an important means to control arms exports, although many of the major producers of SALW remain outside the existing non-proliferation regimes which remain non-binding.

423. The United Kingdom also supports the destruction of SALW, by providing £7.5 million for programmes managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to collect, manage and destroy weapons and ammunition in over 25 countries.[533] The United Kingdom has also dedicated £400,000 to a NATO project for the destruction of small arms and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) in Ukraine.[534]

424. Finally, the United Kingdom strategy focuses on the demand for weapons, trying to avert conflict before violence breaks out. "Reducing demand for guns will require a commitment to long-term sustainable development, improved public security in communities, heightened public awareness, and increased alternative livelihood opportunities, including for former combatants."[535]

425. The Quadripartite Committee has consistently called on the Government to expand its regulation of British nationals trafficking in arms. At present, the Export Control Act 2002 regulates trade in long range missiles and torture equipment, but not SALW or MANPADS. Last year, the Quadripartite Committee concluded: "We recommend that trade in such weapons, including MANPADS, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic light weapons, should be subject to extra-territorial control where they are intended for end use by anyone other than a national government or its agent, and where the country from which the trade is being conducted or from which the export will take place does not itself have adequate trade or export controls consistent with the British Government's policy on arms exports."[536] The Quadripartite Committee repeated its recommendation again in its Report in March 2005.[537]

426. We conclude that the United Kingdom's efforts to counter the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) are steps in the right direction but that more needs doing. We urge the Government to continue its support for regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement by bringing states which produce SALW into the treaty regimes and by strengthening the binding elements of regimes tackling the proliferation of conventional weapons. We also fully endorse the comments made by the Quadripartite Committee on Strategic Export Controls, recommending that trade in MANPADS, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic light weapons, should be subject to extra-territorial control if intended for end use by anyone other than a national government.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

427. The Proliferation Security Initiative is an informal effort by states in co-ordination with the US to interdict traffic in WMD materials and technology, which US President Bush launched in Cracow on 31 May 2003 in response to US frustration over its inability to detain the So San, a ship bearing Scud missiles from DPRK to Yemen in December 2002. According to its Statement of Principles:

The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of [WMD] items, including existing treaties and regimes…PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.[538]

428. Eleven states initially took part in the PSI. 15 states now formally participate in activities, about 60 have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction principles, and two flag of convenience states, Liberia and Panama, have signed agreements with the US permitting the interdiction of ships flying their flags.[539] The PSI is an intergovernmental initiative with no secretariat.

429. Andrew Semmell, US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Non-proliferation described the US view of the Proliferation Security Initiative. He said: "The PSI brings together countries in partnership to defeat the trafficking of deadly weapons and technologies involving state or non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI and [UNSCR] 1540 are complimentary. Paragraph ten of the Resolution reflects this symbiosis."[540]However, UNSCR 1540 does not provide for an interdiction committee, for instance, which would strengthen the legitimacy of any activities by PSI states on the high seas.

430. Commenting on the PSI's previous successes, First Watch International said that credibility for Libya' decision to abandon its WMD programmes "must also be given to...international co-ordination under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)."[541] We commended the Government's decision to take part in the PSI in our Second Report of Session 2003-04.[542] Over the last year, a number of military and naval exercises have taken part within the PSI. These included Exercise Team Samurai in October 2004, a Japanese led interdiction exercise, and Exercise Chokepoint '04, a US led interdiction exercise in November 2004. Although these exercises have not involved British personnel, a number of conferences have also taken place, such as operational experts meetings in Norway, Australia and one took place in the US in March 2005.[543]

431. In our Report of last July we raised concerns about the legal basis of the PSI,[544]despite the implicit reference to the initiative in Paragraph 10 of UNSCR 1540, which "calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials."[545] In its response to our Report, the Government said that it does not accept that there are legal difficulties over the PSI.[546] However, the PSI still does not accord with Article 110 of the Convention on the Law on the Sea, which only permits interference with another state's vessels when there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy or the slave trade, unauthorised broadcasting, is without nationality, or is of the same nationality as the warship despite flying another flag.[547]

432. In response to our request that the Government outline how it will draw a distinction between the legitimate and illegitimate transport of WMD by sea, the FCO stated in its response to our Report that "the Government is working in the International Maritime Organisation to secure amendment to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Marine Navigation (1988) [SUA Convention], which will make it an internationally recognised offence to transport WMD, their delivery systems and related materials on commercial vessels. This was originally a US initiative, though a number of states are working together to secure these amendments. The text of the amendments is still under active discussion, though it is likely that the boarding provisions will not relate to military or fleet auxiliary vessels, and will require express flag state consent (or deemed consent if the flag state fails to respond within 4 hours to a request to board one of its vessels)."[548]

