Written evidence submitted by Elisabeth
Hughes, Freelance Writer and Researcher on Libya and North Africa
LIBYAN POLICY AND THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
0.1 The current political structure in Libya
The Jamahiriya, or "state of the masses",
was instituted by the current leader of the country, Colonel Qadhafi,
after a successful coup to remove the head of the monarchy ruling
the country in 1969. This "state of the masses" is based
on the political and philosophical thinking of Colonel Qadhafi's
Green Book, which highlights the need for the state to
be representative of the whole of society and to reflect the thinking
of the masses. However, the state is effectively run by Colonel
Qadhafi, whose only role is as the Leader or Guide of the revolution.
For administrative purposes, the country is divided into regions,
[shabiyya]. In each locality there is a Basic Peoples Committee,
in which each Libyan is intended to be active in making the political
decisions affecting the region and the country as a whole, hence
"state of the masses". These committees take part in
a General People's Congress, made up of representatives from each
BPC and this Congress is called in order to facilitate the decisions
of the BPC at a national level. A cabinet, or General People's
Committee, elected by the Congress from nominees chosen by Colonel
Qadhafi, are responsible for the management of the Congress and
the day by day running of the state, in the vein of a traditional
government; headed by the Secretary of the General Peoples' Committee,
currently Shukri Ghanem.
0.2 The role of Colonel Qadhafi in the regime
As previously mentioned, Colonel Qadhafi has
no formal role within the political structure of Libya. However,
he exercises almost total control over his cabinet and the country's
treasury. It is also the Leader who chooses when to convene the
General People's Congress. By nominating ministers for office
in the various Secretariats, the Leader is also able to ensure
that all of his cabinet are supportive of the aims of the revolutionary
movement and will, therefore, support his aims. He is known for
surrounding himself with members of his family and supporters
are often members of his own tribe. The BPC's too reflect a strong
pro-Qadhafi bias, and are often influenced by supporters of the
revolutionary movement. There is no official opposition to the
Leader within Libya, and, therefore, no official method of registering
opposition to Colonel Qadhafi's policies.
0.3 The weakness of the Jamahiriya
Despite the lack of official opposition, the
Jamahiriya does face opposition. It is considered to be effectively
policed and the regime runs a highly effective security machine
to suppress any serious opposition. Another result of the lack
of any other political representation is the potential weakness
of the state in the event of the loss of Colonel Qadhafi. Any
suggestion that the Leader intends for one of his children to
take over, either in the near future, or in the more long term
is roundly denied and this uncertainty surrounding the continuation
of the regime also serves to weaken the power of the state. Also
a problem for the regime is the general level of political apathy
throughout the country. This is a result of both the non-violent
way in which Libya became independent, and the non-inclusive manner
in which the revolution was undertaken; by a small group of military
officers rather than a civil uprising. It is also in a small part
caused by the widespread levels of poverty and unemployment. The
population is currently growing at a rate of 3% per annum, increasing
the potential for even higher levels of poverty and unemployment
in the long term.
0.4 The oil dominated economy and lack of
any viable alternatives
The above mentioned poverty and unemployment
are compounded by the Libyan economy's dependence on oil revenues.
Libya has relatively few other natural resources, and none that
have been successfully developed into a sustainable industry as
a viable alternative. Even a basic commodity such as water is
severely limited in the desert country, effectively terminating
any hopes of establishing an agricultural industry. Oil incomes
have been used to bring in agricultural commodities, and there
is currently no functioning scheme to invest oil incomes into
an industry to support the economy after these have dried up.
There has been much talk of developing the infra-structures, and
particularly a transport infra-structure, required to construct
an industry around travel and the sites of interest within the
country. To this end, and in order to release the economy from
dependence on the oil and gas industry, a programme for economical
development is being formulated. Should this prove successful,
it may be the first step towards providing a resolution to this
very limiting dependence.
