Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from
the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey, 29 March 2005
I have the pleasure to enclose herewith for
your information and perusal, the letter by HE Mr Serdar Denktas,
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus, addressed to Mr Donald Anderson, Chairman
of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, with
regard to the report on Cyprus of the Committee.
HE Akin Alptuna
Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey
29 March 2005
Annex 1
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTRY AND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
I have the honour to refer to your Committee's
recent Report on Cyprus and to bring the following pertinent considerations
to your kind attention.
I wish to express, at the outset, our utmost
appreciation of your esteemed Committee's interest in the Cyprus
question as well as the considerable amount of work and time invested
in preparing your said report which is evident from the extensive
outcome. The reasons presented in your report for conducting an
inquiry on Cyprus are most welcome and your valuable efforts shall
undoubtedly contribute to our common search for a mutually acceptable
political settlement in Cyprus. It needs to be stressed, however,
that certain findings and recommendations in your report bear
the danger of encouraging the Greek Cypriot leadership to harden
its uncompromising stance.
As the Turkish Cypriot side, we have already
demonstrated our readiness for and remain committed to a viable
settlement based on the principles of equality, bi-zonality and
power sharing. The Annan Plan not only incorporated these basic
elements but offered compromise solutions to other important aspects
of the Cyprus question within a well balanced and carefully designed
whole. As also noted in your report, the Greek Cypriot people
were neither well informed on the Plan nor voted against its actual
content. It is widely acknowledged that during the propaganda
period on the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot people were mainly
bombarded with reasons to reject the UN plan rather than unbiased
facts on its provisions. Finally, in his dramatic speech on 7
April 2004, the Greek Cypriot leader, Mr Papadopoulos, presented
his people with the option of strengthening their "Republic"
and dictating their terms for a solution within the EU as opposed
to the Annan Plan.
It is clear from their overwhelming rejection
that the Greek Cypriot people not only followed the lead of Mr
Papadopoulos but related to the objections and concerns imposed
upon them in connection with the settlement plan. The fact remains,
however, that the Greek Cypriots did not deliver an educated verdict
on the Annan Plan but opted to reject unification on the basis
of power-sharing. Moreover, the "Lordos study", which
is also cited in your report, revealed the striking reality that
the majority of Greek Cypriots are not simply ready to unite with
Turkish Cypriots.
In view of the foregoing, it is our considered
opinion that concentrating as a priority on revising the Annan
Plan to alleviate Greek Cypriot concerns would only help provide
the Greek Cypriot leadership with the opportunity to elude their
primary responsibilities. As also stated by the UN Secretary-General,
it is now for the Greek Cypriot side to convince the world, in
general, and the Turkish Cypriot side, in particular, that their
overwhelming rejection was not a demonstration of their total
refusal of a settlement based on power sharing and equality. It
is obvious that unless the Greek Cypriot political leadership
sincerely desires a mutually acceptable solution and reflects
that political will upon its people in clear terms, the Greek
Cypriot side shall not be ready for unification the basis of a
compromise settlement. Hence, in the absence of good faith on
the part of Greek Cypriot leadership, efforts to eliminate Greek
Cypriot objections to the UN plan runs the risk of turning into
a futile exercise to meet all Greek Cypriot demands at the cost
of Turkish Cypriot rights and interests.
It is of utmost importance, therefore, that
as also recommended in your present report the Greek Cypriot side
articulates its final comments on the Annan Plan in order to provide
for a solid assessment of the way forward. While clarifying its
position in finality would be a step in the right direction, we
share the assessment of the UN Secretary-General that the Greek
Cypriot professed willingness for a political settlement also
needs to be demonstrated in action. I am sure you will agree that
the EU initiatives taken in the aftermath of the referenda to
support the economic and social development of the Turkish Cypriot
people provided a perfect opportunity to that end. Unfortunately,
Greek Cypriot reaction to each and every proposal has been one
of obstruction in spite of the fact that they were expressly and
technically aimed at facilitating an overall settlement.
The EU Council regulations on financial aid
to and special conditions for direct trade with North Cyprus and
the Greek Cypriot objections in this regard are well known and
need no further elaboration. While it is promising that agreement
has been reached on the mechanics of delivering the proposed financial
aid, Greek Cypriot rejection of the original Commission proposal
and the fact that certain amendments sought by Greek Cypriots
have been incorporated in the final regulation should not be overlooked.
