Annex 1
Memorandum by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus regarding the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament Report on Cyprus, published
on 22 February 2005
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Cyprus welcomes the interest of the House of Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee in the Cyprus issue and receives the Committee's
Inquiry Conclusions and Recommendations with high expectations
and respect.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Cyprus shares many of the Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations
and particularly welcomes the support given to the call for a
census in the areas of the Republic, which are not under effective
control of the Government, the support for the Cyprus Government
proposal on Famagusta Port and Varosha, the withdrawal of Turkish
troops and settlers, and the advice to British citizens buying
property in the occupied areas.
Inevitably there are some issues that we have
divergent views on. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hereby presents
the response of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The
purpose of this response is to highlight the areas of major concern
to the Cyprus Government and to indicate the substance of the
Cyprus Government's policy approach on the issues.
A. CYPRUS AND
EUROPEAN VALUES
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 103: We conclude that there
is as yet little evidence that the Republic of Cyprus has fully
taken on board that its membership of the EU involves obligations,
as well as opportunities. We recommend that the Government work
on a bilateral 1evel, and with its European partners, to encourage
Cyprus to adapt to European Union values and methods of working."
From the evidence alluded to in the report this
is an incredible conclusion to reach and as such is extremely
disappointing and deplorable, to say the least, that another member
state's parliamentary institution should level the charge that
a newly admitted state is failing to adapt to European Union values
and methods of working.
The Government of Cyprus totally rejects such
accusations, which are considered unfair and ungrounded. The Republic
of Cyprus, like any other member state, is entitled to, and has
an obligation to safeguard its sovereign rights. In this context,
as with all EU member states, Cyprus sees its membership as a
matter of protecting its national interests and not in terms of
gaining leverage over a third country or more particularly leverage
over a certain section of its population. (The UK parliament would
dismiss out of hand that it would even consider using its EU membership
as leverage over the Scots, or the Welsh, and certainly not over
a third country.) The very fact that Cyprus joined the consensus
decision to open negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 is evidence
that it is willing to be co-operative and communautaire whilst
defending its national interests.
The issue of considering different options with
regard to opening negotiations with Turkey was not unique to Cyprus;
several well established member states have contemplated similar
agendas and promoted their own policies based on their own national
interests. It should be borne in mind, that the Republic of Cyprus
is the only member state whose territory, (which constitutes European
Union territory), continues to be illegally occupied by the troops
of a third county seeking membership to the union (The Republic
of Turkey).
The Government of Cyprus, in defending its sovereign
rights, will spare no effort within the contexts of its EU membership,
to remind of Turkey's obligations emanating from international
law, UN Security Council resolutions, ECHR Judgments and the Copenhagen
criteria. The Republic of Cyprus remains steadfastly committed
to the Community methods of cooperation and solidarity and as
a small EU member state expects from its partners to demonstrate
the same degree of cooperation and solidarity. The Foreign Affairs
Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament should have directed
its admonition to the Government of Turkey, the occupying power
and not the Republic of Cyprus, the victim of the military aggression.
B. DIRECT FLIGHTS
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 146: We recommend that in
its response to this Report, if not sooner, the Government clarify
whether it has the power to authorise direct passenger flights
between the United Kingdom and northern Cyprus. We further recommend
that if it does possess the power to authorise flight, the Government
announce a date from which such services will be permitted, subject
to satisfactory safety inspections of the facilities at Ercan
and other assurances."
The importance accredited to this issue in the
light of evidence received by the committee is puzzling and leads
to the justified suspicion that there are stronger motives at
play than mere facilitation of travel and tourism. That said,
it must be reiterated that, under international law, every member
state of the international community, as a matter of sovereignty,
has the indisputable right to determine which of its ports and
airports are open and functioning, as well as to define the terms
of operation for these ports and airports.
Furthermore, the Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation, the constitutive instrument of ICAO, to which
188 Countries including Cyprus, Turkey and the United Kingdom
are contracting States, affirms that every State has "complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory"
(Article 1).