THE CURRENT
INTERESTS AND
MOTIVATIONS OF
THE QADHAFI
REGIME:
1.1 Survival of the Leader
At the present time, the survival of the Leader
is seen as a highly important factor in the changes and choices
of political policy in the country. This is affecting both domestic
and foreign policy, as witnessed by the December 2003 decision
to abandon WMD or by Colonel Qadhafi's concessions to the human
rights groups demanding improvement to democracy in the country,
including the recent decision to abolish the People's Court, a
highly contentious judicial court which has come under fire in
recent times as a result of the well-reported trial of the Bulgarian
medics in Benghazi. Economic changes within the country, intended
to improve the economical situation of the population are also
influenced by a desire to maintain support and the opposition
faced by Prime Minister Ghanem in removing basic food subsidies
is a reflection of the regime's concern for survival. This is
despite the fact that there is currently little organisation in
the opposition towards Colonel Qadhafi and the regime, and the
lack of any strong leadership for this opposition.
1.2 Hereditary succession
Linked to the survival of the Leader is the
safety of his children who, as increasingly political figures,
are increasingly at risk of attack from opposition, particularly
once the issue of succession is bought into play. Although firmly
denied as a matter for current discussion, it can be argued that
the possibility of a hereditary or at the very least organised
succession is of major importance to the motivation of the regime.
Positioning Saif al-Islam as a spokesman with the West, for example,
could certainly be seen in this light.
1.3 Normalising relations with the USA and
with other countries
Perhaps the most important factor influencing
policy at the current time is the attempt to normalise relations
with the international community. This attempt both improves his
standing in Libya, as one of his favoured portrayals is as an
international statesman, and improves the country's standing and
opportunities for investment and trade. The importance of the
USA link cannot be overstated, as the US support is crucial to
a return to the international fold. This is evidenced by the continued
attempts to accommodate the USA once relations had begun to improve
with the European community. A relationship with the Bush administration
is also a highly important step towards the investment of US-based
international oil companies, needed to both increase oil revenues
and finance development projects.
1.4 Re-generating the economy
It could, therefore, be said that the need to
normalise relations with the US and the international community
is itself motivated by the need to re-generate the economy. The
general poverty in the country can be alleviated by the injection
of FDI and the restructuring necessary for this. Ultimately, this
is also motivated by a desire to bolster support for the regime,
and prevent discontent which could spread into an organised opposition.
It is within this context that the Libyan decision
to abandon WMD and to support the "War against Terror"
can most usefully be viewed. However, the importance of the link
to Islam in the "War against Terror" and in the Libyan
desire to secure safety for the regime are also vital context.
ISLAM IN
LIBYA: THE
CONTEXTS
2.1 Sanusi and the spread of Islam
Islam was popularised in Libya principally by
the Sanusi movement: a religious movement headed at the time by
Sayyid Muhammed Ali al-Sanussi, the grandfather of King Idris,
the monarch whose reign Colonel Qadhafi and the military coup
interrupted. The influence of the Sanusi, whose teaching focused
on a return to those of early Islam, and the Bedouin amongst whom
they preached, can still be seen in Libya today, where the practice
of maintaining shrines dedicated to local "saints" is
still in evidence. The Sanusi were also an important force in
uniting the country under one religion, and as one nation. They
were very active in organising resistance to the Italians, at
the time occupying Libya under colonial rule. Today, the population
of Libya adheres principally to the Sunni branch of Islam and
the principles of the Green Book mostly follow the teaching of
Islam, as interpreted by the Leader.
2.2 The `asabiya and national identity; tribal
opposition
The importance of a collective identity to the
Sanusi resistance to the Italian occupation is echoed in the importance
of a national identity to the revolutionary movement, both Arab
and Islamic. In an effort to stamp out opposition focused on the
respect still afforded the Sanusi King as a leader rooted in tribal
identity, Colonel Qadhafi and the revolutionary movement focused
their attention in the early days of the new regime on the weakening
of the tribe as a political entity and the strengthening of an
identity focused on pan-Arab nationalism rather than family or
tribal links. The pan-Arab nationalism that ignited Colonel Qadhafi
in his early moves into international statesmanship was a part
of this project, as is his desire to be seen as an Islamic statesman.
