Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from
the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign
and Commonwealth Office, 14 March 2005
Thank you for your letter of 28 February, seeking
information about North Africa, Afghanistan and proliferation.
I enclose a memorandum which sets out detailed
answers to each of your questions.
Chris Stanton
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
14 March 2005
Annex 1
NORTH AFRICA
1. What Plans does the Government have to
expand the United Kingdom's presence in Algeria?
Levels of staffing in Algiers have increased
in recent years; the Government expects that they will continue
to increase in 2005. In his letter of 4 March to the Chairman
of the FAC, Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under Secretary of the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, confirmed that the Government
expects a Defence Attache and a Commercial Secretary to arrive
at Post before the end of 2005.
The Government is aware of calls to re-open
the British Council's office in Algiers. The British Council is
currently reviewing this issue.
2. What is the United Kingdom's position
as regards reform of the Barcelona Process, in particular as it
relates to the countries of N Africa?
The United Kingdom supports greater EU engagement
with the North Africa and seeks to shape EU policy, including
the Barcelona Process, to promote greater economic, political
and social reform in the region.
A review of the Barcelona Process was launched
in November 2004 to examine the first 10 years of the Barcelona
Process and make recommendations on its future development. The
Government welcomes this review and considers that it is a unique
opportunity to shape the future of the EU's engagement with the
Mediterranean region in the next decade. The Government has called
for a more strategic approach to the Barcelona Process, focussing
on a limited number of objectives in the areas of governance,
economic reform and education.
3. What is the United Kingdom's position
towards the conflict in the Western Sahara and the UN peace plan?
In common with most other countries, the Government
regards the sovereignty of Western Sahara as undetermined pending
United Nations efforts to find a solution to the dispute over
the territory. The United Kingdom seeks a just, lasting and mutually
acceptable solution to the dispute that provides the people of
the Western Sahara with an opportunity to exercise their right
to self-determination.
The Government has consistently supported the
efforts of the UN Secretary-General to find a solution to the
conflict in the Western Sahara and believes that it is important
that the UN process is maintained. The Government fully support
Alvaro de Soto (UN Secretary General's Special Representative)
in his efforts to take negotiations forward.
4. What outstanding areas of difficulty are
there in the UK's bilateral relationship with Libya?
Libya's decisions formally to accept responsibility
for the Lockerbie bombing, renounce terrorism and take action
to dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction development programmes
are important and welcome developments. As the Prime Minister
said when he visited Libya in March 2004, we are aware of Libya's
past record, but should acknowledge and support change where we
judge that it is real. The Government is committed to developing
the bilateral relationship with Libya and widening co-operation
into new areas eg education and health.
The Metropolitan Police Service and the Libyan
authorities have set up a joint investigation into the murder
of WPC Yvonne Fletcher. Work on the investigation is ongoing.
A Scottish criminal investigation into Lockerbie remains open
but the FCO understands that in the absence of new information
the Lord Advocate is not currently planning to pursue enquiries.
The Government is concerned by the human rights
situation in Libya. Through the Global Opportunities Fund, the
FCO is supporting Libyan work on prison reform. And the Government
continues to look for other ways in which we can work with the
Libyan government to improve Libya's human rights record.
AFGHANISTAN
5. What is the current NATO presence in Afghanistan,
broken down by contributor and by role? What further resources
are expected to be contributed by NATO member states; and what
NATO requirements remain unmet?
We commend to the members of the Committee the
latest NATO update (attached). It gives a snapshot of the overall
force level, but the Committee should be aware that individual
contributions are constantly changing. The current figures include
contributions to ISAF in Kabul and to the PRTs and Forward Support
Base (FSB) in the north run by the UK, Germany and the Netherlands.
The following nations currently contribute to the PRTs and FSB
under NATO command: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary,
the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States of America. The Czech Republic has
announced that it will be contributing 40 personnel to the German-led
PRT in Feyzabad later this year.
Under Stage 2 of ISAF expansion, the US, Italy,
Spain and Lithuania will run PRTs under ISAF in Western Afghanistan.
Denmark and Iceland have offered support (as has non-NATO Sweden).
Italy and Spain will also provide a FSB.
These commitments mean that NATO's statement
of requirements for Stages 1 and 2 have now been met.
6. What is the timetable for placing the
NATO and other international forces in Afghanistan under a unified
command; and what obstacles will have to be overcome for this
process to succeed?
Following discussion by Defence Ministers at
Nice 9-10 February and the declaration by Heads of State and Government
on 22 February, NATO military authorities have been tasked to
"develop for Council consideration a plan to increase synergy
and better integrate the two operations." The plan will take
into account continued ISAF expansion in accordance with the current
operational plan.
There are many potential obstacles, both political
and military. These include the risk that some Allies will view
a single mission as a precursor to a US troop withdrawal and resist
it. NATO will need to generate sufficient forces to set up PRTs
additional to those absorbed from the Coalition, and to take account
of any slowdown in the envisaged build-up of the Afghan National
Army and Afghan National Police. Some Allies have expressed the
view that a single mission will require substantial changes to
the NATO Operational Plan for the ISAF mission, and a new UN mandate.
