Written evidence submitted by the International
Maritime Organisation
On behalf of the Secretary-General, I refer
to your letter of 22 February 2005 requesting the IMO's perspective
on the impact of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the ongoing threat
of terrorism at sea, particularly in strategic locations such
as the Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits.
By way of response I would point out, firstly,
that the PSI and the CSI are initiatives of a State Government
and, as such, the Secretariat of IMO is not in a position to provide
a perspective on their impact.
However, I would like to bring to the attention
of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons the following
activities of IMO which relate to policy aspects of the war against
terrorism.
Since its inception in January 1959, the Organization
always had as an integral part of its mandate the duty to make
travel and transport by sea as safe as possible. This mandate
has continually evolved to meet the changing conditions and requirements
of the international maritime community. In its early days, IMO
concentrated on the formulation of international conventions,
codes, recommendations and performance standards relating to the
safety of ships and to the protection of the marine environment.
The Organization thus provided an international framework of co-operation
through which ships and port facilities have been able to detect
and deter acts which threaten security of maritime transport.
During the late 1970s, at the request of one
of its Member States, it began to consider the subjects of barratry
and maritime fraud. In 1983, piracy and armed robbery against
ships were added to the IMO agenda.
Thereafter, in 1986, following the Achille
Lauro incident, IMO adopted practical measures to tighten
security both aboard ships and onshore with the aim of preventing
terrorist attack acts against passengers and crews on board ships.
As a corollary measure, it also developed the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Ships, 1988
and its Protocol relating to Unlawful Acts Against Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf. These instruments, which entered
into force in 1992, empower States to take appropriate legal action
(including extradition and prosecution) against anyone accused
of perpetrating unlawful acts against international shipping.
In the wake of the tragic events of 11 September
2001 in the United States of America, the Secretary-General of
IMO consulted on the need to review the measures already adopted
by the Organization to combat acts of violence and crime at sea.
This resulted in the unanimous adoption by the twenty-second session
of the Assembly of resolution A.924(22) of 20 November 2001 on
Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism
which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety
of Ships. In anticipation that significant changes would need
to be made to IMO's foremost treaty on ship safety—the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS Convention)—the
Assembly also agreed to hold a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime
Security in December 2002, to adopt new regulations to enhance
ship and port security and avert shipping from becoming a target
of international terrorism.
The 2002 Diplomatic Conference, which was attended
by 109 Contracting Governments to the SOLAS Convention, as well
as a number of United Nations specialized agencies, intergovernmental
organizations and non-governmental international organizations,
was chaired by Mr Frank Wall, CMG (United Kingdom). It adopted
a series of wide-ranging new security measures which represented
the culmination of a great deal of intense work which had taken
place at IMO during the preceding year. These measures, which
entered into force on 1 July 2004, are contained in a new chapter
XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and thus have the force of international
law. They are supported by the new International Code for the
Security of Ships and of Port Facilities (the ISPS Code) which
establishes the detailed security-related requirements, consisting
of Part A (the provisions of which are mandatory) and Part B (the
provisions of which are recommendatory).
Although the work within IMO was initiated as
a result of the events of 11 September, the end results address
aspects of security beyond terrorism and cover as well the whole
spectrum of security such as attempts to commit petty thefts,
piracy and armed robbery, attempts to board a ship as a stowaway
or illegal migrant.
The maritime security measures apply to ships
engaged in international trade and to port facilities[119]serving
such ships. They are aimed at establishing a security conscious
culture amongst seafarers, ship owners, ship operators, maritime
sector services providers and port facility operators, users and
service providers and focus on enhancing awareness and vigilance.
These measures are preventative in character
and, in situations where security is breached or of a security
incident, the response is a matter for the police and the security
services of each State.