433. The International Maritime Organisation described the state of discussions on amendments to the SUA Convention.

The draft protocol to the SUA Convention currently under consideration proposes two main sets of amendments to tackle terrorism in its modern manifestations. These are, firstly, amendments to article 3, which establishes a list of offences that are to be regarded as unlawful acts for the purposes of the treaty. Secondly, the proposed amendments introduce a totally new provision which establishes the right and sets out the procedures to be used in connection with the boarding on the high seas of foreign flagged commercial vessel by officials of another state party.[549]

The IMO says that some of the proposed new offences, such as using any explosive radioactive material against or on a ship or discharging noxious substances from a ship are relatively uncontroversial. However,

more problematic are those new offences, the so called transport offences, which seek to make the carriage at sea of prohibited weapons, explosive or radioactive material or nuclear material unlawful acts…Equally controversial is the proposed dual-use provision which would make it an offence to transport at sea any equipment, materials, software or related technology which are capable of being used for benign as well as for malignant purposes.[550]

434. Draft Article 8, permitting officials of one state party to board and search foreign flagged vessels in the EEZ [Exclusive Economic Zone] or on the high seas, which are reasonably suspected of being involved in, or being the target of, terrorist attacks, is particularly controversial. The powers in the draft Article would extend to questioning, searching and detaining anyone on board the ship, or detaining the ship and cargo.

435. In negotiations, the draft article has undergone changes, "aimed primarily at ensuring no boarding takes place without express authorisation from the flag State and that proper safeguards are observed in all cases of boarding which take due account not only of the safety and security of the ship and its cargo and the commercial or legal interests of the flag State but also of the human rights of all persons on board."[551] However, we have serious concerns about the human rights of individuals under the original draft Article 8, given the lack of an effective legal regime on the high seas.

436. We welcome the ongoing development of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and we recommend that the Government set out in its response to this Report the most important developments which have come out of the meetings of operational experts and military exercises. However, we remain concerned about the legality of detentions of shipping on the high seas, and in particular with draft Article 8 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Marine Navigation. We recommend that the Government outline how it will ensure the human rights of those on board any detained vessels, and how it will limit any potentially destabilising interdictions or detentions, particularly if the Government adheres to its position of "deemed consent", giving states four hours to respond to demands to allow boarding.

The Container Security Initiative

437. The US Customs Service launched the Containers Security Initiative (CSI) in January 2002 amidst rising concerns that terrorists ship WMD into a US port. The CSI emerged in two phases, first by targeting security at 20 priority ports, before examining other ports, and took the form of posting US Customs Officials around the world to examine containers bound for the US. To avoid problems of sovereignty, the officials have only observer status. The other three complimentary components of CSI are: the use of intelligence to identify high risk containers; the application of advanced detection equipment; and the introduction of more secure technology for containers. The initiative also places burdens on shipping companies to provide information on their containers, at cost of fines or other punitive measures.[552] The United Kingdom joined the CSI in December 2002; ports included in the initiative are Felixstowe, Liverpool, Southampton, Thamesport and Tilbury.[553] However, the United Kingdom does not have officials carrying out a similar function in major ports overseas. Without the posting of HM Customs officials overseas, the United Kingdom's ports may remain under terrorist threat.

438. Commenting on the CSI, the Paymaster General, Dawn Primarolo, MP, said in October 2004: "By implementing the CSI in a further four UK ports, Customs demonstrates commitment in the fight against terrorism. We will continue to share intelligence and co-operate with our partners overseas to prevent suspect material from falling into the hands of terrorists."[554] Other international legal instruments dealing with security in ports include the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, chapter XI, and the International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (ISPS).[555]

439. We conclude that the Container Security Initiative is a sound means to promote the security of the United States. We recommend that the Government examine the possibilities of enacting a similar initiative to secure the ports of the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories.

452 The White House, US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003 Back

453 Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A more secure world: Our shared responsibility para 117 Back

454 "Seven steps to raise security by Mohammed ElBaradei", Financial Times, 2 February 2005, Back

455 Ibid. Back

456 The NPT: A crisis of non-compliance, US Department of State, 27 April 2004 Back

457 HC Deb, 26 January 2005, col 429W Back

458 Statement by Ambassador David Broucher to the NPT Preparatory Committee, FCO, 26 April 2004 Back

459 The 2005 Review Conference: Understanding the Challenges and Devising Response, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, 30 October 2004 Back

460 "Seven steps to raise security by Mohammed ElBaradei", Financial Times, 2 February 2005 Back

461 Atlanta Consultation on the Future of the NPT, The Carter Centre, January 26-28, 2005, and Advancing the NPT: 13 Practical Steps, Middle Powers Initiative, April 2003, Back

462 Atlanta Consultation on the Future of the NPT, The Carter Centre, January 26-28, 2005 Back

463 "Brazil claims backing on uranium", BBC News Online, 24 November 2005 Back