We do not believe that this is the case.
7. What progress is being made on training
Afghan military and police units, on achieving DDR and on reducing
the role of "warlord" commanders in Afghanistan?
Around 22,000 soldiers have been trained for
the Afghan National Army (ANA), and some 30,000 police for the
Afghan National Police (ANP). Over 42,000 personnel have now passed
through the Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
process. These, and other measures designed to build the capacity
of the central government, in particular those within the broad
field of Security Sector Reform, will have a positive impact on
the centre-regions power dynamic.
The Afghan government has taken strong legal
and constitutional measures to prevent militia infiltration of
the electoral process. For example, candidates for the Presidential
election were required to have no link to armed militia. Article
16 (clause 3 (a)) of the Electoral Law (2004) states that candidates
shall not "have non-official military forces or be part of
them". Candidates for the Parliamentary elections face exactly
the same stipulation (Article 20, clause 3 (e)). Likewise the
Political Parties Law (2003) Article 6 (clause 5) stipulates that
political parties shall not "have military organisations
or affiliations with armed forces". Article 17 (clause 1)
of the same law notes that the dissolution of a political party
shall not be ordered unless, inter alia, "the party uses
force, or threatens the use of force, or uses force to overthrow
the legal order of the country, or the party has a military organisation
or affiliations with armed forces."
8. How many Provincial Reconstruction Teams
are now operating in Afghanistan; what have been their achievements;
and what further plans there are for their development?
19 PRTs are currently established throughout
Afghanistan. PRTs have operated in Afghanistan under the control
of the US-led Coalition since December 2002. ISAF has run PRTs
in the north since December 2003 and is now establishing teams
in the west.
PRTs have successfully introduced a measure
of stability to the areas in which they operate through patrolling,
monitoring and mediation, thereby facilitating the reconstruction
and development efforts of other members of the International
Community and allowing extension of the influence of the Government
of Afghanistan. In areas where, for various reasons, other agencies
have been unable to operate, PRTs have participated in the reconstruction
effort themselves. PRTs help provide enhanced security assistance
during the Presidential election in October 2004 and some are
also involved in the process to demobilise and disarm regional
militias.
Stage 3 of NATO planning for ISAF expansion
will involve establishing PRTs in the south. This may involve
taking over some existing Coalition PRTs. Canada has declared
that it will run a PRT in the south from August 2005. The UK has
indicated that it intends to shift its non-Kabul based military
effort from the north to the south over the next 12-18 months.
9. What assistance is the Government giving
to the Afghan authorities for the holding of parliamentary elections?
What is the UK's involvement in the UNDP's Support to the Establishment
of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) project?
HMG hopes to provide assistance to the Afghan
authorities for the holding of parliamentary elections as we did
for last year's presidential elections.
The Independent Electoral Commission and the
UN are currently discussing technical issues and election needs.
The UK stands ready to help ensure that these elections are conducted
as successfully as the presidential election. We again plan to
provide support to the EU and OSCE election support missions.
Primary responsibility for security during the
parliamentary elections will lie with the Afghan security forces,
with ISAF and the Coalition again in support. Precise requirements
cannot be determined until the election date is set. We expect
international support will be in line with that provided for the
presidential election ie additional NATO forces in country with
others on standby.
The UK has given considerable support to the
UNDP SEAL project. Our Embassy in Kabul is an active member of
the informal strategic committee established to ensure dialogue
between major donors. The UK will be represented at the French/UNDP
donor conference to be held in Paris on 29 March 2005. We hope
to provide expert assistance to the French/UNDP proposal to assist
the establishment of a new Afghan Parliament. We have for example
contributed advice on how to set up a Parliamentary Secretariat.
10. What is the latest situation with regard
to opium poppy cultivation and the National Drug Control Strategy
in Afghanistan?
We refer the Committee to the Written Ministerial
Statement by Bill Rammell on Thursday 10 March—a copy is
attached.
In addition, Gareth Thomas visited Afghanistan
on 2-3 March in follow-up to the visit of Hilary Benn in January.
Mr Thomas called on President Karzai and had meetings with the
Finance, Agriculture, Counter Narcotics (CN) and Rural Rehabilitation
Ministers as well as other Ministers. He also had round table
meetings with major donors (World Bank, European Commission, USAID
and Germany) and implementing partners on alternative livelihoods.
There was agreement on the need for the UK and
other donors to continue to support community-based, so-called
"quick impact" projects eg "cash for work"
schemes to renovate rural roads and to build wells, delivered
through the National Priority Programmes and despite the continuing
security and capacity constraints. The focus should also continue
on longer-term investment and development. This includes Afghan
proposals to work up a longer term (five year) strategy on counter-narcotics
and to develop more comprehensive "investment plans"
to underpin the working of the new CN Trust Fund, which donors
will be asked to support at the Afghan Development Forum (4-6
April).