Moreover, no State is obliged to open any of
its airports to international traffic unless it has bound itself
by treaty to do so. Every State has also the indisputable right
to close certain ports and airports for reasons that it, alone,
is competent to determine. The Republic of Cyprus has every right
to determine that the ports and airports in the areas under foreign
occupation are closed; such a position is mandatory, bearing especially
in mind that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is not in
a position to exercise effective control and impose terms of operation
on these ports and airports, as well as the relevant obligations
emanating from international treaties, especially those relevant
to transboundary international crime, security, illegal immigration,
narcotic drugs trafficking and terrorism.
The ports in the occupied areas of Cyprus were
closed by an Order of the Council of Ministers of the Republic
of Cyprus, of 3 October 1974, which was communicated to the International
Maritime Organisation on 12 December 1974 for distribution to
its Member States.
The ports having been closed by the Government,
it is for the Government to determine whether, when, and on what
conditions they shall be reopened. The sovereign Republic of Cyprus
alone, and nobody else—any third party—has the right
to decide that the ports in the areas under foreign occupation
will operate again. The same applies to the airports, which were
built in the occupied areas after 1974, (on properties belonging
to expelled Greek Cypriots, whose rights continue to be violated),
the functioning of which were never authorised by the Cyprus Government.
A decision to open or reopen the ports and airports
in the northern part of Cyprus falls quite clearly within the
category of public acts that can only properly be taken by the
recognised government, ie, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
The subordinate local administration established by Turkey in
the occupied areas of Cyprus (European Court of Human Rights in
its judgement in the case of Loizidou v Turkey) has no
right to take that decision. Thus, even though the "authorities"
in the occupied areas of Cyprus operate port and airports, all
States are under a legal duty not to recognize this and to consider
those ports and airports as closed.
Furthermore, this obligation is strengthened
by the existence of a specific duty of loyal co-operation between
Member States and the European Community enshrined in Article
10 of the EC Treaty. In that respect, the European Court of Justice
held that the said duty "imposes on the Member States and
the Community institutions mutual duties to co-operate in good
faith", (Judgement of 16 October 2003, in Case C-339/00).
Moreover, as has been recognised by the Legal
Service of the EU Council (Opinion of the Legal Service of 25
August 2004, Doc No 11278/04), the duty of loyal co-operation
would be breached if the Member States or the institutions of
the Union were to ignore the sovereign right of the Government
of Cyprus to declare the closure or to authorize the opening of
ports and airports situated in the occupied areas of Cyprus.
C. INTRA-ISLAND
TRADE
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 115: We are greatly disappointed
that it has so far proved impossible to gain agreement on the
modest but important proposals to improve the operation and usefulness
of the Green Line Regulation on intra-island trade. We recommend
that the United Kingdom work closely with the Luxembourg presidency
to secure early implementation of these changes and to streamline
procedures for making further amendments. We further recommend
that the EU should take steps to bring in genuinely free trade,
with traders in the South of the island being free to move goods
and products across the Line to the North."
The United Kingdom has a special role in working
for a solution preserving the sovereignty, the territorial integrity
and the unity of the Republic of Cyprus. It should aim at the
economic integration and the rapprochement of the two communities
and should avoid actions that are not in line with this goal.
The recommendation on intra-island trade has
been superceded by events following the Cyprus Government's collaboration
and co-operation with the European Commission and the adoption
of the amended line Regulation on 17 February 2005. The EU Regulation
on the green line (No. 866/2004) provides for intra island trade
and for exports to the EU through the legal ports and airports
of the Country. The Regulation entered into force on 1 May 2004.
Combined with the Commission's implementing rules adopted on 7
July 2004, it provides the legal machinery for the crossing of
persons and goods across the line.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is
the first to support the economic development of the Turkish Cypriots;
an economic development based on the proper criteria that promote
the ultimate aim of facilitating the reunification of our country.