Contrary to Greek Cypriot claims, the delay in adapting the regulation
primarily arose from the need to negotiate the text and it is
hard to project the prolonged agreement as a sign of goodwill
on Greek Cypriot part.
It is well known that the European Commission
drafted and proposed the financial aid and direct trade regulations
as a set of measures to "facilitate the reunification
of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish
Cypriot community". The financial aid and direct trade
regulations constitute integral parts in this respect and were
certainty intended as such by the Commission when they were submitted
together to the Council. Greek Cypriot approval of the financial
aid regulation does not change the reality that its firm rejection
of the direct trade regulation renders ineffective the benefits
of financial aid and the ultimate goal behind the regulations.
It is indisputable that the production and free trading of goods
and services on a competitive basis lies at the core of sustainable
economic and ensuing social development. Improvement of the general
infrastructure and the living standards in North Cyprus by means
of financial aid would only serve as an artificial boost in the
absence of direct and preferential trade links with the EU. No
financial input or amendment to the Green Line regulation can
be a substitute for the direct trade regulation which would eliminate
the restrictions on the creation of the necessary conditions for
economic and social development in North Cyprus.
The rigid position of the Greek Cypriot side
on the direct trade regulation is ultimately aimed at holding
the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot people hostage
to its political considerations. We are confident that the EU
shall not allow Greek Cypriot political interests prevail over
its constructive initiative. I wish to express our concern, in
this regard, that the disbursement of the financial aid without
any agreement on the direct trade regulation could encourage the
Greek Cypriot stance aimed at doing away with it.
As for the Greek Cypriot proposal on the Famagusta
Port, it needs to be noted that this issue was first brought up
as part of the so-called confidence building measures declared
by the Greek Cypriot side in July 2004 shortly after the draft
Commission regulations became public. Conveniently, the same proposal
was officially brought to the attention of all concerned in September
2004, well before the Council deliberations commenced on the regulations.
It is evident from the foregoing timing that the Famagusta Port
proposal was designed as an alternative to the direct trade regulation.
The content, on the other hand, leave no room for doubt that the
proposal was simply aimed at preventing the direct trade regulation
from materialising in addition to the added benefits of gaining
control over the Famagusta Port and acquiring land for Greek Cypriots,
much more of which was on offer on a give and take basis in the
very plan they overwhelmingly rejected. Entertaining such initiatives
would be tantamount to entrusting the economic and social development
of the Turkish Cypriot people with the Greek Cypriot administration
and can only help enhance the negative approach it displayed at
the referenda.
It needs to be stressed, in this context, that
as the Turkish Cypriot side we are ready to discuss and agree
on any modalities, including confidence building measures, which
are truly designed to create a new dynamic and contribute to the
search for a political solution. Our sincere commitment in this
regard is evident from our continuous actions such as the opening
of the Greek Cypriot secondary school in the Karpaz area, our
ongoing preparation for the opening of new crossing points and
the Council of Ministers Decision No T 239-2005 (2 March 2005)
which is aimed at further facilitating the operation of the improved
Green line regulation by providing for the import of commercial
goods from South Cyprus.
The recommendations of your distinguished Committee
with regard to the steps that need to be take by the international
community towards removing the obstacles in the way of the economic
and social development of the Turkish Cypriot people are most
welcome. Your unequivocal support for the implementation of the
EU Council regulations on financial aid and direct trade as well
as your call for the early commencement of direct flights between
United Kingdom and North Cyprus are of great value in this respect.
We only hope that the efforts aimed at putting an end to our unjust
isolation start yielding concrete results before. the Turkish
Cypriot people's confidence in the international community is
damaged beyond repair.
With regard to your recommendations on future
negotiations, I wish to reiterate our firm conviction and readiness
to work towards a negotiated settlement under United Nations auspices
it is of uttermost importance to remember within the context of
any future initiative that the Turkish Cypriot people voted in
favour of the Annan Plan not as a perfect but compromise solution.
I am confident that our following views on the issues which have
been dealt with in your report shall be noted in due consideration
of this fact.