11. What is the role of the Prime Minister's
Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Lieutenant General John McColl?
What practical arrangements are in place for Lt Gen McColl to
liaise with the FCO and to ensure that his work is fully complementary
to that of the British Embassy in Kabul?
As the Prime Minister's Special Envoy to Afghanistan,
Lieutenant General John McColl has an important role designed
to cover the full span of the UK's engagement with Afghanistan.
His broad remit is to maintain and develop the UK's relationship
with President Karzai and other senior Afghan interlocutors in
pursuit of HMG's strategic interests in Afghanistan and the region;
to report to the Prime Minister on developments in Afghanistan
with recommendations on areas in which the UK can make a critical
difference; to add value to all key areas of the UK/Afghan bilateral
relationship; to trouble-shoot when problems arise; and to offer
advice to President Karzai.
He will visit Afghanistan 2-3 times in the next
year in order to engage with President Karzai and the Afghan authorities
across a range of issues vital to the bilateral relationship including
reconstruction, security sector reform, the democratic process
and counter-narcotics work. General McColl will be in a position
to offer advice and encouragement to President Karzai and other
key players through telephone contact at other times.
The British Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dr. Rosalind
Marsden will continue to take forward the substance of our bilateral
relations. General McColl's remit will be to act as a high-level
contact with President Karzai and carry out the remit I have already
described. The FCO has arranged to give General McColl access
to all the relevant diplomatic reporting. He will also be regularly
briefed on developments in Afghanistan by the Whitehall Afghan
Strategy Group and on a Departmental basis as appropriate.
PROLIFERATION
12. What is the Government doing to aid states
with their reports to the UNSCR 1540 Committee and what are the
Committee's current priorities?
The UK was approached by a number of states
seeking advice on the structure and scope of national reports
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540. In response
to these approaches, the UK circulated widely its own draft report
on 13 August in order to provide a possible model for others to
follow. Many States welcomed this circulation. The UK then formally
submitted its national report to the 1540 Committee on 29 September,
and the Foreign Secretary made a Statement (Official Report, 11
Oct 2004: Column 4WS) at that time.
The UK has taken every opportunity to promote
the importance of compliance with UNSCR1540 to non-reporting States,
both during bilateral discussions, and through the delivery of
an EU demarche in some countries where we are acting as Local
Presidency. All approaches have made further offers of assistance
to States to complete their reports.
The Committee appointed the first four of probably
seven experts in January this year. These experts have now begun
work in New York. They will analyse the reports that have been
received from UN Member States, and advise the Committee on their
content.
The Committee currently has two main priorities.
The first is to encourage all States to report as required by
the Resolution. Over 100 States have now done so, but many countries
have not. The Committee is contacting the Permanent Representatives
of these States in New York to reinforce the importance of compliance.
The second priority is the analysis of the reports that have been
received. These vary in the amount of detail supplied, and so
we expect that the experts working for the 1540 Committee will
request further information from a number of States in order to
reach a comprehensive judgement of how appropriate and effective
each State's measures are. This is likely to take some time, given
the complexity of the subject and the volume of material to process.
Once these judgements have been reached, the Committee will consider
ways in which States might be assisted in introducing any additional
measures required to bring their regulations, laws and measures
up to an appropriate, effective standard.
The UK is working closely with the experts and
other Committee members, in its capacity as one of three Vice
Chairs, to ensure that this substantial amount of work progresses
speedily and comprehensively.
13. What steps towards disarmament, in compliance
with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, might the United
Kingdom propose at the May NPT review conference?
The United Kingdom is committed to the ultimate
goal of general and complete disarmament enshrined in Article
VI of the NPT. Ever since we ratified the Treaty we have recognised
our disarmament obligations as one of the nuclear weapon States
and we have led by example.
Since the end of the Cold War we have reduced
the explosive power of our nuclear forces by 70%. Much of this
was accomplished during the 1990s, when we withdrew our maritime
tactical nuclear capability and the Royal Air Force's WE177 nuclear
bomb, making the United Kingdom the only nuclear weapon State
to reduce its capability to a single weapons system. We now have
a stockpile of fewer than 200 operational warheads, as a minimum
deterrent and the ultimate guarantor of our national security.
At the 2000 Review Conference the UK played
an important role securing agreement on a Final Document which
we continue to support and which included 13 practical steps towards
nuclear disarmament.
The UK itself had fulfilled many of these priorities
before 2000. As part of the Strategic Defence Review in 1998,
we reduced the operational status of our nuclear weapons. Only
one Trident submarine is normally on patrol at any one time and
its missiles are not targeted at any other state.
We ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in 1998 and continue to call on other states to
sign and ratify the Treaty. We continue to observe a moratorium
on nuclear explosive testing and have not conducted an explosive
nuclear test since 1991. Our continued commitment to the CTBT
is demonstrated by our support for the CTBT Organisation.
