Written evidence submitted by the International
Crisis Group
1. THE EXTENT
AND SOURCES
OF INSECURITY
Violence has spread to affect all sectors of
society in all aspects of daily life. Ordinary Iraqi citizens
feel insecure in their neighbourhoods and even in their own homes.
Traveling outside of urban areas is particularly risky. The fear
is less of bomb attacks and other insurgent activity—of
which most people see little (other than on TV)—than of
the general lack of law and order.
It originates in a number of sources, ranging
from criminality to insurgency, with lines sometimes blurred:
Insurgents will pay small sums of money to fellow Iraqis to place
explosives or carry out light-weapon attacks; criminal gangs that
specialise in kidnapping may sell their captives to insurgent
groups (especially if it involves foreign victims).
The insurgencies in Iraq today are primarily
driven by deep-seated grievances prevailing in two communities:
Disaffected Sunni Arabs, who fear being de-privileged after decades
of access to power and wealth through their proximity to especially
the republican regimes, and equally disaffected members of the
Ba'ath party (including many secular Shiites) who have become
targets of de-Ba'athification (regardless of their conduct under
the previous regime). Members of these two communities could theoretically
be drawn back into the political process if they are given sufficient
assurances and power to allay their fears of future punishment,
discrimination and repression. They have suggested that, despite
their boycott of the January 2005 elections, they are interested
in participating in the drafting of the constitution. Many have
also indicated their abhorrence of practices such as the beheading
of hostages or suicide bombings in crowded civilian areas, which
they attribute to foreign fighters.
There are two other groups that fuel the insurgencies:
Foreign fighters (Al-Qa'ida-inspired jihadis) and former-regime
stalwarts. The first are in Iraq to fight the occupying forces;
they have no Iraqi agenda. The latter realise there is no room
for them in the new Iraq and will fight so as to create chaos,
hoping that this will trigger an early exit of foreign forces
and the installation of a strongman who might protect their interests.
There are also the adherents of Muqtada al-Sadr,
the so-called Mahdi Army (in reality a ragtag band of part-time
fighters based in the urban Shiite slums of Baghdad and several
other cities), who fought battles with US forces in April and
August-September 2004. They are not politically disaffected as
much as the members of an economically marginalised underclass.
Much will depend on the success of the new government in restoring
law and order, repairing basic infrastructure and creating jobs
in order for this group not to be resuscitated for political ends
by Muqtada al-Sadr or others.
Finally, there is a much broader group of unemployed
Iraqis who serve as a recruiting ground for the insurgent groups,
regardless of the latter's ideology or politics, or who may resort
to criminality. They include workers of idle state factories,
soldiers of the dismissed national army and young Iraqis who have
never held a job. Only a massive attempt at employment generation
may serve to reabsorb members of this group into legality.
This growing panoply of insurgents and criminal
elements have caused the profound insecurity that Iraqis experience
today. The most disturbing aspect of this phenomenon, apart from
its widespread nature, is how it has fed on citizen inertia to
transform and develop itself. Insurgents now move around with
ease among a subdued and, in some quarters, even supportive population,
including in the capital.
2. TACKLING THE
INSURGENCIES AND
IMPROVING SECURITY
First of all, it is critical to understand that
there is not a single insurgency, and that most of insurgent activity
is locally-driven. US commanders have tended to blame foreign
fighters like Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi for most of the violence.
This reflects a failure to appreciate that while these fighters
obviously enjoy certain sources of Iraqi support, especially in
tribal areas in Al-Anbar (Falluja/Ramadi), Salah al-Din (Tikrit/Samarra)
and Nineveh (Mosul) governorates, they are only a small group
whose agenda and means of achieving it differ significantly from
that of most Iraqi insurgents.
While whosesale assaults on urban centres such
as Falluja and Samarra no doubt have succeeded in killing quantities
of insurgents, they have (1) failed to prevent the escape of key
insurgents, and (2) created a more generalised anger and resentment
among a population that feels reinforced in its perception that
it is being disenfranchised and marginalised in the new Iraq.
What counter-insurgency efforts have lacked
is precision/discrimination in targeting, as well as strong intelligence
to ferret out key operators. The deployment of military forces,
and especially foreign military forces, in fighting the insurgencies
has minimised the potential role of an Iraqi police force and
local intelligence gathering. Perhaps even more dangerously, the
deployment of elite Iraqi units almost exclusively composed of
Kurds in areas such as Falluja, Najaf and Mosul has alarmed Arab
communities there and stirred communal tensions. (Kurdish peshmerga
fighters are the most battle-hardened, disciplined and reliable
forces currently available in Iraq; the temptation is great to
deploy them as proof of the rebirth of the Iraqi security forces
in a virtual security vacuum.)