Concerning the claims about the Annan Plan falling
short of meeting Greek Cypriot concerns, suffice it to point out
the common view of the international community that the referendum
on the UN Plan provided the Greek Cypriot people a concrete opportunity
to fulfil their professed goals including those on she controversial
issue of security territory and property. If anything their rejection
of the Plan denied the Greek Cypriots the desired benefits of
added security, harmony and prosperity.
The Former Special Representative for Cyprus
of the United Kingdom and the European Union, Lord David Hannay,
concluded that by taking the rejectionist baton the Greek Cypriot
administration and political parties ensured that "9%
of territory on offer was not returned to their administration;
that the tens of thousands of Greek Cypriot, who would have returned
to their property would not be able to do so; that Turkey's troop
presence would not be reduced, and that there would be no cap
on the number of Turkish mainland citizens who would come to the
North and get Turkish Cypriot citizenship" (House of
Lords, 26 May 2004)
In fact, the Annan Plan not only conferred real
and tangible benefits to Greek Cypriots but favourable trade-offs
acquired by the Greek Cypriot side comprised a serious portion
of the plan in its finalised form. The Minister for European Affairs
of the United Kingdom, Mr MacShane, stated this fact in the following
words: "Much of the finalised document is the result of
the work of Greek Cypriots themselves . . . I repeat that I firmly
believe that the plan provides a fair, just and lasting basis
on which to reunite . . . There is no plan B or C . . . The Annan
Plan had clear advantages. Half of all Greek Cypriot refugees
would have returned to their former homes under Greek Cypriot
administration. A property restitution scheme would have given
dispossessed owners a much improved system for getting back a
share of their properly and compensation for the remainder"
(House of Commons, 16 May 2004).
In fact, in their numerous public statements
following the referenda, the Greek Cypriot political leadership
openly declared that their professed concerns regarding the security
issue, the number of settlers, property restitution and so forth
were not the main reasons behind their rejection of the Annan
Plan. Once the "Republic of Cyprus" in its usurped capacity
dominated solely by Greek Cypriots became a member of the EU,
the Greek Cypriot side would be in a stronger negotiating position
given the EU membership process of Turkey. It was with the very
same reasoning that Mr Papadopoulos asked for a "resounding
no" from his people to the Annan Plan and it was Mr Papadopoulos
who saw no objection in publicly boasting during the December
2004 EU Council of Ministers Summit that as he promised, Greek
Cypriots lost nothing by rejecting the UN plan but gained the
power to veto Turkish EU membership.
In view of the above, stressing that Turkish
accession is, in practice, dependent on a political settlement
in Cyprus and suggesting that Turkey can assist a political solution
by withdrawing some of its troops from the island can easily be
perceived and presented as a confirmation of the success of the
intransigent Greek Cypriot policy. The Greek Cypriot leadership
shall, naturally have no incentive to resume negotiations or to
finalise a settlement for as long as it feels confident that there
is a real possibility of dictating its demands by prolonging the
solution of the Cyprus issue. It is true that circumstances are
faced whereby a member of the European Union has a political dispute
with a candidate country. It is equally true, however, that this
awkward situation primarily arose from the acceptance of a conflict
island as a member of the EU as well as the Greek Cypriot rejection
of a plan to provide for a reunited Cyprus entering the Union.
It is also important, in this context, to note that the Cyprus
question is not a dispute between Turkey and the "Republic
of Cyprus" but one which needs to be negotiated and solved
between its two counterparts, the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot
peoples.
In the light of the foregoing, the only way
to help bring about a speedy political solution, which will undoubtedly
benefit all concerned including the EU, is to remind the Greek
Cypriot side of the foregoing realities and urge its leadership
to work in goodwill towards that end. We expect and trust that
the EU shall not allow Greek Cypriot political aspirations to
prevail aspirations which are aimed at utilising its EU membership
as well as the membership process of Turkey first to delay and
then to dictate its terms for an eventual settlement. It is, therefore,
our strong opinion that withdrawal of some Turkish troops or other
initiatives taken by Turkey at this juncture and within the framework
of its membership process would only help encourage Greek Cypriot
obstructionist policies both in the EU and in relation to a political
settlement in Cyprus.