This has been shown in practice by the announcement and implementation
of four packages of measures, of 30 April 2004, 26 April 2004,
16 and 30 July 2004, respectively. These measures have in essence
freed the intra island trade of agricultural and manufactured
goods and minerals, produced in the northern part of Cyprus, as
well as their export through the legal ports and airports of the
Republic of Cyprus. Unfortunately, due to political considerations,
such far-reaching measures are not being made use of, due to the
insistence of the occupation regime for direct trade through illegal
ports and airports in violation of international law. It should
be reminded, in this respect, that Mr Talat himself admitted in
his letter to the EU Heads of State, 1 June 2004, that: ".
. . In fact we do not believe in intra-island trade . . .".
It is no surprise that the illegal regime in
the occupied areas have and continue to restrict commerce between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots as part of a campaign to sabotage the
"Green Line" Regulation so as to justify their call
for "direct trade" instead. This attitude gives credence
to the fact that the Turkish Cypriots are being protectionist,
and that they fear successful intra-island trade will undermine
their case for direct trade with other countries.
Moreover, the Government of Cyprus has declared
its readiness to make special arrangements to render Larnaca Port
a hub for the movement of Turkish Cypriot products across the
line and to the outside world. The Government could hire the services
of Turkish Cypriots to assist with the increased weight of customs,
immigration, storage and other operations which the implementation
of this proposal would place upon Larnaca Port. The Port would
be ideal for the envisaged function because of (i) Larnaca's proximity
to the Nicosia and Famagusta areas (the distance between Larnaca
and Famagusta is only 30 km); (ii) the excellent highway system
connecting Larnaca to the rest of Cyprus; (iii) the up-to-date
infrastructure available at Larnaca Port; and (iv) the relatively
small volume of Turkish Cypriot exports to the outside world (the
value of those exports—about half of which are citrus fruits—is
estimated at around Euros 50 million/annum).
D. AID AND
DIRECT TRADE
REGULATIONS
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 122: We regret that valuable
aid for the people of northern Cyprus is being held up by political
and procedural disputes within the EU. We recommend that the Government
use its good offices to persuade all parties to remove the remaining
obstacles to disbursement of this aid; and
Paragraph 135: We conclude that undertakings
given to Turkish Cypriots by the international community must
be honoured. We recommend that the Government do more to turn
its words into action, by working with the Luxembourg presidency
of the EU to remove obstacles to direct trade with and travel
to northern Cyprus, and that it encourage the wider international
community the same."
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus, in
line with the EU's General Affairs Council's Conclusions of 26
April 2004, firmly believes that the economic development of the
Turkish Cypriots will facilitate the reunification of Cyprus,
through measures that will promote the economic integration of
the island and improve contact between the two communities and
the EU.
Like the Committee, the Cyprus Government regrets
that valuable and considerable aid for the Turkish Cypriot community
is being held up by political considerations and procedural obstacles
within the EU. However, unlike the Committee, the Government of
Cyprus believes that the delays in adopting the regulation are
rooted in the British Government's insistence that the aid regulation
is coupled with the direct trade regulation.
Further, it should be recalled that the Republic
of Cyprus was the first to propose that the funds, earmarked for
the Turkish Cypriot community in the event of a solution (
25.9 million), should be given to the Turkish Cypriots
immediately. The Government of Cyprus deplores the delay in the
adoption of the "financial aid" Regulation, considering
that the text of the Regulation was finalized as early as October
2004. The Government of Cyprus has collaborated constructively
for the achievement of unanimity in regard to the text of the
aid regulation and has repeatedly urged the Presidency of the
European Council to advance the adoption of the regulation. The
true victims of this delay and of the insistence on the linkage
between aid and trade are the Turkish Cypriots and the economic
growth of the Turkish Cypriot community.