The Bush administration has now recognised the
importance of building up viable Iraqi security forces, and is
making more resources and trainers available for this purpose.
It is not clear, however, whether it has also recognised the importance
of building up, in particular, a viable police force that
could restore law and order—the absence of which has been
the one issue that has riled ordinary Iraqis more than any other
(with power shortages a close second) since the first day after
the collapse of the Ba'ath regime.
The key to tackling the insurgencies is to dry
up popular support for them and reduce the pool of recruitable
young men. Such a strategy will have to be multi-track, consisting
of the following components:
Political: Assist the creation of a legitimate
government that can effectively govern and deliver essential services
to the population and keeps corruption to a minimum. Serious overtures
have to be made to bring disaffected Iraqis back into the political
fold. Promote an open and inclusive constitutional process.
Economic: Promote the type of reconstruction
that draws in the largest number of unemployed. Fix the problems
with the power supply.
Security: Build up a police force able
to restore law and order. Build up an intelligence capability
that can ferret out hard-core insurgents. Build up customs capabilities
and other forms of border control to prevent jihadis and funds
from entering Iraq. Start reducing the presence and visibility
of US forces in populated areas.
3. THE FUNCTIONING
OF PRE-ELECTION
GOVERNING BODIES
The interim government of prime minister Iyad
Allawi was generally seen as a US-installed regime doing Washington's
bidding which, moreover, failed to restore law and order (despite
the tough talk) or re-start reconstruction, and was deeply corrupt.
Whatever government that emerges from the January elections is
certain to have a good deal more legitimacy than the Allawi-government
(despite the fact that the elections failed to be broadly inclusive;
see below), and so in itself is a significant improvement. But
much will depend on (1) how effective the new government will
be in delivering essential services, (2) how effective it will
be in curbing corruption rather than thriving on it, and (3) how
capable it will be of distancing itself from US/UK tutelage, lest
it also be tarnished with the "proxy" label that undermined
its predecessor.
4. STATE OF
POLITICAL ORGANISATION
Iraq is in the very early stages of institutional
formation. Political parties are rudimentary structures, personality-driven,
often sectarian in outlook and without national agendas. In this
vacuum, former exiles/expatriates and their political organisations
have had a head start, and they are resented for it by a resident
population that had to suffer the Ba'ath regime and the deprivations
that came with UN sanctions. The empowerment of local government
may serve to overcome this destabilising cleavage over time, as
it will allow the emergence of home-grown local leaders who can
graduate to positions of national power—if Iraq doesn't
break up before this happens.
5. THE ELECTIONS
AND THEIR
IMPACT
On balance, the fact that elections were held
was a very positive development, given the level of turn-out,
the euphoric responses among those who cast their ballots, the
relative freedom and absence of violence in which they occurred,
and the likelihood they will yield a political leadership that
will more closely reflect the will of the majority of Iraqis than
the previous one.
That said, the elections were seriously flawed
in the non-participation of a significant component of Iraqi society.
This was reflected in the composition of the turn-out.
The exclusion, or self-exclusion, of most Sunni Arabs, in particular,
bodes ill for the stabilisation of Iraq as it is precisely this
disaffected group that fuels the primary insurgency. Their absence
at the polls was not due merely to an official boycott of Sunni-Arab-based
parties such as the Muslim Scholars Association and the Iraqi
Islamic Parties (whose members were permitted to run as independents),
nor only to violence and intimidation (even in Jordan and the
UAE, Sunni Arabs mostly stayed away). Many chose to shun the polls
seeing the election as the mechanism by which the Shiite majority
would gain political power, a development that was not in their
interest and they did not wish to legitimate through their participation.
(Evidence suggests that what remains of the non-sectarian "Sunni"
Arab middle class in urban centres such as Baghdad and Mosul did
vote, if they had the chance.)
For the sake of the country's stabilisation,
every effort should be made to bring a broad spectrum of Sunni
Arab political actors into the political process and institutions
through the back door. They want participation in the army and
security services, the cabinet, the ministries, and the committee
that will be charged with drafting the constitution. They also
want a reversal of de-Ba'athification (though they might agree
to the creation of a fair screening mechanisms to weed out those
with blood on their hands). Leaders of the United Iraqi Alliance
(reportedly strongly backed in this approach by Ayatollah Sistani)
have publicly reached out to their Sunni Arab brethren, and some
Sunni Arab leaders have suggested they might be willing to re-join
the political and, especially, the constitutional process. These
are encouraging signs but the obstacles are many: There is no
clear, representative Sunni Arab leadership with whom to negotiate
and who can deliver (for example, an end to insurgent violence),
and none is likely to emerge; each time insurgents attack a Shiite
mosque or leader, pressure mounts on the Shiite leadership to
allow retaliation (successfully resisted so far); the temptation
to invite only moderate Sunni Arabs, such as Adnan Pachachi
and Ghazi al-Yawar, may be too powerful to resist; and the demands
of the Sunni Arab community may prove unacceptable. Still, there
is no alternative.
