Written evidence submitted by Gabriel
Partos, South-east Europe Analyst, BBC World Service
1. SERBIA—POLITICAL
UNCERTAINTY:
1.1 Since the assassination of Prime Minister
Zoran Djindjic in March 2003, successive Serbian governments have
been lacking a firm sense of direction. The current four-party
administration of the moderate nationalist Vojislav Kostunica
relies for its majority in parliament on the support of ex-President
Slobodan Milosevic's Socialist MPs. That has proved a serious
obstacle in the way of establishing a proper level of co-operation
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) in The Hague. The Socialists have threatened to bring down
the government if it transfers indicted war crimes suspects—many
of them senior officials or officers from the Milosevic era—to
the ICTY's custody.
1.2 Divisions within the governing coalition
add to what many observers see as a drift in policy. Although
the centre-right administration should have a considerable measure
of ideological coherence, on key issues the various coalition
parties disagree. Two examples: on the question of Serbia's union
with Montenegro, the G17 Plus Party of technocrats is out of tune
with the rest of the coalition by arguing for separation on the
grounds that Montenegro is a financial burden for Serbia. And
on the issue of Serb participation in the 23 October Kosovo assembly
elections Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic opposed Prime Minister
Kostunica's call for a boycott, noting that it would deprive the
remaining Serb population of a say in Kosovo's affairs.
1.3 Disunity was one of the reasons for
the government's almost instant loss of popularity. That was underlined
by the poor showing of the coalition's candidate who came fourth
in the June 2004 presidential election—less than four months
after the Kostunica administration assumed office. Victory went
to the opposition leader, Boris Tadic, of the pro-Western, pragmatic
Democratic Party (DS). He beat the ultra-nationalist Radicals'
candidate into second place. The same pattern was repeated in
the race for the influential Belgrade mayor's post during the
nationwide local authority elections, held in September/October.
1.4 President Tadic has promised that the
DS—while continuing to remain in opposition—will contribute
to Serbia's stability by acting as a constructive partner to the
government. The DS has already made a remarkable recovery since
its disastrous performance in the December 2003 parliamentary
elections. However, it needs more time to rebuild; and its leaders
appear to believe that they can benefit from helping to keep the
Kostunica government in power and, in the process, giving it further
opportunities to make mistakes.
1.5 The next electoral test is expected
in February 2005 when direct elections to the parliament of the
Serbia-Montenegro (SaM) union are due. The union parliament has
few powers because authority is largely devolved to the constituent
republics. But the SaM elections could prove important, not least
by precipitating moves towards early parliamentary elections in
Serbia itself if Kostunica's party and its allies suffered another
setback. In any subsequent elections the governing coalition—on
current trends—would be likely to be squeezed between the
DS and the Radicals.
1.6 Serbia's failure to co-operate with
the ICTY and introduce more wide-ranging reforms has produced
strains in its relations with the European Union and the United
States. After the fall of the Milosevic regime the West lavished
aid on newly-democratising Serbia; but since then the outside
perception of the country has changed from that of the much reformed
"prodigal son" to one that is failing to meet its obligations.
As a result, the US Administration has frozen most forms of assistance
for Serbia, and the process towards forging closer links between
Serbia and the EU has been making little headway.
2. SERBIA AND
MONTENEGRO—THE
FUTURE OF
THE UNION
2.1 The revamping of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia into the loosely-knit union of SaM in February 2003
has until now put the issue of Montenegrin independence on the
backburner. By acting as midwife to the birth of the SaM union,
the EU has earned itself a three-year breathing space during which
it does not have to deal with the consequences of a possible referendum
on Montenegro's independence.
2.2 The creation of the SaM union has been
a success in terms of crisis prevention/postponement. But it has
not so far laid the foundations for a stable, long-term union.
The failure of Serbia and Montenegro to harmonize many of their
customs tariffs finally prompted the EU in September 2004 to shift
its position and consider separate trade deals with the two republics
as part of a future Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)
with SaM.