With regard to the draft regulation for the
conduct of the so-called "direct trade", between the
Turkish Cypriot community and the rest of the EU, it must be noted
that the legally operating airports and ports of the Republic
of Cyprus are already at the disposal of the Republic's Turkish
Cypriot citizens. The Government of Cyprus believes that, as a
matter of fact, the draft Regulation on "direct trade"
deviates from the declared aim of the General Affairs Council's
Conclusions of 26 April 2004, which is the reunification of Cyprus
and its people. On the one hand, the draft Regulation offers no
substantial "added value", since the economic development
of the Turkish Cypriots can primarily be promoted through the
"line" Regulation per se. On the other hand, discussions
regarding "direct trade" in the form of the draft Regulation
remove the incentive for Turkish Cypriot economic operators to
cooperate with their Greek Cypriot counterparts, and they strengthen
pro-partition forces in the Turkish Cypriot community, whose objective
is the separate evolution of the two communities and the political
upgrading of the illegal regime in the occupied areas.
From a legal point of view, the draft Regulation
suffers from two primary flaws, which are reflected in the Opinion
of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union of 25
August 2004.
First, the draft Regulation stands on an erroneous
legal basis, this being Article 133 of the EC Treaty which concerns
trade with third countries. As clearly stated in Protocol 10 of
the Act of Accession of 16 April 2004, the areas of the Republic
of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic does not exercise
effective control are part of the territory of the Republic of
Cyprus, which joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Thus any attempt to
present and/or treat the occupied areas as a third country amounts
to a violation of international law and EU law.
Second, the current provisions of the Regulation
contradict the sovereign right of the State of Cyprus to define
the points of entry and exit from its territory. The said provisions
imply the use of ports and airports in the occupied areas of the
Republic which the Cypriot Government has declared closed for
as long as more than 36% of its territory remains under the military
occupation of more than 35,000 Turkish troops.
To the dismay of the Cypriot Government, these
proposals have yet to be acted upon, even though they were formally
submitted to the Commission in the summer of 2004. This also suggests
that the so-called "direct trade" draft regulation would
result not in promoting Cypriot reunification through the economic
development of the Turkish Cypriots, but in facilitating the political
upgrading of the illegal regime in the occupied areas. Needless
to say, this is a policy to which no Cypriot Government respectful
of the Republic's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity
can ever consent to.
E. FINANCIAL
GESTURES BY
TURKEY ON
PROPERTY ISSUES
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 211: We conclude that a substantive
financial gesture by Turkey on the property compensation issue
would be a magnanimous and positive move which would reflect well
on Turkey and should be of some assistance in reducing Greek Cypriot
opposition to a solution which stops short of full restitution."
Following the Turkish invasion of 1974, the
forced eviction of more than 160,000 Greek Cypriots from their
ancestral homes, and the illegal occupation of 36.2% of the Republic
of Cyprus' territory, the Turkish occupation regime placed the
properties of dispossessed owners at the disposal of own "authorities",
the Turkish military and ordinary Turkish Cypriots. After the
commencement of Turkey's organised colonialisation of occupied
Cyprus in late 1974 many such properties were handed over to the
Turkish mainland settlers. The distribution of properties was
also used by the Turkish Cypriot leadership to "buy off"
political influence, both within and without the Turkish Cypriot
community.
The basis of the conclusion reached to by the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament is
seriously flawed and is erroneous in its facts. According to the
Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (the four inner-state
Applications of Cyprus against Turkey) and a number of individual
Applications, most notably the Loizidou vs Turkey case,
Turkey has explicit legal obligations and financial responsibilities—not
magnanimous and positive moves or financial gestures—towards
the Greek Cypriot refugees. These obligations amount to not only
compensation for the loss of use of property but also for the
return of the properties to their lawful owners.
Moreover, aggravation of the on-going violation,
of the locally any internationally recognized home and property
rights, of the lawful owners, could potentially engage the criminal
and civil responsibility of all persons who contribute to the
unlawful exploitation, by supplying goods, services and capital
to the actual trespassers. Additionally, the illegal "sales"
and construction boom, taking place in the occupied areas, engages
Turkey's own international legal responsibility since no construction
can take place without the license of its subordinate local administration.
The Republic of Cyprus demands that the Republic
of Turkey—now set to open negotiations for accession to
the EU on 3 October 2005—immediately introduce, in the occupied
areas, a moratorium on all construction activities not consented
to by the lawful property owners.