It should also be noted, in this context, that
the Turkish army is in Cyprus under legal obligations to keep
peace pending a solution and the presence of Turkish troops is
a vital security requirement for Turkish Cypriot people in the
absence of a political settlement. The history of Cyprus stands
testimony to Greek Cypriot proficiency for acting in total disregard
of international treaties and norms as well as resorting to violence
to achieve their unfulfilled goals. Given the Greek Cypriot destruction
and usurpation by force of arms of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus
and the eleven years of oppression including human rights violations
and armed attacks they had been subjected to between 1963 and
1974, it is actually Turkish Cypriots who should be worried about
security and guarantees. Lord Hannay agrees in the following words.
"As demonstrated by the highjack of the post independence
constitution and when Archbishop Makarios was overthrown by force,
the Greek Cypriots have consistently threatened the chance for
peaceful coexistence" (House of Lords, 26 May 2004).
An overview of the public debate on different
media organs during the propaganda period on the Annan Plan, would
suffice to demonstrate that the primary concern of ordinary Turkish
Cypriots was whether the final version of the plan provided for
the continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee and the right to intervene.
An overwhelming majority of Turkish Cypriots demanded the continuation
of the Treaty of Guarantee and the confirmation of this eventuality
at the highest level contributed considerably to the ensuing referendum
result. It would be detrimental to overlook the fact that Turkish
Cypriots voted in favour of a settlement which incorporated the
necessary guarantees to prevent the recurrence of their past experiences.
It could be tenable to assume that the need
for those guarantees could well be met by oilier means such as
international forces and total demilitarization only if the agonies
of the past did not take place under very similar circumstances.
It is pertinent to remember that while Turkish Cypriots faced
the aggression of their former partners between 1963 and 1974,
a United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was stationed on
the island. Moreover, Cyprus was to be demilitarized other than
the levels and forces provided for under the 1959-60 international
Treaties. Not only the Greek Cypriots openly violated the agreements
from the very first days of their implementation but UNFICYP fell
short of stopping the influx of arms and troops from Greece during
its presence on the island.
It is uncalled, therefore, to expect Turkish
Cypriots to give up on the principle of the continuation of the
Treaty of Guarantee which is not only vital for their security
needs but has historically been the only instrument preventing
their total annihilation. It is also important to note that contrary
to Greek Cypriot claims, providing for the continuation of the
Treaty of Guarantee in the Annan plan was a principle agreed by
all the signatories to the said Treaty apart from the Greek Cypriot
side. In other words, any changes in this regard would require
the agreement of all concerned including the United Kingdom. As
for the "right to intervention", it would only be a
matter of debate if history repeated itself with the Greek Cypriots
renewing their past crimes against the independence of the island
and against the Turkish Cypriots. That right can only be a source
of security for both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples
as it provides ironclad guarantee by their two motherlands, Turkey
and Greece. The truth of the matter is that security concerns
were put to the forefront by the Greek Cypriot side at the last
hour as a pretext for their refusal of the Annan Plan.
At a conference on Greek-Turkish relations held
in Bologna between 10 and 11 February 2005, Secretary-General's
Former Special Representative, Mr Alvaro De Soto, confirmed this
reality in the following words: "Security issues came
out of a clear blue sky at the last minute, causing a disproportionate,
ill-defined brouhaha. During most of the negotiations it was viewed
as the least contentious core issue; in his speech in support
of the plan during the run-up to the referendum, Mr Clerides dismissed
all the fuss about it as a red herring." Most striking
revelation in this regard came from Mr Papadopulos and was widely
reported by the Greek Cypriot press on 14 January 2005. Commenting
on the main reasons for the Greek Cypriot people's rejection of
the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriot leader dismissed the security
concerns as a myth and singled out their commitment to the continuation
of the "Republic of Cyprus" as the main motive.