The United Kingdom announced in 1995 that it
had stopped the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons
and other nuclear explosive devices. We also announced that fissile
material no longer required for defence purposes would be placed
under international safeguards. We support a Fissile Material
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as a global ban on the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. The 2000 Final Document called on
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to agree a Programme of
Work and commence negotiations on an FMCT. We have proposed that
States remove impediments to these negotiations, such as linkage
between this and other issues and, more recently, debate on whether
an eventual FMCT could be verified. The UK proposes commencing
negotiations, without preconditions, to facilitate progress at
the Conference on Disarmament before the review conference.
We value all reductions in nuclear weapons levels,
whether achieved through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral
means. We have welcomed reductions in nuclear weapons by the US
and Russia through the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty and
the Treaty of Moscow, which will make a significant contribution
to the reduction of nuclear stockpiles and fulfillment of Article
VI.
Since the 2000 Review Conference, the United
Kingdom has made particular progress on disarmament measures outlined
in the Final Document in addition to the measures already carried
out. For example, we have dismantled all our remaining Chevaline
warheads. And we have undertaken a three-part programme of work,
studying methodologies for the verification of nuclear disarmament.
We will be presenting the findings of these studies at the Review
Conference.
The UK's nuclear deterrence policy is long-standing
and remains unchanged. Nuclear weapons are useful only as a deterrent
and their role is political. At the Review Conference we will
report, with confidence, on the progress we have made to fulfil
our disarmament obligations under Article VI and the proposals
we support for further progress towards the ultimate goals set
out under the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the international
non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
14. Does the Government support making withdrawal
from the NPT more difficult?
The UK supports universalisation of the NPT
and is not in favour of any State leaving the Treaty. Withdrawal
can constitute a threat to international peace and security when
it happens in the context of nuclear proliferation. We believe
that a State should be held responsible for violations committed
while a Party to the NPT even after it has withdrawn. Nor should
it be allowed to benefit, after withdrawal, from nuclear materials,
facilities, equipment and technologies acquired from a third country
under the peaceful uses articles of the Treaty.
The UK has, with other States Party to the NPT,
been examining the scope for making withdrawal from the Treaty
a more costly and disadvantageous option. We believe there are
strong arguments for doing so, provided that the process of securing
agreement does not undermine the international consensus underlying
the NPT as a whole. We expect there to be a wider exchange of
views during the Review Conference in May.
15. What is the Government doing to support
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 2003
Action Plan?
The Government attaches a high priority to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the organisation responsible
for overseeing its implementation. The Action Plans on National
Implementation and Universality of the Convention, adopted by
the Conference of States Parties in 2003, receive our continued
strong support.
The UK played a significant role in brokering
the Action Plan on National Implementation. We believe national
implementation is essential to the effectiveness of the convention,
and support the deadline in the Action Plan for all States Party
to have full and complete national implementation in place by
the 10th Conference of States Party (November 2005). A recent
progress report, issued by the OPCW, indicates there has been
limited progress with national implementation since the adoption
of that Action Plan. As the 10th Conference approaches, promotion
of this Action Plan will continue to be a focus of our work. We
shall be pressing those countries that have not made relevant
progress to complete their national implementation obligations
as soon as possible.
We strongly support the Action Plan for Universality,
adopted by the Executive Council in 2003, which aims to accelerate
the rate of accession to/ratification of the CWC and urges States
Party to strengthen efforts to achieve universality through bilateral
contacts with, and provision of assistance to, non States Party.
We have participated in assistance visits, both
bilaterally and in conjunction with the OPCW, to promote the objectives
of these Action Plans. The UK frequently delivers demarches, along
with other EU partners, to States not Party to promote Universality
and the benefits of membership of the CWC. As an EU Member State,
we also offer assistance in these areas through the EU Joint Action
in support of OPCW activities. We will continue to work closely
with our international partners and the OPCW to achieve a Convention
with universal adherence, which is effectively implemented.
16. Does the Government support the introduction
of a verification mechanism as part of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention?
HMG continues to believe that the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention would be strengthened by a verification
mechanism. After the failure of the negotiations on this in July
2001, the Government issued a Green Paper on the strengthening
of the BTWC. It set out a range of practical measures that attracted
support from other States Party.
We remain ready to take part in negotiations
of such a mechanism. The Government will work closely with other
States Party including EU partners, ahead of the 2006 Review Conference,
to consider whether we can strengthen the convention in ways that
can be collectively supported.
17. What developments on the G8 Global Partnership
are expected to emerge from the Gleneagles Summit?
Counter-proliferation is an established and
important part of G8 work. As G8 Presidency, we will build on
the mandate agreed by G8 Leaders in the Sea Island Action Plan
on Non-Proliferation, although this not a headline theme of the
UK G8 Presidency. The Global Partnership, along with enrichment
and reprocessing and combating biological threats, is one of three
key areas of focus.