In essence, the SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS
Code take the approach that ensuring the security of ships and
port facilities is basically a risk management activity and in
order to determine what security measures are appropriate, an
assessment of the risk must be made in each particular case. The
ISPS Code provides a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating
security risk, enabling SOLAS Contracting Governments to offset,
through appropriate security instructions, changes in security
threats with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities.
The maritime security measures also establish
the right of a State which is a SOLAS Contracting Government to
deny the entry of ships into its ports or to expel from its ports
ships when it considers that the ship in question either does
not comply with the provisions of the special measures to enhance
maritime security or presents a threat to the safety or security
of persons, ships, port facilities and other property.
The measures also require States to provide
general guidance on the measures considered appropriate to reduce
the security risk to ships flying their flag when at sea. In addition,
coastal States are expected to offer advice, and where necessary
assistance, to ships operating, or intending to operate, in their
territorial sea in order to reduce the security risk.
The use of a ship engaged in lawful trade for
the purpose of generating funds to finance terrorist activities
is not explicitly addressed in the measures. However, ships are
required to carry on board documentary evidence attesting the
employment of the ship (ie who decides the chartering and who
the charterers are) and the employment of the seafarers working
on board. These are to be made available to the competent authorities
of each State for the investigative work of their security services.
The measures are currently in force in 153 States
(including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
and by 17 March 2005 they will be applied by 155 States. It is
estimated that approximately 20,000 seagoing ships have complied
with the measures. The estimated number of port facilities which
are required to comply with the measures is of the order of 9,500.
The information available suggests that 94% of SOLAS Contracting
Governments have approved port facility security plans for 97%
of port facilities.
In broad terms States have the treaty obligation
to establish and to maintain the necessary legislative and administrative
infrastructure so as to give full and complete effect to the provisions
of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code. They must also monitor
and take appropriate enforcement action to ensure the compliance
of ships flying their flag and that of port facilities located
within their territory with the provisions of the SOLAS chapter
XI-2 and of the ISPS Code. In addition, they have the right to
take control and compliance measures against ships entering or
in their ports irrespective of the flag such ships are entitled
to fly.
Only seven months have lapsed since the entry
into force of these special measures. Their success in the long
run can only be determined by establishing whether they have achieved
the objectives of the ISPS Code and have protected the maritime
transport sector. However, one can argue with confidence that
the introduction of the measures has not caused any adverse effects
to the continuation of the world trade.
Although SOLAS chapter XI-2 and the ISPS Code
have been designed to protect ships and port facilities from terrorist
acts they contain elements which address aspects relating to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[120]
In particular, they require ships and port facilities to operate
in accordance with approved security plans and to have in place,
inter alia, appropriate "measures and procedures to prevent
weapons or any other dangerous substances and devices intended
for use against persons, ships or ports, and the carriage of which
is not authorized, from being introduced into port facilities
or on board ships". It is up to each of the SOLAS Contracting
Governments to consider how best to use the Code in pursuing the
objectives set by United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540(2004)
or by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/59/80[121]
At the early stages of the development of the
special measures it was recognized that the collaboration of several
organizations was required in order to address the security of
containers and, specifically, the security of closed cargo transport
units (closed CTUs). Bearing in mind:
— the inter-modal and international
nature of closed CTUs movements;
— the need to ensure security of the
complete transport chain and the respective roles of all those
involved;
— the role of frontier agencies, in
particular Customs Administrations, in controlling the international
movement of closed CTUs;
— the competencies and work of the
World Customs Organization (WCO) in the area of international
maritime transport; and
— the long-standing co-operation of
IMO with the WCO in the area of international maritime transport,
RP Balkin
Director, Legal Affairs and External Relations Division,
International Maritime Organisation
7 March 2005
119 Port facility is a location, as determined by the
Contracting Government or by the Designated Authority, where the
ship/port interface takes place. This includes areas such as anchorages,
waiting berths and approaches from seaward, as appropriate. Back
120
The United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1540(2004)
was adopted on 28 April 2004. Back
121
Adopted on 16 December 2004. Back
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