Regarding the return of Greek Cypriot displaced
to their former homes and the restitution of Greek Cypriot property,
it needs to be stressed that a reasonable limit was called for
in both cases if the long agreed principle of bi-zonality was
to the safeguarded and the humanitarian needs and rights of thousands
of Turkish Cypriots living on the territory to be returned or
on the property asked for restitution were to be protected. It
is of utmost importance, in this context, that the majority of
the Turkish Cypriots who were to be affected are displaced persons
themselves most of whom had been rendered refugees three times
over as a result of Greek Cypriot atrocities and its aftermath
since December 1963. In addition, the mutual crossings on the
island had them realise in despair that they had no homes to return
to or no chance of restitution even if they opted to do so as
a result of the widespread Greek Cypriot policy of expropriation
and demolition of Turkish Cypriot property.
The provisions incorporated in the Annan Plan
with regard to the intractable property issue were carefully designed
and provided a balanced scheme aimed at recognising the rights
and addressing the needs of each people to the extent possible
without overriding the other's. The international law was fully
respected and recognised on a combined basis of restitution, return,
compensation and/or exchange. This aspect of the Plan called for
a considerable compromise on the part of both the Turkish Cypriot
and the Greek Cypriot peoples. In spite of the evident sacrifices
it entailed for many of them, the Turkish Cypriot people chose
to face the burden in awareness of the fact that a durable solution
inevitably called for a good deal of compromise. As also stressed
by Mr De Soto "the plan would have brought considerable
pain, upheaval and sacrifices to the Turkish Cypriots-one quarter
would have been uprooted, another quarter would have had to move,
many not for the first time . . ." (Third International Conference
on Federalism, Brussels, 3-5 March 2005). Moreover, determining
the sufficient time and means that would be needed to overcome
the upcoming difficulties was almost impossible. Nevertheless,
Turkish Cypriots opted to accept the provisions of the UN Plan
with the strict understanding that this, in its entirety, would
be the final price to be paid for a peaceful future in a unified
island.
On the other hand, Greek Cypriot people who
had always been promised full restitution and return of all Greek
Cypriots to their former places of residence by their leadership,
were neither ready nor willing to compromise in this regard. Efforts
to overcome Greek Cypriot objections on the property issue cannot
and should not be undertaken in isolation of this striking reality.
It is crucial, in this context, that the Greek Cypriot side is
made to realise that the mutually accepted principle of bi-zonality,
the dynamic realities on the ground as well as the conflicting
rights and interests of the two peoples necessitate serious concessions
from both sides on the property issue. Otherwise, a mutually acceptable
settlement of this crucial matter shall not only continue to evade
but efforts aimed at its solution would only contribute to further
complication at the expense of a comprehensive settlement.
As for the so-called issue of "settlers",
it needs to be stressed that the Annan Plan dealt with the global
question of determining the destiny of thousands of people who
were of Turkish and Greek origin and lived respectively in North
and South Cyprus. The question of migrants and their rights is
an international phenomenon which affected both parts of the island
over the years. It is a fact that the growing need for extra workforce
prompted the migration of thousands of Turkish citizens to North
Cyprus over the years. It is a matching fact, however, that thousands
of Greek citizens from Greece as well as Pontian Greeks from different
parts of the world migrated to South Cyprus for various reasons.
Most of these people acquired citizenship or right to permanent
stay in line with the relevant legislation on both sides but,
above all, established a new life on the island. It should be
stressed that most of these people have been living in Cyprus
for decades and their descendants know of no homeland other than
the island.
It was, naturally, difficult to formulate a
fair basis for resolving this important issue given the well known
sensitivities of both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples
and the need to respect the human rights and freedoms of those
whose future depended on the outcome. The UN Plan included a number
of relevant provisions aimed at addressing the main concerns of
both peoples while safeguarding the international norms and principles
in this respect. The ceiling on the number of people with Turkish
and Greek origin who would be allowed to stay on the island constituted
only one aspect of the integrated whole and cannot be addressed
in isolation of other considerations. I am sure you will agree
that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan does not make
their opposition to the agreed numbers more credible than the
rights and concerns of others. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot
approval of the plan does not eliminate their traditional doubts
arising from the historically proven Greek Cypriot proficiency
of gradually colonizing the island.
I have written at some length but given the
comprehensive nature of your report I am sure you will agree that
we should spare no effort aimed at contributing to the search
for a lasting settlement of the Cyprus question.
Please accept, Mr Chairman the assurances of
my highest consideration.
Serdar R Denktas
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
29 March 2005
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