The Global Partnership has already achieved
substantial success. Many programmes are now underway. A number
of projects have been completed, and the pace of implementation
is increasing. As Presidency, we will build on this success under
the theme "pledges to progress", aiming to iron out
obstacles to progress and promote faster implementation to deliver
on the promises made at Kananaskis in 2002. We have circulated
a questionnaire on implementation to G8 partners and those countries
which, while formally outside the G8, are fully associated with
this initiative. In this respect, we also want the Global Partnership
to be more inclusive and make better use of contributions from
non-G8 donors such as the Netherlands and Norway.
Looking to the future, we expect the Global
Partnership to develop in a more forward-looking way. The FSU
will remain its primary focus, but the Partnership will also need
to evaluate the scope for new projects to respond to challenges
elsewhere. We want to encourage the inclusion of countries such
as Kazakhstan and Georgia, which have made clear they are ready
to take on the commitments in the Kananaskis declaration to join
the Partnership.
The work of the GP also needs to be co-ordinated
with other non-proliferation initiatives, such as the US Global
Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims to encourage the conversion
of reactors world-wide from HEU to LEU. In order to achieve this,
we have begun a detailed discussion with G8 partners and other
stakeholders to review priorities and look.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
March 2005
QUESTION 5
NATO in Afghanistan: Factsheet: 21 February
2005
Background
NATO took command and co-ordination of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in August 2003. ISAF is NATO's
first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. ISAF operates in
Afghanistan under a UN mandate and will continue to operate according
to current and future UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions.
ISAF's mission was initially limited to Kabul. Resolution 1510
passed by the UNSC on 13 October 2003 opened the way to a wider
role for ISAF to support the Government of Afghanistan beyond
Kabul.
What is the aim of the operation?
ISAF's role is to assist the Government of Afghanistan
and the International Community in maintaining security within
its area of operation. ISAF supports the Government of Afghanistan
in expanding its authority to the rest of the country, and in
providing a safe and secure environment conducive to free and
fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and the reconstruction
of the country.
What does this mean in practice?
ISAF conducts patrols throughout the 18 police
districts in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Over a third of
these patrols are carried out jointly with the Kabul City Police.
There are also presence and patrol activities conducted within
the Provincial Reconstruction Team areas of operation.
ISAF co-ordinates Civil Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) projects throughout its area of operations. The CIMIC
objectives are to assist the Commander of ISAF in his effort to
support the Government of Afghanistan in maintaining and expanding
security throughout the country, to support stabilisation, reconstruction
and nation-building activities, and to co-operate with the International
Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The CIMIC
teams work in close co-operation with the local population and
authorities and assess the situation concerning education, health,
water, sanitation and internally displaced persons and returnees.
They also initiate and monitor projects funded by either national
or international donors.
On a political level, ISAF works closely with
the Afghan authorities, the United Nations Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA), UN agencies, international organisations,
non-governmental organisations and the US-led coalition (Operations
Enduring Freedom—OEF). ISAF has Liaison Teams that co-ordinate
issues directly with the Government of Afghanistan, with UNAMA
and other international players.
ISAF also supports the Government of Afghanistan
in its security sector reform efforts.
How is ISAF structured?
ISAF is structured into four main components:
— ISAF Headquarters: provides operation-level
direction and planning support to the Kabul Multinational Brigade
(KMNB) and conducts operational tasks in its area of responsibility.
It liaises with and assists in the work of UNAMA, the Afghan Transitional
Government and governmental and non-governmental organisations;
— The Kabul Multinational Brigade:
ISAF's tactical headquarters, responsible for the planning and
conduct of patrolling and CIMIC operations on a day-to-day basis;
— Kabul Afghan International Airport:
ISAF assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism
in the overall operation of the airport;
— Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs):
PRTs are arranged as civil-military partnership to facilitate
the development of a secure environment and reconstruction in
the Afghan regions. As of 31 December 2003, the military element
of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz became
subject to the ISAF chain of command as a pilot project. Additional
PRTs under ISAF command are being established (see below).
How does NATO manage the ISAF mission?
The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's highest
decision-making body, provides the political direction and co-ordination
for the mission. The NAC works in close consultation with non-NATO
nations taking part in ISAF and special meetings with these nations
are held on a regular basis.
Based on the political guidance provided by
the NAC, strategic command and control is exercised by NATO's
main military headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, led by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR). The Joint Force Commander (JFC) based
at the Joint Force Command in Brunssum (The Netherlands), is responsible
at the operational level for manning, training, deploying and
sustaining ISAF.
In January 2004, NATO appointed Minister Hikmet
Cetin, of Turkey, to the post of Senior Civilian Representative
(SCR) in Afghanistan. Minister Cetin is responsible for advancing
the political-military aspects of the Alliance's engagement in
Afghanistan and receives his guidance from the NAC. The work carried
out by the SCR is crucial to the success of NATO's mission of
assisting the Afghan Transitional Government in fulfilling the
Bonn Agreement commitments. He works in close co-ordination with
the Commander of ISAF (COMISAF) and the UNAMA as well as with
the Afghan authorities and other bodies of the International Community
present in the country.