F. SETTLERS VOTING
Foreign Affairs Committee Report on Cyprus:
"Paragraph 80: After careful consideration,
we conclude that it was right that all those on the electoral
roll in northern Cyprus were able to participate in the referendum
held in April 2004 and we recommend that the same arrangements
should apply in respect of any future referendum on a solution
to the Cyprus problem."
This is an issue that the Cyprus Government
made clear representations to the UN Secretary General, prior
to the referendum, against the inclusion of the settlers vote
in the referendum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would like
to recall that, based on the Annan Plan and despite numerous protestations,
Turkish settlers, were to be given citizenship of Cyprus or a
permanent right of residence leading to citizenship. All provisions
regarding citizenship were drafted to obscure the fact that the
issue is "Turkish settlers".
On 15 March 2004, the Turkish Cypriot side,
under Ambassador Ziyal's guidance, asked for a list of "50,000
persons in addition to their spouses and children" to be
granted UCR citizenship; Since some 18,000 settlers, married to
Turkish Cypriot, were entitled to citizenship under another provision,
Turkey was in effect asking for 68,000 settler families to be
granted citizenship. On the basis of two persons per family (2
x 50,000) plus the 18,000 spouses of Turkish Cypriots, Turkey
was therefore admitting to the presence of at least 118,000 Turkish
settlers.
The Plan as "finalised" provided for:
a list of 45,000 persons; the spouses of Cypriots (18,000 plus);
and, furthermore, an additional 20,000 Turks as permanent residents,
who would be entitled in four years to UCR citizenship, thus providing
for some 83,000 Turks to remain. In addition, 18,000 Turkish University
staff and students would remain as residents, while, under the
Turkish immigration quota, another 10,000 Turks could settle (in
fact remain Cyprus). Thus, under the 2004 version of the Plan,
111,000 Turkish settlers were either entitled to UCR citizenship
or to residence.
It suffices to remind that the Republic of Turkey,
in violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention, of the Statute of
the International Criminal Court and the Treaty of Establishment,
illegally implanted these settlers in Cyprus.
Moreover, why all Turkish settlers, who constitute
a majority of persons on the "electoral rolls of the TRNC",
have been permitted to vote in the referendum, in spite of the
principle, laid dawn by the International Court of Justice, "requiring
the free and genuine expression of the will of the people concerned",
as well as, the precedent applied in Western Sahara and East Timor?
The issue is really about Turkish settlers voting. The UN was
given an Opinion by 18 of the world's leading jurists on the unlawfulness
of letting settlers vote. The Greek Cypriot side had raised this
issue constantly.
Most notably, President Clerides raised it on
24 July 2000 at Geneva, when Mr de Soto gave his Preliminary Thoughts
on a Plan for Cyprus. President Clerides also raised it many times
thereafter, as did President Papadopoulos in letters of 28 February
2003, and 22 March and 25 March 2004. However, when the issue
was yet again raised by President Papadopoulos, as the referendum
approached, the UN Secretariat briefed diplomats that, by raising
"settlers issues", the Greek Cypriot side was attempting
to torpedo the talks. The Secretary General did not take up the
President's request to discuss at Bürgenstock modalities
to easily and quickly settle the issue through a review of the
"voters list", which denotes the place of origin of
each voter. He merely stated that raising the issue was a major
addition to the Plan which was before the parties and that it
undermined a fundamental parameter of his Plan.
The irony is that Mr de Soto, before (but also
after) he was assigned in Cyprus, has been serving as the representative
of the Secretary-General in Western Sahara, where, as representative
of the United Nations, actively promotes the view that "according
to international law and the International Court of Justice rulings
`settlers' should NOT be entitled to vote".
G. EXPECTATIONS
OF FUTURE
UK POLICY AND
ACTIONS
It is welcomed that the Committee recommends:
"that the UK Government make the achievement
of a solution to the Cyprus problem a priority of its foreign
policy in 2005" and that it conclude that "there
is no wish or intention on the part of the British Government
to perpetuate the present state of affairs on the island."
