Letter to the Chairman of the Committee
from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
9 December 2004
During your recent visit to Vienna, you mentioned
that the Committee would like to receive greater detail of our
agreement with Iran over its development of uranium enrichment
and reprocessing technology. This forms part of the agreement
negotiated in Paris on 5-6 November 2004, which took effect on
15 November 2004. A copy of the agreement is enclosed.
Under the agreement Iran has undertaken to suspend
"all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and
specifically:
— the manufacture and import of gas
centrifuges and their components;
— separation, or to construct or operate
any plutonium separation installation; and
— all tests or production at any uranium
conversion installation".
This goes beyond the Joint Statement made in
Tehran on 21 October 2003 (copy enclosed), in which Iran undertook
to suspend "all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities
as defined by the IAEA", in that it explicitly includes enrichment-related
activities, and identifies a number by name, including in the
area of uranium conversion. Crucially, in the new agreement Iran
has also undertaken to sustain the suspension while negotiations
proceed on mutually acceptable long-term arrangements.
The IAEA has now verified that the agreed suspension
is in place. This opens the way for negotiations on a long-term
agreement to begin.
The Paris agreement makes clear that the long-term
arrangements will provide "objective guarantees" that
Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
There will also be firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and
economic co-operation and firm commitments on security issues.
The UK, France and Germany ("the E3")
have not agreed that Iran should eventually resume enrichment-related
or reprocessing activities. The E3 have made clear to Iran that
at present we can envisage no "objective guarantees"
which could give us the necessary confidence that do not include
cessation of all activities which could help Iran produce weapons-grade
fissile material. This would include enrichment-related, reprocessing
and uranium conversion work. We recognise that it would in principle
be possible to develop mechanisms for monitoring enrichment or
reprocessing work that would give a high degree of confidence
that declared nuclear materials were not being diverted. This
would be effective as long as those monitoring mechanisms remained
in place. However, such monitoring mechanisms would not provide
objective guarantees that Iran could not use enrichment-related
or reprocessing technology to produce fissile material for nuclear
weapons in the future. Once the technology has been mastered,
even for civilian purposes, it would be possible in future to
use it, or adapt it, to produce fissile material. Given the history
of Iran's failure to meet its safcguard8 obligations, we believe
that monitoring alone would be inadequate to give us the assurance
we need.
We are now working with E3 and EU partners to
develop proposals in other areas which would accompany the guarantees.
We have indicated to Iran our willingness to offer political assurances
of access to the international nuclear fuel market at market prices,
in line with measures at present being developed in various international
fora, with spent fuel to be returned and reprocessed outside of
Iran. We have also indicated our willingness to support Iran's
acquisition of an alternative to its planned heavy water research
reactor which does not present the same proliferation-related
concerns. We will first need to establish with Iran its needs
for research reactors, and how they could most appropriately be
met. Other areas where we might potentially work with Iran include
nuclear safety and the physical security of nuclear installations
and material. In non-nuclear areas, the working groups set up
by the Paris agreement are due to consider technology and co-operation,
and political and security issues. We look forward to an early
discussion with Iran about the agenda for these working groups.
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
9 December 2004
Annex 1
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and the Governments of France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
with the support of the High Representative of the European Union
(B/EU), reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement
of 21 October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building
on that agreement.
The E3/EU and Iran reaffirm their commitment
to the NPT.
The E3/EU recognise Iran's rights under the
NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty,
without discrimination.
Iran reaffirms that in accordance with Article
II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek to acquire nuclear
weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and transparency
with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement the Additional
Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.
To build further confidence, Iran has decided,
on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to
include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and
specifically:
— the manufacture and import of gas
centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation,
testing or operation of gas centrifuges;
— work to undertake any plutonium separation,
or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation;
and
— all tests or production at any uranium
conversion installation.
The IAEA will be notified of this suspension
and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be implemented
in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that
it has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained
while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement
on long-term arrangements.
The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is
a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.
Sustaining the suspension, while negotiations
on a long-term agreement are under way, will be essential for
the continuation of the overall process. In the context of this
suspension, the E3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations,
with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long
term arrangements. The agreement will provide objective guarantees
that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes.
It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological
and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.
A steering committee will meet to launch these
negotiations in the first half of December 2004 and will set up
working groups on political and security issues, technology and
cooperation, and nuclear issues. The steering committee shall
meet again within three months to receive progress reports from
the working groups and to move ahead with projects and/or measures
that can be implemented in advance of an overall agreement.
In the context of the present agreement and
noting the progress that has been made in resolving outstanding
issues, the E3/EU will henceforth support the Director General
reporting to the IAEA Board as he considers appropriate in the
framework of the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement
and Additional Protocol.
The E3/EU will support the IAEA Director General
inviting Iran to join the Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches
to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
Once suspension has been verified, the negotiations
with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume.
The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession
negotiations at the WTO.
Irrespective of progress on the nuclear issue,
the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination to combat terrorism,
including the activities of Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups
such as the MeK. They also confirm their continued support for
the political process in Iraq aimed at establishing a constitutionally
elected Government.
14 November 2004
Annex 2
Joint statement at the end of a visit
to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany
1. Upon the invitation of the Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany paid a visit to Tehran on 21 October 2003.
The Iranian authorities and the Ministers, following extensive
consultations, agreed on measures aimed at the settlement of all
outstanding JABA issues with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme
and at enhancing confidence for peaceful cooperation in the nuclear
field.
2. The Iranian authorities reaffirmed that
nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence doctrine and that
its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in
the peaceful domain. They reiterated Iran's commitment to the
nuclear non-proliferation regime, and informed the Ministers that:
(a) The Iranian Government has decided to
engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve,
through full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues
of the Agency, and clarify and correct any possible failures and
deficiencies within the IAEA.
(b) To promote confidence with a view to
removing existing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field:
(i) Having received the necessary clarifications,
the Iranian Government has decided to sign the JABA Additional
Protocol, and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation
of its good intentions, the Iranian Government will continue to
cooperate with the Agency in accordance with the Protocol in advance
of its ratification.
(ii) While Iran has a right within the nuclear
non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment
and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.
3. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France
and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government and
informed the Iranian authorities that:
(a) Their Governments recognize the right
of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance
with the NPT.
(b) In their view, the Additional Protocol
is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity
or national security of its States Parties.
(c) In their view, the full implementation
of Iran's decisions, confirmed by the IABA Director-General, should
enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the JALA Board.
(d) The three Governments believe that this
will open the way to a dialogue on a basis for longer-term co-operation,
which will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating
to Iran's nuclear power generation programme. Once international
concerns, including those of the three Governments, are fully
resolved, Iran could expect easier access to modern technology
and supplies in a range of areas.
(e) They will cooperate with Iran to promote
security and stability in the region, including the establishment
of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations.
21 October 2003
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