Which countries are contributing?
ISAF currently numbers around 8,000 troops from
36 NATO, nine partner and two non-NATO/non-partner countries.
ISAF tracks individual contributions by each country but those
numbers change on a regular basis due to the rotation of troops.
Please contact the specific countries for their contributions.
ISAF contributing nations (as of 21 February
2005)
NATO NATIONS
Belgium 616
Bulgaria 37
Canada 992
Czech Republic 17
Denmark 122
Estonia 10
France 742
Germany 1,816
Greece 171
Hungary 159
Iceland 20
Italy 506
Latvia 9
Lithuania 9
Luxemburg 10
Netherlands 311
Norway 313
Poland 5
Portugal 21
Romania 72
Slovakia 16
Slovenia 27
Spain 551
Turkey 825
United Kingdom 461
United States 89
PARTNER NATIONS
Albania 22
Austria 3
Azerbaijan 22
Croatia 45
Finland 61
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) 20
Ireland 10
Sweden 85
Switzerland 4
NON-NATO/NON-EAPC
NATIONS
New Zealand 5
What other tasks does ISAF carry out in support
of the Government of Afghanistan and the International Community?
From 14 December 2003 until 4 January 2004,
ISAF successfully supported the conduct of a major political event
in Kabul, the convening of a Constitutional Loya Jirga, a grand
council specific to Afghanistan, which adopted a new constitution
for the country. ISAF assisted the Afghan authorities in providing
security throughout the process.
In September and October 2004, ISAF also assisted
in providing security for the historic presidential election (see
below).
ISAF leads the operation and control of the
Kabul International Airport in support of the Afghanistan government.
At this time, the Airport receives both military and civilian
air traffic. The end-state goal is to have the airport transition
to an Afghan-led, 24-hour, 7-days-a-week operation. The rehabilitation
of the airport and the opening of Afghan airspace by providing
effective air traffic control capability will contribute to the
economic and social development of Afghanistan. mAir traffic through
Kabul International Airport has been steadily increasing. It now
averages more than 3,000 air movements per month, an increase
of 42% over 2003.
ISAF has been helping to train and build up
future Afghan security forces. This has involved assisting individual
Allies in the training and development of the new Afghan National
Army and national police.
As a result of the Heavy Weapons Cantonment,
the regions of Jalalabad, Kandahar, Gardez, Herat, Parwan, Konduz,
Mazar-e-Sharif, Bamyan and Kabul are now free of all working or
repairable heavy weapons. ISAF has completed the cantonment of
751 heavy weapons in the Kabul area. Around Kabul ISAF has reached
the landmark that 1,000 weapons have been placed in one of the
four-cantonement sites on the outskirts of the city. In total,
3,304 heavy weapons (operational and repairable) 78% have been
cantoned in sites that are under the control of the ANA. They
remain the property of the Ministry of Defence.
The redeployment and cantonment of heavy weapons
is an initiative of the Afghan Ministry of Defence. Under the
terms of the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and the
Government of Afghanistan, signed on 9 December 2003, ISAF has
been supporting the Afghan Ministry of Defence in its efforts
to carry forward the cantonment of heavy weapons outside Kabul
city limits. The cantonment of heavy weapons constitutes an important
step towards the further development of a capable Afghan National
Army (ANA), as it is likely that most of these weapons will eventually
be used to equip ANA units.
ISAF works closely with the Government of Afghanistan
and the United Nations in support of the Disarmament, Demobilisation,
and Reintegration (DDR) process. The DDR process was initiated
with a pilot project in October of 2003 and is aimed at the disarmament
and demobilisation of former combatants prior to their reintegration
into Afghan society. The DDR process is run by the Government
of Afghanistan with the assistance of UNAMA and ISAF. To date,
more than 22,000 men have started the DDR programme, and almost
13,000 light weapons have been collected. The DDR completion now
has achieved 26% throughout the country.
The Heavy Weapons Cantonment programme and the
DDR process are complementary and will lead to the increased security
and enhanced rule of law in Afghanistan, which is particularly
important in the lead up to this year's elections.
What is the state of play in ISAF's expansion
to other parts of Afghanistan?
ISAF's mandate was initially limited to security
assistance to Kabul. Resolution 1510 passed by the UNSC on 13
October 2003 opened the way to a wider role for ISAF to support
the Government of Afghanistan beyond Kabul.
Following the UN decision (UNSCR 1510), NATO
last year decided to expand further its assistance for stability
and security throughout Afghanistan on the basis of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams and temporary deployments for specific purposes
and events, This progressive expansion, starting in the North
of the country, is now underway.
Where are ISAF's new PRTs?
Following the establishment of a NATO pilot
PRT in Kunduz under German lead last December, ISAF established
permanent PRT presences in Mazar-E Sharif (UK), Meymana (UK),
Feyzabad (GER) and Baghlan (NETH). Together with a Forward Support
Base (a logistics hub) near Mazar-E-Sharif and temporary satellite
presences in Sar-e-Pol, Samangan, Sherberghan, ISAF is thus be
able to influence security in nine northern provinces of the country.