2.3 The EU's new twin-track approach is
a pragmatic device whose purpose is to induce progress in the
SAA negotiations with Belgrade. It is not designed to boost the
Montenegrin government's aspirations for independence. However,
it may yet become one of the nails in the coffin of the SaM union
if the two republics decide to go their separate ways. An early
indication of that may come in the elections for the SaM parliament,
due in February 2005. A strong showing for Montenegrin Prime Minister
Milo Djukanovic's party and its allies could set in motion moves
towards Montenegro's independence.
2.4 The three-year trial period of the SaM
union is not due to run out until February 2006. At present support
in Montenegro for independence and the continuation of the SaM
union are almost evenly balanced. If the much-delayed progress
in the SAA talks with the EU comes as a result of the new twin-track
approach, it would help those who argue that Montenegro could
integrate with the EU more quickly by going it alone than in partnership
with Serbia. Djukanovic may also want to use an independence referendum
to rally support at a time when he will have been in power as
prime minister or president, without interruption, for 15 years.
2.5 The future of the SaM union is likely
to re-emerge as one of the key issues on the regional agenda next
year. It has the potential to slow down much-needed political,
economic and administrative reforms in both republics as attention
focuses once again on whether—or in what shape—the
Serbia-Montenegro union should continue.
3. KOSOVO—THE
STATUS ISSUE
3.1 The debate on the future of SaM is expected
to coincide with—and is likely to be overshadowed by—the
negotiations on Kosovo's long-term status. According to the United
Nations' timetable, Kosovo's progress under its current UN administration
towards establishing the required standards of democracy, the
rule of law, inter-ethnic tolerance and the protection of ethnic
minorities is to be reviewed in mid-2005. If the assessment is
positive, talks on Kosovo's status might, according to the tentative
timetable, begin in early 2006.
3.2 Unless there is a recurrence of the
serious inter-ethnic violence of March this year, the expectation
is that the mid-2005 review is likely to be broadly positive.
One reason is that conditions have already improved considerably:
there are democratically-elected multi-ethnic authorities in place
which have been taking on an increasing range of competencies
from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). However, much still needs
to be done to improve security for the Serb minority, most importantly
to create conditions that would favour the return of Serb refugees.
3.3 Another reason for pressing on with
talks on Kosovo's future is that there is a growing realisation
that Kosovo cannot remain in limbo in the medium to longer-term.
By mid-2005 six years will have passed since the Kosovo war: there
is increasing frustration among the Kosovar Albanian majority
with the continuing UN administration and the current status under
which Kosovo formally belongs to the SaM union. The March riots,
in which there were widespread attacks on the Serb community,
were an expression of that frustration. Nor will much-needed foreign
investment flow into Kosovo while its status remains unresolved.
3.4 Kosovo's Albanians are overwhelmingly
in favour of independence. They would like Kosovo's future to
be decided on the basis of self-determination. In the period after
the 23 October Kosovo Assembly elections that argument may gain
even greater prominence in the political rhetoric of the Kosovar
Albanian leadership.
3.5 Serbs (both in Kosovo and in Serbia
at large) want Kosovo to remain within the SaM union, or if that
union is dissolved, in Serbia itself. But there is an increasing
realisation among some Serb officials that, whatever the historical
links, Kosovo cannot be kept against the will of the vast majority
of its inhabitants. However, very few Serb politicians are prepared
to declare that in public for fear that it would undermine their
support among the electorate.
3.6 One of the key issues during 2005 will
revolve around the likely format and duration of any negotiating
process that might determine Kosovo's long-term status. The options
include an international peace conference, such as Dayton (Bosnia)
or Rambouillet (Kosovo); negotiations among the interested parties
with the support of the US and the EU, such as Ohrid (Macedonia);
or a form of shuttle diplomacy.
3.7 Kosovar Albanians and Serbs are poles
apart on the issue of Kosovo's future status. There has been little
change on either side—at least in terms of public appearances.
Until relatively recently the international community felt that
opening up this issue would only create greater instability—for
example, by undermining the authorities in Serbia. Now there is
an increasing awareness that instability is more likely to threaten
the region if the current state of uncertainly over Kosovo's future
is allowed to continue for long.
Gabriel Partos
South-east Europe Analyst
BBC World Service
11 October 2004
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