Currently, the regime is more likely to use the tribal identity
as a method of maintaining power, for example the importance of
Colonel Qadhafi's own clan in holding office and influence, and
the encouragement through the mechanics of tribal leaders to allege
loyalty to the leadership and revolution.
2.3 The Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Resistance
Although organised opposition to the regime
is practically non-existent, there does remain a significant amount
of support for Islamist resistance, principally the Muslim Brotherhood.
Although essentially non-violent, the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood
constitutes the majority of political prisoners in Libya. Both
the Leader and Saif al-Islam Qadhafi have stated that only prisoners
linked to al-Qaeda are now held as "prisoners of conscience",
but it is popularly held that a large number of the Brotherhood
remain in Libyan jails.
THE ISLAMIST
THREAT
3.1 Support for the War on Terror
Concern surrounding this Islamist resistance
motivates the current support for the US sponsored "War against
terror". Colonel Qadhafi, through past attacks on the religious
establishment, has in many ways separated himself from other Islamic
countries, as evidenced by the current frosty relations between
Libya and Saudi Arabia or Iran. This increases the risk to the
regime of threats of an Islamic kind. It is understood that Colonel
Qadhafi firmly believes that his leadership is threatened by Islamic
fundamentalism. This threat has increased with his courting of
normalisation with the Western, or non-Muslim international community
in particular. Certainly, the threat of Islamist opposition to
his rule offers a distinct embarrassment to a regime whose principles
are based on Islam. That this threat is increasing is also a worry
to the regime as occasional demonstrations break out, particularly
in the Benghazi region, where resistance has been loosely linked
to the Islamist cause.
3.2 Al-Qaeda links and returnees
The spread of resistance linked to Islamist
groups is beginning to worsen. The possibility that Libyans have
been recruited to the Islamist groups abroad is also offering
cause for concern. Some were undoubtedly involved in fighting
in Afghanistan and there are a small group of Libyans involved
in the resistance in Iraq. As these fighters return to Libya they
bring with them both the desire to turn to the outlawed Islamist
opposition and the practical experience of opposition to the governing
regime. Despite multiple attempts to repress the Islamic opposition
inside Libya, pockets survive, offering the potential of a pattern
for political opposition from other groups as they are encouraged
to question the regime.
3.3 Support for democracy and "normalisation"
as servants of the Leaders purposes
Although all the factors detailed above suggest
that Colonel Qadhafi will continue to support the USA in its "War
against Terror" and make concession to ensure its continued
support, there is a real possibility that the Leader has abandoned
none of his revolutionary policies. He has been prepared to comprise
in the light of a potential reconciliation with the USA and the
international community. However, concessions and changes influenced
by the normalisation process, for example reform in areas of human
rights and democracy, have been minimal. Much has been made of
the extent to which the decision to renounce WMD has actually
affected the military defence of Libya and proposals for reform
remain, at this point in time, mostly proposals.
CONCLUSION
3.4 Real change is, at best cosmetic, and
ultimately, little has changed to divert the Leader from his pro-Arab,
anti-Western leanings. However, cosmetic "democracy"
and normalised relations with the Western world are currently
seen by the Leader and his supporters as key to regime survival
and these policies are likely to remain characteristics of the
Libyan regime. The effect that Islam has on Libyan policy is not
a case of the mere reflection of the philosophies and tenets of
the Islamic religion but also reflects the concerns of Colonel
Qadhafi and his government to secure the regime and the survival
of the Leader. It offers, at the present time, the most organised
domestic opposition to the regime, and the medium term prospects
to encourage future opposition. It also provides the impetus for
much of Libya's own foreign policy. As such, external foreign
policies as regards Libya should take into consideration the shallow
nature of change to the unique structure of the Libyan regime,
the total importance of the figure of Colonel Qadhafi and the
influence that Islam has on policy and security in the country.
Elisabeth Hughes
21 January 2005
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