NATO is currently in the process of filling
the requirements for expansion of ISAF to the West, with a view
to establish new PRTs, as well as to incorporte existing PRTs,
currently under the command of the US-led Coalition (Operation
Enduring Freedom).
What are Provincial Reconstruction Teams for?
PRTs are structured as a civil-military partnership
and they demonstrate the commitment of the International Community
to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
Only the military elements of PRTs are integrated
in the ISAF chain of command. The primary purposes of PRTs are:
— to help the Government of Afghanistan
extend its authority;
— to facilitate the development of
a secure environment in the Afghan regions, including the establishment
of relationships with local authorities; and
— to support, as appropriate, security
sector reform activities, within means and capabilities, to facilitate
the reconstruction effort.
How is the location of NATO's PRTs determined?
The composition and geographical extent of PRTs
is determined on recommendation by the PRT Executive Steering
Committee, in consultation with SACEUR, the Afghan authorities,
the Joint Force Commander and framework nations in light of the
specific situation in the provinces in which they operate. Factors
such as the security situation, the status of reconstruction,
governance and the presence of other international agencies will
play a role in defining the specific objectives of individual
PRTs.
What support did ISAF provide for the October
presidential elections this year?
Interim President Karzai requested ISAF assistance
in securing the proper environment for the conduct of free and
fair elections. In response, while the Allies stressed that the
primary responsibility for the overall security during the electoral
process rests with the Afghan security forces, NATO supported
the electoral process in its area of operations.
The North Atlantic Council approved on 23 July
2004 detailed military advice on ISAF support for the presidential
election, which was held on 9 October 2004.
ISAF support for the presidential elections
was configured to provide additional forces at two levels in theatre.
A first level was located at the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs). Augmentation of PRTs was matched to the local security
situation, as determined by lead nations, in consultation with
the ISAF Commander.
A second level in theatre consisted of one battalion
provided by Spain and one battalion provided by Italy, with supporting
elements. The Spanish battalion provided the ISAF Quick Reaction
Force and the Italian battalion provided the in-theatre Operational
Reserve Force. The Italian battalion was an element of NRF 3.
These additional forces deployed to Afghanistan
in September and remained for about eight weeks, covering the
election period.
How did the operation evolve?
ISAF was created in accordance with Agreements
resulting form the Bonn Conference, December 2001, after the ousting
of the Taliban regime. Afghan opposition leaders attending the
conference began the process of reconstructing their country by
setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional
Authority (ATA).
The concept of an UN-mandated international
force to assist the newly established ATA was also launched to
create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the
reconstruction of Afghanistan. These agreements paved the way
for the creation of a three-way partnership between the ATA, UNAMA
and ISAF.
ISAF is not a UN force, but it is deployed under
a mandate of the UNSC (four UNSCRs—1386, 1413, 1444 and
1510—relate to ISAF). A detailed Military Technical Agreement
between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Government
provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.
Initially, individual nations volunteered to
lead the ISAF mission every six months. The first ISAF mission
was run by the United Kingdom, Turkey then assumed the lead of
the second ISAF mission. The third ISAF mission was led by Germany
and the Netherlands with support from NATO.
NATO has led the ISAF mission since 11 August
2003 and financed by common funding and the troop-contributing
nations. The Alliance is responsible for the command, coordination
and planning of the force. This includes providing the force commander
and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.
NATO's role in assuming the leadership of ISAF
in August 2003 overcame the problem of a continual search to find
new nations to lead the mission and the difficulties of setting
up a new headquarters every six months in a complex environment.
A continuing headquarters also enables small countries, which
find it difficult to act as lead nations, to play a strong role
within a multinational headquarters.
QUESTION 10
Written Ministerial Statement (10 March 2005)
Afghanistan: Counter Narcotics
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Bill Rammell): The
United Kingdom, as lead nation, salutes the determination of President
Karzai and his Government in implementing the 1384 (2005) Counter
Narcotics Implementation Plan. The Plan is a framework for action
to accelerate all our efforts over the coming year and sets out
counter-narcotics (CN) activities ahead under eight pillars:
— alternative livelihoods;
— interdiction and law enforcement;
— demand reduction and treatment of
addicts;
The adoption of this Plan follows the successful
holding by President Karzai in December 2004 of the first Counter
Narcotics National Conference in Afghanistan. At that Conference
and since then, President Karzai has delivered powerful messages
to reinforce his strong determination to act against all aspects
of the narcotics trade.
The UK welcomes this renewed commitment and
joins with the wider international community in pledging our collective,
increased support for the 2005 Plan. There are some early signs
that this year may see an overall reduction in opium poppy cultivation
levels. However, as it is still early in the harvest cycle, we
need to wait for the UN assessments later in the year on levels
of cultivation and on how much of the crop in the fields has been
destroyed.