Following the formation of a government, the
next big challenge will be the drafting of a permanent constitution.
The two key issues here will be the nature of Iraq's political
structure (How much decentralisation? A separate federal region
for the Kurds?) and the role of religion (Implementation of Shari'a
law?). Given the heterodox nature of Iraqi society and the fact
that no single party was able to carry the elections (the United
Iraqi Alliance is a very loose coalition that is unlikely to survive
long beyond the formation of a new government), there is some
ground for optimism: It will be very difficult for the Islamists
to impose their vision on the country; a compromise may be found
in the relegation of the question of religion to regional centres
through decentralisation. But where will be the limit to Kurdish
ambitions?
Other challenges lie ahead. It is difficult
at this point to gain a full view of the results of provincial
elections, but two trends are noteworthy:
1. In the south, Islamist parties or
coalitions seem to have prevailed. Bred primarily in exile, they
will now have to demonstrate that they can govern and be inclusive.
This means they may not survive the next elections, currently
scheduled for mid-December. Moreover, there is likely to be a
power struggle between those who carry the taint of Iranian exile
and tutelage and who advocate the implementation of Shari'a law,
and those who are secular and have decried Iranian meddling.
2. In predominantly Sunni Arab governorates,
voter turn-out was extremely low. The formation of provincial
councils in such circumstances would be imprudent, as they could
not possibly be considered to be representative or enjoying electoral
legitimacy. The problem has been taken to an extreme in Nineveh
governorate (Mosul) where, despite the preponderance of Sunni
Arabs, the minority Kurds won the elections. The Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, an Islamist Shiite party that,
at the national level, was a primary component of the United Iraqi
Alliance, came in second, even though very few Shiites live in
Nineveh (mostly Shiite Turkomans). The formation of a Kurdish-dominated
provincial council in Nineveh would entail minority rule and likely
give rise to sectarian fighting.
The most dangerous provincial election took
place in Kirkuk governorate. Here Kurds swamped the polls and
swept to victory, facing opposition only from the minority Turkomans
(Arabs stayed away). The Kurds now control the provincial council
in addition to the security apparatus and the administration (directorates),
while they are increasing their numbers and enjoy US military
protection. Sectarian animosities in Kirkuk are now so strong
that a small spark could ignite sectarian violence; Arabs and
Turkomans are known to have started arming themselves, but they
would likely be outnumbered and overpowered by the Kurds. The
United States has contented itself with telling the Kurds it insists
on Iraq's territorial integrity and with preventing major violence
from breaking out. It has failed so far, however, to formulate
a pro-active policy to accommodate the concerns of all communities
in Kirkuk, including the return of displaced Kurds and Turkomans
and the fate of those brought in by the previous regimes as part
of a strategy of Arabisation. Under the interim constitution (the
Transitional Administrative Law) the question of Kirkuk was excluded
(specifically postponed) from the drafting of the permanent constitution.
However, if, in determining the nature of Iraq's political structure,
the drafters of the constitution reach a decision to establish
a federal Kurdish region, they will have to delineate the boundaries
of such a region; this will inevitably raise the issue of Kirkuk.
More insidiously, in the absence of a political settlement in
Kirkuk and a passive US attitude, the Kurds are able to continue
to "create facts" on the ground, thereby upsetting the
delicate political balance in the governorate and making a peaceful
solution more difficult.
6. ROLE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
The US and UK should make every effort in post-election
Iraq to:
— Refrain from interfering in Iraqi
politics and decision making;
— Step up the building and training
of Iraqi security forces, especially the police;
— Encourage a growing role for the
United Nations, especially in shepherding the constitutional process,
arranging a referendum on the constitution, and organising general
elections following the constitution's adoption;
— Halt the slide toward sectarian conflict,
especially in Kirkuk, including through support in the Security
Council for the appointment of a UN Special Rapporteur for Kirkuk
and possibly of a UN Supervisor with powers to impose law;
— Reduce the presence and visibility
of their forces in populated areas, especially as viable units
of the Iraqi security forces can be deployed.
As we said in a report in December 2004, "What
is now required is dual disengagement: a gradual US political
and military disengagement from Iraq and, no less important, a
clear Iraqi political disengagement from the U.S. The new Iraqi
state must define itself at least partially in opposition to U.S.
policies or it runs the risk of defining itself in opposition
to many of its own citizens."
Joost R Hiltermann
Middle East Project Director,
International Crisis Group
24 February 2005
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