Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20-28)
12 OCTOBER 2004
MR GABRIEL
PARTOS AND
DR JONATHAN
EYAL
Q20 Chairman: Before I call Sir John
to question on Bosnia Herzegovina, some questions on Macedonia.
We know of the enormous tensions which culminated in the Ohrid
framework agreement in August 2001. We know of the considerable
progress made there, in part due to the leadership of President
Trajkovski. Now we are at the point of the referendum, which is
to be held on 7 November, relating to the decentralisation portion
of the framework agreement. Is it your view that the people of
Macedonia recognise the fundamental dangers of a "yes"
vote in that referendum, which could put in question the whole
of the framework agreement and indeed put a big question mark
over both their NATO and their EU aspirations?
Dr Eyal: My personal impression
is that people do recognise it. What people, if one can refer
to the majority of the population of the republic, do not seem
to agree on is what the Ohrid Agreement actually meant. Did it
mean a protection of a minority, an exalted status for a minority
within the state, or did it ultimately mean a state for two ethnic
groups? Indirectly this is the question which is seeking an answer
supposedly—
Q21 Chairman: But the direct effect of
the referendum would be to put the reform of a local government
structure right back to 1995, which everyone agrees is wholly
anachronistic, with local communes of 500 or so.
Dr Eyal: Absolutely.
Q22 Chairman: It would therefore surely
wholly undermine the framework agreement.
Dr Eyal: Absolutely, there is
no doubt about it and that message was put by every government.
What I am not entirely sure about is whether the message seeped
to the population. Let us not forget, that for the majority Macedonian
population, there was a whiff of opposition to the Ohrid Agreement;
there was a feeling that this agreement was somehow pulled out
of them by the threat of violence and there has been resentment
over tiny issues like, for instance, languages used on the cover
of a passport. Effectively what they boil down to is whether Macedonia
is a state for the Macedonian majority with an Albanian protected
minority, or a state of two ethnic groups? We are coming back
to that one. My guess is that I hope that the referendum will
be rejected.
Q23 Chairman: Or not meet the 50%.
Dr Eyal: Or fail on a technicality.
I agree with you however that they would tear up the entire delicate
balance which has been maintained more than we expected since
the Ohrid deal.
Q24 Chairman: Mr Partos, do you agree?
Mr Partos: I agree on the whole
and it is in a sense ironic that when you are almost facing the
last step, the last piece in the jigsaw as far as Ohrid is concerned,
the last major piece in the jigsaw, let us put it like that, everything
else having been taken care of, such as proportional representation
for Albanians, building up the police, the security forces, public
services, language use and so on, all these having been settled,
it would in some ways be tragic for Macedonia if this last piece
of jigsaw were not to be put in place. I think that on the whole,
even if the majority of those who turn up and take part in the
referendum vote against the decentralisation plans, there will
be ways in which Macedonia and the Macedonian Government—and
successive governments have been able to negotiate through inter-ethnic
coalitions and so on—might go back to the drawing board
and come up with some other similar arrangement and try to push
that through. I think that what is very likely to happen, in one
way or another, is that things are going to be slowed down, "things"
being, of course, the Ohrid agreement being put completely in
place, finalised, implemented and, of course, Macedonia's integration
with the EU, which ultimately is essential for the country's prosperity.
Q25 Sir John Stanley: As far as Bosnia
Herzegovina is concerned, as you know, the absolute top priorities
for their government, with all three ethnic groups absolutely
agreed on this, is NATO membership plus EU membership. There is
nothing implicit about this: this is totally explicit. Indeed
in Sarajevo recently, I was very impressed about the strength
of the EU organisation there with EU ambassador and staff and
so on really trying to help the new government through the early
stages of the EU membership process and the same was true on the
NATO side. However, in both cases, the key stumbling block is
getting agreement of the EU on the one hand, NATO on the other,
to the fact that Bosnia Herzegovina is compliant with its international
obligations and of course that centres most particularly on the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY.
The question I want to put to you is that it appears that the
EU and NATO are setting the bar of this particular high jump at
slightly different levels, possibly significantly different levels.
The NATO bar appears, under strong American influence, to be set
at the point where NATO is saying "You have to get Mladic
and Karadzic in the bag, behind bars and then we will think about
you getting into the partnership for peace" which of course
is the gateway through to NATO. The EU, on the other hand, is
setting the bar arguably lower by saying "We will take you
into a stabilisation and assistance programme, SAp, on the same
basis as we allowed Croatia in". In other words, "You
get Carla del Ponte to sign up on the paper saying you are compliant
and if it's good enough for Carla del Ponte, it's good enough
for us". I want to ask whether you think the British Government
should be setting the position for entry for both NATO and the
EU on the basis of getting Mladic and Karadzic behind bars, or
do you think the British Government's position should be the EU
one, which is that if Carla del Ponte is willing to sign up that
they are complaint, they should be allowed to go forward?
Dr Eyal: I would say neither,
if I may say so. First of all Mrs del Ponte's remit ends at the
end of this year. There is a limit to how many more indictments
she can issue which expire at the end of this year. Now, that
is a good side actually, because it could reassure all those countries.