The UK has increased its spending to US$100
million this year on counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan.
Specifically, we are stepping up activity in support of the 2005
Plan in the following ways:
On creating alternative livelihoods for farmers
who currently grow opium poppy, following the visit of my Rt hon
Friend the Secretary of State for International Development to
Afghanistan in January 2005, the UK has pledged US$125 million
of support for alternative livelihoods in 2005-06; our alternative
livelihoods commitment has more than doubled annually from 2002-03
to 2005-06. The UK is also leading the way in pressing some of
the larger multilateral donors, such as the World Bank, to include
counter narcotics objectives in their programmes. Activities include:
— substantial support to activities
to bring short term, visible impact in 2005, building on the US$5
million already made available for "cash for work";
— support to a wide range of agricultural
and off-farm income generating activities in poppy growing provinces;
— increasing access to credit to rural
areas, and developing products to address the specific problem
of opium debt;
— assessing opportunities to promote
alternative products to opium poppy, and more favourable terms
of trade for those products;
— improving the co-ordination and implementation
of development and counter narcotics programmes in Badakhshan,
where the UK has already committed more than US$7.5 million.
On law enforcement, the UK has mapped out and
is coordinating the development of the Counter Narcotics Police
of Afghanistan (CNPA), working with other lead nations to establish
the counter narcotics capacity of all Afghan law enforcement institutions.
As part of the CNPA development plan, the UK establishing a further
nine mobile detection teams (over 100 officers) in the next 18
months, capable of interdicting drug trafickers in Kabul and the
provinces. We are also providing mentoring for intelligence and
investigation units. We are looking to international donors to
contribute to the CNPA development plan. We also welcome the recent
results of the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF), for which
the UK has provided advice and funding. The Force has seized over
75 tonnes of opiates, destroyed 80 drugs labs and disrupted two
drugs bazaars during the last year;
On developing the criminal justice system, the
UK, working with the UN, has set up and completed the first phase
of training and mentoring of the Counter Narcotics Criminal Justice
Task Force of investigators, prosecutors and judges. The Task
Force will be 80 strong by mid-2005. We have also funded UNODC
(nearly US$2 million) to establish a secure court and prison facility
for counter narcotics;
On eradication of the opium crop, this will
be carried out in 2005 by the US-supported Central Poppy Eradication
Force (CPEF) and by Governors and Police Chiefs at local level.
The UK is working closely in both these areas and has established
a Planning and Monitoring Cell to ensure that eradication by CPEF
is targeted in a way which takes account of alternative livelihoods.
We are also helping CPEF with salaries and equipment and are the
major donor for verification and assessment of the eradication
campaign to ensure it is carried out: over US$1 million to establish
30 ground-based verification teams (240 people) and satellite
imagery. The first 15 verification teams should produce preliminary
results by March.
On building the institutions necessary to support
long-term Afghan commitment, the UK is helping to build central
and provincial capacity in a number of key government institutions,
including the new Counter Narcotics (CN) Ministry under Minister
Qaderi, the counter narcotics function within the Ministry of
the Interior, the Rural Reconstruction Ministry, the Office of
the National Security Adviser, the Civil Service Commission and
the Cabinet Secretariat;
On lobbying, my Rt hon Friends the Foreign Secretary
and the Development Secretary have now launched a substantial
lobbying campaign to encourage international partners, including
the G8, the EU, the US, neighbouring countries of Afghanistan
and other Berlin Conference participants, to support the Plan
and help establish the new Counter Narcotics Trust Fund. The aim
of this Fund will be to pull together donor support for the Afghan
government's counter-narcotics priorities. The April 2005 Afghan
Development Forum will be an important opportunity for the Afghan
government to seek additional support for alternative livelihoods;
The UK is also working with Afghan and international
partners:
— to raise public awareness of the
risks to Afghanistan of the drugs trade and the dangers to health
from addiction associated with growing opium poppy through proactive
and comprehensive information campaigns and drug treatment activities;
— to increase regional co-operation
to tackle the drugs trade across borders through implementation
of the April 2004 Berlin Declaration on Counter Narcotics Within
the Framework of the Kabul Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration
of December 2002. In 2004-05, the UK provided around US$2.5 million
of assistance to increase counter narcotics capacity on Afghanistan's
borders with Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan, the three main routes
for opiates being smuggled out of Afghanistan. Further such assistance
is planned for financial year 2005-06.
My Rt hon Friend the Foreign Secretary (Mr Jack
Straw) visited Kabul on 16 February, the day President Karzai
launched the 2005 CN Implementation Plan. They agreed on the crucial
importance of working together in support of the Plan to mobilise
international assistance so that narcotics does not destroy Afghanistan's
potential for stability, reconstruction and a thriving licit economy.
The 2005 Plan therefore represents an important opportunity. We
share the resolve of the Afghan government to achieve the sustainable
elimination of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2005
and beyond.
I am placing copies of the Plan in the Library
of the House.
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