That said, it has to be acknowledged that there
continues to be a wide spread belief that the United Kingdom seems
to support and promote proposals which do not serve the aim of
the reunification of Cyprus, or indeed the purpose of the economic
development of the Turkish Cypriot community and the economic
integration of the island and which, on the contrary, infringe
on Cyprus's sovereignty. The United Kingdom Government; as guarantor
of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security, of the
Republic of Cyprus, has an obligation to work towards the reunification
of Cyprus and its people respecting, at the same time, international
law including the acquis communautaire. In this respect, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs recalls the legal obligations contained in
the provisions of Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed
in 1960 which state that: ". . . the United Kingdom, .
. . recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity
and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of
affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution."
Moreover, the United Kingdom, which was instrumental
in the elaboration, drafting and adoption of United Nations Security
Council resolutions pertaining to the attempted secession of the
Republic of Cyprus—especially resolutions 541 (1983) and
550 (1984)—must avoid any and all actions, which would lead
to the undermining and weakening of those resolutions. There is
no doubt that our common goal of reuniting Cyprus will be adversely
affected by such actions, which will undoubtedly lead to the upgrading
of and the creeping or overt recognition of the secessionist entity
in the occupied part of the Cyprus.
The occupied part of Cyprus constitutes an inseparable
part of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cyprus. This
is established by a number of United Nations Security Council
resolutions and no country (except the occupying power) or international
organisation recognises the secessionist entity or any of its
actions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalls UN Security Council
resolution 541 (1983), which brands the [secessionist declaration]
in the occupied part of Cyprus as "legally invalid and
calls for its withdrawal", and 550 (1984), which ".
. .Reiterates the call upon all States not to recognize the purported
state of the `Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' set up by secessionist
acts and alls upon them not to facilitate or in any way assist
the aforesaid secessionist entity."
In view of the above, the United Kingdom should
not support and/or promote proposals for "direct trade"
with the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus. Such moves lack
any sound legal basis. In fact, they clearly try to promote and
present external trade with a secessionist entity as lawful. They
attempt to legalise an illegal situation in the territory of a
Member State of the EU where the application of the acquis
communautaire is suspended, whilst at the same time creating
serious practical problems and setting dangerous international
precedents. More importantly, such proposals disregard the aim
of the economic integration of the island and its people—an
aim which proposals for "direct trade" risk sacrificing
on the altar of political considerations.
Such policies are regrettable and can affect
the traditional excellent relations and bonds of friendship between
the peoples of Cyprus and the United Kingdom and the latter's
role in future negotiation, which should aim at making the necessary
changes in the Annan plan, to make it functional and workable
and in line with the EU acquis communautaire.
The welfare and prosperity of the people of
Cyprus lie in the economic integration of the two communities
and the unification of the island's economy: not with the encouragement
of unlawful, separatist tendencies. For, any moves or initiatives
supposedly aiming at the economic development of Turkish Cypriots
but with evidently hidden political motives, create nothing more
than a disincentive for a solution and promote the permanent division
of the island, whose northern occupied part continues to toil
under the presence of 36,000 troops and more than 160,000 seniors
transplanted illegally from an EU Candidate Country. It is in
this context that the United Kingdom should be aiming at the intensification
of contact and cooperation between the members of the two communities,
whilst avoiding actions that are not in me with the goal of the
reunification of Cyprus.
The continuing occupation of the northern part
of the island by Turkish troops and the political and other support
to the secessionist entity in violation of UN Security Council
mandatory resolutions are incompatible with international law
and the behaviour by a country aspiring to become a member of
the EU. The Government of Cyprus believes that the withdrawal
of Turkish troops, as well as the fulfilment of Turkey's obligations
under the Customs Union Agreement concerning Cyprus, and, moreover,
the removal of the vetoes on the participation of Cyprus in various
international organisations, will facilitate Turkey's accession
prospects. The United Kingdom should insist on Turkey's full compliance
with those obligations.
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