One of the reasons that a lot of those countries were reticent
about cooperating was that it seemed to them to be a never-ending
process. They delivered, as they saw it, a number of suspects,
only to be confronted by yet another list. Now, I don't think
that Mrs del Ponte, as such, is the critical element. I think
that the British position should be, that there should be considerable
progress in handing over the alleged war criminals, which must
include at least one of the two names that you have mentioned,
but that the subsequent cooperation could be left, and indeed
strengthened, in increasing involvement by us. What I mean is
that you should not stop and say "We are doing nothing until
all the people on the list are delivered". There has to be
a delivery of one of the top people on that list as an example
of the willingness to cooperate. It is not Bosnia itself that
should be a victim. What I wanted to say about Bosnia is that
it is a very tight, very difficult job to try on the one hand
to encourage the country and, at the same time, not to hold them
up to blackmail by Republika Srbska, the Serb controlled area,
which may refuse to cooperate on one of these issues. I know that
the Bosnians were very disappointed by the fact that they had
failed in what they were seeking to achieve at the Istanbul summit
of NATO. I would suggest that the discussion should go much more
on technicalities now rather than principles. For instance, the
Bosnian defence ministry was established about six to eight months
ago; it has yet to function. The border police are functioning
now and seem to be rather efficient, but that is in its infancy.
We are at a very early stage. I would suggest that talking about
technicalities is more important than the principles and I would
not give Mrs del Ponte the ultimate veto of our involvement.
Mr Partos: What I would add to
this is that General Mladic and Mr Karadzic are symbols of the
utmost importance. And for any kind of progress towards NATO or
EU membership, or indeed the reforms which are part of bringing
the different entities of Bosnia together to make it into a genuinely
functioning state to succeed—and to succeed within the next
few years rather than being dragged out for another long period
with implementation already under way for nine years—it
is essential that those symbols of the war in Bosnia, of the divisions
and the ethnic cleansing are dealt with through the mechanisms
of international justice. How you can apply that in terms of political
conditioning is another matter for the governments to decide.
I would say that in my view at least an attempt to try to arrest
them, which is seen as a genuine attempt, would be essential to
speed up the reform process. Without it, things will take much
longer.
Q26 Sir John Stanley: Do you think it
is fair or reasonable to make Bosnia Herzegovina's entry into
either NATO or the EU dependent on capturing war criminals, however
intensely desirable, who themselves may be spending much of the
time, or possibly most of the time out of the country and therefore
not within the grasp of the government concerned?
Dr Eyal: No, I do not think that.
Clearly the pressure of all Western governments was towards Belgrade.
There is absolutely no question that the arrest of either Mr Karadzic
or Mladic is only going to happen with the assistance of the military
intelligence of Serbia and with the direct order of politicians
in Belgrade. I think that Bosnia, quite frankly, is a bystander
to this process. So in a way, the Bosnians are right to feel victimised,
but one has to be more careful about the implications. It is rather
easy to suggest that Bosnia and the treatment of Bosnia should
be completely separated from that of Serbia. It is logical and
just to make that suggestion, but in practice what we are engaged
in is a very careful balancing act of reassuring the Serbs of
Bosnia that they are not completely detached from Serbia and that
there is some linkage, even if it is not official, between the
future disposition of Bosnia and the future disposition of Serbia.
Any other policy will make the management of Bosnia's internal
politics ten times worse. I am not pretending that it is a very
clever policy: I am merely suggesting that it is a doable one.
Q27 Ms Stuart: Following on from Sir
John's point, I was rather puzzled by Dr Eyal's almost implication
that there was choice as to whether you could hand over one or
two of these serious criminals and whether that was really the
right test. I have a sense a lot of activity is going on without
achievement. Am I right in assuming that the only people who probably
have real political clout are not actually the EU, but the United
States?
Dr Eyal: Not necessarily. Actually
the European Union has an enormous amount of influence in some
particular countries like the United Kingdom. It is not a secret
that the United Kingdom is viewed by many Serbs as being the most
recalcitrant in their eyes, or the most insistent on the handover
of all the people whose names are printed on any of Carla del
Ponte's lists. I am not sure that Washington actually, despite
the fact that it of course can block almost any path in terms
of NATO, or indeed in terms of international organisations' access
to cash, is the main player as far as Belgrade is concerned. They
do look upon London as one of the main players and it is true
to say that they assume in Belgrade that Paris and Berlin are
perhaps a bit more, shall we say, flexible on how many war criminals
can be handed over. I am only giving my impressions about the
way things are seen from Belgrade's perspective. All I am saying
is that I do not believe for a moment that we can wait until the
entire list of indictees is handed over. That is never going to
happen. Let me remind you that has not happened in the case of
Croatia either. Very often, the difference between Croatia and
Serbia is that the Croats have made the right noises, while the
Serbs have not even done that.
Q28 Chairman: The fact is that those
noises have been sufficient to persuade Carla del Ponte that they
have used their best endeavours in the case of Croatia, hence
Britain withdrew its objections in respect of the agreement.
Dr Eyal: Absolutely. At the end
of the day, what I am saying is that it would be a package deal
which would have to have a large element of handing over those
who have now become absolute symbols of the horrors of the 1990s.
At the same time, I think everyone accepts, although not publicly,
that once this is done, we are in a different world and we can
move much faster, even if, sadly, not every name on the list would
be ticked off at the end of the day.
Chairman: Gentlemen, we have kept you
in the field for some good time and you have been extremely helpful.
May I thank you both on behalf of the Committee?
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